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Capitalism in China is under transformations. This research aims to register and interpret 
China’s discourse on network technologies, reveal the underlying ideologies, and tie this 
discourse to the transformation of China’s capitalism of which it is a part. Digital discourse, 
as this thesis defines it, is about the contemporary discourse on network technology under 
Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics. China’s state-led capitalism has gone through all 
aspects of changes that are enabled by network technologies, ranging from production, 
consumption and the market, to the relations between international capital, the State, 
domestic capital, and individuals are experiencing changes. Along with the economic, 
political and technological changes are ideological transformations. Digital discourse is part 
of the social process that is related to other social changes. This thesis will focus on the 
particular forms of digital discourse as a channel to investigate both social and ideological 
transformations in China’s digital capitalism.  
 
In particular, this thesis looks at the digital discourse from three social and political actors. It 
analyses discourse from the current central government’s information society policies and 
President Xi Jinping’s speeches, from CEOs of the dominant Internet companies in China, 
and from young workers in China’s ‘Silicon Valley’ Shenzhen. Through the lens of ideology, 
this thesis provides a critique of how digital discourse from different actors legitimate social 
relations in the current capitalism in China. In particular, at the international level, the 
government and BAT have appropriated a nationalist discourse to legitimate the global 
expansion of China’s capital and enterprises. At the domestic level, these actors have 
produced different types of discourse to legitimate the concentration of the market and the 
commercialisation of Internet platforms. At the individual level, there is a tendency among all 
actors to construct a consumer identity to replace a more politically active citizen identity.  
 
Through analysing digital discourse from these three actors, this thesis also identifies several 
features of ideology and the mechanisms of how ideologies work in contemporary capitalism. 
While the study illustrates the discrepancy of ideological discourse between by the dominant 
groups and subaltern groups, it also identifies one crucial ideology that legitimates, 
internalises and naturalises the dominant socio-political arrangements surrounding the 
commercialised Internet – This is no alternative. This finding suggests a double-layer and 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Digital Capitalism in China is under transformations.  
 
The Xi-Li Administration began in 2013 has emphasised the Internet-enabled Economic 
‘New Normal’ and new socio-political arrangements in the digital age. This ‘New Normal’ 
focuses on ‘high-quality’ development, at the centre of which is the ICT and Internet-enabled 
new production, domestic consumption and technology development. At the 2015 World 
Internet Conference, Xi announced to the whole world that China’s goal is “to ensure that the 
more than 1.3 billion Chinese people and people across the world can all enjoy the benefits of 
Internet development”. In the same speech, Xi made the two phrases famous: ‘Cyber 
Sovereignty’ and ‘a community of shared future in cyberspace’. The government is both 
looking both inwards and outwards for an economic restructuring plan.   
 
Around 2010, the Chinese Internet market has become gradually dominated by three 
companies, Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent, known by the acronym BAT. Started their core 
businesses in areas of the search engine, e-commerce and instant messaging software, BAT 
have now expanded into almost all areas of people’s life, from social media communication 
and online shopping to home delivery and finance services. Along with the expansion of their 
empires is the violation of user privacy, surveillance, and ignorance of user need. In 2004, 
one user sued Baidu for using her browsing history and cookies for targeted advertising as a 
violation of her privacy. The final judgement from Nanjing Gulou Peoples’ Court went 
against her appeal, claiming a verdict against Baidu will significantly hinder the normal 
healthy development of Internet innovative technologies and service.  
 
In 2018, A group of workers in Shenzhen Jasic Technology Company, dissatisfied with the 
poor working conditions and low pay, organised demonstrations, strikes and attempted to 
form Trade Union that would be independent of the Chinese authority. This protests gained 
support from Marxist and Maoist student group, left-wing scholars and sympathisers. 
However, the protests were soon cracked down by the authorities, and radical students and 
activists were detained.  
 
In March 2019, a developer created a webpage on Github, one of the largest online 
community for programmers, owned by Microsoft since 2018. The webpage was named 996. 
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ICU that refers to the long working hours for programmers in China. 996 means to work from 
9 am to 9 pm and 6 days per week. ICU means that programmers who work overtime risk 
poor health conditions and could end up in an intensive care unit. This webpage developed 
into a campaign against the 996 working system. Programmers started to post whitelist and 
blacklist of technology companies in China about their working conditions. This campaign 
attracted heating debate on Chinese social media platforms such as Zhihu, Sina Weibo and 
WeChat. The CEOs soon responded with counter-discourse. Jack Ma, for example, claims it 
is a ‘blessing’ to work for 996 systems. Qiangdong Liu, CEO of JD, another e-commerce 
giant, backed Ma’s statements and claims that the economic growth in China has created 
‘slackers’ and ‘slackers are not my brothers’.  
 
These changes in societies attracted my attention and concerns about the development of 
China’s digital capitalism. With the alienated and exploited work, highly concentrated 
market, strictly censored and occasional loosened control over the online space, how are the 
power relations maintained? How could change happen? Or what prohibits changes from 
happening? What are the cultural and ideological underpinnings of the current institutional 
changes that enabled by network technologies in China?  
 
1.1. Key Concepts 
 
These questions brought me to the first key concept of ideology. Ideology itself is a term of 
complexity. As Eagleton (1991/2007) illustrated, there are at least six different ways to define 
ideology, and each of them has different epistemological and ontological commitments 
(Eagleton, 2007: 28). This thesis chooses to focus on a Marxist critical tradition in 
understanding what ideology is and does. Ideology, in brief, legitimates the current social 
relations and in particular the dominant power relations. It is about promotion, legitimation, 
deception with or without intentions.  
 
This understanding of ideology is determined by the philosophical underpinnings of this 
study. This study will be conducted from a critical approach which refers to the ‘theory of 
society’ in Adorno’s term. According to Adorno, the ‘theory of society’ investigates “societal 
totality and its laws of movement” (Adorno, 1976b: 68). The critical approach focuses on the 
“structural basic conditions”. Its purpose is to reveal the “deceit of appearances” and to seek 
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the “alteration of the manifest” (ibid.). Therefore, it will neither satisfy itself with a mere 
collection of immediate empirical findings (individual, concrete observations), nor with some 
empty general laws that are deprived of substantive content (ibid.: p70). As Adorno points 
out, and as Horkheimer developed on critical theory, “critical sociology is… necessarily also 
a critique of society” (ibid.: 114). 
 
Critical social research thus should possess not only the explanatory and descriptive but also 
evaluate the objects it studies. First of all, it emphasises the meaning given by individuals or 
groups. It recognises its study objects as subjects with self-understanding and their actions 
full of meaning. But this cannot be separated from an understanding of the material structures 
behind those meanings and activities. These structures, though ignored by some social 
scientists, should be isolated and clarified. All human practices are mediations between 
objects and subjects. A single focus on either side is not comprehensive. As Harvey points 
out, the role of critical social research is to “keep alert to the structural factors while probing 
meanings”(Harvey, 1990: 13). 
 
Moreover, this dialectical perception of social reality inevitably leads to an evaluation of it. 
Since the study object of social science is society, which is the product of people’s activities 
under certain conditions, it should “develop a critical self-awareness in people as subjects and 
indeed assist in their emancipation” (Sayer, 2010: 28). Society is not something external to 
people, but a complex entity produced by and for human beings. Therefore, critical social 
research inevitably deals with deconstructing the existing dominant social order. It is critical 
in the sense of discovering and criticising the otherwise ignored oppressive social structures.  
 
The discussions of ideology and critical approach of this research pose another question 
about how to understand the nature of the Chinese economy and its socio-political 
arrangements. Since critical social research aims to evaluate the object from understanding 
society as a whole, it is crucial for this research to discuss the totality of Chinese society. 
With the socialist heritage inherited from the revolutionary past, Whether China is a socialist 
or capitalist country is always under debate. This thesis, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, 
understands China as a capitalist country with special characteristics. This is important for 
this thesis to understand the contradictions in Chinese society and thus ideologies regarding 
network technologies. The changing ownership of land, enterprises, the integration into the 
global capitalist market through FDI, export and investments, the social relations derived 
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from the economic and political relations all pose new contradictions in the Chinese society. 
Ideologies thus not only reflect these unsolved problems in reality but also respond to them. 
Study of digital discourse thus cannot be separated from an analysis of capitalism with 
Chinese characteristics.  
 
Digital discourse, as this thesis defines it, is about the contemporary discourse on network 
technology under Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics. Since China’s state-led capitalism 
has gone through the political-economic changes enabled by network technologies, along 
with the economic, political and technological changes are ideological transformations. 
Digital discourse is part of the social process that is related to other social changes. This 
thesis will focus on the particular forms of digital discourse as a channel to investigate both 
social and ideological transformations in China’s digital capitalism. 
 
1.2. Ideology Critique in Media and Technology Studies  
 
Ideological critique in media studies is nothing new and indeed motivated the discussion of 
the previous chapter. Derived from the Marxist tradition, adopted the by Frankfurt School 
and later British cultural studies, a lot of developments have been made in this area (Adorno 
and Horkheimer, 2002; Hall, 1982; Marcuse, 1964) and contributed to the very ‘opening up’ 
or elaboration of the very idea of ideology in the Marxist tradition, especially as regards 
‘ideology in practice’ as opposed to or in distinction to more ‘abstract’ theorisations of 
ideology. 
 
However, there are two main disagreements about the traditional ideology critique in media 
and culture studies. First of all, as criticised by several analysts of political economy(Fuchs, 
2011; Garnham, 1998; D Smythe, 1994), cultural studies tend to focus mainly on ideology 
critique and not enough on the political economic aspects of media in terms of capital 
accumulation, media concentration, and so on.  
 
The second issue is that ideology critique in communication and media studies focuses 
mainly on the content presented in the media, instead of the narratives of media itself (with 
some exceptions, see discussions made by Slack and Wise, 2005). In other words, ideology 
critique tends to neglect the discourses about how media technologies are, can or should be 
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developed and used, i.e. the politics of/behind media. As argued by Gillespie and his 
colleagues, while media and communication researchers focus on texts, media industries and 
audiences/users, “the materiality of these devices and networks has been consistently 
overlooked” (Gillespie et al., 2014: 1). The main problem of this unbalanced focus is that it 
will cause a tendency to neglect social relations behind those media or communication 
means, i.e. how these means are developed and applied. This concentration on the content 
itself reflects a reified understanding of information and media. This has become a crucial 
issue especially with the fast development of ICTs and the Internet, when people’s 
engagement with media technologies as such has become a major issue.  How does one 
conduct critique of ideology in an environment that media not only present content but also 
provide a channel, a medium for communication and the technology itself is one major 
source of profit and with which users primarily engage with so much pleasure and 
involvement? What does it mean when a platform such as Facebook claims that it is not a 
media company but only provides connections to people? Is it true that we have entered a 
new era in which everyone has the power to speak out, thus all hierarchies have been 
abolished? These questions force us to look beyond the textuality of the media, and draw our 
attention to the materiality of media technology and the broader socio-political contexts in 
which they are developed, indeed encouraged. Ideology critique thus should go beyond 
examinations and interpretations of media texts (though this does not mean that textual 
analysis is irrelevant or less important), but of discourses about media and technologies, their 
developments and usages. It means that media researchers cannot neglect the development 
and impacts of the technologies and materiality behind the screens any more.  
 
Among the discussions about the relationship between technology and society, technological 
determinism is one of the established study areas. Every time a new technology is invented or 
introduced the issue of technological determinism arises both in academic and popular 
discourse. New technologies, it is claimed, either provide new, exciting and positive solutions 
to certain problems or represent some kind of dominating or all-consuming threat. Similarly, 
every time when new technologies are improved or expanded, discourse on how they will 
hold the power to change the whole world (in a good way or bad way) emerges. The 
optimistic outlook will emphasise ‘technological fixes’ or, more cosmically, the 
‘technological sublime’, later adapted by Mosco (2005) as the ‘digital sublime’. The more 
pessimistic outlook may be less pervasive among most users but expressed in various 
political discourses or debates in a variety of media themselves. This pessimistic view 
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expresses concerns about ‘addiction’ to new media or a topic of fictional fantasies about 
being dominated or replaced by AI technologies or of a population pacified by such 
technologies and their use. Both reactions can be said to be a product of reductive thinking, 
highly criticised as technological determinism. Technological determinism here is perceived 
as a one-dimensional understanding of the development of technologies and such debates 
about technological determinism have always been a focus of historians of technologies 
(Bimber, 1994; ML Smith, 1994; MR Smith, 1994). 
 
Some studies have focused on the connection between ideologies regarding new technologies 
and the transformation of advanced capitalism. These studies focus on the digital discourse, 
digital sublime, or ‘spirit of network’. Mosco has pointed out that “cyberspace is a central 
force in the growth of three of the central myths of our time, each linked in the vision of an 
end point: the end of history, the end of geography, and the end of politics” (Mosco, 2005: 
13). For Fisher, digital discourse on network technology “has been a centrepiece in the 
legitimation of the transformation of advanced capitalist societies from Fordism to post-
Fordism” (Fisher, 2010: 10).  
  
While there are sporadic studies about China’s digital discourse (Gewirtz, 2019; Hong, 2008; 
Wu and Yun, 2015; Zhao, 2007), no previous research was dedicated to provide an overall 
picture and to link it to China’s social changes. This research will make a contribution to 
provide some preliminary discussions on how digital discourse contribute to the legitimation 
of the current transformation of China’s capitalism.    
 
1.3. Research Questions and the Overall Structure of this 
Thesis 
 
This research aims to register and interpret China’s discourse on network technologies, reveal 
the underlying ideologies, and tie this discourse to the transformation of China’s capitalism 
of which it is a part. This research will address the following research questions:  
 
• RQ1: What kinds of digital discourse regarding the Internet economy and politics are 
created and promoted? How does the government discursively construct China’s 
developmental path in ICT- and Internet-related documents?  
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• RQ2: What kinds of digital discourse regarding the Internet economy and politics are 
created and promoted?  How do BAT discursively represent themselves and their 
relations with other stakeholders in the CEO’s speeches?  
• RQ3: What kinds of digital discourse on China’s Internet is constructed among 
workers?  
• RQ4: How does the ideological digital discourse legitimate the institutional 
arrangements and power relations in the transformation of China’s capitalism?  
 
To find out the answers to these questions is the task of this thesis. Chapter 2 and 3 set up the 
theoretical and contextual foundations further in details. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical 
discussions on ideology. Based on the methodological and philosophical background of this 
thesis, it reflects on discussions of classical Marxist tradition of ideology, including works 
from Marx, Lukács, Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, Williams and Hall. These authors 
represent two approaches towards ideology theorisation. The first one emphasises the 
material structure of society as a whole. Through analysing the fundamental contradictions in 
capitalist societies and late capitalist societies, this approach argues that reification and 
identical thinking derived from the commodity fetishism disguise the real relations between 
human beings. The relations of things thus disguise the relations of human beings. Ideology 
for this type of argument is pejorative, but not necessarily class-genetic. The second approach 
emphasises the legitimation and promotion of dominant social power. From this sense, 
ideologies serve the interests of the dominant power and secure the complicity of subaltern 
groups and classes. They might be chaotic and episodic, but functions to limit people’s 
capacity for revolutionary thought. It is worth noticing that not all of the ideas from the ruling 
class or a ruling group are ideological unless they are promoting dominant interests. It is also 
worth noticing that discourse that is not subject to dominant power relations is not 
ideological.  
 
After setting out how I use the term ideology in this thesis, I then turn to the context of 
analysis in China. Chapter 3 addresses the question of how to understand the political 
economy of China. It first positions itself in the academic discussions of two stances to 
understand China’s political economy: Socialist Market Economy or Capitalist society with 
Chinese characteristics. To further engage in the debate, this chapter then illustrates some 
basic characteristics of the Chinese political economy. These focal points under debate are 
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land issues, ownership of domestic enterprises, foreign-invested enterprises, political reforms 
and the Party-State. This chapter ends with a reflection on the contradictions in Chinese 
society and the unfortunate decline of its Socialist heritage. This chapter is necessary as it 
illustrates the economic structural and political contradictions in China. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, to understand and identify ideology is necessarily linked to the critical 
examination of contradictions in society as a whole.  
 
Chapter 4 and 5 serve to form the analytical framework in this thesis. Chapter 4 focuses on 
digital discourse in advanced capitalism. First, it addresses one prominent ideology regarding 
the relations between technology and society – technological determinism. Techno-
determinism emphasises the independence of technology from society, the determinant role 
of technology in society and technology itself as human progress. All these aspects neglect or 
downplay the discussions of social relations. Second, this chapter reviews the literature on the 
digital discourse that is connected to the political economy analysis of capitalist society. This 
approach is in line with the philosophical background of this thesis. The discussions in 
advanced capitalism are embedded in the transformation from Fordism to the so-called Post-
Fordism (Harvey, 1990). Along with the changes in economic, socio-political arrangements 
are ideological changes. From an economic perspective, these ideologies argue that network 
technologies have brought a decentralised and de-hierarchised market, flexible production 
and working process, and participatory culture (Fisher, 2010; Freedman, 2012; Fuchs, 2014a; 
Fuchs and Sandoval, 2013). From a political perspective, these ideologies emphasise that the 
Internet will automatically bring democratisation and empowerment in society, thus facilitate 
de-regulation and de-politicisation (Dean, 2004, 2013; Mosco, 2005).  
 
Chapter 5 turns the focus back to China. It examines China’s digital discourse with a 
discussion of the matrix of power relations in China brought by network technologies. First, 
it addresses the techno-determinism in the Chinese context: techno-nationalist discourse and 
de-politicisation of technology. China’s historical background as a de-colonised periphery 
country during the imperialist expansion of capitalism, endeavour of modernisation and 
industrialisation, and reform and open-up in a post-revolution situation together shape the 
development of this type of digital discourse (Dai, 2003; Wu and Yun, 2015; Yang and 
Mueller, 2014; Zhao, 2007, 2010). Second, China’s digital discourse has gone through the 
changes from ‘post-industrial’ ideologies to ‘neo-industrialisation’(Gewirtz, 2019; Hong, 
2008; Zhao, 2007). Third, to investigate ideologies regarding network technology in China’s 
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society better, this chapter further provides an analysis of the matrix of power relations in 
China’s ICT industry(Meng, 2018; Schiller, 2005; Yang, 2009; Zhao and Schiller, 2001). In 
particular, it outlines the relations between global capital, the State, the market, and society. 
The tensions among these stakeholders highlight some unique contradictions and power 
relations in the development and transformation, enabled by network technologies, of China’s 
capitalism. This chapter also deepens the discussions in Chapter 3 on Capitalism with 
Chinese Characteristics. Finally, Chapter 5 provides an analytical framework for 
investigating China’s digital discourse, emphasising several aspects from economic and 
political aspects.  
 
Chapter 6 explains how this thesis will investigate the research questions. It first introduces 
CDA as the main methodology, emphasising the ‘heterogeneous’ feature of CDA or CDS 
(Wodak and Meyer, 2015b). The end of this chapter reflects on some methodological issues 
in this research. The rest of the chapter is divided into three sections. Each section explains 
the sampling and analysing strategies applied for three types of materials: the government 
documents, speeches from CEOs of the BAT, and data generated from focus groups with 
workers.    
 
Chapter 7, 8, and 9 present findings from these three important stakeholders and their digital 
discourse – the government, the BAT, and the workers. Chapter 7 finds out three main 
themes of government digital discourse under the ultimate goal to ‘build a Cyber 
Superpower’ and the claimed core value to ‘serve the people’. The first main theme is about 
information economy. The Xi-Li administration has promoted a ‘New Normal’ of the 
Chinese economy. The ‘New Normal’ claims an ‘upgrade’ of the Chinese economy that 
promotes digital economy, mass entrepreneurship and innovation, and the role of the Chinese 
enterprises. The second main theme in the government digital discourse is cybersecurity that 
emphasises core Internet technologies, Cyber Sovereignty and a ‘clean environment in the 
Cyberspace’. Finally, there is a global aspect in China’s digital discourse in which, China’s 
soft power and the participation in the global digital economy and global Internet governance 
are key issues.  
 
Chapter 8 outlines three main themes from the CEOs’ digital discourse. First, the BAT has 
represented their platforms as the Internet ‘infrastructure’ and ‘utility’ to downplay their de 
facto domination in the market. Since the first years of BAT, they are in conflicts with 
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China’s ‘real economy’. Therefore, a second main theme in their discourse is about a 
reconcile with the traditional industrial sectors. The BAT have claimed to facilitate the 
upgrade China’s economy, help traditional industries, and increase domestic consumption. 
Finally, there are contradictions in BAT’s discourse on its global identity and Chinese 
identity. The Chinese identity is used to legitimate its business expansion into new areas and 
the world market.  
 
Chapter 9 presents the results from focus groups with three types of workers. It focuses on 
the lived experiences of workers about the highly commercialised and politically controlled 
Internet in China. Do they legitimate the current power relations surrounding the Chinese 
Internet and how? Are there any internalised ideologies regarding the current power 
relations? Do they pose any challenges or alternatives, in their everyday life, against the 
dominant companies and political controls? This chapter addresses these questions. It finds 
out that while workers’ digital discourse legitimate the Internet economy and politics in 
several ways, these ideologies embedded in the discourse are not necessarily internalised. 
Among all the ideologies, ‘There is no alternative’ stands out as the main ideology regarding 
the Internet. It includes three types of arguments: there are not alternative platforms, no direct 
political participation, and more importantly, no other ways to organise social relations.  
 
To wrap these findings up, Chapter 10 serves to conclude the whole thesis. It argues that the 
digital discourse from different actors legitimates the power relations in the development and 
transformation, enabled by network technologies, of Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics. 
In particular, first, the digital discourse legitimates the current global expansion of China’s 
capital and enterprises. Second, it legitimates the concentration of the market, intensifying the 
positive aspects and mitigating the negative consequences. Third, it also actively constructs a 
consumer identity to replace a more politically active citizen identity. This thesis thus 
proposes a double-layer, multi-dimensional understanding of ideology under digital 
capitalism. On the one hand, the dominant power relations can promote certain types of 
ideologies to legitimate the current situation. On the other hand, ideology can arise from the 
economic structure. In digital capitalism, the internalised ideology might be that the only 
feasible way to organise the Internet is through commercialised platforms. This reflects the 
commodity fetishism in the capitalist society.  
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CHAPTER 2. DEFINING IDEOLOGY IN THIS THESIS 
 
This chapter will serve to discuss and define the term ideology used in this thesis. Discussing 
the differing approaches to ideology and examining the social functions of ideology are 
essential for understanding domination, oppression and struggles in social reality. This 
chapter refers to traditional Marxist theories because their focus on class, domination and 
ideology fits my fundamental understanding of Chinese society as an authoritarian capitalist 
society in a transnational informational capitalist system (see discussions about China’s 
capitalism in Chapter 3). 
 
This chapter will focus on three aspects of ideology from a Marxist critical tradition. Firstly, 
it will discuss the Marxist traditions in understanding what ideology is (2.1). Secondly, it will 
discuss the functions of ideology and whose interests ideology serves (2.2). Finally, by way 
of conclusion, this chapter will give a comprehensive account of how this thesis will identify 
and understand ideology. It will also provide a hypothesis for understanding ideology and 
how it may be said to operate in China regarding the Internet as a social practice (2.3). 
2.1. Defining Ideology 
 
This section will discuss what ideology is and where ideology comes from. These two closely 
related questions are fundamental to identifying and distinguishing what ideologies are and 
what they are not. There are several ways to approach these questions. Following Lukács, 
Adorno and Horkheimer, it is possible to understand ideologies as being defined by and 
emerging from basic economic structures. Following Gramsci and Hall, ideologies might be 
understood as akin to existing systems of political ideas which are in contradiction with one 
another. It is also possible to identify ideologies from historical analysis, following Williams.  
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The discussion of what ideology is and where it emerges from will shed light on how to 
identify ideological discourses through a combination with critical political economic 
analysis of the Internet.  
 
As I will demonstrate in this section, if ideology derives from economic and political tensions 
in reality, such as the conflicting interests among internet companies, states and users, then it 
is necessary first of all to identify the conflicts in Internet-related areas, such as digital labour 
issues, political control, etc. The need to identify these conflicts will be further developed in 
this thesis in the literature review, part of which will discuss such issues.  
 
2.1.1. Ideology which emerges from economic contradictions 
 
One way of understanding ideology is in terms of the economic structure of a society and its 
contradictions. This kind of understanding is based on Marx’s analysis of economic structure 
in class society in general and capitalist society in particular. As Eagleton argues, there are 
two main categories of ideological analysis which are derived from Marxist economic 
structural thinking: the commodity form and exchange value (Eagleton, 2007: 125). Lukács’ 
notion of ideology derives from the commodity form; Adorno’s notion of ideology derives 
from the mechanism of exchange value. 
 
First of all, Marx’s critique of ideology, that is, his conceptualisation of it, is the primary 
notion of what it is and how it operates that subsequent Marxist theory elaborates on, debates 
and often reconceptualises, often radically, or, much more complexly. For Marx, ideology is 
a type of consciousness that derives from the real conditions of existence in any social 
formation. Building on his establishment of historical materialism in The German Ideology, 
Marx and Engels make it clear that consciousness should be understood as “conscious 
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existence” deriving from reality. People’s ideas are “direct efflux”, “reflexes”, or “echoes” of 
reality (Marx and Engels, 1845: 42). Consciousness, then, is the product of an individual’s 
material activity and their material intercourse; individuals are active subjects instead of 
passive products of the environment. The same applies to ideology. Ideology can only derive 
from real struggles in social reality, corresponding to certain economic and political 
contradictions. 
 
To explain this further, I would refer to Marx’s conceptualisation of ideology as working like 
a ‘camera obscura’. As Marx points out, “If in all ideology men and their relations appear 
upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their 
historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-
process” (Marx and Engels, 1845: 42). This is Marx’s metaphor explaining how ideology 
emerges from a reversed representation of social reality: just as when one looks through a 
‘camera obscura’ and sees an upside-down version of reality, so ideology inverts our 
understanding of the social formation. 
 
There are two main concepts in Marx’s works that are closely related to ideology: alienation 
and fetishism, though these might be seen as one and the same concept with different 
emphases. Along with Marx’s emphasis of analysis on economy in his later works, he 
discusses the alienation of social power in The Germany Ideology. According to Marx, 
alienation of social power takes the form, in capitalist society, of the domination of 
apparently autonomous relations between commodities over relations between human beings, 
of capital over labour, of dead labour over living labour. In other words, alienation means 
that people cannot control their own products or means of production, so the relationship 
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between products and means of production take precedence over individual human 
relationships.  
 
Marx also refers to commodity fetishism which is connected to his notion of alienation. 
Commodity fetishism means “the definite social relation between men themselves which 
assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things” (Marx, 1867: 165). A 
commodity thus obtains a mysterious character that “reflects the social characteristics of 
men’s own labour as objective characteristic of the products of labour themselves, as the 
socio-natural properties of these things” (ibid.: 164-165). The real social relations between 
human beings seem to be governed by the interactions of commodities. 
 
Georg Lukács expanded Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism with his use of the concept 
of reification, and connected it to Weber’s idea of rationalisation in modern society. Deriving 
from Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism, Lukács defines the phenomenon of reification 
as “a relation between people [which] takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a 
‘phantom objectivity’ and autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to 
conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people” (Lukács, 1971: 
83). He then expands this phenomenon to all aspects of the social system based on Weber’s 
critique of rationalism: “capitalism has created a form for the state and a system of law 
corresponding to its needs and harmonising with its own structure” (ibid.: 95). And he finally 
expanded reification into the “ever more reified levels” of social consciousness (Rehmann, 
2014: 79). Following this theory, all aspects of human life are rationally and mechanically 
divided into isolated parts, detached from a totality.  
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Lukács’ arguments about ‘false consciousness’ can also shed light on my understanding of 
what is ‘false’ about ideology and is perhaps the most familiar notion arising from the 
Marxist analysis of what ideology ‘is’. As Eagleton points out, commodity fetishism for 
Marx and reification for Lukács are “an objective material structure of capitalism” and not 
just “a state of mind” (Eagleton, 2007: 100). It is from this prevalent phenomenon of 
reification in capitalist society that the reified consciousness, ‘false consciousness’, emerges. 
Since this relation between things in everyday life-process obscures internal relations 
between people, it appears in people’s mind as the authentic, unadulterated form of reality. 
‘False’ means not the “true representatives of his [human] societal existence” (Lukács, 1971: 
93). Ideology is the “empirically given”, the “psychologically describable and explicable 
ideas which men form about their situation in life” (ibid.: 51). Ideology is psychologically 
given consciousness derived from the domination of commodity-structures in everyday life. 
Lukács therefore develops Marx’s definition of ideology as ‘false consciousness’ to the 
partial, immediate, empirical, psychological understanding of social reality that disguises the 
real dialectical relations between men and nature. This is one aspect of the concept of 
ideology which will inform my thesis. 
 
Another line of analysis of ideology, closely related to Marx’s analysis of the capitalist 
economy, is derived from the key concept of exchange value mainly developed by the 
Frankfurt School scholar Theodor Adorno (Eagleton, 2007: 125). For Adorno, the 
mechanism of abstract value is the origin of ideology. Abstract value is exchange value as 
opposed to use value. Abstract value refers, for example, to the amount paid for a product. 
Use value, by comparison, refers to the usefulness of a product. A chair, for instance, is 
useful in the sense that it can be sat on (its use value); a chair that is sold in the marketplace is 
given a price (its abstract value). In Capital, Marx explains that every commodity could be 
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seen from qualitative and quantitative perspectives. The qualitative aspect is a commodity’s 
usefulness; that is, the use value that is produced by concrete labour. Exchange value 
“appears first of all as the quantitative relation, the proportion, in which use-values of one 
kind exchange for use-values of another kind” (Marx, 1867: 126). The labour that produces 
this exchange value is abstract labour, which appears to have no relationship with the 
usefulness of a product. All kinds of concrete labour are “together reduced to the same kind 
of labour, human labour in the abstract” (ibid.: 128). Different kinds of labour can only be 
distinguished in quantity by measuring the duration of labour-time on the scale of hours, days 
etc. The heterogeneous characteristics of commodities and individual labourers are thus 
subordinated to an abstract homogeneity.  
 
For Adorno, this abstract exchange value is the basis for ideology. It makes the supposedly 
incommensurable characteristics of things disappear, as well as people’s thinking. Ideology 
for Adorno is a form of ‘identical thinking’, which “homogenises the world” (Eagleton, 2007: 
126). Ideology suppresses the distinctions, differences and uniqueness of human thinking. 
Adorno further develops this notion of ‘identical thinking’ and emphasises its function in 
reproducing the current system of social reality. I will discuss this in more detail in the next 
section (2.2).  
 
To sum up, Marx, Lukács and Adorno’s theorisation of ideology are based on a critique of 
the economic structure in capitalism. From this perspective, ideology is seen as an expression 
of illusory ideas generated from contradictory social relations.  
• It derives from the phenomenon of the domination of relations between things 
over the relations between human beings (Marx); 
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• It is the partial, immediate, empirical and psychological way people 
understand the world, based on their isolated situation in life (Lukács); 
• It is a form of ‘identical thinking’ which eliminates heterogeneous 
characteristics of objects and other possibilities of life (Adorno). 
 
2.1.2. Ideologies embedded in political conflicts 
 
Another main line of enquiry useful for understanding ideology in Marxist theories is that 
suggested by political struggles among classes or in a certain class. Analysis of ideology 
informed by such struggles emphasise the point that “economic relations themselves cannot 
prescribe a single, fixed and unalterable way of conceptualizing” social reality (Hall, 1996: 
38). Reality “can be ‘expressed’ within different ideological discourses” (ibid.). This section 
will focus on Gramsci and Hall’s analysis of ideology. 
 
Several refinements or distinctions in Gramsci’s work can shed light on my discussion of 
ideology. First of all, Gramsci distinguishes two kinds of ideology: the first one is “organic 
ideologies” which is given to “the necessary superstructure of a particular structure”, and the 
other is “the arbitrary elucubrations of particular individuals” (Gramsci, 1971: 376). Another 
notion refers to “common sense”. With the elaboration of this term, Gramsci points out an 
important feature of people’s empirical consciousness, that it is chaotic. Common sense for 
Gramsci is the “realistic, materialistic element” which is “superstitious and acritical”, and an 
“immediate product of crude sensation” (ibid.: 420). It is “the spontaneous philosophy of the 
multitude” (ibid.: 421). Finally, there is the term ‘hegemony’ which will be discussed in next 
chapter about the function of ideology (see 2.2).  
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It is clear that Gramsci refers to ideology in a more neutral way than Marx and Lukács’ 
negative conception of ideology. However, the similarity implicit in these two perspectives of 
ideology should not be ignored; that similarity is the combination of objective and subjective 
aspects of ideology. Ideologies, for Gramsci, are on the one hand historically given and on 
the other hand actively organised by individuals. They correspond to a particular historical 
structure and political moment, which means that they have their basis in reality. Moreover, 
they are at the same time arbitrary interpretations of daily experience and practices produced 
by subjects. In this sense, ideology for Gramsci has the same meaning as for Lukács in that it 
refers to an immediate and empirical expression of lived experience, though Gramsci 
abandons the negative ideological function of disguising the proper perception of a 
contradictory reality. 
 
Hall also abandons the negative concept of ideology in the Marxist tradition and reinserts 
class struggle “at the centre of the problematic of ideology” (Larrain, 1996: 47). For Hall, 
ideology is a term used to refer to “those images, concepts and premises which provide the 
frameworks through which we represent, interpret, understand and ‘make sense’ of some 
aspect of social existence” (Hall, 1995: 89). These concepts of ideologies include the key 
notions that ideology operates (a) “in the articulation of different elements into a distinctive 
set or chain of meanings” and ideologies “take place through social practice and political 
struggle”; (b) that ideology “pre-date individuals, and form part of the determinate social 
formations and conditions in which individuals are born”; (c) and works by “constructing for 
their subject positions of identification and knowledge which allow them to ‘utter’ 
ideological truths as if they were their authentic authors” (ibid.: 89-90). From this re-
articulation, it is clear that this concept of ideology does not necessarily point to a certain 
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ruling class but rather Hall is describing ideological discourses that can represent different 
classes or groups.  
 
Hall’s understanding of ideologies can be better illustrated by scrutinising his concrete 
analysis of Thatcherism. By raising the question of internal contestation within the dominant 
classes and the novel elements in ruling ideas, Hall criticises the classical Marxist theory for 
its “lack of adequate explanatory power about the concrete empirical development of 
consciousness and practice in the working classes of the advanced capitalist world” (Hall, 
1995: 43). He therefore adopts a Gramscian approach to analysis how Thatcherism gained 
hegemonic power within the ruling class and over the dominated classes. He tries to 
understand “Thatcherism’s capacity to become popular” and the “ideological effectivity of 
Thatcherism in defining new contours in political language and calculation” (ibid.: 41). If 
Lukács’ focus on the economic situation which distinguishes the empirical consciousness 
from possible class consciousness, then Hall’s analysis concentrates on how this empirical 
consciousness is formed, encoded and made popular and thus has hegemonic power. As 
Larrain points out, by the analysis of the concrete political problem of Thatcherism, Hall 
contributes significantly to “the understanding of how political discourses and currents of 
thought are formed or transformed, and how social groups seek to articulate their interests 
with those of other groups” (Larrain, 1996: 63).  
 
Gramsci and Hall focus on the complexity of political ideologies within different classes and 
groups. Though their concept of ideology is different from what Lukács and Adorno 
emphasise about the origin of ideology deriving from economic structure of capitalism, these 
thinkers do not necessarily contradict one another. For example, Hall discusses the historical 
and cultural construction of ideologies of masculinity and femininity: the complexity of 
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which does not in contrast with the fact that these ideologies are derived from social 
economic structure (Hall, 1995: 90). The discussion of racist issues, broadly considered, are 
also compatible with discussions of class and economic issues from an ideological 
perspective. To take another example, conservativism or nationalism in Thatcherism may 
derive from people’s inverted economic condition, from an impartial understanding of 
reality; they also derive from the ideologies which have existed for a long time and which 
obtain renewed characteristics in modern times.  
 
To sum up, this category of ideology influences the concept of ideology as used in this thesis 
along the following lines: 
• Common sense ideology is chaotic, disjointed, and episodic (Gramsci) 
• Ideology could mean a framework for people to make sense of social 
existence (Hall) 
• Ideology is important in political struggles (function of ideology, see 2.2) 
 
2.1.3. Tensions and Reconciliation: a summary 
 
The following section will discuss key ideas from Raymond Williams relating to concepts of 
ideology and also serve to summarise the preceding discussion. The differences between the 
two categories discussed previously– the negative and the neutral – from my understanding, 
could be interpreted in Raymond Williams’ words as “epochal questions” and “historical 
questions”.  While the first one refers to “large features of different epochs of society, as 
between feudal and bourgeois”, the second one refers to “different phases of bourgeois 
society, and different moments within the phases” (Williams, 2005: 38). The former requires 
a perspective from economic conditions, the modes of production to discern some epochal 
features such as, commodity fetishism or reification or identity in capitalist society. The latter 
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focuses more on those active, dynamic, concrete meanings, values, ideas in social practices 
and political struggles.  
 
For Williams, there are three types of culture: the dominant, alternative and oppositional. The 
dominant meanings and values have gone through a “selective tradition”. This is a process 
through which “from a whole possible area of past and present, certain meanings and 
practices are chosen for emphasis, certain other meanings and practices are neglected and 
excluded” (Williams, 2005: 39). Alternative and oppositional culture derive from previous 
the social formation and the formation of new social classes. While he is discussing culture 
and social consciousness, Williams’ analysis of culture can also serve as a framework for 
analysing where ideological or non-ideological consciousness derives from. Working with 
Williams’ analytical framework we can understand that ideologies derive from a historical 
selection process; conquering these ideologies requires the practice and coming to 
consciousness of new classes. 
 
Williams’ understanding of the relations between base and superstructure can also shed some 
light on my understanding of two categories of ideology/ideologies illustrated in the previous 
two sub-sections (2.1.1 and 2.1.2). According to Williams, in the phrase “social being 
determines consciousness”, determination means “setting limits, exerting pressures” 
(Williams, 2005: 34). We could also say that the general ideology generated by economic 
conditions sets limits to the arena in which ideologies of political struggles could play out. In 
this way, we could combine together the two categories of ideologies analysed in the section 
2.1.1 and 2.1.2.  
2.2. The Functions of Ideology 
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This section will focus on the functions of ideology. The discussion of the functions of 
ideology will be helpful in this thesis for two main reasons. Firstly, it is a complementary 
way to identify specific forms of ideologies (i.e., whether certain arguments are ideological 
and why). Secondly, it will help to analyse how ideologies work. There are three main types 
of functions in traditional Marxist arguments. First, ideology serves to distort solutions and to 
restrain real revolutionary thoughts and alternatives. Second, ideology is used to disguise the 
reality of capitalist means of production as a whole: it is a partial representation of reality, 
which may or may not be produced intentionally. Third, ideologies are used to win consent 
and legitimate the ruling power. Fourth, ideologies are said to reproduce and maintain the 
current capitalist system.  
 
2.2.1. Ideology as distorted solutions and limiting revolutionary thoughts  
 
As ideologies derive from real contradictions which cannot be solved in reality, they are 
applied as ‘distorted solutions’ according to Marx. As discussed in 2.1.1, according to Marx, 
ideology arises from a contradictory reality and a distorted appearance of those material 
limitations. It refers to “idealist, speculative, mental expressions” of real empirical 
contradictions, fetters, and limitations (Marx and Engels, 1845: 51). It is a significant point 
for Marx to show that the origin of ideology is in the contradictory nature of reality. Because 
those real contradictions cannot be overcome by people’s will at the moment, they can only 
be solved in their consciousness. As Marx points out, increase in the productive forces is the 
material premise of Communism, so before people can arrive at an adequate level of 
productive forces, they can only liberate themselves “each time to the extent that was dictated 
and permitted not by their ideal of man, but by the existing productive forces” and based on 
the historical conditions, the “restricted productive forces” at that time (Marx and Engels, 
1976: 431). As long as contradictions exist, and as long as people cannot solve them all in 
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reality, they can only reach “distorted solutions” in their minds (Larrain, 1979: 46). Yet, these 
“distorted solutions” do not come from nowhere; they usually derive from inverted 
appearances. As Eagleton points out, ideology is “an imaginary resolution of real 
contradictions which blinds men and women to the harsh actuality of their social conditions” 
(Eagleton, 2007: 77). It functions by distracting people’s attention from real conflicts to 
distorted solutions.  
 
Gramsci’s discussion of the function of common sense is useful for the understanding of 
ideology, as well as his main discussions of hegemony. First of all, he states that common 
sense functions as a limit on revolutionary thought. Through a critique of Bukharin’s 
Theories of Historical Materialism, the focus of which is a critique of his systematic 
philosophies, Gramsci claims that the starting point to understand consciousness should be 
“the philosophy of common sense, which is the ‘philosophy of non-philosophers’” (Gramsci, 
1971: 419). He claims this because philosophical and religious systems are actually 
“unknown to the multitude and have no direct influence on its way of thinking and action” 
(ibid.: 419-20). Common sense instead functions in an indirect way which limits people’s 
capacity for revolutionary thought.  
 
Adorno’s critique of identical thinking also touches on this issue of distorted solutions and 
limits to revolutionary thinking (see 2.1.1). In a key criticism of Adorno’s understanding of 
ideology as identical thinking and a totalitarian system, it is claimed that modern capitalist 
society is very different from Nazi society thus there is more room for “variousness, plurality, 
cultural relativity, concrete particularity” (Eagleton, 2007: 128). While it might be hard to 
claim “it is the way it is” in modern society, there should be no doubt that “it cannot be 
different from what it is” (Rehmann translated from Adorno’s German text, 2014: 92–3). In 
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other words, we should understand this identical character of ideology in a broader way: 
though it seems that there is a range of variations and oscillation in capitalist society, this 
range can only be tolerated under the basic principle of developing the whole society in a 
capitalist manner. There is no alternative possibility of developing a large-scale social 
formation or social order in a socialist manner. For example, there is ‘common sense’ that 
socialism is an ideal that is impossible to achieve and therefore dangerous; or that is not in 
accord with ‘human nature’ and therefore will always fail; or the means used to try to achieve 
it lead to worse outcomes than those contradictions and suffering that capitalism gives rise to. 
All these notions are examples of ‘common sense’ and set limits to revolutionary thinking. 
 
We have seen then, that while there is a range of perspectives concerning the distorted 
solutions and limits on revolutionary thinking, with some disagreement over the nature of 
identical thinking, it is clear that a key function of ideology is to prevent people from 
formulating alternative solutions or organising themselves in an alternative way, other than 
within the capitalist system. 
 
2.2.2. Ideology as a partial understanding of reality  
 
‘Distorted solution’ is a kind of disguise of total reality which only partially represents 
reality. It is based on the economic system in capitalism and which ideology derives from 
(see 2.1). For example, commodity fetishism in capitalist society has ideological functions, as 
a form of distorted solution. According to Eagleton, this commodity fetishism has three 
consequences for ideology. It firstly conceals the social character of labour. This “atomising 
operation of the commodity” makes it harder to grasp society as a whole which renders the 
capitalist order “less vulnerable to political critique”. This domination of social life by 
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“inanimate entities” also leads to a feeling of a capitalist social system as something natural 
and inevitable (Eagleton, 2007: 85). 
 
Another example is the exchange of labour-power. When analysing the commodity exchange 
of labour-power, Marx points out four important realms of human rights relating to ideology 
in capitalist society: freedom, equality, property and Bentham (Marx, 1867: 280). These are 
all derived from the economic appearance of commodities. Workers are free to sell their 
labour-power. They exchange commodities equally with each other in the market. Everyone 
only disposes his own property. Furthermore, everyone simply struggles for his individual 
interest disregarding others’ interest or common interest. Therefore, freedom, equality, 
individual ownership and individualism can be seen as significant types of ideology inherent 
in capitalist society which restrict a total understanding of reality.    
 
Reification and rationalisation, as criticised by Lukács, have a similar function as ideology. 
The appearance of atomisation, caused by abstraction, rationalisation and quantification in 
capitalism under the domination of commodity-structure, has a significant influence on 
consciousness and has its functions. First of all, rationalisation in modern Taylorism denotes 
a break of work-processes from the “organic, irrational and qualitatively determined unity of 
the product” (Lukács, 1971: 88). This then breaks down the object of production into isolated 
parts in order to calculate the results accurately. A commodity is no longer an organic unity 
of use-value. This separation of objects of production necessarily leads to the breakdown of 
subjects. Workers are no longer the master of the production process but only a “mechanical 
part incorporated into a mechanical system” (ibid.: 89). This mechanised labour results in an 
increasingly “contemplative” activity and lack of will of workers (ibid.). This ‘independence’ 
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of the process from human consciousness and intervention then changes individuals’ 
immediate attitude to the world.  
 
Moreover, the rational and isolated exchange between commodity owner (or owners of 
labour-power as commodity) also gives an “immediate, practical as well as intellectual 
confrontation of the individual with society, production and reproduction of life” (ibid.: 92). 
Various forms of capital (such as merchant capital, finance capital), still serve in the 
exploitation of surplus value, yet “in the minds of people in bourgeois society they constitute 
the pure, authentic, unadulterated forms of capital” (ibid.: 93). The immediate commodity 
relations conceal the actual relations between men and relations between men and objects, so 
the reified mind regards these forms as the representations of the whole social existence. The 
immediate experience of commodity exchange, as only part of the story, is understood as the 
whole reality.  
 
2.2.3. Hegemony used to gain consent for the dominant power 
 
Another function of ideology is for the ruling power to gain consent. I would like to, first of 
all, emphasises the distinguish made by Gramsci between “historically organic ideologies, 
those, that is, which are necessary to a given structure, and ideologies that are arbitrary, 
rationalistic, or ‘willed’”. He further confirms that both could direct human behaviours as “to 
the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is 
‘psychological’; they ‘organise’ human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, 
acquire consciousness of their position, struggles, etc. To the extent that they are arbitrary 
they only create individual ‘movements, polemics and so on’”(Gramsci, 1971: 377).  
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This function of ideology to gain consent is then best illustrated by Gramsci through his 
arguments about hegemony and its arena, which is civil society. Gramsci uses the term 
hegemony instead of ideology to emphasise the practical dynamic process through which a 
ruling power wins consent from those subordinate to it. Thus it is a process of language and 
culture (that is, discourse) as well as economic and political means. For example, the ruling 
class could use the tax system to gain favour from those people it needs to support it or at the 
least tolerate it. It could also create a wealthy but politically uninterested middle class. On the 
political level, the parliamentary system gives people an illusion of self-government and 
freedom. The legal system should seem as equal to everyone. These are normal economic and 
political strategies to build hegemony in Gramsci’s terms or, we can say, appearances which 
bring about ideology in Marx or Lukács’ terms. It is obvious that the success of this strategy 
is highly related to ideology’s functions to disguise reality and to the partial representation of 
reality. The difference is that Gramsci places more emphasis on how ideology/hegemony is 
used in political struggles.  
 
The arena for people to explain these appearances actively and for the ruling class to 
strategically gain consent is civil society. Instead of employing the power of coercion, as the 
state does through repressive apparatuses such as the army, the police or the criminal system, 
ideology in civil society operates through “hegemonic apparatuses” such as schools, 
churches, families and other private institutions. It is these “hegemonic apparatuses” that 
“bind individuals to the ruling power by consent rather than by coercion” (Eagleton, 2007: 
114). For Gramsci, then, civil society is the mediation between state and the economic 
structure, the terrain for class contestation, and the place where hegemony is fought for. It is 
the stage of various competing interpretations of appearances, daily practices. And thus the 
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social and cultural superstructure is not utterly determined by the base (the economic 
structure) as there would be no contestation or no need for ideology to operate as a discourse. 
 
Ideology from Gramsci’s perspective thus comes about through class struggles in reality. The 
arbitrary character of ideologies and the chaotic character of common sense do not mean they 
are just speculations of individuals but that they have their roots in historical social reality 
both at the economic structural level and at the political superstructural level. Hegemony 
means the practical strategies for a dominant class to win consent from those subjugated 
groups. Ideology therefore necessarily serves the interest of a dominant social group.  
 
2.2.4. Ideology used to reproduce the current system  
 
Another important function of ideology is mainly pointed out by the critique of ideology 
made by the Frankfurt School, which is to immortalise and reproduce the current system. 
Ideology is an instrument of domination, derived from this instrumental reason. Horkheimer 
and Adorno discuss this category of ideology in their classic work Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. For them, ideology “functions as an instrument of control” (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 2002: 118). It is characterised by its reproduction of a given social order and its 
manipulation (Rehmann, 2014: 85). It keeps people to stay in common with others and to fit 
into the existing social order. Ideology does this by “duplicating appearances”, and this 
“omnipresent and impenetrable world of appearances” then “blocks insight” (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 2002: 118). Ideology is therefore actually a “blatant lie about its meaning [of 
brute existence], a lie which is not articulated directly but drummed in by suggestion” (ibid.). 
Because this “world of appearances” is so prevalent, ideology becomes powerful enough to 
“consolidate the immutability of the existing circumstances” (ibid.: 119). This understanding 
can be understood to be very close to Marx’s founding conception of ideology as disguised 
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reality. The appearances, the fetishism of commodity for Marx or reification for Lukács, 
disguise reality, that is, the real relationship between man and products and between human 
beings (the ‘real conditions of existence’). 
 
This deceptive function of ideology is realised through what Adorno and Horkheimer 
conceived of as ‘the culture industry’ in late capitalist society. The ideology behind it is the 
positivistic technocratic thinking used to immortalise the current situation as something 
unchangeable. It thus legitimates the existing social power: “technical rationality today is the 
rationality of domination” (Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002: 95). Adorno and Horkheimer 
argue that the main purpose of the culture industry is to degrade people to pure objects that 
are subjected voluntarily to the current system, thus to the domination of existing power. The 
culture industry successfully fulfils this aim by reproducing reality and leading people to 
follow this reproduced, i.e. current, social relations. By uncritically duplicating the alienated 
reality in Marx’s terms or reified relations in Lukács’ terms, instrumental ideology “exploits 
the cult of fact by describing bad existence with utmost exactitude in order to elevate it into 
the realm of facts” and through such elevation “existence itself becomes a surrogate of 
meaning and justice” (ibid.: 119). In the calculation of possibilities, people are reduced to a 
human species without different individualities and they can thus be interchangeable with one 
other. Everyone seems to have the chance to succeed as long as you obey the rules and accept 
the planned opportunities given by the powerful. It is a choice to be an insider or outsider. 
The culture industry promotes the promise of a welfare state on the one hand, and uses tragic 
stories to remind those who want to leave the system of a miserable existence once being 
abandoned by the system on the other hand.  
 
 40 
To sum up, this section discusses several functions of ideology in the Marxist tradition, 
especially from a negative aspect which guide this thesis in its empirical research to identify 
ideologies and to understand how they work. The functions identified in this section serve: 
  
• to disrupt people’s attentions (as imagined solutions of contradictions in 
reality); 
• to limit revolutionary thought (chaotic common sense); 
• to limit options through identical thinking; 
• To disguise contradictions through partial representation of social existence 
(e.g. the ‘fair’ exchange of wage labour); 
• To win consent from subordinate groups through hegemony; 
• To control and manipulate through instrumental reason; 
• To immortalise and reproduce the current system. 
 
2.3. A Model of Ideology 
 
With the analysis of ideology in the previous sections, this section will attempt to approach a 
model to understand ideology. This model will pave the way for my further analysis of 





Figure 2.1. The Relationship between Reality, Appearances and Ideology  
 
The previous sections have limited the use of ideology in this thesis. It will focus on the role 
of ideology in legitimation, to gain consent for the dominant power and to reproduce the 
current system, through distorted or partial representation of the reality.  
 
First and the foremost, the understanding of ideology has to be rooted in social reality. It 
necessarily corresponds to the contradictions in reality. The fundamental conflicts in 
capitalist society is economic struggles within its structure. But ideology does not reflect this 
reality directly. There are inverse appearances between reality and ideology. These 
appearances have a deceptive character to disguise the contradictory reality. It is shown both 
on the level of economic structure and on the level of political superstructure. From the 
economic aspect, there is the phenomenon of reification, derived from commodity fetishism, 
in the economic base that disguises the real relations between human beings. The exchange of 
labour power suppresses immeasurable heterogeneous characteristics of human beings and 
form a kind of identical thinking. From a political perspective, ideology serves the political 
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oppressions and struggles. The modern parliamentary system manifests an illusion of self-
organised government, and the juridical institutions disguise the real inequality. The welfare 
state makes people believe that the state feeds people instead of the other way round. The 
culture industry tries to immortalise the current existing social order by reproducing it again 
and again. These appearances of these phenomena all correspond to contradictions in reality 
in capitalist society and have an ideological influence on people’s cognition. So, ideology is 
not just the arbitrary speculations of individuals (and thus it is absurd when one hears people 
referring to their own personal or individual ideologies). It has its root in reality constructed 
throughout the interactions between objects and subjects.   
 
The roots of ideology in contradictory reality determines that ideology necessarily serves the 
interests of the ruling class. Its three main functions: distorted solution, partial representation 
of reality, reproducing the current system, are all closely related to the dominant class and 
ruling power. However, ideology should not be perceived as a static and single mode of 
thinking. Ideology has a complex and dynamic character. We can easily identify competing 
ideas within the ruling class. Subjects could interpret those appearances within a wide range 
of different meanings. Yet, these differences are limited within a closed system. When the 
rule of the dominant class is in danger, those differences will be vanished. The fundamental 
function of ideology of preserving the current social order in the interest of dominant class is 
shown. Pragmatic interests or class situation limits class consciousness or ideology. As 
Eagleton puts it, “at a certain points its [bourgeois] genuinely cognitive discourse becomes 
blacked, forced up against certain conceptual limits which mark the real historical frontiers of 
bourgeois society itself” (Eagleton, 2007: 51).  
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In conclusion, ideology corresponds to a variety of inverse appearances. It reproduces the 
current system and disguises the contradictions through distorted solutions in mind and 
partial representations of the reality. To think and to act ideologically means to conceal the 
real contradictions in favour of the dominant class. Though ideology necessarily serves the 
interests of the ruling class, it is held by both the ruling class and dominated groups.  
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CHAPTER 3. CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
This chapter aims to describe the main characteristics of Chinese political economy. There 
are two main stances towards Chinese political economy. The first one claims that China is a 
socialist market economy and the second one China is a capitalist society with special 
characteristics. This thesis argues in line with the second position. China’s political economy 
has its own characteristics in its transformation from the earlier centre-planned 
(commanding-height) economy and socialist revolutionary heritage towards a market 
economy or capitalist economy. This chapter first outlines some of the discussions on various 
forms of capitalism and different perspectives that have been put forward to understand 
China’s political economy (3.1). It then focuses on four main aspects in the current 
discussions of China’s political economy: land issues (3.2); ownership of domestic 
enterprises (3.3); foreign relationships, especially foreign investment (3.4); and the 
controversial role of the party-state in political reforms (3.5). Finally, I will discuss the 
decline of China’s socialist tradition and provide a summary of the political and economic 
contradictions in contemporary China (3.6). Discussion on these issues will prepare for my 
further investigation of China’s contemporary ideologies and ICT-related discourses.  
3.1. The Capitalist Economy and Chinese model  
 
The last four decades have seen what is called ‘the rise of China’. This phrase normally 
indicates the fast development of the Chinese economy. Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 show China 
and other regions’ share of the worldwide GDP based on purchasing power parity (data 
source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, data after 2012 are estimated by IMF staff). 
China has a much larger share than other BRICS countries, as well as Japan and Germany 
that has the third and fourth largest share of the world economy. China has been increasingly 
involved in the global economy in terms of export and import of goods, foreign direct 




Figure 3.1. Percentage share of world GDP based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP), by 





Table 3.2. Percentage share of selected countries and regions in world GDP (PPP), data 
source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2017 
 
GDP change is another indicator normally used to show the fast development of the Chinese 
economy. While GDP per capita is still relatively low and inequality is increasing fast, this 
fast growth in GDP is often presented to give confidence to both citizens and global capital 
markets. Figure 3.2 shows the GDP changes of the seven countries and regions that are 
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India 2.907 3.248 3.503 3.391 3.878 4.169 4.585 5.217 6.235 7.226 
Japan  7.816 8.288 8.673 8.164 7.73 6.833 6.175 5.346 4.745 4.369 
German
y 6.592 6.253 5.91 5.622 5.186 4.877 4.302 3.924 3.574 3.32 
Russia  n/a n/a n/a 5.195 3.386 3.281 3.6 3.952 3.642 3.169 
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estimated by IMF staff to have developed the fastest in 2022 (predicted statistics). This rapid 
growth is always seen as evidence of a strong economy in China, in comparison to both 
advanced economies as well as emerging and developing countries.  
 
 
Figure 3.2. GDP Change in China and other regions, data source: IMF World Economic 
Outlook Database, April 2017 
 
However, when we look at the statistics of GDP per capita, the scenario looks different. 
Figure 3.3 shows that national income per person in China or India is only a fraction of that 
of the USA or EU countries. The GINI index is a widely-used measurement to indicate the 
inequality of wealth distribution in a country. The values of the index are between 0 and 1: a 
higher value indicates a higher level of inequality. Figure 3.4 shows the high level of 




Figure 3.3. GDP per capita in China and other regions, data Source: World Bank, Sep, 2017 
 
 
Figure 3.4. GINI income coefficients (for latest year available), data source: OECD, Sep 
2017. 
 
There is little doubt that China has been highly involved in the modern capitalist world 
market, as a consequence of a series of reforms from within and pressures from the outside 
world. The dramatic changes in China have led to significant debates on the “nature” of 
China’s political economy, especially on the question of whether China has a capitalist or 
socialist market economy (Amin, 2013; Arrighi, 2007; Harvey, 1990, 2005; Lin, 2006, 2013).  
  
This section will start with one simple question – what is an “authentic” capitalist society – 
for obvious reasons, before I enter into the debates between the view of China as a capitalist 
society as opposed to a socialist market economy. I will argue that there are many “faces” or 
“varieties” of capitalism, therefore it is counterproductive to argue about the degree of 
difference of China’s political economy compared to other capitalist societies. It would be 















GINI income coefficients (for lastest year available)
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First of all, there should be little doubt that it is difficult to argue for an “authentic” capitalist 
society or capitalist model. While it is important to acknowledge the fierce expansion of 
capitalism into non-capitalist societies (Harvey, 2003; Lenin, 1917; Luxemburg, 1913; Marx, 
1867), the claim of a “capitalist homogenization of the world” (Lin, 2006: 6) is debatable. On 
the contrary, researchers and authors have long been arguing for a diversity of capitalism and 
different characteristics of capitalist countries. For example, comparative political economy 
and international political economy have long been focusing on the varieties of capitalism 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hall, 2015; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall and Thelen, 2009), 
especially on the between the UK, US and German economies (Chandler et al., 2009). Some 
scholars also distinguish “good capitalism” from “bad capitalism”, using the categories of 
state-guided capitalism, oligarchic capitalism, big-firm capitalism, and entrepreneurial 
capitalism (Baumol et al., 2007). Studies focusing on new emerging economies and 
developing countries, such as the BRICS, also identify special characteristics of these 
countries’ economies (Prashad, 2013). There are also different types of socialism. For 
example, socialism in Marx’s understanding is probably very different from Lenin’s 
practices, and even further from Stalinism. Therefore, the diversity of forms of capitalism 
poses a difficult question in terms of identifying the “nature” of China’s economy. However, 
one thing is clear, as pointed out in Halliday’s description of China’s situation after the 
1980s, there is no “third way” between state-centred and capitalist economy: there are only 
“variations on the two main ways” (Halliday, 1999: 283–5). 
 
Before arguing for the view of China as a socialist market or as a capitalist society with 
Chinese characteristics, I will outline several representative theories that have been 
developed for defining China’s economy to help illustrate what is meant by “Chinese 
Characteristics”. 
 
Some scholars emphasise the socialist elements in China’s development. For example, at the 
early stage of China’s reforms, some authors hold positive prospective views of China’s 
development (Nee, 1989; Schweickart, 1998: 8; White, 1996). They are supportive of 
China’s “market socialism” and predict that China’s market transition will stimulate the 
private market, encourage entrepreneurship, and bring redistribution of power, equal rights 
and social justice. A different view which also stresses the socialist elements of China’s 
economy defines China as a combination of state socialism and private capitalism (Amin, 
 49 
1990, 2013; Arrighi, 2007; Therborn, 2000). The key points of this view are (1) the 
transformation of land into commodity in China is finished (Amin, 2013: 66); (2) socialist 
principles continue to be important in areas such as health care, education and welfare 
(Arrighi, 2007: 351); (3) collective ownership in rural areas and Township and Village 
Enterprises (TVEs) enable accumulation without dispossession (Arrighi, 2007: 361–7).  
 
The other side of the argument asserts that the true nature of China’s political economy lies in 
capitalism. Some economists emphasise the dominant role of the market in China, under the 
label of “state capitalism” (Naughton and Tsai, 2015: 2). They believe that China has 
successfully transformed from a centrally planned economy to a market economy and the 
market is now the predominant institution in China (Naughton, 2017: 5; see also Qian, 2002). 
Some others express concerns about economic reforms that have taken place without genuine 
political reforms. They claim that China is “crony capitalism built on systemic corruption and 
raw political power”(Y Huang, 2008: 236, 276; Pei, 2016).  
 
One aspect is especially worth noticing: the perspective of international relations, or the 
global capitalist system. This perspective emphasises the international pressures faced by 
revolutionary states in history and contemporary times. Recalling the history of revolutionary 
states and the failure of the “de-link” project, Halliday describes the difficulties faced by 
post-revolutionary countries and the pressures from the international capitalist system 
(Halliday, 1999: 283–7). Considering contemporary neoliberal developments, some critical 
globalisation scholars argues that globalisation essentially serves the interest of global capital 
and transnational corporations (Chase-Dunn and Gills, 2005: 54). Some argue that China was 
forced into the world market after the collapse of the USSR. Others in turn criticise how 
internal [?] reform policies have pushed China into the world market and led it to fulfil the 
demands of global capital and multinational corporations (Hong, 2010; Huang, 2003).  
  
In studies of the Chinese reforms, two models are always compared with China: the Latin 
American model and the East Asian model. Scholars and researchers look to identify 
similarities and differences between these regions in order to seek an alternative path for 
modernisation, with the aim of supporting stable sustainable economic development, political 
democratisation and social justice and welfare. The comparisons between these models can 
also shed light on the definition of Chinese characteristics (for more discussions see Lin, 
2006; Huang, 2008).  
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The least disputed aspect of China’s capitalist development might be the increase of social 
costs (housing, education, and health care) and the penetration of a capitalist logic throughout 
society. Criticisms have come from both the left and from the liberal side, especially focusing 
on the degradation of social welfare in China. Arguing from a left perspective, Lin criticises 
that “the persistence of sweatshops, the collusion of money and power, the dictatorship of 
capital, and the reign of developmentalism all violate socialist promises” (Lin, 2013: 87). 
Liberal economists also criticise the decline of social welfare in China. For example, Huang 
points out that the Chinese rural policies in the 1990s led to the increase of adult illiteracy by 
30 million between 2000 and 2005 (Huang, 2003: 244–9). He also points out the decline of 
public financing for health care (ibid.: 249–51).  
 
To sum up, there are “varieties of capitalism” as well as socialism, and linked to these are 
perspectives to understand China’s political economy. Therefore, in order to decide which of 
the views prevails, the following sections will scrutinise some of the main issues under 
debate, and illustrate some basic characteristics of the Chinese political economy.  
3.2. The Land Issue 
 
Issues of land, modes of production in rural areas and the life of peasants are important in 
China. China’s economy and people’s livelihoods [?] rely largely on agriculture. China’s 
reforms in rural areas underwent several phases (Y Huang, 2008; Kroeber, 2016; Perkins, 
1988: 605). One key issue in the debates related to these reforms is the ownership of land. 
Scholars who emphasise the socialist character of China’s economy argue that the fact that 
land in China is still, officially, collectively owned by the peasants, makes China different 
from other capitalist countries. This logic is based on Marx’s description of the “primitive 
accumulation” in the history of Britain. In the transition from a non-capitalist to a capitalist 
society, land is acquired as property by individuals and exchanged in the market as 
commodities. Under unequal power relations (oftentimes involving violence), the trading of 
land as a commodity would often lead to the proletarianisation of farmers, i.e. the deprivation 
from their means of production (land), which led them to be forced into labour market in the 
industrialised cities. These peasants eventually become the “double free” workers in the 
cities, selling their own labour to capitalists. In Marx, the double freedom is workers’ 
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freedom to sell their labour-power on the market and the freedom from any ownership of the 
means of production (Marx, 1976). 
 
One representative of this type of argument that still presents China as socialist based on 
collective land ownership is Samir Amin. He argues that this “Chinese specificity” – whose 
consequences are of major importance – absolutely prevents us from characterizing 
contemporary China (even in 2013) as “capitalist” because the capitalist road is based on the 
transformation of land into a commodity” (Amin, 2013: 68). Besides, Amin also claims that 
“the range of users’ rights has expanded considerably” since the transition of communes 
(ibid.: 70). Similarly, Giovanni Arrighi shares Amin’s view that “equal access to land” in 
China guarantees China’s continued development as a non-capitalist society (Arrighi, 2007: 
16). According to the policymaker, state leader and then Premier in the late 1970s and 80s, 
Zhao Ziyang, this is partly true. Since the late 1970s, communes (gongshe) in China started 
to be dissolved. Through the “rural land contract policy” (bao chan dao hu), peasants started 
to hold de facto control over the land they farm (Zhao et al., 2009: 97). This transformation in 
rural areas brought astonishing income increases for peasants between 1978 and 1984 
(Harvey, 2005: 126).  
 
However, this is not the whole story. Land issues in rural area have been some of the most 
complex issues in contemporary China. As Harvey shows, after the initial income growth 
during the first years of the rural land contract policy, incomes in rural areas faced stagnation, 
and challenges caused by the loss of collective social rights soon appeared (Harvey, 2005: 
127). The idea of “equal access to land” held by Amin and Arrighi might just be indicative of 
a rosy-tinted view provided by official statements and needs to be updated to take into 
account what happened over several decades of development. Two groups of scholars have 
made extensive contributions to the critique of this view. The first group argues for 
privatisation of land in rural China with the purpose to give peasants more power in 
controlling their land (including scholars such as Yang Xiaokai, Wen Guanzhong, Chen 
Zhiwu). The second one argues for the opposite: to strengthen collective ownership of rural 
land (including writers such as Wen Tiejun, Pan Wei, Cao Jinqing, Li Changping; see He, 
2009).  
 
Economists from both sides have discussed the problems with the current land system. For 
example, liberal economists have criticised the polarization between the rich and the poor 
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parts of rural society caused by the privilege held by village cadres. They claim that the 
actual power holders of control over land in rural areas are not peasants, as is claimed in 
official documents. Rather, in reality, the officials at different levels of government get to 
decide how to use, convert (Liuzhuan) and rent the land. They thus argue for privatisation of 
land, in order to give peasants private land ownership and use rights. Several mass incidents 
caused by corruption and abuse of power in land conversion have supported their views. For 
example, in 2011, villagers from Wukan protested against corruption conducted by local 
officials who sold land without properly compensating the villagers.  
 
While arriving at a similar judgement on corruption in rural villages as liberal economists, 
some scholars who work more closely with peasants in China propose to strengthen 
collective ownership to protect peasant rights. For example, He Xuefeng, based on his long-
term fieldwork with peasants, divided Chinese peasants into five categories and argues that 
only strengthening collective ownership could best guarantee equality in rural areas. 
Collective ownership will enable a flexible dynamic redistribution of land based on the 
categories proposed by He. According to his argument, roughly speaking, peasants either 
work on the land with limited rights, or have left the land behind when they migrated to 
cities. Either way, the current land system cannot prevent deprivation of peasants, and neither 
can it guarantee their livelihood. For the former (those who still work in their land), the 
current collective ownership prohibits them from extending their farming area and improving 
farming equipment and land situation (because those who left their land still own the land are 
not willing to permanently converse or to invest in their own land). For the latter, while 
migrant workers still own the land, there is little income they can earn from this. This is 
because either nobody is working on their land, or they can earn only little rent from the land 
due to the poor condition of their land (for more explanations of why this has happened, see 
He, 2009: 61). Moreover, those who have left their land and work in cities are de facto wage 
workers in cities (Chase-Dunn, 2010: 47–8). Therefore, being aware of the risks of moving 
their family entirely into the city, most migrant workers prefer not to give away their land in 
exchange for money or residential rights in cities (He, 2009). Several empirical researchers 
have observed this (See, for example, Le, 2010; Zhang, 2011). Therefore, the current land 




A series of urbanisation developments after the 2000s has made the situation worse for 
peasants whose livelihoods are entirely or partly dependent on farming activities. On a 
positive note, urbanisation is needed in China. First of all, migrant workers (nongmingong) 
have contributed significantly to China’s rapid development since 1979. According to 
different estimates, there are about 150 to 200 million migrant workers in China (He and 
Dong, 2009b). The massive migration of peasants has left some villages with smaller 
populations, worse living conditions and reduced efficiency in land use. Secondly, because of 
the particularities of the process of modernisation in China, China’s urbanisation lagged 
much behind its industrialisation (Ding, 2003). Finally, as Harvey observed, huge mega-
projects come along with rapid urbanisation and construction of physical infrastructure, 
which can absorb surplus capital and the vast labour surpluses caused by the destruction of 
state-owned enterprises (hereinafter SOEs) (Harvey, 2005: 130–2). Therefore, there are 
actual needs for urbanisation. Some local governments have thus tried to relocate rural 
populations through different projects, such as Withdrawing Villages and Combining 
Residences (Che cun bing ju), or Moving Villagers to Urban Housing (ju min shang lou) (for 
more examples see Zhou and Wang, 2015). 
 
However, in reality, urbanisation has faced many challenges, which have in parts brought 
further deprivation to rural populations, instead of improving their living standards. Two 
policies play important roles in the process. First of all, since local governments have been 
financing themselves since the tax-sharing reform (fen shui zhi) in 1994, “land development  
(expropriation, conveyance, and leasing)” has “become so important to local public finance” 
(Lin and Yi, 2011: 54). Therefore, local governments are eager to acquire more rural land 
that can be used for the expansion of urban areas and for making profits by selling this land. 
However, this practice was curbed by the central government’s new policy aimed at 
protecting and guaranteeing the amount of farming land in China, known as Linking New 
Land Used for Urban Construction with the Decrease of Land Used for Rural Construction 
(Chengxiang Jianshe Yongdi Zengjian Guagou). According to this policy, there are 
restrictions on local governments for expanding construction land. They have to balance the 
increase of land used for construction in urban areas with a corresponding decrease in rural 
areas. Therefore, local governments have huge incentives to destroy peasants’ own houses 
scattered around farm land in rural areas, and to encourage or force peasants to move to 
government/local-built and more concentrated new buildings (in rural or urban areas). In this 
way, a lot of rural land can be vacated. This newly reclaimed land, according to the latter 
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policy, can then be transformed into urban areas for commercial construction use and sold to 
construction companies. Local governments thus could earn money from this transformation 
which they can invest into other municipal affairs. The growth of local GDP brought by the 
sale of land can be presented as a great political achievement by local politicians and help 
promote their careers in the Party, in addition to the benefits gained by local officials through 
receiving briberies.  
 
The process might seem promising to peasants, however is not necessarily beneficial for 
them in reality. There are two ways in which this transformation generally happens. The first 
one involves peasants getting some compensation for the destruction of their own house, and 
these peasants then are encouraged to buy a new home (a flat in an apartment block) in an 
urban area. In this case, peasants become urban citizens and are thrown into the “reserve 
army” of wage labour (in some cases they are willing participants in this because they can 
earn more money in the city than from the land, such as is the case in Chengdu). In some of 
these cases, peasants do not have much negotiating power against the local government and 
thus do not receive enough money to get education in cities, or start businesses, i.e. to acquire 
new means and skills of production.  
 
In the second type of process, peasants stay in rural areas, which are transformed from areas 
containing individual dwellings to containing blocks of flats. These peasants can still keep 
their land for farming. However, in reality, the new-built houses usually are far away from 
their farming land. These conditions are not suitable for China’s agricultural model, in which 
each peasant has a small amount of land instead of large farmland. Moreover, peasants’ 
living costs also increase in this process: they need to pay more for utility bills, as well as for 
food which they used to grow on land adjacent to their previous houses. Therefore, the 
urbanisation projects actually have created many difficulties for those who are willing to 
continue farming. Peasants are in fact deprived by the Party-State, whether they end up with 
or without access to land, with only some exceptions in areas very close to big cities (for 
example, local residents in some Chengzhongcun in Shenzhen or Beijing).   
 
Finally, “access to land”, as described by Arrighi mentioned earlier, in reality cannot 
guarantee peasants’ ownership and use of the land, nor can it ensure that peasants will not be 
involved in capitalist production. In other words, even for those peasants who still live from 
agricultural production, who neither move to cities nor become migrant workers, “access to 
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land” cannot entirely guarantee their livelihood. For example, Zhang and Donaldson studied 
the capitalist forms of agrarian production taking hold in farming activities where peasants 
sell “labor to the owner of substantial land rights and capital” (Zhang and Donaldson, 2010: 
459); see also Zhang and Donaldson, 2008). They found this to be on the rise in rural China. 
Therefore, even though in practice, “access to land” is more than official rhetoric, peasants 
can still end up mostly involved in capitalist production within the broader Chinese context.  
 
To sum up, what is seen by some as the main characteristic of “socialist” China – peasants’ 
equal access to land – has already lost its socialist essence and has largely been subsumed by 
capitalist mode of production.  
 
3.3. Domestic Enterprise Ownership 
 
Another main aspect of debates on China’s economy relates to the ownership of domestic 
enterprise. From a classical Marxist point of view, the capitalist system is based on the 
commodification of labour and exploitation of surplus-value from workers (Marx, 1867). 
This mode of production by its very nature leads to crisis, either because of under-
consumption or over-accumulation. On the one hand, capitalists need to lower wages as much 
as possible to squeeze more profits. On the other hand, this low level of wages leads to 
insufficient consumption of products from workers, thus causing the crisis of under-
consumption. There are several attempts from within the capitalist system, such as 
Keynesians, Roosevelt’s New Deal, and the welfare state, i.e. demand-side economics, which 
attempt to solve this problem by creating jobs and providing for basic needs through state 
intervention. These policies, however, have been condemned to failure after the 1970s.  
Moreover, there is another related issue: the accumulation of capital would finally reach a 
point at which capital cannot be invested to extract profits from the domestic market 
anymore. This is the crisis of over-accumulation of capital. This then leads capitalists to 
invest capital in foreign countries. In the contemporary capitalist world system, every nation 
state, especially less developed countries, tries to attract more investment through lowering 
tax for transnational corporations. The resulting flows of capital have led to an asymmetric 
world system. They have also caused problems for modern capitalist welfare states. 
Inequality is one of these negative consequences.  
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This mechanics of the capitalist system partly explain why TVEs and SOEs are important in 
the debates about China’s economy: they are involved in the redistribution of profits/capital. 
The basic idea behind public ownership is that local governments (townships and villages) or 
the state can be involved in the redistribution of profits from production, thus decreasing 
exploitation in enterprises. The ideal type of public or state ownership would market-
oriented, however with workers owning the means of production, controlling how to run the 
enterprises, and equally distributing profits of production. As Arrighi understands it, TVEs 
should be “collectively owned” with “a variety of local arrangements and practices” (Arrighi, 
2007: 362–3). The main features include management authority held by local governments, 
assigned allocation of profits, and in general a transformation of ownership from collective to 
private (ibid.). Arrighi believes that the innovation and development of TVEs has contributed 
to “the success of reforms” for four reasons: by absorbing rural surplus-value and increasing 
rural income, by increasing competition in the market, by contributing to local tax revenue 
thus alleviating the tax burden of peasants, and by reinvesting back to improve local 
conditions (ibid.: 263-4). Due to these reasons, he argues that China is facing “accumulation 
without dispossession” and thus a path different from a capitalist one (ibid.: 361). Stiglitz 
also argues that TVEs are an effective way to prevent public assets from being appropriated 
by private capitalists (Stiglitz, 2006). Many economists and social scientists share this view 
and praise the innovation of TVEs ( Roland, 2000: 282; Naughton, 2018: 271). It is claimed 
that TVEs are not only magically efficient micro-economic forms, but also that they 
guarantee the protection of public interests.  
 
However, the real situation of TVEs is more complex than this view. For one thing, TVEs are 
not based on collective ownership as believed by many Western economists. Rather, as 
Huang Yasheng points out, “the official definition and the official data include both TVEs 
controlled by townships and TVEs controlled by private entrepreneurs” (Y Huang, 2008: 75). 
TVEs are a “locational concept – enterprises located in the townships and villages” (ibid.: 
77). In another word, the category of the TVEs includes collective enterprises, private-owned 
enterprises and household businesses. In a more detailed breakdown of the different types of 
TVEs, Huang, using official data from the Ministry of Agriculture from 1985 to 2002, shows 
that “private TVEs absolutely dominated the total pool of TVEs” (ibid.: 78). In 2002, there 
were 0.73 million units of collective TVEs, 2.3 million private TVEs and 18.3 household 
businesses. As to number of employees, collective TVEs hired 38 million persons (this 
number was 41.5 in 1985), private 35 (4.75 in 1985) and household businesses 59.8 (23.5 in 
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1985) (ibid.: 79). This convincingly shows that TVEs in China are not all collectively owned, 
as opposed to the consensus view. Rather, the private sector increasingly dominates TVEs.  
These TVEs were “private operations in all but name” (Harvey, 2005: 129). This finding is in 
line with China’s privatisation since the 1980s (Jefferson and Su, 2006).   
 
Moreover, the power relations within TVEs only serve to make the situation more complex. 
First of all, the private ownership of TVEs means that employees do not hold the right to 
organise themselves and control the production process. Secondly, the privatisation of 
previously collectively owned TVEs has led a to massive change of public assets from public 
into private hands of local elites (for more discussion on this topic, see section 3.5). 
Therefore, the ideal type of TVEs described by Arrighi, controlled and owned by workers, is 
far from the real situation. Smythe, when expressing his concerns in the 1970s about China’s 
path to developing ICTs, made a similar mistake (Zhao, 2007). He assumed that the official 
rhetoric of the “mass line” describes a democratic form of decision-making. However, in 
reality “mass line” “was easily subverted from above and from below” (ibid., 95). Therefore, 
the power dynamic in TVEs was never a democratic socialist one.  
 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have also seen a steady decline in importance in China’s 
economy. As shown by statistics about structural changes in employment in China between 
1980 and 2002, the number of workers employed by SOEs dropped from 67 million in 1980 
to 35.3 million, while the number of employees in private companies multiplied from 0.8 
million in 1980 to 42.7 (Harvey, 2005: 128). Moreover, SOEs have experienced 
transformation into limited liability or shareholding companies, and later into “share-based 
co-operatives” and even full foreign ownership. They are also allowed to hire “contract 
workers” with little social protections and insurance. In general, manufacturing employment 
has seen a dramatic decrease since the 1990s (ibid.).  More specifically in the electronic 
components manufacturing sector, SOEs only account for 8.3 percent of the annual sales 
income as compared to 91.7 percent coming from private, shareholding and foreign-invested 
enterprises (Hong, 2011b: 45).  
 
Moreover, similar to the situation of TVEs, the current ownership of SOEs is not held by the 
people, but by the Party-State. Before the reforms of the 1980s, “public ownership” 
(gongyouzhi) meant collective ownership and enterprises “owned by the whole people” 
(quanmin suoyouzhi) (Zhu, 2018: 11). The administrative institutions were only 
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representatives of this “ownership by the whole people”. However, after these reforms, the 
“ownership by the whole people” has been transformed to state ownership. These state-
owned enterprises actually include wholly state-owned companies or enterprises of with the 
state is the sole investor, or companies in which the state has a stake, whether controlling or 
non-controlling. As Zhu points out, the main difference between capitalism and socialism is 
in fact ownership by the whole people, not the state (ibid.). Moreover, without proper 
democratic popular control, public ownership could easily lead to “an actual separation of 
the popular working classes from the means of production and distribution” (Wu, 2005: 49, 
italics in original). Changes which happened to workers’ conditions in the ICT industries 
reflect this phenomenon very well. As illustrated by Zhao, industrial workers soon lost their 
control over production and technological innovation once privatisation of SOEs and the 
“digital revolution” took hold in China, as technocratic elites seized power (Zhao, 2007).  
Therefore, the actual situation of ownership of SOEs has already lost its original purpose as a 
socialist means to protect the people’s ownership and property rights. 
 
3.4. Foreign Relationships  
 
Another type of ownership that is important in China is foreign-invested enterprises. China’s 
fast export-driven development is inseparable from the country’s position in the world 
capitalist system and represents one of the main characteristics of China’s political economy. 
Figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 show the development of FDI inflows into China. China’s 
development accounts for a large part of the increase of FDI inflows in developing 
economies in general. According to Zhao Ziyang’s account, there were serious debates and 
divergences within the CCP during the first years of reforms on the issue of allowing foreign 
investment (Zhao et al., 2009: 102). These disputes within the party leadership might partly 
explain the weak legal protections and limited success of foreign capitalist enterprises in the 
1980s observed by Harvey (Harvey, 2005: 130). Neither was export-led growth a planning 
priority at the beginning of the reforms. It was not until 1987 with the successful experiments 
in Guangdong that the party started to accepted this developmental path (ibid.: 135). The 
1990s then saw the first peak of FDI inflows into China as well as foreign trade, after the full 
establishment of the Reform and Open Up Policy in 1992 following Deng’s “southern tour”. 
During the beginning of the 2000s there was a second peak partly because of China joining 
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into the WTO in 2001. The general economic trends and political arrangements indicate 













Figure 3.7. Percentage share of China's FDI inflows in relation to developing economies as 
a whole, data source: UNCTAD 
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While China is one of the most attractive countries for investment, the majority of China’s 
FDI comes from one region or area. Figure 3.8 shows the eleven most attractive economies 
for FDI in 2015. They together compose 62% of worldwide FDI inward flows.  While the 
five leading economies for FDI are the U.S. (22%), Hong Kong (6%), UK (6%), China (excl. 
HK, 5%), and Germany (5%), if Hong Kong is included, China is the second-largest country 
in terms of cumulative FDI.  However, as shown in Figure 3.9, more than 83% of the total 
value of inward FDI actually utilised by China in 2015 comes from Asia. Moreover, Hong 
Kong is the leading source of mainland China’s FDI (Figure 3.10), ranging from 30% to 70% 
of the total value in different years (about the relationship between China’s FDI and Hong 
Kong, see Nolan, 2012) (data from UNCTAD). Figure 3.11 further shows the other top 4 
Asian countries that are sources for China’s FDI.  
 
Figure 3.8. Percentage share of worldwide FDI inward flows in 2015, by selected economies, 
data source: UNCTAD. 
 
 




Figure 3.10. Percentage share of HK FDI in total value of FDI actually utilised by China, 
data source: UNCTAD 
 
 
Figure 3.11. Percentage share of other Asian countries’ FDI in total value of FDI actually 
utilised by China (top 4 excluding HK), data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
While political restrictions could be one of the main reasons for this dependency on FDI from 
one area or region, there is little doubt that China is continuously opening up to foreign 
investment. According to the 2016 world investment report published by UNCTAD, China 
and India are said to be “most active in opening up various industries to foreign investors” 
(UNCTAD, 2016: 90). According to the report, China has loosened restrictions on foreign 
investment in the real estate market, the manufacturing sector and certain service sectors 
(ibid.).  
 
At the same time, China’s outward investment is increasing (See Figure 3.12), which leads to 
questions such as “Is China buying out the world?”. However, as shown in Figure 3.12, FDI 
outflow still makes up only a small part of GDP, and net outflow is still smaller than net 
inflow. As stated by Nolan in 2012, “two thirds of China’s outward FDI would go to Hong 
Kong”, and “China would hardly participate in mergers and acquisitions of TNCs” (Fuchs, 
2015: 249). However, this situation is also changing rapidly. As shown in Figure 3.12, since 
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2013, China’s investment outflow has grown dramatically, and the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), necessitates closer observation of this tendency. As observed by Lee, Chinese state 
capital has distinct characteristics compared to global private capital. One such characteristic 
is that Chinese foreign investment focuses on mining, construction and manufacturing 
industries (Lee, 2018). It is also worth noting that Chinese state capital plays a crucial role in 
China’s global capital expansion with the aim to strengthen China’s political influence all 
over the world.  
 
 
Figure 3.12. Foreign Direct Investment, net outflow and inflow (% of Chinese GDP), 
Mainland China (excl. HK, Macao), data source: World Development Indicators 
(26/05/2017) 
 
The privatisation of TVEs and SOEs as well as the opening up to foreign investment in China 
has led to further exploitation of workers. In an estimate created by Huang from two different 
sets of data of private-sector shares of industrial value added/profits in large Chinese 
industrial firms, both datasets show increases of indigenous and foreign private ownership (Y 
Huang, 2008: 15). According to the OECD data, the sum of indigenous and foreign private 
sector ownership has increased from 28.9% in 1998 to 44.7% in 2001 and 71.2% in 2005. In 
to the Guangdong Statistical Manual, the change in private ownership is estimated differently 
(31.8% in 1998, 38.8% in 2001 and 50.8% in 2005). Despite the differences, both data sets 
show the increasing domination of capitalist private ownership in China. As Li points out, 
both Chinese and foreign capitalists can profit from “intense and massive exploitation” in the 
 63 
Chinese capitalist system (Li, 2008: 27). According to his estimate, the wage share has 
dropped from “51–52 percent in the 1980s to 38 percent in the early 2000s” (ibid.: 28). To 
sum up, the ownership changes of TVEs, SOEs, and foreign-invested enterprises since the 
1990s show the increasing dominance of the capitalist mode of production in the industrial 
sector in China.  
3.5. Political Reforms and the Party-State 
 
The role of the Party-State is arguably the most controversial issue in analyses of China’s 
reform drive. In the literature, there are three main stances regarding the role of the state and 
potential political reforms from the 1990s onwards. Proponents of all of these positions agree 
that democratisation is the ultimate goal of China’s political reforms to some extent, but they 
disagree on how and when these political reforms should happen.  
 
The first position puts forward the view that modernisation in developing countries is 
possible, if not only possible, through authoritarian rule and a strong state (Yang and He, 
1994). This perspective is popularised by the so-called New Authoritarianism or New 
Conservatism in China (representatives of this view include Wu Jiaxiang, Zhang Bingjiu and 
Xiao Gongqin). People who hold this perspective believe that New Authoritarianism is 
suitable for the early stage of modernisation in third-world developing countries. What makes 
it different from the ‘old’ authoritarian is that its ultimate goal is democracy. However, 
because of the lack of existing democratic and civil society institutions in developing 
countries, it is difficult to develop the economy or pursue modernisation in these societies 
using the power of democracy. Therefore, in order to pursue the goal of development, it is 
necessary to build a new political authority and political monopoly in order to drive 
economic development and economic liberalisation. To sum up, according to this position, 
stability is the most important feature needed for China to develop its economy, thus a strong 
state is necessary at this stage in China’s development. The position of New Authoritarianism 
is that the development of a liberal economy will gradually, eventually bring democracy (Lu, 
2009). These arguments are based on the examples of the Asian Four Tigers and 
Huntington’s theory in Political Order in Changing Societies. A main characteristic of New 
Authoritarianism is the separation of economic reforms from political reforms.  
 
 64 
However, this argument has been highly criticised since its early days. Critics point out that 
New Authoritarianism holds an idealised assumption of political power (Yang and He, 1994). 
New Authoritarianism is based on expectations that the government will democratise itself 
after economic liberalisation. However, taking into account the deep entanglements of 
political and economic interests in the hands of the powerful, this is unlikely to happen. The 
main precondition needed for New Authoritarianism, i.e. the separation of politics and the 
economy, is also not a reality in China. Social problems such as corruption take hold exactly 
because of political power, not because of the lack of it. Moreover, New Authoritarianism 
believes that economic development will lead to a stronger civil society. However, what is 
missing from this view is the fact that civil society does not come automatically but needs to 
be cultivated and struggled for. Experiences from Latin American hace illustrated that 
economic development does not necessarily lead to democratisation (Diamond et al., 1999). 
Examples from the Asian Four Tigers cannot apply to China directly either (Zheng, 2004: 
176). For one thing, the so-called “East Asian model” countries developed within an 
environment that was conditioned by the Cold War and advanced capitalist countries’ 
transformation from Fordism to post-Fordism. The Asian Four Tigers received support from 
the U.S. and developed through growing their manufacturing industries. This development 
path has also led to their military and economic dependency on the U.S. For China, these 
preconditions do not exist anymore, and the U.S. is unlikely to support a more competitive 
Chinese economy (Liu, 1994; Zheng, 2004). Moreover, the examples of Taiwan and Hong 
Kong have shown that the coming together of several factors led to political reforms, not 
economic development alone (So and May, 1993).  
 
The second position also emphasises the importance of the Party-State, however this is 
argued from a different and more left-wing perspective (e.g. Hu Angang, Wang Hui, Kuang 
Xinnian, Cui Zhiyuan, Lin Chun, Lv Xinyv; for more discussions related to this New Left 
discourse, see Xu, 2000; Wang, 2002, 2003; Zheng, 2004: 174–7). This stance takes a global 
perspective, and its proponents argue that in the asymmetric capitalist world system, the CCP 
“remained the only institution powerful enough to shield national unity and to bring itself…to 
the authority of constitutionalism and legality” (Lin, 2006: 4, although in the corresponding 
endnote, she holds a more negative view about the CCP, see Note 4, 289). This view is based 
on de-colonisation theory, dependency theory and world system theory. It puts forward a 
sceptical view of globalisation and foreign capital, which includes opposition to the FDI-
driven approach of development. Moreover, this perspective emphasises the historical 
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heritage of the CCP from its revolutionary past and its official ideological claims to guarantee 
that the needs of the population will be met (Lin, 2006: 6; Riskin, 1987: 319). Its defenders 
also believe in the potential for political reform and democratisation within the CCP. For 
example, there is a consensus view that there are political struggles and factions within the 
CCP (Lin, 2006: 3,6; Meng, 2018; Zhao, 2012: 167). To summarise this position, because of 
the revolutionary past of the CCP and the necessity of having a strong national state that can 
defend national interests in the global capitalist world system, scholars with this point of view 
anchor their hope for China to be able to fight neoliberalism and serve people’s interests to 
the CCP.  
 
However, there are several flaws in the arguments put forward by this position. For one, it is 
argued here that the CCP will defend China’s national interests against global capital because 
of the CCP’s revolutionary history. However, it is difficult to say to what extent the elites in 
the Party these days still serve to defend the national interest of China, and more specifically, 
the Chinese people. For example, some critical scholars have pointed out the active 
collaboration of elites from the core and peripheral countries, through which the self-interests 
of these elites move to the fore at the expense of national concerns (Robinson, 2012). At the 
same time, this criticism should not lead to a blanket denial of the role of states in the global 
South when it comes to defining and defending national interests in relation to processes of 
globalisation and neo-liberalisation. However, it is too early to reach a conclusion on this 
actually being the case with the Chinese state. As opposed to defending its citizens against 
global market pressures, the Chinese government is notorious for attacking labour rights and 
implementing policies in favour of FDI, local governments are known for grabbing land from 
peasants, and all levels of government are notorious for corruption (see for example Lee, 
2007; Ngai, 2005, 2016).  
 
Moreover, advocates of this stance believe that the Chinese model is concerned with “how 
not to lose the people and their interests and power central to government commitment and 
policy decisions” (Lin, 2010: 72). However, concentration of power is more likely to lead to 
inequality in redistribution. As much as I agree with the arguments that systemic economic 
reforms would not “be possible without thorough political changes” (Lin, 2006, p3), there is 
one more important question: how much deeper can these political changes and even reforms 
reach without encompassing more wide-ranging institutional changes such as restrictions of 
power, transparency of information and freedom of speech. At this point, left-wing advocates 
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of the Party-State may make the same mistake as the New Authoritarianism advocators: they 
are motivated by a somewhat naive belief that the political and economic elites (most of the 
time they are the same groups of people) would be willing to give up their privilege 
voluntarily. Contrary to the romanticised notion of benevolent political power, people’s 
everyday life experiences and many studies have proven that economic reforms without 
simultaneous sufficient political reforms have led to massive corruption, violation of people’s 
basic rights, removal of peasants from their land, violent exploitation of workers (including 
both migrant workers and workers from previous SOEs), and people being deprived of basic 
education, healthcare and housing, all of which are the most profound achievements from 
Mao’s era (see also the discussions about crony capitalism in section 3.1).  
 
More detailed examination and research has highlighted the positive correspondences 
between concentration of power and corruption, even before China’s reforms (D Huang, 
2008; Yang, 2007). Since the late 1980s, there was a prominent debate on whether China’s 
economic transformation would change the political power structure. The debate originated 
with the publication of Victor Nee’s “market transition theory”. Victor Nee argued that 
China’s economic transition would change the dominance of the administrative power 
structures over the distribution of resources, thus will be more advantageous to direct 
producers, including peasants, workers, and small entrepreneurs (Nee, 1989). However, in 
later research, he found that a handover of power from the political elites to direct producers 
without political power was not particularly prevalent (Nee, 1991). Other studies of rural (Oi, 
1992) and urban areas (Bian and Logan, 1996) also prove the limitations of Nee’s market 
transition theory. Rona-Tas thus argues that China’s economic transition actually provides 
new ways for those in positions of political power to acquire economic and social benefits 
(Rona-Tas, 1994). Parish and Michelson further point out that economic transition actually is 
a political transition, during which the political elites can gain more benefits for themselves 
through influencing the new ways in which power and resources are distributed (Parish and 
Michelson, 1996). After separating “cadres” with real power from those without, they show 
that through China’s transformation its administrative powers gained even more benefits than 
they had before. To sum up, the expectation to arrive at equality and democracy without 
thorough institutional changes probably is just a wishful fancy. Concentration of power has 




Contrary to the first two views that have been discussed, the third perspective proposes a 
more dramatic reform of political systems, which is best illustrated by liberal economists. 
Leading liberal economists have argued that some of the social issues in China, such as 
corruption, inefficient productivity, inequity and lack of welfare, are attributed to the 
inefficient institutions created by the visible hand of the state (Y Huang, 2008: 276). This 
kind of thinking has even been published in official newspapers such as Beijing Youth and on 
the People’s Daily website, argued by leading economist Wu JingLian (Wu, 2001). Some 
have classified Chinese economy as crony capitalism or statist capitalism (Pei, 2008, see also 
Huang’s summary of this point of view in Huang, 2008: 276). These writers have voiced 
strong criticism regarding the corruption caused by the current power relations and the 
political system in China. For example, Zhu Jiaming, one of the most important reformers 
from the 1980s, criticises the process of privatisation of SOEs and the appropriation of public 
interests by officials or managers (Zhu, 2013: 118–9).   
 
When considering the range of these arguments, the actual situation in China is probably 
closest to the blueprint of China’s development proposed by the advocators of New 
Authoritarianism. According to the account given by Yang, Deng Xiaoping encountered the 
ideas of New Authoritarianism in 1988 and modelled his strategy for holding political power 
in a developing economy in accordance with this idea (Yang, 2004: 546). The current pattern 
of Xi’s strong leadership also shows the party’s continuing aversion to political reforms. 
From the perspective of power relations, the economic transition actually strengthened and 
benefitted political power holders (in terms of the stability and political legitimacy gained by 
the CCP via economic development). There are clear correlations between economic and 
political power. Some thus perceive China’s political economy as “crony capitalism” (Pei, 
2016) or a combination of authoritarianism with neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005).  
3.6. Contradictions in Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics 
and the Decline of Socialist Welfare 
 
Just as it is undeniable that China has achieved huge successes in developing its economy and 
decreasing absolute poverty, there is also little doubt about the decline of socialist welfare in 
China. The heritage of socialist welfare from Mao’s era and its subsequent decline are 
important features of China’s contemporary political economy.  
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First of all, during Mao’s era, China has achieved admirable progress in several areas (Lin, 
2006; Meisner, 1999). For example, in his historical study of China’s contemporary history, 
Meisner outlines several achievements of Mao’s socialist government. First of all, during 
Mao’s era, China has transformed from “a primarily agrarian country to a relatively 
industrialized nation”. Secondly, this industrialisation has changed China’s social structure, 
in terms of an increase in industrial workers and technological intellectuals. Thirdly, several 
“mammoth irrigation and water control works” were constructed which are beneficial to 
agricultural production and have helped increase productivity (Meisner, 1999: 415–6). 
Moreover, during Mao’s era popular welfare in terms of education and health improved 
(ibid.: 419). These achievements paved the way for the fast industrial development in both 
urban and rural areas after Mao (Andreas, 2010; Naughton, 1996). Any assessment of Mao’s 
era cannot ignore this historical socialist heritage. To some extent, China’s current 
development continues on from the modernisation of Mao’s era (Lin, 2006: 1–2), and the 
CCPs continued political legitimacy is connected to this (Meng, 2018).  
 
On the other hand, it is undeniable that Mao’s era has also included disasters in Chinese 
history, in terms of the devastation of traditional culture and large numbers of dead (Yang, 
2012). It would be a lack of common sense to emphasise the benefits coming from 
industrialisation over the massive numbers of deaths of human beings. Moreover, though 
impressive achievements were made from 1949 to 1978, economic development was 
extremely unbalanced between the industrial and agricultural sectors, and between urban and 
rural areas. Economic efficiency and people’s living standards, especially for peasants in 
rural areas, barely increased (Meisner, 1999: 418–9; Zhao et al., 2009: 112). In terms of 
politics, while Mao launched several political movements to practice his “continuous 
revolution” theory to stop corruption within the Party, almost all of these movements failed – 
either because of external threats (such as the Soviet Union) or of the power struggles within 
the Party. Most importantly, these political movements failed to establish real democratic 
socialist institutions (Meisner, 1999: 369–70), though they might have planted seeds relating 
to ideas of rights and struggles into peasants’ and workers’ minds. Several recent Maoist 
struggles in China (e.g. the Jasic Incident) demonstrates this long-lasting influence of 
Maoism and the social movement tradition beyond Mao’s era.   
 
Therefore, after Mao’s death, it is safe to say that in China both the left and liberal sides of 
the political spectrum, as well as both officials and the public, supported reforms and the 
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development of a market economy. For the liberal side, the capitalist market represented the 
way to bring political liberation to the people. For the left side, following a more or less 
deterministic view meant that if socialism is the ultimate goal for China, developing a 
capitalist market economy would be “unavoidable” as the “preliminary phase in the potential 
commitment of any society to liberating itself from historical capitalism on the long route to 
socialism/communism” (Amin, 2013; 71; also see the official discourses of the Primary Stage 
of Socialism). As controversial as this argument is, there is a consensus among the left and 
the right that a market economy is necessary for economic development in China.  
 
China has seen massive growth since these reforms. First and foremost, China has succeeded 
in alleviating poverty (Amin, 2013; Lin, 2006). For example, China’s “gigantic antipoverty 
project” has reduced the number of people living below China’s subsistence line from 250 
million in 1977 to 50 million in 2003 (Lin, 2006: 7). As Amin claims, China’s recent 
development shows a “striking contrast” to the “former China of hunger and extreme 
poverty” (Amin, 2013: 70). Moreover, China’s reform has involved massive urbanisation, 
accommodating around 400 million new urban inhabitants over two decades (ibid.: 73). 
Along with this urbanisation, there are parallel developments in infrastructure, transport, 
financial systems and diversity of consumer commodities (ibid.). The spectacular 
development China has experienced might be one of the reasons why scholars and the whole 
world is obsessed with understanding this Chinese model, and why there are numerous 
debates on whether China is a socialist or a capitalist country. 
 
However, trying to deny the fact that China has become a capitalist society and thus shares 
some issues with other capitalist societies would be counterproductive. In contemporary 
China, even the most devoted enthusiasts of the Party-State have to admit the decline of 
socialist welfare. For example, Lin has pointed out the social issues brought by the neoliberal 
form of development after the late 1970s. These issues include “overcapacity”, decline of 
social welfare (such as education and public health care), increase of inequalities along 
regional, sectoral, class, gender, ethnic and other dimensions, as well as increase of 
corruption in parallel with increased FDI (Lin, 2006: 8–10). Harvey also points out the 
inequalities between rural and urban areas, regional inequalities, proletarianisation and 
exploitation of wage labourers, the privileged status of party members, government officials, 
capitalists and bankers, as well as a reconstitution of class power (Harvey, 2005: 142–151).  
 
 70 
Inequality has increased dramatically. Sun uses the term “Cleavage of the society” to 
describe the social inequality and the unbalanced development in China since the 1990s (Sun, 
2003). Hu and his colleagues referred to China as “one country, four worlds”, pointing out 
the huge inequalities between different regions, areas, and social structures in China in 2001 
(Hu et al., 2001). In a book edited by Whyte, the authors claim that there are two societies 
within China due to rural-urban inequality (Whyte, 2010). These observations were made one 
or two decades ago. Though the situation has improved now, especially with economic 
growth in poorer regions, inequality is still high. The GINI index mentioned in the first 
section of this chapter (3.1) illustrates the high level of inequality in China. Along with the 
dissolution of SOEs, TVEs and the commune system, the social care system, especially in the 
rural areas, has been damaged: housing, and education have become burdens covered by most 
people privately. The neoliberal development has brought sharp conflict between (domestic 
and foreign) capital and workers. Recent examples include manufacturing workers’ suicides 
at Foxconn factories and the “996, ICU” movement of programmers. Moreover, since the 
economic crisis in 2008, the government has realised the limitations of the export-oriented 
development path, and thus incessantly promotes domestic consumption. Consumerism has 
been prominent all over China. Finally, as Meng points out, the economic reforms have not 
only led to increasing economic and social inequality but also to unequal distribution of 
symbolic resources  (Meng, 2018: 12–3; Meng and Huang, 2017). The developments of party 
organs on the one hand and commercial media at the other have made it more difficult for 
disadvantaged groups to produce and distribute their own meaning and symbols. Therefore, 
the decline of many aspects of the socialist heritage since the reforms is clearly visible.  
 
To summarise, in terms of contradictions, China shares some contradictions with other 
capitalist countries: overproduction and under-consumption, and overaccumulation of capital 
(Fuchs, 2015; Harvey, 2005). Moreover, based on the preceding discussion in this chapter, 
one can identity several unique contradictions shaping the Chinese political economy (see 
Table 3.2). The first one is that the “equal access to land” which is mentioned in official 
discourses cannot guarantee peasants’ rights. Land distribution and land rights in reality are 
much more complex, especially with significant corruption in governments at local and 
village levels. Moreover, as part of the process of urbanisation in China, more peasants have 
become migrant workers, living in the cities partly or entirely. They have become de-facto 
wage labours. On the other hand, the current land system cannot serve the interests or 
guarantee the rights of those who still live on the land and are farming. In addition, new 
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developments of urbanisation after the 2000s have made the situation of peasants worse, by 
further depriving peasants of their land, which was instead used for urban construction. These 
developments have either thrown more peasants into wage labour or made it harder for 
peasants to live on their land. There are some exceptional cases in which peasants benefit 
from urbanisation, especially in geographical locations which are close to cities, where 
peasants can get paid a large amount of money for their land. However, for most peasants 
who live in remote areas who and are living off farming activities, the new developments 
cannot improve their livelihood. Peasants are still highly deprived in China’s modernisation 
process.  
 
Secondly, the tendency for privatisation of SOEs and TVEs after the reforms is clearly 
noticeable. TVEs are not always collectively owned in reality, no matter what the official 
discourse implies. The privatisation of TVEs has led to huge levels of corruption at different 
levels of government. Similarly, the actual ownership of SOEs worth investigating. There is a 
substantial difference between being “owned by the whole people” and beign owned by the 
state. In most cases, SOEs in China are in state ownership, which means that it cannot be 
guaranteed that they are run in the public interest. Similarly to what happened with TVEs, 
massive levels of corruption occurred during the privatisation of SOEs, and workers’ rights 
were dismantled significantly during the process.  
 
Thirdly, FDI has become an important part of China’s export-driven development strategy, 
especially after the 1990s. Foreign ownership of enterprises has increased dramatically. This 
illustrates China’s position in the global capitalist system. Moreover, while the government 
hopes to learn from the Asian Four Tigers, i.e. through utilising foreign capital to bring in 
new technologies, upgrading management skills and workers’ skills, the real situation is 
different for China. Opening to FDI has led China into a downstream position in the global 
capitalist manufacturing system. China has become famous as the “world factory” with 
workers experiencing increased exploitation.  
 
Finally, while the country is gradually changing from a centre-planned commanding-height 
economy into a “market economy”, the government is still playing a conspicuous role in the 
economy. The lack of democratic reform has led to a loss of large amounts of public assets 
into the hands of the powerful at different levels of government, for example, through land 
redistribution in rural areas, construction in the process of urbanisation, and privatisation of 
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SOEs and TVEs. The leaked Panama Papers also contain evidence of the involvement in 
corruption of several leaders in the central government. Therefore, it might be safe to say that 
without thoroughly democratic political reforms, the problem of corruption and unequal 
redistribution of wealth will continue to exist for a long time.  
 
Along with these developments since the beginning of the reform process, China’s socialist 
heritage from Mao’s era has declined. Inequality has dramatically increased, social welfare 
(education, health care and housing) has declined, and precarious and unsecure labour have 
dominated the jobs market. These contradictions and the decline of the socialist tradition, 
according to the discussions of ideology in Chapter 2, are the basis for the understanding of 
contemporary ideologies prevalent in Chinese society. Moreover, ICT development is not 
only part of this neoliberal development (as Schiller states, China and ICT as two “pillars” of 
digital capitalism), it is also seen to be able to solve all problems encountered in the course of 
China’s development. Recent policies have focused on using ICTs as a means to update 
traditional industries and to solve social issues such as poverty and inequality without 
necessarily changing social relations. Acknowledging that China has turned to capitalism is 
thus crucial to identify the ideological discourses which disguise this reality.  
 
Capitalist contradictions share in common: 
Overproduction, underconsumption, over-
accumulation of capital 
Class struggles and social relations 
Ownership issue: ‘equal access to land’ 
cannot guarantee peasants’ ownership and 
rights in reality.  
Social relations between the State, capital 
and peasants and migrant workers 
Ownership issue: SOEs and TVEs are not 
de facto collectively owned since the 
privatisation. 
Social relations between the State, capital 
and workers 
Capital and ownership issue: FDI has 
become an important part of China’s export-
driven development strategy after the 1990s  
Social relations between the international 
capital, the State, and workers 
Political reform: the government is still 
playing a conspicuous role in the economy.  
Social relations between the State, domestic 
capital, and workers 
Decline of Socialist Heritage   Social security for the working class 
worsens 
Table 3.1. Contradictions under Chinese Capitalism and the corresponding social relations.  
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CHAPTER 4. DIGITAL DISCOURSE IN ADVANCED 
CAPITALIST SOCIETIES 
 
This chapter will review the literature on digital discourse in advanced capitalist societies. 
Based on discussions on ideology in Chapter 2, there are two main categories of functions of 
ideology: disguise or misrepresent the reality, and legitimate existing reality and immortalise 
the current social order.  
 
This chapter will, first of all, discuss the prevalent ideology to understand the relationship 
between technology and society – technological determinism (4.1). It will then focus on 
technology ideologies that are specifically related to the capitalist economy, in production, 
exchange and consumption processes (4.2). Thirdly, this chapter will try to bridge analysis of 
ideology and discourse to a political economic analysis of the Internet-related issues (4.3). 
Section 4.4 will turn its focus to review technology discourses in the political arena. Finally, 
this chapter will provide a summary of digital discourse in advanced capitalist societies. This 
summary will serve as a framework for further analysis.  
4.1. Technological Determinism  
One prevalent approach to understanding the relationship between technology and society is 
that technology shapes society. Every time a new type of medium is introduced into the 
society, a binary discussion of either optimist or pessimist views about the technology begins. 
This was the case when radio, television and cable TV were introduced to society, as well as 
for the Internet.  As pointed out by Fenton, both approaches of understanding media are 
reductive and partly come from a media centrism, failing to capture complex relationships 
between new technologies and societies (Fenton, 2012: 124). 
 
Many scholars have contributed to the discussions about technological determinism (TD). 
Distinctions have been made through the so-called ‘spectrum’ between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
theories of TD (Marx and Smith, 1994: pxii, or see a revisit of TD made by Heilbroner, 1994: 
74–7; MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999: 4). Several researchers have objected to this 
distinction between hard and soft theories of TD (Bimber, 1994; Misa, 1988; Robertson, 
1992). Some scholars have distinguished technological optimism from technological 
pessimism (or in Kling’s term as technological utopian and anti-utopian, 1994; Fuchs 2011). 
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Within these differences, two dimensions about technological determinism are settled. To be 
technological deterministic, whether techno-optimist or techno-pessimist, means that (1) the 
development of technology has its own logic, and (2) new technology, as an independent 
agency alone or as a secondary force in collaboration with other social agencies, has great 
influences on societies, no matter if the consequences are considered good or bad 
(MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999).  It either neglects the complex development of technology 
or holds a deterministic view that ICT will automatically bring a better or worse world in 
terms of economy, politics and culture. Furthermore, Fisher identifies a third assumption 
regarding technological determinism – ‘benevolence’ – that technological progress is related 
to human progress and in itself positive  (Fisher, 2010: 17).  
 
First of all, technological determinism means isolation of technology from society. It sees the 
development of technologies happening in a fixed, predictable and necessary sequence, as 
ruled by a naturally given law independent from social forces. TD neglects the social forces 
in the development and application of technologies, such as economic, political, cultural and 
even individual factors (for case studies about how these factors could influence the 
development of technologies, see Mackenzie and Wajcman, 1999). In some deeper latent 
assumptions, TD asserts that, in the long term, only those intrinsically best technologies can 
survive. Thus technology will develop in certain ways. However, this is not a tenable 
argument, as argued by some scholars with a social construction approach or applying actor-
network theory (ANT). The so-called ‘best’ is more about a concept constructed by society 
and less about the technology itself (for the social construction approach see (Bijker, Hughes 
and Pinch, 1987; Bijker, 1997, and about ANT see Callon, 1986; Latour, 1996; Law and 
Hassard, 1999).  
 
Moreover, technologies are seen as either scapegoat or elixir for social issues. TD argues that 
certain economic, social and cultural changes (i.e. social structures) will automatically evolve 
by adapting specific technologies. It asserts that society can only evolve in a certain 
sequence. In other words, it is a claim of historical necessities over contingencies. It neglects 
the complexity and uncertainty in the development of technology and its mutual construction 
with society (for critiques of the arguments about automatic changes, see Staudenmaier, 
1985; Cohen, 2000; Kling, Rosenbaum and Sawyer, 2005; Fuchs, 2011).  
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Another techno-determinist assumption is that technological development is human progress 
(for critiques of this argument, see Marx, 1987; Smith, 1986, 1994). In general, this 
perspective perceives technological improvement is the basis for and an index of social 
progress.  It assumes that any innovations and changes in technologies “almost certainly 
would be for better” (Marx, 1987: 33). However, the danger of this assumption is that if 
technology advancement becomes a means and an end of itself, then it no longer serves its 
genuine ultimate goal – progressive development of the society and humankind. Within 
capitalist systems, technological innovations could serve the interests of capital accumulation 
or political domination, instead of a better and more equal society.  
 
In media and communication studies, TD argues for a deterministic understanding of certain 
‘effects’ brought by media, and isolation of technology from societies (critiques see 
Williams, 1974/2004; Gillespie, Boczkowski and Foot, 2014). Both optimistic arguments, 
such as that the Internet or Web 2.0 will automatically bring about an expansion in the 
economy, greater democracy or worldwide understanding, and pessimistic ones, such as that 
the Internet will distort or ruin ‘authentic’ human inter-relationships or leading us to 
“amusing ourselves to death”, are techno-deterministic, failing to grasp social factors behind 
technologies themselves and real social contradictions leading to these phenomena.  
 
TD is a one-sided deterministic thinking about the relationships between technology and 
society (Fuchs, 2011). It has to be technological and determinist at the same time (Cohen, 
2000, p147). Concerns of this domination of this cause/effect or input/output logic in modern 
society has been expressed by Western Marxists, and is termed as reification by Lukács 
(1923/1972), as instrumental reason by Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/2002), or one-
dimensionality by Marcuse (1964) (see also Fuchs, 2011). From a critical dialectic 
perspective, this logic conceals contradictions, antagonistic forces and the coexistence of 
risks and potentials in reality. This is why both techno-optimistic and techno-pessimistic 
understandings of ICT and the Internet are identified as ideologies themselves rather than 
analyses of the ‘real situation’ itself. They are ideologies because they, in Kling’s terms, 
technological utopian and anti-utopian analyses, both neglect the complex situations in reality 
that they are supposedly describing. These situations could include real conflicts and 
resistance, distribution of technological skills, social relations for technologies to be effective 
and important contingencies (Kling, 1994). As Smythe (1994) and Williams (1974) remind 
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us, the development and application of technology are full of historical ‘intentions’ and need 
‘cultural screening’ all the time (Smythe, 1994; Williams, 1974/2004).   
 
The critique of techno-determinism (TD) is crucial because TD facilitates a passive response 
to technological developments (Curran et al., 2012; MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999; Mosco, 
2005). It purposely neglects social factors such as economic, political, institutional or cultural 
aspects. While promoting one-dimensional thinking about how technology should be 
developed and how it could influence society, it discourages people from actively 
participating in liberating the potentials of science and technology. Therefore, the first and 
most important approach that will be applied in this thesis is a critique of technological 
determinism.  
 
To sum up, technological determinism has three primary branches. The first one is that the 
development of technology has its own logic, independent from society. The second one is 
that technology can act as an independent actor to bring inevitable changes to the whole 
society. Thirdly, technological developments are seen as human progress. All types can be 
found in discourses about ICT and the Internet, encompassing either a techno-optimism or 
techno-pessimism. Techno-determinism is an ideology because it disguises the relationship 
between technology and society. It conceals contradictions, antagonistic forces, and the 
coexistence of risks and potentials in reality. TD expects to change society via technologies 
instead of challenging any social relations. Therefore, it serves the interests of the ruling 
powers.  
4.2. Digital Discourse and Capitalist Economy  
 
When the Internet was first commercialised and introduced to the public in 1990s, it was 
welcomed as a promise for prosperity and wealth for all. Advocators of the New Economy 
claims that it will work as a vehicle for everyone to have an economic and productivity 
growth. This claim emphasises the discontinuity between ‘New’ and ‘Old’ economy. 
Representatives such as Alvin Toffler (The Third Wave 1980), John Naisbitt (Megatrends 
1982), Kevin Kelly (Out of Control 1994 and Wired Magazine founded in 1993), and 
Nicholas Negroponte (Being Digital 1995) promote a radical break from the past in all kinds 
of areas. These ideological discourses have been studies by other scholars under the broader 
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cluster of ‘culture’ (Fuchs 2015, Van Dijck 2013), ‘spirit’ (Fisher, 2010), ‘myths’ (Mosco, 
2005), ‘predictions’ or ‘prophecies’ (Curran, 2012). 
 
Curran illustrates the development of this ideology through a historical narrative and shows 
how the Internet economy was described as a vehicle to generate “wealth and prosperity for 
all” even during and after the crisis (Curran, 2012: 4). Then in 2004, Tim O’Reilly made 
popular the term Web 2.0 as a fully real two-way network. Scholz points out that Web 2.0 is 
actually a marketing ideology (Scholz, 2008). This newness, says Scholz (2012), “is aimed at 
potential investors”. A lot of speculative money was indeed invested into this new 2.0 
economy, although the first Internet boom between 1995 and 2000 had been proved to be a 
bubble (Curran, 2012: 6). Some authors have proposed new terms of economy, showing an 
optimistic view of the new development with the Internet: such as attention economy (Doyle, 
2013; Vukanovic, 2009) and Gift economy (Barbrook, 2005; Barbrook and Cameron, 1996). 
However, the promised new potentiality for national economic growth never came. The 
contribution of the Internet economy to GDP is never as good as it was boosted (Curran, 
2012). These ideologies conceal or only partially represent the real conditions of capitalist 
economy. They thus serve to legitimate capitalism and its latest development. As Des 
Freedman points it out precisely, these ideologies, the “insider knowledge and cutting-edge 
perspectives”, articulate “a deterministic vision of a frictionless capitalism in which questions 
of property have been side-lined, profit making naturalised and exploitation minimised”  
(Freedman, 2012: 91) 
 
This section will review the digital discourses and critiques of these discourses in the 
economic areas. This section will review debates about the New Economy from three 
aspects: market, production and consumption.  
 
4.2.1. Decentralised and de-hierarchised market  
 
To understand the digital discourse and its relation to the market, one needs to first of all look 
at the broader political-economic context starting from the last decades of the previous 
century: neoliberalism. Neoliberalism could refer to a political theory which “posits that 
society works best when business runs things and there is as little possibility of government 
‘interference’ with business as possible” (McChesney, 2000: 6). It could also refer to a theory 
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of political economic practices that “proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005: 
2). In short, neoliberalism refers to a series of institutional arrangements that severely restrict 
government’s interference with the market on the one hand, and maximise the role of a free 
market and profit-making corporations on the other hand. Moreover, neoliberal political 
economic development would not sweep all over the world without a set of parallel 
ideologies, influencing government and public’s practices, through advocating a free market, 
deregulation, and laisser faire economy.  
 
Digital discourse functions as advocators of this neoliberal tendency, promising a 
decentralised global market. Through a critical analysis of the Wired magazine, Fisher (2010) 
has illustrated how digital discourse is used to legitimate the transformation from liberal 
Fordism to neoliberal Post-Fordism in advanced capitalist societies. On the one hand, as the 
market is integrated into network technology,  it has become more spontaneous, self-
regulating, and requires no external regulations and governing coordination. On the other 
hand, since the market has become more chaotic and unpredictable, network technology is 
necessary to enable individuals and companies to become adaptive to this fast-changing 
environment and to become more flexible (Fisher, 2010: 45–79).  
 
For example, Larry Downes, a best-selling author on information technology and business 
changes, claims that the “markets generally work better than traditional forms of government 
in establishing rules for disruptive technologies” (Downes, 2009, cited in Freedman, 2012: 
78). This disruptive technology shakes up the status quo and forces firms to adapt to the 
drastic transformations. According to this view, new technologies serve the ‘rebels’ and 
‘pioneers’ who are sceptical of the traditional hierarchical industries and authoritarian state. 
These pioneers suspect the traditional government and believe in the rule of the free market. 
They believe that the new capitalist phrase brought by network technologies is “an 
overcoming of the pitfalls of Fordist society” and “the embodiment of the humanist critique 
of capitalism” (Fisher, 2010: 72).  
 
According to the advocators, new technologies have changed the dynamism of the market in 
terms of rediscovering the niche market all over the world. The Internet will decentralise the 
market, challenge the old rule of monopolies and provide new opportunities to start-ups 
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(Curran, 2012: 5; Freedman, 2012). For example, in the media sector, the ‘long tail’ of media 
markets, accessible digital equipment and low marginal costs (the cost for every extra unit of 
products) will facilitate a more diverse range of content, especially in the niche markets. This 
tendency will not only encourage innovations but also expose consumers to more choices 
(Freedman, 2012: 72). Therefore, according to this view, the Internet environment is an 
‘open’, ‘connected’, and ‘decentralised’ market, as compared to the old ‘closed’, 
‘proprietorial’, and ‘hierarchical’ system. Even there are oligopolies such as Google 
(Alphabet) and Facebook, these companies claim themselves as platforms and pipes that are 
facilitating ‘sharing’, ‘openness’ through API or other technologies. They also claim to have 
a more horizontal company structure which enables better collaboration and innovation 
within the companies.  
 
Therefore, from the market perspective, New Economy advocators claim that new 
technologies bring a de-centralised market which requires no external regulation, and a de-
hierarchised market that challenges monopoly. However, it is clear that this understanding of 
the free market, enabled by and in need of network technology, legitimates the neoliberal 
shift away from the Keynesian consensus since the 80s.  
 
4.2.2. The Flexible production process and working process 
 
In the 1970s and 80s, ‘post-’, whether it is postmodern, post-Fordism, or post-industrial 
societies, and ‘flexibility’ became the buzzwords (MacDonald, 1991). The emergence of 
these new words is related to the structural-technological transformation, in advanced 
capitalist societies after World War II, from Fordist production to Post-Fordist mode of 
production and capitalist accumulation. The New Economy proponent said that a 
restructuring of firms, industries, and the labour market is necessary for the age of tightened 
international competition and ‘dramatic’ technological changes. According to this view, the 
post-war mass production and standardised consumption are not suitable any more for the 
rapidly changing international market (Piore and Sabel, 1986). The firms, therefore, should 
restructure themselves with more ‘flexibility’ to respond to capital and market need. From the 
workforce perspective, this restructure of firms means several dimensions of changes: more 
multi-skilled workers, changeable size of the workforce, and a flexible wage system 
(Atkinson and Gregory, 1986). The structure of firms has become more decentralised and de-
 80 
hierarchised, as Castells claims that corporations have dramatically transformed from vertical 
bureaucracies to more horizontal structures (Castells, 1996: 164). These flexible 
managements will thus increase profits for companies.  
 
From worker’s perspective, the New Economy supporters also claim that this new mode of 
production could democratise production and liberate labour. Several types of new ‘work 
culture’, such as ‘fun work’ ‘creative work’ ‘happy work’,  has come along with this 
restructuring of corporations. More recently with the development of the Internet, a lot of 
scholars have observed the transformation of manual work towards more informational one 
in the developed countries, such as immaterial labour, affective labour, cognitive work, 
prosumer and plabour (Hardt and Negri, 2001; Kitcher, 1990; Kücklich, 2005; Lazzarato, 
1996; Ross, 2009, 2012). According to the New Economy proponents, ‘knowledge worker’ 
(Drucker, 1999) or ‘informational worker’ (Castells, 1996) have replaced the traditional 
industrial, blue-collar workers. These new white-collar workers or knowledge workers are 
said to be dramatically different from their predecessors. These new workers, or professionals 
or expertise as they would avoid the title of worker, have more control over and acquire more 
freedom during the work process instead of only implanting orders from their supervisors. 
Their jobs are also portrayed by technology companies as more fun and creative (Barbrook 
and Cameron, 1996). The ‘New Economy’ theorists such as Tapscott and Williams and 
companies such as Google celebrate the benefits brought to the companies by involving 
employees and consumers into decision-making processes (Freedman, 2012: 77). According 
to this kind of discourses, individual workers have more say in their working process and can 
engage in their working process more meaningfully. The production process also becomes 
more democratic and collaborative (see critiques from Fisher, 2010: 141). According to 
Fisher,  this type of discourse is a response to the alienated nature of industrial work. It thus 
shows some potentials of individual emancipation but enables more implicit exploitation in 
the post-industrial work process.  
 
Another new ‘work culture’ is “the ‘entrepreneurship’ ideal – where workers would fend for 
themselves” (Greenbaum, 1995: 92). As Harvey points out, one feature of neoliberalism is to 
promote individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills (Harvey, 2005: 2). Work enabled by 
information and network technologies facilitates this entrepreneurship ideal. Workers are also 
“conceived in more individualized and privatized terms rather than in terms of members of a 
class” (Fisher, 2010: 88). As Howard puts it, for neoliberalism, "individuals are interpreted as 
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rational and self-interested beings who seek material advancement, while rejecting public or 
social intervention into their lives" (Howard, 2007, p4). Individuals are encouraged to 
"become self-critical, to take personal responsibility for their lives, to adapt specific practices 
of self-regulation and improvement, and to embrace entrepreneurial and materialistic self-
identities" (ibid., p5). The traditional notions of class in industrial factories are dissolved. 
Knowledge worker could choose to work for companies or as freelancers or start their own 
business, as Kelly calls “polyemployment” (Kelly, 1999, cited in Fisher, 2010: 95). On the 
one hand, these knowledge workers enjoy the freedom and mobility. On the other hand, their 
connections to any corporations decrease. They are expected to be responsible for their 
equipment and training. They also enjoy a lower level of protection and security and a higher 
level of precarity (Sandoval, 2016).  
 
Mosco (2005) does a similar critique of the entrepreneur ideology of the Internet economy. 
He critically analyses the claim of the End of History made by Fukuyama (2001). He accuses 
Fukuyama as a mythmaker who possesses mythical thinking, the main purpose of whom is to 
promote transcendent vision by ignoring contradictions in reality. One main problem of 
Fukuyama’s claim is his failure to take into account the problems of market power. He 
assumes that Fukuyama equals markets with freedom – “they are free by definition” (60), 
thus neglects the conflicts in the post-Fordism economy and politics. Fukuyama is never 
alone. To some extent, Castells (2013) has made a similar claim about what he calls the 
“Network Enterprise” (29).  It is said that the value theory, work, labour, class and gender 
issues have all changed with the rise of the network enterprise. However, though Fukuyama 
and Castells have made similar claims, we need to be cautious about calling someone as 
ideological workers or ideologues. We can refer to how Mosco (2005) distinguish mythical 
thinking (Fukuyama as a representative) and analytical thinking (Daniel Bell) for this matter. 
While the first serves as “a transcendent vision, eliminating impurities, and inoculating 
against harmful forces in order not just to present that vision but to promote it fully and 
forcefully”, the later rooted “in the banal experience of day-to-day life, with all its impurities, 
tensions, conflicts, and contradictions” (68).  
 
4.2.3. Consumerism, participatory culture, sharing, and prosumer 
 
This new mode of production is inseparable from changes on the users’ side.  
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The first feature is an increase of consumerism in the society facilitated by new technologies. 
Campbell points out two broad strands in the contemporary sociology of consumption in 
Britain (Campbell, 2005). His discussion is used to inform my analysis of two fundamental 
ideological aspects of consumerism. The first one is that the shifting of focus/paradigm to 
consumption conceals the still fundamental contradictions of production in capitalism, 
especially in developing countries and the global capitalist system. As illustrated by Harvey 
in his discussions about the conditions of post-modernity, consumption is rather an 
ideological reflection of changes in production. It has an ideological function to "keep 
capitalist production profitable" (Harvey, 1989: 61). The second one is that the celebration of 
consumption and consumer power neglects the fact of capitalism's capability and wiliness to 
forge a particular type of workers suited to new productive processes or work. It disguises the 
fact that consumer decisions may not reflect their political interests but "not surprisingly 
favour the global economy's search for the cheapest possible prices, irrespective of the 
consequences for labour" (Miller, 2005: 8). Consumption can be rather better defined as "lack 
of choice" (Miller, 2005: 16, see also Miller 1987). This ‘lack of choice’ links back to Marx’s 
concept of alienation which means the producers are alienated from the means of production, 
their own labour power and their own products. Therefore, as a consumer, people only have 
secondary relationship to goods, instead of a direct control of production or distribution of 
goods.  
 
Secondly, Related to the more flexible and entrepreneurial work are the increasingly blurred 
boundaries between work time and leisure time, production and consumption. It is claimed, 
according to some commentators, that new technologies and the Internet have changed how 
people live together. The Web has brought openness, sharing, community, collaboration. 
Terms such as ‘prosumer’ and ‘playbour’ are used to describe this new phenomenon. 
Consumers and Internet users are more actively participating in the production process and 
surplus-value production by contributing to open source projects, crowdsourcing or ‘sharing’.  
 
New technologies, through the promises of creativity, joy and participation, let more people 
engage more meaningfully in the productive process. It means a deeper involvement in the 
capitalist logic of production in almost every aspect of life with the help of communication 
technologies (Fisher, 2010). Audiences of mass or new media, users online, player of games, 
etc. are all integrated into a type of production for the benefits of big companies or Internet 
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platforms (Ross 2013, Terranova 2013, Fuchs 2013, 2014, 2015, Freedman, 2012: 76). 
However, these productive labour are disguised by the ideological discourses of 
‘participation’,  ‘sharing’,  ‘friending’, ‘liking’, ‘joyful’, ‘fun’, ‘open source’ (Van Dijck 
2013, Fisher 2010). For example, van Dijck (2013) analyses the replacement of 
connectedness by connectivity, and the related terms of sharing, friending, liking, etc. These 
terms disguise the usage of users’ data, especially metadata, to make profits by the 
companies. As Fuchs (2014) points out in the critical introductory book of social media, 
Jenkins’ claim about participatory culture on social media is “a form of cultural reductionism 
and determinism that neglects structural constraints of human behaviour and the dialectic of 
structure and agency” (66). These celebratory discourses of new media and the Internet 
functions as ideologies, which conceals the exploitation of users as conducting productive 
labour. As Freedman points out, the so-called Internet economy is actually constructed by 
“contradictory forces” that “promise dispersion but reward concentration and that fetishise 
openness but encourage proprietary behaviour” (Freedman, 2012: 92). The is, above all, on a 
the basis of the capitalist pursuit of profit.  
 
Market  • De-centralised (needs no external regulation from the government) 
• De-hierarchised (challenge monopolies and facilitate niche 
markets) 
Production  • Companies: restructuring of the workplace 
• Workers: democratic working processes and creative and fun work 
(encourage individual personality and creativity, emancipation, 
personal freedom) 




• Participatory culture, sharing 
• Openness (democratisation) 
Table 4.1. Typology of New Economy Ideology 
 
To sum up, the ideologies of the New Economy are prominent in the capitalist economy, 
ranging from market to production to consumption. As shown in Table 4.1, these discourses 
intend to deviate people’s attention from exploitation to liberation, in terms of deregulation of 
market, flexible work, joyful prosumer or playbour, all have ideological functions.  
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4.3. Political Economy: A Complement  
This section will try to understand this New Economy from a political economy perspective. 
Critical political economists have been trying to reveal what’s hiding behind the ideological 
discourses illustrated in the last section.   
 
4.3.1. Commodification of information and user data 
 
 
First of all, one primary question regarding the new digital or network technologies is ‘how 
to think about information (Schiller, 2007). The main idea of the Information Age is that 
media and communication technologies will drive the economy. Information, it is said, is “a 
resource like other resources… which have values and costs and are used in achieving 
program goals” (Horton 1983, cited in Schiller, 2007: 3). More recently, we see “data is the 
new oil”, said to be credited to a UK mathematician Clive Humby in 2006. It is true that 
information is a vital resource. However, the problem is that this kind of discourse has been 
appropriated to legitimate the commodification of information and data under the current 
capitalist mode of production. To solely emphasise information as a resource is to represent 
its usefulness partially and to ignore the surplus-value extracted by capital, thus the social 
relations behind. The fundamental question is who has the power to control and utilise 
information and data.  
 
From a Marxist view of capitalism, it is necessary to find a certain form of commodity used 
by capital to accumulate because ‘the wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of 
production prevails appears as an “immense collection of commodities”; the individual 
commodity appears as its elementary form (Marx, 1867: 125). According to Dallas Smythe 
(1977), the commodity form of ‘mass-produced, advertiser-supported communications under 
monopoly capitalism’ is ‘audiences and readerships’ (Smythe,1994: 3). This means that on 
advertising-supported social media, the commodity is the user. And the time users spend on 
social media becomes work time, a time during which they are engaged in producing user-
commodities and economic value. In this way, they become unpaid user-workers (Fuchs, 
2014a: 74). And social media companies accumulate capital by exploiting this new kind of 
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labour through selling audience/user-commodities. The users are ‘fairly active and creative, 
which reflects Cultural Studies’ insights about the active character of recipients, but this 
active and creative user character is the very source of exploitation, which reflects Critical 
Political Economy’s stress on class and exploitation’ (ibid.: 100). And we can even say that 
the more active users are on corporate social media that advertising-financed, the more 
heavily they are exploited. Not only users’ participation and social networks are sold by 
social media companies as commodities, but also the audience’s personal information (ibid.). 
Targeted advertising is a method based on user data and personal information make capital 
accumulation more efficient. 
  
4.3.2. Labour issues in general 
 
Labour is another focal point throughout the development of the Internet and social media. 
Though the New Economy advocators celebrate the ‘flexibility’ brought by the Post-Fordist 
production and new technologies (see 4.2.2), critical political-economic scholars have 
pointed out the underlying logic of ‘flexible accumulation’ for capital, and the negative 
consequences of it. As Terranova (2013) correctly reminds us, the understanding of ‘digital 
economy’ cannot be separated from the broader background of late capitalism, especially 
after the crisis of Fordism. If we consider the capitalist mode of production as a dynamic 
system from a historical perspective, then it is clear that the labour process is always 
changing, based on a larger mechanism of capitalist extraction of value. The debate about 
“flexibility” in the 1980s had already shown this trend. Back in the 1980s, a lot of people 
were celebrating new ‘post-industrial’ sectors. Because of the development of technology, it 
is said that competition had been replaced by corporation. A lot of small businesses were 
built up because they were said to be more sensitive to the market with the help of direct 
communication between producers and consumers. And the upgrade of work, the 
replacement of hard manual work by white-collar mental work, seemed to be nothing but 
plausible.  
 
However, as Harvey (2000) points out from the other side of the story through his analysis of 
the change of labour process, labour markets, products and patterns of consumption after the 
recession in the 1970s and 80s (Harvey, 1990: 141–172). Harvey argues that the enhanced 
flexibility and mobility have allowed stronger labour control at the workplace, through “high 
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levels of ‘structural’ unemployment, rapid descruction and reconstruction of skills, modest 
gains in the real wage, and the roll-back of trade union power” (ibid.: 147, 150). He shows 
how the labour market structure has been divided into core and periphery. The former is 
consist of employees with more secured and permanent jobs while the latter refers to those 
who suffer much lower level of protected and secured jobs (such as part-time, fixed-term or 
lesser skilled work). Moreover, the seemly ‘flexible’ production and geographical mobility 
and ‘disorganised’ market, enabled by institutional and technological innovation, facilitate an 
“ever more tightly organized” capitalism (ibid.: 159).  
 
Therefore, the seemingly more flexible work exert tighter control over workers. For example, 
Armstrong and his colleagues (1984) have shown while the ‘flexible management’ in 
workplace seemed to give more autonomy (in terms of less direct control from the managers) 
to workers, changes in workplace under this flexible discourse have pushed workers to do 
more work and deploy ‘collective self-discipline’ (Armstrong et al., 1984: 399). Greenbaum 
also points out the ‘violent’ restructuring of workplace forces workers to acquire more skills, 
to perform more functions and to shift between tasks and positions (Greenbaum, 1995: 100). 
The formal control in technology companies, thus, is replaced by softer normative control 
(Fisher, 2010: 102).  
 
In the ‘digital economy’, while work, in general, are more informationalised – mental work 
becomes more informational in advanced countries and manual work more industrialised in 
developing countries – it is hard to say whether the working conditions are getting better. As 
some critical scholars have pointed out that though forces of production have developed in 
digital area, the relations of production have not changed so much (Fuchs and Sandoval 2013; 
Fuchs 2014). The production is still based on the logic of extracting surplus value, thus is 
exploitative. Studies have been conducted in different industries, such as call-centre (Huws, 
2009), knowledge-based economy (Huws, 2014), manufacturing factories in the Global South 
(Qiu, 2016), the so-called Gig Economy (Woodcock and Graham, 2019). Labour issues 
within the Internet companies, which claims their employees enjoy more freedom at the 
workplace, are also repetitively reported (see case studies in Birkinbine et al., 2016). 
 
4.3.3. User labourer as an analytical category  
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As a result of new ICTs technologies and the Internet, along with the transformations in the 
workplace, the production processes in general go under changes as well. User issues become 
a significant topic around the Internet and social media. It is said that new technologies have 
brought more democratic, participatory, playful and voluntary work. However, some scholars 
have pointed out that the commercial usage of users’ personal information is a type of 
exploitation (Andrejevic 2013; Fuchs 2014). Undoubtedly, not everyone agrees with this 
argument. Three main reasons are given: 1) users are not exploited because they are not 
paying money; 2) exploitation only exits in the area of wage labour, users are not paid thus 
are not generating value thus they cannot be exploited; 3) because users are willingly and 
voluntarily to submit their personal data online and they surf the Internet with pleasure, thus 
they are not exploited.  
 
Unfortunately, all of these three arguments are not convincing. It is true that users are not 
paying for the service. It is because they are the commodities that are sold to the advertising 
companies by the platforms. As early as 1977, Dallas Smythe has already pointed out this 
blindspot in communication studies. As for the second argument, feminist studies about 
domestic labour have already successfully developed the theory that unpaid labour could also 
be highly exploited. In terms of user labour, Fuchs (2014) conducts a comprehensive study, 
applying Marx’s theory of value and exploitation, to demonstrate that users do generate both 
value and use-value for the platforms. Exploitation happens when value is generated by 
workers but expropriated by capitalists. From an examination of the financial report of 
several large Internet companies, it is clear that users have made huge profits for these 
companies but get with no paycheck. For the last claim, users’ willingness to go online is not 
necessarily contradicted to the fact that they are exploited. Moreover, it could be used by 
those platforms as a type of ideology to keep users stay online and continuously being under 
exploitation. 
 
However, it is worth noting that exploitations happening online could be, in many ways, 
different from that in traditional sweatshop or workplace. For the first reason is that, as 
Andrejevic pointed out, the Internet is a realm “inhabited by those with the time and access to 
participate in online activities” (Andrejevic, 2013: 153). However, as the penetration rate of 
the Internet is increasing fast, people from different classes, race, gender and nation 
background are all going online. Another difference that makes people tend to reject the term 
exploitation for online behaviours is that users tend to see their own behaviours as personal 
 88 
choices, lacking coercion. However, as Andrejevic points out, coercion is not solely about 
individuals making decisions, but also about “social relations that structure them” (ibid.: 
161). As long as the companies and governments still possess the rights to dispose of users’ 
online personal data at their will, there is coercion. Let alone there is also a kind of social 
coercion to be online in order to be connected to friends, relatives and society (Fuchs, 2014). 
However, these differences are not the reasons to claim that user labour is not being exploited 
– such claims could be seen to conceal the reality and thus are ideologies. 
 
4.3.4. Company concentration   
 
Scholars from a critical political-economic perspective have expanded their study of the 
power relationships around traditional media into the new digital area. The Internet economy 
took off in a socio-political background of de-regulation and neoliberalism, which facilitated 
the expansion of multinational companies and digital media companies. The mergers and 
takeovers among media companies, including electronic/digital media companies, have led to 
a higher rate of integration and concentration, letting several companies monopolise the 
market (Mosco, 1996, 2005; Schiller, 2007). Curran points out that the New Economy 
discourse has failed to fulfil its promise to create “a level playing field between small and 
large enterprise” and take into account the “continuing economic advantage of corporate 
size”(Curran, 2012: 7). Instead, the large corporations and conglomerates continue to 
dominate leading market sectors. The very existence of Internet giants such as Facebook, 
Alphabet, Amazon, Apple and Microsoft proves this argument.  
 
Van Dijck (2013) also reminds us to pay attention to a variant of takeover, particularly in the 
digital age– partnership (37). While this partnership could mean the integration in a 
traditional way – an integration of companies from different positions in the production chain 
(e.g. traditional media as content providers, Internet platforms as channels, search engines, 
and advertising agencies, etc.). Van Dijck acutely points out that a new kind of integration 
has created a “nirvana of interoperability” in which exists the “frictionless sharing” of users’ 
data between big Internet companies and platforms (Van Dijck, 2013: 164). This will benefit 
those for-profit companies, but even non-profit platforms, such as Wikipedia, cannot escape 
from it.  
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Political economy of the Internet  Ideologies  
Commodification (production) • Information or data as a new 
resource  
Labour issues (production and 
consumption) 
• Playbour  
• Free and Sharing  
Consolidation (market) • Connectivity  
Table 4.1. Analysis of ideologies of the Internet from a political economic aspect.  
 
To provide a comprehensive understanding of Internet-related ideologies and to help to 
reveal some of the ideologies discussed in section 4.2, this section provides a complementary 
analysis. The review of the political economy of the Internet mainly focus on three aspects: 
commodification of information and data, labour issues, and Internet company consolidation. 
Each of these three aspects has corresponding ideological discourses.  
 
To combine what has been reviewed so far from Table 4.1 and 4.2, we can identify several 
ideologies from the aspects of market, production and consumption (see Table 4.3).  
 
Market  • De-centralised (needs no external regulation from the government) 
• De-hierarchised (challenge monopolies and facilitate niche 
markets) 
• Connectivity  
Production  • Companies: restructuring of the workplace 
• Workers: democratic working processes and creative and fun work 
(encourage individual personality and creativity, emancipation, 
personal freedom) 
• Entrepreneurship (individualism) 




• Consumerism  
• Participatory culture, sharing 
• Openness (democratisation) 
• Plabour  
Table 4.2. typology of New Economy ideologies from political economic perspective. 
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4.4. Digital Discourse and Politics  
While most of the ‘network society’ or ‘information society’ discourse is about the New 
Economy, there are several main political dimensions in it.  
 
4.4.1. Deregulation  
 
It is clear that the arguments of the decentralised market, free trade with the help of network 
technologies and flexible production of ‘New Economy’ all lead to one seemingly reasonable 
conclusion in governance: deregulation. The development of neoliberalism in the US (under 
the Reagan administration), UK (Thatcher) and all over the world have highly undermined 
the Post-War Fordist welfare state. The state withdrew from economic activities and 
restricted itself in providing limited social services.  Transnational Corporations not only 
control businesses, importations and exportations in the home country but also businesses 
within nations other than its home country. Neoliberalism advocates strong private property 
rights, free markets, free trade, individual entrepreneurship and little government 
interference. Therefore, we see a transfer of power from government to private sectors and 
waves of deregulation of removing or reducing regulations in sectors, including industrial and 
service sectors.  
 
Not only the corporations are crucial actors in constructing technology discourse to promote 
de-regulation. As Mosco points out, government plays an enormous role in constructing 
digital ideologies because “much of its legitimacy today is based on identification with this 
future wave” (Mosco, 2005: 43). As the power has largely transferred from the government 
to private sectors, keeping up with the technology is what left to the government to gain a 
genuine universally recognised legitimacy in the Western liberal democratic societies. 
Therefore, the government do “whatever it takes to strengthen identification with the new 
technologies” (ibid.). The governments thus are enthusiastic in publishing favourable policies 
for investments in high-tech sectors, attracting international technology companies, spending 
money in increasing access, emphasising education in technology-related disciplines in 
schools and universities. These actions not only endorse the ‘New Economy’ discourse but 
also legitimate its development.  
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4.4.2. Democratisation and the ‘end of history’  
 
One prominent argument of technology discourse is that new technologies and the free 
market will automatically bring democratisation to societies. For example, Francis Fukuyama 
provides “a mythic umbrella that shelters visions of cyberspace and the end of history” 
(Mosco, 2005: 59). According to him, the global belief in the free market, technology and 
empirical science will lead to a worldwide spread of liberal democracy. Similarly, recent 
scholarly and popular publications have emphasised an ‘essential’ role played by the Internet 
and social media in radical social movements. A series of social movements from 2009 on 
was called “Twitter revolution”. Castells (2012) claims that the Arab uprisings were 
“spontaneous processes of mobilization that emerged from calls from the Internet and 
wireless communication networks” (106). According to him “the digital social networks 
based on the Internet and on wireless platforms are decisive tolls for mobilizing, for 
organizing, for deliberating, for coordinating and for deciding” (229, emphasis added).  
 
However, with a more in-depth analysis of these movements, some scholars have pointed out 
that this is not the case. Putting social media in the centre of movements reflects a lack of 
“deep and critical contextualisation of social and political life” (Fenton, 2012: 125). The 
political impacts of the Internet on social media have to be understood through a broader 
analysis of the social context (Aday et al., 2012; Anderson, 2011; Newsom et al., 2011). For 
example, Curran (2012) points out, the Arab spring had “deeper underlying causes and were 
prefigured by protests over many years” (54). Through a comparison between Singapore and 
Malaysia, he shows the importance to take more detailed socio-political context into 
consideration, though they are both claimed to be authoritarian democracies (23). This shows 
the importance to pay attention to concrete local social background.  
 
Some scholars have conducted empirical researches on the role of media in social 
movements. Results show a complex usage of media by protesters. For example, Tufekci and 
Wilson (2012), through a survey study, shows face-to-face was the most important way of 
communication for Tahrir Square activists (Tufekci and Wilson, 2012). Traditional 
interpersonal communication and traditional media played a more important role in providing 
information and communicating. A result from a survey with Occupy Wall Street activists 
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shows that both interpersonal and mediated interaction are important for activists, and older 
online media (email, website) were more important than web 2.0 social media (Fuchs, 
2014b). These empirical results not only show the importance to put questions in a concrete 
situation, but also make clear that the role played by social media and the Internet in radical 
social movements should not be overestimated.   
 
The proclamation made by Fukuyama that the inherently free Internet will necessarily bring 
democracy has been proved to be an illusion (Curran, 2012). As Curran points out, the 
Internet could be controlled, though maybe not comprehensive, but efficient enough (12). 
This has already been proved by some researches done in both western and eastern countries. 
The roles played by the Internet for radical social movements need to be carefully scrutinised, 
put into the specific socio-political context.  
 
4.4.3. Empowerment through the Internet and identity politics  
 
The Internet is claimed to have changed our everyday life. Along with the changes in the 
workplace and the blurred boundaries between work and leisure (4.2.3) is the blurred 
boundaries between private and public. It is not surprising that this development has been 
celebrated by some early enthusiasts (Benkler, 2006; Jenkins, 2006). According to them, new 
technologies could empower users to build new public sphere for connection and creation. 
Some scholars have welcomed this transformation. For instance, this fusion of public and 
private sphere, according to Papacharissi (2009), could bring power to people’s hand and 
push private concern into public’s eyes. Therefore, it could open up new discussions about 
issues otherwise could be ignored in traditional politics (Papacharissi, 2009). The Internet 
could then give people the ability to “watch the powerful” (Castells, 2013: 413). It is said that 
the Internet could automatically bring this because of its inherent technological design as 
decentralised with nodes. Thus it would be difficult to maintain total control, though the 
powerful always try hard to utilise new technologies in the service of their interests.  
 
These changes, it is claimed, happen in a new society which Castells claims as a “network 
society” (Castells, 1996, 2009, 2013). A network society, according to Castells’ definition, is 
a society “whose social structure is made around networks activated by microelectronics-based, 
digitally processed information and communication technologies” (Castells, 2013: 24). 
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According to him, power relations in this network society has “decisively transformed” (ibid.: 
4) with the help of the “global digital networks of communication”. Castells identifies one 
specific novel type of communication which he terms as “mass self-communication”. 
According to him, this mass self-communication could “decisively” (4) increase users’ 
autonomy vis-à-vis power centres. This transformation from traditional mass communication 
to a mass self-communication, it is said, could largely empower users’ in horizontal 
organisational structures.  
 
Another new possibility brought by this networked connected society is the fluid identity 
(Papacharissi, 2010). This is also observed by Negri and Hardt in the Empire when they talk 
about the transformation from a disciplinary society to a society of control, or in their 
celebration of the Multitute, who are fluid, hybrid, and mobile subjectivities, constituted by 
multiplicity (Hardt and Negri, 2001). People now are free to choose any identity, without 
being boned to obligations (Bauman, 2004). Some have claimed this fluid, ever-changing 
identity as a way to escape from or a refusal to power.  
 
On the other hand, there are some criticisms about the optimistic view of the empowerment 
role of the Internet. First of all, as Castells himself also points out, there is a difference 
between inclusion and exclusion. For one thing, not everyone has equal access to the Internet 
(Curran, 2012: 13). Moreover, poverty could demotivate people to participate in politics, let 
alone online participation (ibid.: 14). Secondly, even for those who have been guaranteed of 
access to the Internet, the questions of “who is communication what to whom” still matters a 
lot (Fenton, 2012: 127). It is hard to say that the power structures online have been 
dramatically changed. The main problem of the Internet is still who has power, or in terms of 
the communication technology who is communicating what to whom. As Van Dijck points 
out, with an analysis of the way platforms treat their users, some users are “more equal than 
others owing to the hierarchical system inscribed in their interface design” on a judgement of 
who are more valuable and who are not (Van Dijck, 2013). Moreover, as critical political 
economists remind us several times, no matter who gets attention, it is the companies who get 
benefits from users’ online creative, enthusiastic participation (Fuchs, 2014a; Ross, 2009; 
Tiziana, 2013). This commercial activity could harm the potential empowerment capability of 
the Internet.  
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Thirdly, some criticisms have paid attention to issues about privacy and surveillance on the 
Internet. Lyon, for example, claims that new media have facilitated the mass surveillance by 
government and companies, especially in the broader social context of fighting terrorism, 
pushing it to an unprecedented scale that people would never accept in traditional politics 
(Lyon, 2003). With the help of massive collection and storage of data and metadata, everyone 
is under scrutinising in cyberspace. However, this is in no way a mere technology issue. As 
Mosco (2005) points out, the threat to privacy is “arguably intrinsic to the commodification 
process”. Put it in Harvey’s term (2005), the process of accumulation by dispossession has 
extended its area into personal data.  
 
4.4.4. Legitimation, de-politicisation and the end of politics  
 
This emphasis on deregulation, democratisation brought by new technologies and identity 
politics have ideological consequences. They serve to legitimate or disguise the broader social 
power relations and to distract public attention away from politics.  
 
This kind of individualistic discourse fits well to the broader social context of neoliberalism 
and individualism. Instead of liberating people from old power relations, it serves for deeper 
involvement in capitalist exploitation and de-politicisation. For example, Borsook criticised 
the “cyber-selfishness” in the culture of Silicon Valley (Borsook, 2001). Sunstein claims that 
the display of “daily me” on the Internet could personalise and depoliticise public issues 
(Sunstein, 2007). As Dean points out, the personalised media, distinguished from mass media, 
cultivate merely particularities. Individuals only coexist, without collective identity and 
representative culture. This absence of firm identity, as she puts it, not only can and has been 
tolerated by the state, but itself can “generate processes of surveillance and incitement to speech 
useful for producing and maintaining power” (Dean, 2013: 142).  
 
This idea of Internet as liberator still has its popularity. Besides the claims of the end of 
history, this ‘end of’ series also includes the end of space, with its variations of the end of the 
nation-state, of vertical relationships, of traditional identities, of war. It is claimed that the 
Internet facilitates communication across territorial boundaries. The nation focused space has 
been replaced by global cyberspace. Moreover, it is said that the foundation, the 
infrastructure, of the Internet also annihilate virtual space, the vertical social structures. 
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Instead, it has established a type of horizontal organisations and relationships. The traditional 
power relationships that constitute politics and struggles are now replaced by new types of 
citizens and identities with horizontal communications brought by digital informational 
technologies. With this annihilation of territorial and social space, the traditional nation-states 
and identities will come to an end, automatically bringing together an end to war and 
inequality. There will only exit a global way of life without unequal identities. Therefore, the 
end of space means “a process of freeing people from spatial constraint with all its confining 
economic and social implications” (Mosco, 2005: 92). 
 
However, this is an ideology. Arguments about the death of distance and the end of history 
always direct to the end of politics. First of all, there seems to have no need for fighting for 
equal education or the sustainable environment in the real world since the Internet could 
provide everything and technologies could solve all the problems (Wertheim, 2000). 
Secondly, and arguably more fundamental aspect, the plausible potentials of the new 
technologies to empower people and to negate boundaries deviate people’s attention from 
concrete political-economic concerns, but focusing on a ‘daily me’ (Sunstein 2007) that 
personalises and depoliticises public issues (Fenton, 2012). The autonomy of multitudes 
proposed by Negri and Hardt (2004) is set to be achieved through individuals. However, it is 
this personalisation, the sole emphasis on individuality, that is the real problem. As Dean 
(2013), getting her ideas from Agamben’s ‘whatever being’, points out: this personalised new 
media enables passive subjects who “seek nothing” and “lack nothing” (141), thus will lead 
to the evacuation of politics. The class struggle should have already come to an end and 
democracy will come through simple online participations on whatever issues interest you. 
Once again, the discourses of ‘online participation’ function as ideologies in terms of its 
concealment of the needs form struggles in reality.  
 
Different actors  Ideologies  
State/institutional 
level 
• De-regulation  
Group, Societal 
level  
• Decentralised structure, horizontal organisation → Internet 
will bring democratisation (optimistic) 
• Internet will ruin society (pessimistic) 
Individual level  • Internet and empowerment → identity politics  
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• Individualism and de-politicisation 
Table 4.1. typology of technology discourse and politics 
To sum up, as shown in Table 4.4, there are Internet-related ideologies at the state 
institutional, societal and individual level. These ideologies function to legitimate the 
political-economic development in the informational capitalism, to undermine the 
understanding of power relations in the society as a whole, and to depoliticise political issues.   
 
4.5. Mapping Internet Ideologies in Advanced Capitalism 
To sum up, this chapter has outlined several technology discourse and Internet ideologies in 
advanced capitalism from three aspects:  
 
• Technological determinism, which is a crucial type of ideological discourse to 
understand the relationship of technology and society (partly belongs to the New 
Economy discourse, partly to the New Politics discourse); 
• The New Economy which focuses on technology discourse regarding the market, 
production and consumption process in the advanced capitalism; and  
• The New Politics which discusses the new power relations between the state, society 
and individuals.  
 
While Western scholars have conducted comprehensive analysis of technology discourse and 
ideologies in the advanced capitalist societies, there are no enough discussions to 
contextualise these ideologies in the Chinese society which has relatively different ways of 
economic accumulation, political arrangements and culture. Next chapter will thus focus on 
the situation in China.  
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CHAPTER 5. CHINA’S DIGITAL REVOLUTION 
 
This chapter will focus on China’s digital revolution from both ideology aspect and political-
economy aspect. As a peripheral country in the world capitalist system (Wallerstein, 2004), 
China’s development has been influenced by the advanced capitalism and restricted by the 
world system. On the one hand, China has been actively learning from the Western 
experiences and concepts, including the Information Superhighway and Information Society. 
On the other hand, China’s pre-industrialised situation restricted the extent to which China 
could copy the Western path. Therefore, this chapter will show some unique characteristics of 
China’s ICT- and internet- related ideologies and development.  This chapter will first of all 
focus on the techno-determinist ideologies in China’s digital discourse (5.1). It will then 
discuss influence of the Western futurist discourse about the New Economy in China and 
how this discourse was later adjusted in the Chinese context as ‘neo-industrialisation’ (5.2). 
Section 5.3 will investigate the matrix of power relations in China’s ICT industries from the 
perspective of political economy and political science. It will serve as a complement to 
scrutinise the power dynamics in China. This investigation will be helpful to identify 
ideological discourse in my further research. Finally, Section 5.4 provides a summary of 
current discussions of digital discourse in China.  
5.1. Techno-determinism with Chinese Characteristics  
 
This section will focus on two unique aspects of China’s techno-determinist discourse: 
techno-nationalistic discourse (5.1.1) and the detachment of technology development from 
politics (5.1.2). 
 
5.1.1. Techno-Nationalist discourse 
 
Informatisation in the Chinese historical context is inseparable from China’s endeavour of 
modernisation and industrialisation (Dai, 2003; Hong, 2008; Mueller and Tan, 1997; Wu and 
Yun, 2015; Yang and Mueller, 2014; Zhao, 2007, 2010). This informatisation is highly 
integrated into nationalist discourses. Several themes can be identified under this nationalist 
discourses: a) national security, b) competition with the West, c) national progress. However, 
with China’s integration into the global economy, this techno-nationalist discourse also 
clashes with techno-globalism.  
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First of all, military concerns and national security are prominent themes in China’s early 
endeavours to industrialise its industries. Mueller and Tan (1997), for example, noticed the 
similarity among the previous Communist regimes, such as the Soviet Union and China, 
which “equated economic development with forced ‘industralization’ – that is, with the 
construction of large factories devoted to heavy industry” (Mueller and Tan, 1997: 14). They 
point out the close relationship, perceived by the Chinese leaders, between economic 
development and industrialisation, as well as the importance of technology in Mao’s era. 
However, Mueller and Tan failed to address the Cold War context during that period and 
China’s leaders’ determination to achieve self-determination, especially through military 
technologies. As Zhao (2007) accurately remarks, Chinese leadership in Mao’s ear was 
“compelled to address the most pressing problem of the post-revolutionary regime in the 
Cold War context to survive militarily in the age of high-tech wars and nuclear deterrence” 
(Zhao, 2007: 95). China has developed a ‘military-led Chinese techno-nationalism’ under 
Mao since the early 1950s (Feigenbaum, 2003: 29). This developmental path sees technology 
as being fundamental to national security and prosperity. In other words, Chinese military 
programmes were of great significance for Communist China’s survival, national security 
and self-defence. One prominent example is the “two bombs and one satellite” project. The 
belief in this developmental path was reinforced through China’s confrontation with US 
military in Korea and China’s witnessing of America’s Gulf War as an ‘information war’ 
(Zhao, 2007: 97). Moreover, as Wang (2014) points out in his historical narrative of “the 
computer as the nexus of technology and class politics in China 1955-1984”, the pursuit of 
national independence was the primary motivation in the early development of ICT in China. 
Therefore, technological development in China is closely connected to discourse on national 
security and the nation’s self-determination since an early stage. Post-Mao reformers also 
embraced the military-led techno-nationalism. One representative example is the launch of 
the 863 Plan, “a massive military and industrial research and development plan initiated in 
March 1986” (Zhao, 2007: 97).This military-led technological development sets the basic 
tone of China’s techno-nationalism. 
 
Another main contribution to China’s nationalist discourse on technology is the ‘century of 
humiliation’ which is believed to be caused by the inferiority of science and technology 
development in China. This kind of discourse and thinking that the Chinese nation’s past 
humiliations were caused by technologically superior foreign empires existed among Chinese 
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intellectuals much earlier before the establishment of CCP. For example, in the late Qing 
Dynasty, activists such as Kang Youwei, Sun Yat-sen and scholars as Yan Fu have discussed 
this issue under the themes of enlightenment (QiMeng) and salvation (JiuWang) (Li, 1994). 
In fact, CCP was established in the very background of China’s pursuing of salvation and 
modernisation.  
 
This theme has been preserved throughout CCP’s design of national development strategies. 
For example, China’s economic reforms, first of all, came up with the slogan of ‘four 
modernisations’: agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology. It then 
followed by projects such as ‘863’ which aims to develop high technologies and to equip 
China with the capacity to ‘compete with the West’ (Dai, 2003: 9; Zhao, 2007: 97). Later on, 
this modernization is seen as impossible without informatisation (Mueller and Tan, 1997: 22; 
Wu and Yun, 2015; Zhao and Schiller, 2001). Following this consensus, the state initiated 
several projects, such as the ‘Golden Projects’ in the 90s (Zhao, 2007) and Informatisation of 
the National Economy (INE) programme (Dai, 2003). More recently, the state has tried to 
take greater control of domestic communication infrastructure and technological 
development, through projects such as National Informatisation Development Strategy (Year 
2006-2020), companied with the discourse such as ‘Internet Sovereignty’, ‘State Information 
security’ (Zhao, 2010: 267, 271). Along with these projects or national strategies, the 
narrative of ‘Us’ (China could refer to the State, CCP, Chinese people, as well as Chinese 
companies) versus ‘Them’ (actors and agencies from foreign countries) has existed for long. 
This nationalistic ideologies is prominent in the Internet era as well. For example, Yang 
observed a return of popular nationalist discourse, using the “nationalist and anti-imperialist 
ideological discourses of the Mao era” under Xi Jinping’s leadership, and how this nationalist 
discourse has influenced China’s Internet policy (Yang, 2014, p111). Therefore, this 
nationalist discourse of ‘century of humiliation’ is intertwined with the discourse on 
technological development in China. 
 
Finally, ICT and Internet technology have been closely associated with the idea of national 
progress and the hope for ‘the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. As observed by Smythe 
(1973) in China, officials saw (communication) technology as a neutral tool, free from any 
specific class characteristics, and could be seen as a representation of national progress 
(Smythe, 1973/1994). While Smythe’s main concern is the consumer culture behind the 
changes of the public’s consumption habits from bicycles to cars, the main reason for putting 
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technology development as a primary task is still mainly political – in response to the 
international historical situation (Zhao, 2007). Later on, after the reforms, industrialisation and 
modernisation gain closer relationship with economic prosperity and development. A more 
recent example is from Wu and Yun’s analysis of the discourses about technological changes 
and the ‘Internet Plus’ in China. They point out how technological nationalism has shaped 
China’s imagination of modernisation and the ‘Internet Plus’ (Wu and Yun, 2015).  
 
The connection of technology to national progress not only exists in official discourse but 
also is prevail in Chinese society. One famous example is the ‘Needham Puzzle: Why the 
Industrial Revolution Did Not Originate in China’ (Lin, 1995; Needham and Wang, 2004). 
This has been a difficult question preoccupying a lot of Chinese nationalists. This question 
was further developed into a question of why (Western) modernity did not originate in China, 
as reflected in a famous documentary Heshang (River Elegy). This documentary was 
broadcast nationally by China Central Television (CCTV) in 1988 and received massive 
responses and discussions from the public. The idea of developing technology as a primary 
task for China was further confirmed by Deng Xiaoping, when he put forward his famous 
policy, "Science and technology are primary productive forces" in 1988.  
 
However, while not being directly challenged, this techno-nationalism has clashed with 
‘techno-globalism’ since China’s integration into the world economic system. The latter 
emphasises the multiple players and their diverse, if not conflicted, interests in the 
contemporary development of networked technologies (Zhao, 2010: 273). As shown in 
Zhao’s study of China’s pursuit of indigenous innovation of networked technologies, the 
consensus in supporting this objective among domestic actors cannot guarantee an easy way 
to achieve the goal, not least because of the interaction between transnational and domestic 
forces and among domestics actors themselves. This phenomenon is not new. The dynamics 
of China’s telecommunication and information reform are complex since the very beginning: 
the central-local power relations, the competition between different ministries for economic 
benefits and political power, the pressure of spontaneous privatisation, the danger of foreign 
dependency and the imperative of political repression (Mueller and Tan, 1997: 9–12). This 
complexity is also reflected in discourse. Through a throughout study of People’s Daily, 
Hong points out the contradictions shown in the official organ newspaper. On the one hand, 
PD tries to play down the danger of losing national autonomy and self-reliance brought by 
China’s global participation while emphasising China’s advantage in cheap labour and huge 
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market potential. On the other hand, PD occasionally emphasises the importance of creating 
self-sufficiency in pillar industries and national capacities of military defence (Hong, 2008: 
35–6). Therefore, we can expect some extent of clashes of techno-nationalism and techno-
globalism in the current context of China’s deeper integration into the global economy and 
online world.  
 
Moreover, after what happened in Tiananmen Square in 1989, nationalism has become a 
handy discourse for the CCP to repress domestic dissent. While claiming legitimacy through 
rapid economic growth (especially through the FDI-driven, export-oriented and ICT-related 
industries), the political repression is not loosened (though the situation varies under different 
leadership). The Internet has become a crucial site for CCP to control the flow of ideas and 
information. Techno-nationalism and nationalist discourse are important for CCP to gain 
support of this control from the public. The repression of any domestic dissent can be 
legitimated under the name of ‘national security’. As Zhao acutely points out the anti-
democratic nature of the Chinese ‘digital revolution’ (Zhao, 2007: 99), the development of 
Internet is by no means designed to serve socialist democracy because of the explicit 
technocratic developmental path set out since the reform. Instead, it is not surprising to see 
that the role of Internet as profit-making instruments are separable from its role as political 
and social liberation.  
 
5.1.2. The ‘Non-political’ technology 
 
The second type of discourse on technology is highly related to techno-nationalism – de-
politicisation of technology, or, in other words, to detach technology from the political 
domain. Both of these ideological discourses belong to a broader techno-determinist 
ideology.  
 
It is worth noticing that techno-nationalism is not a fixed concept that has never changed. 
Rather, it has experienced subtle changes throughout China’s technological development. It 
has changed from technology for ‘self-determination’ in Mao’s ear to Post-Mao reformers’ 
understanding of technology as depoliticised ‘neutral tool’ and to the more recent statements 
of technology as the main instruments for economic development. In other words, there is an 
increasingly techno-deterministic and instrumentalist tones of technologies under the name of 
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techno-nationalism in China. The international technological competition, including military 
clashes, and capitalist consumerism gradually eroded Mao’s ‘de-link’ project to find an 
alternative technological path for ‘self-determination’ (Halliday, 1999). Instead of insisting 
on alternative ways to develop technologies that are different from the West, there is a 
“prevailing Chinese mindset to ‘catch up with’ or ‘leap frog’ ahead of capitalist technology” 
(Zhao, 2007, p94). I will briefly discuss the historical changes in this section.  
 
This de-politicisation of technology in CCP can be retrieved back to 1970s when the cultural 
revolution is about to finish. During Mao’s ear, technology was used to enhance workers’ 
control over the production process under the socialist relations of production (Wang, 2014). 
In 1971-2, when Dallas Smythe visited China he discovered that the political economists, 
philosophers and political scientists he met regarded “technique and technology as 
autonomous and non-political” (Smythe 1994, cited in Zhao, 2007: 93). As Zhao points out, 
this detachment of technology “from the politicized domain of culture as a terrain of struggle 
within and against capitalism and an economism beyond social division and political 
conflicts” had “a particular ideological appeal to a post-Mao Chinese ruling elite victimized 
by the excesses of Cultural Revolution politics and its rhetoric of class struggle” (Zhao, 2007: 
98). This deliberate detachment of technology from the political debate was a reflection of 
the broader consensus in China’s society during after-Mao ear when Mao’s industrialisation 
strategies and policies were seen as a failure, a pursuit of unrealistic radical relations of 
production and political struggles (Wu and Yun, 2015: 3).  
 
This de-politicisation thus needs to be understood in the broader context. As famously framed 
by Deng Xiaoping as ‘it doesn't matter if a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice’. 
Economic and political reforms face a huge uncertain in the first few years of the post-Mao 
ear. “Crossing the river by feeling for the stones” (Mozhe Shitou Guohe) is more of an 
accurate description of the real complex and difficult situations than a mere excuse to 
legitimate the later on fully-developed capitalist approach. During the 1980s, CCP’s leaders 
realised the severe situation of economic crisis and the urgency to develop the economy, not 
only for economic growth but for the increase in people’s living standard. As stated by Zhao 
Ziyang (the third Premier of PRC and one of the most important figures in China’s economic 
reform) in his memoirs Prisoner of the State, from 1952 to 1980 China’s “industrial output 
had grown 8.1 times, GDP had grown 4.2 times, and industrial fixed assets had grown 26 
times”, yet “average consumption had only doubled” (Zhao et al., 2009: 112). The most 
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pressing task for leaders, elites and intellectuals during that period is thus to recover the 
national economy and people’s lives, instead of continuing political ideological debate 
between capitalist and socialist approaches (though there are exceptions among the 
leaderships such as Chen Yun, see Zhao p101-2). As Zhao stated in his memoir that was 
published after he died, he “did not have any preconceived model or a systematic idea in 
mind” when he started his work on the economic reform. He “started with only the desire to 
improve economic efficiency” (Zhao et al., 2009: 113). Zhao also believes that technology is 
“like economics, a realm distinct from political affairs” which is opposite to Mao’s idea of a 
connection between politics and technology (Gewirtz, 2019: 123). Therefore, this broader 
context – putting economic recovery and economic efficiency over the political debate of 
socialist path – is also reflected in the leadership and elite groups’ attitudes towards 
technology.  
 
China’s economic reform, especially in the 90s when China’s economic developments started 
to roar, pursues a “globally integrated, market-based, ICT-driven mode of economic 
development” (Hong, 2011b: 31). The deployment of ICTs and the informatisation then 
became the top priority for the post-Mao elites and their developmental approach (Zhao, 
2007: 98; Zhao and Schiller, 2001). In other words, technologies have been used as 
instruments for economic development (Gewirtz, 2019). Moreover, they are seen as neutral 
instruments detached from any social relations and thus political debates.  
 
However, this depoliticization is an ideology, a ‘digital sublime’ (Mosco), serving the 
purpose to argue for the ‘end of politics’. For one thing, as Smythe argues, there is a danger 
to measure the technological development against capitalist technique achievement. The 
pursuit and consumption of “capitalist luxury goods such as private automobiles, family-
sized washing machines, family-sized refrigerators, one-way TV, etc.”, argued by Smythe, 
will educate and prepare Chinese consumers to capitalist social relations and thus China a 
capitalist path of development (DW Smythe, 1994, cited by Zhao, 2007: 94).   
 
Both techno-nationalism and the understanding of technology as neutral are techno-
determinism. The former partially emphasises how technology could shape society and equal 
technology development to national development, and the latter perceives the development of 
technology as an independent process, devoid of intervention from any social relations and 
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power dynamics. While de-politicisation of technology has its roots in China’s historical 
context, it was also influenced by Western technology discourse.  
 
5.2. From ‘Post-industrial’ Ideology to ‘neo-industrialisation’ 
 
This section will focus on the impact of the Western optimistic and futurist ideologies about 
ICTs in China. This type of digital discourse is highly influenced by ideological discourses of 
New Economy in advanced capitalism (see 4.2) but also shows its own features.  
 
Since China’s self-reliance was broken during the late Qing Dynasty in the Opium Wars, the 
Chinese intellectuals and political activists have constantly been looking at the West 
(including Japan) to learn not only technologies but also socio-political institutions. One 
prominent example is the arguments between Ti (institutions) and Yong (technology). The 
arguments focused on whether China should adopt Western political institutions and 
constitutions or learn technologies from the West (Li, 1994).  
 
During Mao’s era, China’s pursuit of technological development is clearly embedded in 
China’s pursuit of modernisation, especially industrialisation. Chinese leaders were 
enthusiastic about catching up with the West, especially in technology. However, because of 
the Cold War context and imposed economic blockade, China’s linkage to the world 
economy is highly restricted (Hong, 2011b: 33). During that time, China strategically 
imported foreign technology “on an import-substitution basis” (ibid., see also Tian, 1998). 
The main purpose was to develop domestic industries.  
 
During the reforms, China’s ICT- and FDI-driven, the exported-oriented open-up policy has 
reintegrated China into the world economy. China’s emphasis of informatisation and 
industrialisation were in parallel with the international optimism about technology (Dai, 
2003; Hong, 2008; Mueller and Tan, 1997; Wu and Yun, 2015; Zhao, 2007). As Dai 
observed, the Chinese government’s launch of Informatisation of the National Economy 
(INE) programme occurred during the period when a consensus was emerging in 
international societies. The main point of this consensus was that information technologies 
can serve as a revolutionary force for developing countries to ‘leapfrog’ in technological and 
economic development, especially among G7/8, European Commission and UN (Dai, 2003: 
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10). These post-industrial ideologies then “reincarnated itself into numerous developmental 
policies promoted by international organisations” and to some extent benefited some newly 
industrialised countries, such as the Four Little Tigers in Asia (Hong, 2008: 25). It is not 
difficult to find this kind of discourse about ‘leapfrog’ and ‘catch up with the West’ in 
China’s official discourse during that time. For example, The 16th Party Congress in 2002 
posits “IT applications as the ‘logical choice’ for accelerated industrialization and 
modernization” (Zhao, 2007: 98). Wu and Yun (2016), in their analysis of the discourses 
about technological changes and the ‘Internet Plus’ in China, points out how technological 
nationalism has shaped China’s imagination of modernisation. This type of discourse among 
China’s officials is not only a heritage of national struggle against global imperialism 
inherited from Mao’s era, but also an appropriation of Western techno-utopianism.  
 
One prominent phenomenon is the ‘Toffler Fever’ in China during the 80s and its enduring 
influence on Chinese leadership’s policy agenda for China’s modernization. At the peak of 
this fever, the Toffler couple, Alvin Toffler and his wife Heidi Toffler, were invited to China 
by officials and the party organ (People’s Daily) several times to discuss “China’s economic 
construction and its future development” since December 1982 (Toffler 1998, cited in 
Gewirtz, 2019: 132). Later on,  Zhao Ziyang, then Premier and General Secretary, met the 
couple formally at Zhongnanhai, the centre headquarter of CCP and the State Council, in 
September 1988. Gewirtz’ historical investigation shows that Toffler and other foreign 
futurists’ ideas towards modernisation and technology development had a direct impact on 
Chinese leaders’ agenda for policy-making and action planning, including the premier 
multibillion-dollar state industrial R&D programme, the 863 Programme (863 jihua) 
(Gewirtz, 2019). According to Toffler, developing countries with backwards in industrial 
development might be able to take a new route to leap ahead of the capitalist developed 
world in technology development. Toffler’s ideas and imagination of the future were 
attractive Chinese leaders, especially his promise of a dramatically transformed future 
brought by technology. Besides Toffler, other futurists such as Naisbitt and his description of 
information as a strategic resource also attracted elite discussions (Gewirtz, 2019: 124–5). 
China’s elite groups and top official even hosted a World Futures Studies Federations’ annual 
conference in 1988 (ibid.: 132). During that period, the Chinese leaders were struggling to 
“feel the stones” to boost productivity and economic development. With Toffler and others 
new technology missionaries’  promises, technology development could help China to catch 
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the opportunity of the emerging trends to overcome the backwards in the industry sector and 
finally lead ahead of capitalist countries in the ‘Third Wave’. 
 
During the 90s, new Buzz words such as ‘Surf the Internet’ ‘Information Highway’ gained 
popularity in the public and media discourse. Internet began to become a phenomenon in 
China and ICTs became the “most popularized and commercialized area of hi-tech 
development in China” (Zhao, 2007: 98). ‘Information society’ became a popular slogan.  
Public opinion leaders during that time include elites who received American postgraduate 
education coming back to China and local scientists and media elites who noticed the fast 
development of information and opportunities information technologies can bring to China 
(Wu and Yun, 2015). First, these new words and concepts fit well with China’s pursuit of 
modernisation through a more pragmatic way starting from the reforms (as Deng Xiaoping 
put it as the metaphor of white cat and black cat thus leave the ideological debate aside). 
Second, the claimed opportunity brought by information technology to catch up with or even 
‘leapfrog’ Western societies intertwined with China’s techno-nationalist discourse, together 
forming a new social fever in this new type of technologies, especially personal computers.  
 
However, Western techno-utopianism also faces challenges in China. Through an analysis of 
articles on People’s Daily in several months from 1995 to 2003, Hong (2008) finds out that 
the official discourse is not totally in line with the Western utopian discourse on information 
and post-industrialisation. Instead, after the first few years’ obsession of ‘post-’ discourse in 
the 90s, People’s Daily slightly changed into a more modest tone. Using Hong’s word, the 
term ‘neo-industrialisation’ used by People’s Daily reflects the recognition of China’s reality 
of uncompleted urbanisation and agriculture industrialisation and China’s low-end position in 
the global information economy (Hong, 2008: 29–30). Moreover, the concept of neo-
industrialisation is used to promote market forces and values. Therefore, China’s information 
society is featured with a combination of informatisation and industrialisation, instead of de-
industrialisation (ibid. p37). Hong’s observation is confirmed by Gewirtz’ historical study of 
Zhao Ziyang and his policies on economy and technology. As Gewirtz points out, for Zhao 
and his peer leaders, science and technology development and innovation should serve 
China’s economic innovation and development, “targeted at both ‘promoting the traditional 
industrial revolution’ and ‘catching up with the new task of the global New Technological 
Revolution’ (Gewirtz, 2019: 132). Moreover, this economic innovation should not be, not 
surprisingly, in contradictions with China’s political system (ibid., p133).  
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This neo-industrialisation is inseparable from China’s neoliberal development since the 
reforms. The next section will focus on the power relations in China’s ICT development.  
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5.3. Matrix of Power Relations in China’s ICT industry  
 
To better understand the unique features of China’s digital discourse and why the optimistic 
Western view about Information society is not fully accepted in China, this section will focus 
on the political economy of China’s ICT industry. It serves as a complement to the last 
section to build a framework for further empirical analysis. This section will focus on three 
areas of power dynamics (Zhao, 2007) and power “matrix” (Meng, 2018: 7): tensions 
between global capital and the state (5.3.1), and between the state and the market (5.3.2), as 
well as labour struggles in the society (5.3.3) (see Figure 5.1). These three areas of tensions 
highlight the three facets and forces in the ICT development in China: the state, the capital 






Figure 5.13. Power dynamics between different forces in ICT development in China.  
 
5.3.1. The Post-revolutionary state and the modern globalised world   
 
There are two seemingly contradictory but interconnected ways to understand China’s 
relationship with the world in the ICT area. As illustrated in section 5.1.1, the long-standing 
techno-nationalism has clashed with an increasing techno-globalism in operations. Though 
the former is still a dominant ideology, the emergence of the latter demonstrates the new 
development in ICT and Internet industries in China.   
 
Partly due to the need to ‘catch up’ with the Western technology and the techno-deterministic 
understanding of technology as ‘neutral instrument to economic development’ (see section 
5.1.1 and 5.1.2), the party-state and technocratic elites chose to modernise and industrialise 
China through integration into the global market system (Hong, 2011b; Zhao, 2007; Zhao and 
Schiller, 2001). In contemporary political economy, ICTs and the Internet have become the 
frontrunner of the expansion of transnational informational capitalism (Fuchs, 2010; Schiller, 
2005; Zhao and Schiller, 2001). China’s pursuit of modernisation since reform encountered 
Global 
capital State  Market  Society  
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the expansion of the world market system through information networks and technologies. 
China has since made informatisation as the “top developmental priority of the state” (Hong, 
2011b: 31). As Schiller points out, ICT industry as “capitalism’s most dynamic industry” and 
China as “its most expansionary growth zone” are two poles of growth after the financial 
crisis for the transnational capitalism (Schiller, 2005: 80). These ‘two poles’ are increasingly 
integrated into each other. The ICT manufacturing industry has been crucial in China’s 
integration into the world economy (Schiller, 2008: 112). The stark contrast of investments 
received between China’s special economic zones and coastal regions and central and 
western areas shows how developments of China’s ICTs during reforms “have been 
prioritized to coordinate with the shift of transnational capital to flexible production” (Zhao, 
2007: 99–100). The market-oriented reform and open-up process further unleashed “rampant 
consumerism in China” and turned itself into the “workshop of the world” (ibid, p95). There 
is little doubt that China has pursued a “globally integrated, market-based, ICT-driven mode 
of economic development”, especially during the 90s (Hong, 2011b: 31). As Meng (2018) 
points out, Xi Jinping’s Davos speech about embracing globalisation while Trump building 
barriers might be a “surprise to those who maintain a cold-war image of China” (Meng, 2018: 
9). Therefore, the ICT sector is one of the main areas for China to integrate into the world 
capitalist system successfully.  
 
Similarly, in media and Internet sectors, there is a strong resistance against the penetration 
and influence of imperialist and hegemonic Western media in non-Western media systems on 
the one hand (Zhao, 2012: 146), and an economic imperative to learn from the Western 
media operations on the other (such as entertainment industry, see Sparks, 2012). As Zhao 
points out, analysis of non-Western media systems cannot enjoy the ‘privilege’ to “focus 
more on the relationships between a media system and the social and political settings of a 
given country within the containment of the modern (Western) nation-state” (Zhao, 2012: 
146). It is crucial to consider the power relations between central and peripheral media 
systems in the world. For example, all media students in China understand that the first 
modern newspapers in China were set up by missionary agents in colonised cities and in 
foreign languages. Another example is that during the Cold War, China devoted a lot of 
resources to prevent broadcasting signals from the ‘enemies’. Even today, there is still strong 
resistance against the influence and penetration of Western media in non-Western countries, 
partly because of the Third World nationalism (ibid.).  
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On the other hand, media, and the Internet in particular, as a business has seen an increasing 
integration into the world financial system. For example, Xia and Fuchs (2016) examine the 
intense financialization of major Internet companies in China (Xia and Fuchs, 2016). 
Similarly, Hong (2017) expresses a similar concern of the increasing financed character of 
Chinese Internet economy and how the involvement of transnational finance capital have 
impacted the state-corporate relations (Hong, 2017b). In a more detailed study by Jia and 
Winseck, it shows “the centrality of financial institutions in the ownership” of Baidu, Alibaba 
and Tencent. In particular, they find out the intensive scale of foreign investors ownership 
stakes in Alibaba (40%) and Tencent (45%) (Jia and Winseck, 2018: 54).  
 
Therefore, ICT industries and media sectors have seen the entangled relationship between 
China and the world. On the one hand, techno-nationalism, the underlying competitive 
relations between China and the West, has always been one of the main themes in China’s 
development of ICTs and the Internet. On the other hand, CCP’s pursuit of the market-based 
and export-oriented path of development after the ‘reform and open-up’ policies has 
integrated China more closely into the world market. It is worth exploring how ideological 
discourses have developed to reconcile this contradictory development.   
 
5.3.2. The Party-state and marketisation of the media and the Internet 
 
In the area of control over access and content of the Internet in Chinese society, there shows a 
complex nexus between the coercive state power and the capitalist logic of the market.  
 
Historical development of marketisation has shaped Chinese media into two roles: as an 
ideological apparatus and as commodities (Ma, 2000; Zhao, 2012). On the one hand, CCP’s 
media system, inherited from the Soviet system, has defined the function of media positively 
to motivate the public. During the revolutionary period, CCP emphasised the mass media’s 
role to win “cultural leadership” and to forge a “revolutionary hegemony” (Zhao, 2012: 151). 
For the post-Mao period, CCP still actively use mass media to “shape the contours of Chinese 
modernity” (ibid.). Moreover, after 1989, CCP has tightened its control of media, 
strengthening its “leading role in media and ideology” (ibid.). From the ownership 
perspective, news production and distribution, i.e. news media outlets, are monopolised by 
the State.  
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On the other hand, commercial papers are always one part of China’s media system even 
before the reforms. Before 1949, there were commercial papers in semi-colonial metropolitan 
cities in China. These papers continue to exist after 1949. Moreover, CCP also created other 
afternoon tabloids to “establish its revolutionary hegemony over an urban population” (ibid., 
p157). During Mao’s era, there were several liberal attempts. For example, in 1957, the 
liberal intellectuals made efforts to challenge the party’s monopoly of the media system 
during the ‘one hundred flowers campaign’, but soon oppressed in the afterwards ‘Anti-
Rightist Campaign’. Another example of struggles for liberalisation of media was after the 
‘reform and open up’ during the 1989 pro-democracy moments. However, these attempts all 
failed or later oppressed by the State, and some even ironically “contributed to the Chinese 
State’s fortification of its regime of control” (Zhao, 2012: 150).  
 
After 89 and especially after Deng’s southern tour 1992 that further established the direction 
of China’s reform, commercialisation has become one key component of and it also happens 
in the media system. Though as part of official propaganda machines, news media cannot be 
privatised, the more ‘soft’ parts and peripheral areas of the media and cultural industries, 
such as the entertainment industry, and advertising, are open to private and foreign capital 
(Zhao, 2012: 153). These areas are seen as profit-making enterprises instead of official 
organs. As pointed out by Meng, on the one hand, media institutions in China as “the 
mouthpiece of a revolutionary party has given way to the maintenance of social stability by a 
bureaucratic authoritarian state” (Meng, 2018: 3). On the other hand, the “functioning of 
capitalist logic in allocating communication resources” is crucial in the Chinese context 
(ibid., 9). Therefore, the Chinese media system has a history of a combination of two types of 
media sector: one as party organ, and the other as market-oriented media.  
 
TV, news agencies, and the Internet have similar stories. Television, which is arguably more 
important for Chinese people’s everyday life, faces a similar situation. TV in China is “state 
controlled, monopolistically operated, and highly commercialized” (Zhao, 2012: 159–60). 
News agencies in China experienced a similar process of marketisation (Xin, 2012).  
Understanding the Chinese state’s control of the Internet can follow the same differentiation. 
A detailed study of the first ten years of China’s online media shows this complex picture 
(Peng, 2005). On the one hand, the state sees the Internet as part of its state-dominant news 
media system and a new instrument to continue its propaganda online. On the other hand, 
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CCP has opened peripheral, less political (in a narrow sense) areas of the Internet to private 
capital. This opening-up policy is also partly because of the lag behind of regulation of new 
technologies. As a result, commercial Internet platforms in China started to dominate the 
market. Because of the particular feature of the Internet, these private-owned platforms not 
only function as media, but also provide other services, such as e-commerce, and bring 
economic growth. The State has thus not only allowed these platforms to exist but also 
encourage and support their developments, as long as they conduct proper self-censorship on 
content. More recently, the fast development of Internet business and the tight control over 
the content, such as on Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent, shows clearly that the Internet is the 
main area for generating profits while following strict control of the content.  
 
The marketisation of media in China after reforms has complex consequences. As Ma points 
out, the media market in China is “both restraining and enabling”(Ma, 2000: 22).  On the one 
hand, the market, as criticised from a critical political economic view, facilitates media 
commodities, audience commodities, consumerism, and media conglomerates which not only 
restrict content but also exploit media workers (Fuchs, 2014a; Mosco, 1996; Schiller, 1997, 
2007; Dallas W. Smythe, 1994). Besides, in the Chinese context, commercialisation has 
brought side effects such as paid journalism, uneven development in different regions (Ma, 
2000: 22; Tong and Sparks, 2009). However, on the other hand, in the Chinese or other 
authoritarian contexts, marketisation and economic independence, indeed “weaken political 
control and enhance editorial autonomy” and widen “personal spaces” to a limited extent 
(Ma, 2000: 18, 26). From this perspective, the market does serve as a liberating force. Many 
scholars have discussed the positive effects of China’s marketisation of media (Lee, 2001; 
Xin, 2008). Several official media outlets under commercial operations have seen positive 
development of investigative journalism and citizen journalism (Repnikova, 2017). Internet, 
as new technology developed and adopted in Chinese society after post-Mao reforms, is 
celebrated by many scholars of its liberating power (Yang, 2009).  
 
Therefore, it is not difficult to identify two types of discourses regarding the Internet in 
China. On the one hand, there are strict restrictions on political content, especially political 
news. As part of the party organ, Internet news media are controlled under a similar fashion 
as other propaganda machines. On the other hand, as for-profit enterprises, Internet 
companies operate in a more liberal market setting, deflecting more or less from direct 
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political control. Therefore, it is worth exploring how the State perceives its relationship with 
these Internet companies and vice versa.   
 
5.3.3. The Social dimension  
 
Besides the capitalist logic and the State, there is another key dimension to understand the 
power dynamics of China’s ICT and Internet: the social dimension. Scholars from both 
political economy and political science discuss this issue from different perspectives. While 
the former focuses on labour issues in ICT-related industries, the latter mainly investigates 
the democratisation potentials of the Internet.   
 
Chinese society has seen constant labour struggles in ICT-related industries. Since the 
transition from Fordism to post-Fordism in advanced capitalist societies, most of the 
manufacturing industries have been transferred to developing economies, such as China. At 
the same time, China’s reform has enabled greater integration into the global market, 
especially with an increasing number of manufacturing factories in the coastal areas. Along 
with this global transformation of industries is the transformation of acute labour struggles. 
China has become the world factory with acute labour struggles (Hong, 2011b). Several 
scholars have focused on investigating labour issues in China. For example, Ching Kwan Lee 
studied the transformation of Chinese capitalism through the lens of labour and working-class 
experiences and struggles, especially through gender issues in South China (Lee, 1998), 
labour protests in Rustbelt areas and newly developed areas (Lee, 2007). Pun Ngai and her 
colleagues have published several articles on labour issues in transnational factories in South 
China, especially in Foxconn (Chan et al., 2013; Chan and Pun, 2010). Jack Linchuan Qiu 
and Christian Fuchs have studied the issue from a more global perspective, defining digital 
labour in a broader sense, from manufacturing factory workers to programmers to Internet 
users (Fuchs, 2014a; Qiu, 2016). More recently, Lee has studied a more recent development 
of state capitalism in Africa and its impact on local labour struggles (Lee, 2018).  
 
While political economy scholars’ discussions mainly focus on the relations between the 
State and capital, political science provides another angle to understand China’s Internet 
(Meng, 2018; Yang, 2009). Political scientists try to understand the democratisation role of 
the Internet (or the lack of it) in China. There are three stances. The first one holds positive 
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attitudes towards the liberation role of the Internet in China. As shown in the title of Yong 
Hu’s book (2008), the Internet provides an arena for ‘the rising cacophony’ where public 
discussions and personal expression emerge. In his discussions of distinction between the 
personal and the public, Hu believes that the Internet provides a unique opportunity for the 
public to express opinions and criticisms that are not normally allowed in everyday life. Yet 
Hu also acknowledges the sophisticated control system the Chinese government implements 
(p318) and the weak civil society in China that could limit the possibility of dramatic changes 
brought by the Internet. However, Hu concludes, in countries with limited political liberty 
like China, the Internet shows huge potential for democratisation (p330). The Internet, 
according to Hu, would serve as an efficient and flexible tool to give voices to citizens and 
thus help to build a public sphere in China, though not necessarily guarantee democratisation 
in China (Hu, 2008). Through studying online activism in China, Yang (2009) also provides 
an optimistic view of the Internet’s role in democratisation or at least in facilitating protests 
and struggles (Yang, 2009). Similarly, Ashley Esarey and Qiang Xiao through their analysis 
of online media and blogs show how the Internet has empowered Chinese netizens to 
challenge the state agenda and political repressions. Citizens, according to their study, have 
used creative and sophisticated ways to express their critiques towards the regime (Esarey 
and Xiao, 2008, 2011).  Some researchers have dedicated to unpuzzle the mechanism behind 
China’s censorship. One prominent example is from Gary King and his colleagues (2013) 
who use a well-designed quantitative research method to show convincingly that China’s 
censorship has allowed government criticisms but silenced collective expressions (King et al., 
2013). With slightly different tones, these researches focus on the positive role of the Internet 
in facilitating public expressions and criticisms, and finally democratises China.  
 
What is worth noticing is the time of these publications. From their publication time we can 
see that in the early age of the Internet, especially the first few years of Sina Weibo (launched 
in August 2009) and before Xi’s administration (since 2013), observers of Internet in China 
held a much more optimistic view towards the Internet, in terms of its potential for changing 
the society. It is understandable. During that period, the Internet was still a new area for the 
government to exert total control, thus was a much freer space in China than it is now. Weibo 
was then seen as a public sphere in China where government officials corruptions were 
exposed, local governments were held to take responsibility, and political criticisms enjoyed 
some extent of freedom.  
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This situation has gradually changed since 2010 and control was increasingly tightened after 
Xi Jinping became China’s supreme leader in 2013 (Yang, 2015: 3–4). Series of actions have 
been taken by different agencies, ranging from ‘hard measurement’ such as establishing the 
new ministerial-level Cyberspace Administration of China (Wang Xin Ban) in 2014, the 
publication of China Internet Security Law (Wangluo Anquan Fa) in 2016, to ‘soft 
management’ such as asking Internet companies to commit to manage online comments 
(Xinhua Net, 2014), and boosting Chinese government agencies and official media’s 
presence online.  
 
While this democratisation approach is crucial and fruitful, some scholars have argued to 
think beyond this approach (Meng, 2010; Sparks, 2012; Zhou, 2009). For one thing, the 
liberal democratic view always equalises freedom of speech with freedom of the market 
(Meng, 2010: 502). The pursuit of democracy is thus normally reduced to the pursuit of the 
free market. This is very problematic, as shown by researchers from political economists. For 
example, it is dubious that the already highly divided society in China due to the economic 
reforms (see Chapter 3) could be changed for better with more dramatic commercialisation 
and marketisation. The commercialisation of media has also oppressed the disenfranchised 
groups to have a voice (Zhao, 2007). Moreover, the free market is not necessarily in conflict 
with the State. As Colin Sparks correctly points out, “some writers retain an ideological 
attachment to the notion that marketization of the media will lead it into conflict with the 
party”(Sparks, 2012: 62). However, researches, such as those conducted by Chin-Chuan Lee 
and her colleagues, found that journalists show little difficulty in serving both the party and 
the market while some other times avoid censorship instead of direct confronting (Lee et al., 
2006, 2007). The state censorship could also serve to protect domestic companies (Schiller, 
2008: 114), while in other cases, party-state power and the market rationality could work 
together (Zhao, 2009: 175). Therefore, there is a danger to equal freedom of the market to the 
freedom of speech.  
 
Moreover, the focus on the control exerted by the State will lead to an overlook of other 
subtle types of control and struggles in society. For example, as early as 2000, Ma has 
pointed out the flexible governance by administrative and regulatory technologies to “contain 
strong commercial development within political control” (Ma, 2000: 23). Ma also points out 
the irony of marketisation in China that the authority tolerates media conglomerates and 
groups because “they can serve as the means to control chaotic free competition and limit the 
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proliferation of minor papers ” (Ma, 2000: 18). Zhao Yuezhi also points out that 
commercialisation of media system in China has not “undermined political 
instrumentalization in any substantial way” (Zhao, 2012: 162). Rather, there exist “blunt 
forms of commercial instrumentalization and the abuse of the party’s journalistic power”, 
including paid journalism and blackmailing companies through writing negative stories 
(ibid.). In other words, instead of conflicting political systems, commercialisation of media 
system could see a concerto of political and economic power abuse.  
 
Recent studies show a more nuanced analysis of the complex dynamics of the situation. 
Meng, for example, emphasises the importance of online political discourse to understand the 
nuanced power relations in China between official rhetoric and civic culture (Meng, 2009, 
2011; Meng and Huang, 2017). Repnikova points out that the Western study of China’s 
media and the Internet tend to focus solely on “a fearful, loyal agent of the ruthless party-
state, which exudes no tolerance towards its critics” (Repnikova, 2017: 3). The main focus 
thus is put on censorship, coercion, and official propaganda. Through her fieldwork, she tries 
to outline the web of negotiations between the State and what she calls ‘critical journalism’ 
which includes investigative and critical reports of social issues. She clearly shows how 
media in China is a highly contested space and how different actors negotiate and mutually 
adapted in the process. However, she also shows the potential of “flexible collaboration” 
between critical actors and “the state under authoritarian regime” (Repnikova, 2017: 13). The 
book edited by Yang also shows different attempts to scrutinise these flexible collaborations 
and subtle negotiations online (Yang, 2015). 
 
Finally, moving beyond the conventional research approach towards the Internet in China 
means to pay more attention to the ideological facets. As Yang (2015) points out, critical 
analysis of Chinese Internet should not be confined to the “old dichotomies of resistance and 
control”, instead, it should give more attention to the subtle state power such as its 
propagandistic and ideological methods (Yang, 2015: 4). As Meng (2010) points out, China’s 
revolutionary past has “rendered the authoritarian state historically grounded legitimacy” thus 
an assumption of an antithetical relationship between the regime and the State is not accurate 
(Meng, 2010: 502; see also Zhao, 2009). These arguments demonstrate the necessity to 





Through the historical review of the Chinese digital revolution and the matrix of power 
relations among different forces and actors, there are several themes can be identified in 
China’s digital discourse from three dimensions: techno-determinism, the New Economy and 
the New Politics (see Table 5.1). From this chapter’s discussions, we can identify several 
similarities and differences in digital discourse and contradictions in reality between China 
and the advanced capitalist societies. These discussions will shed light on my further 
research.  
 
  themes 
New Economy 
 
• Techno-nationalism (national security, competition with the 
West, national progress)  
• Different from the post-industrialisation discourse in the 
Western society (Fordism to Post-Fordism), China expresses a 
‘neo-industrialisation’ discourse  
• Same to emphasise the influence of new technology on society 
in the market, production and consumption (technology 
dramatically transforms society) 
New politics  • International level: how the State reacts to global capital 
• State level: deregulation for commercial companies & State 
control of the content 
• Societal level: democratisation brought by the market and new 
technology  
• Individual level: empowerment and freedom of express  
• De-politicisation (technology is non-political) 




CHAPTER 6. METHODOLOGY  
 
6.1. CDA as a Methodology  
 
This thesis chooses critical discourse analysis (CDA) as its primary research method. There 
are various approaches to CDA. According to Wodak and Meyer, researchers under the name 
of CDA can be more usefully thought of as a heterogeneous ‘school’ instead of providing one 
“single or specific theory” or methodology (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 5). They have 
formulated several different approaches within CDA, such as a Discourse-Historical 
Approach (Wodak and Reisigl), Corpus-Linguistics Approach (Mautner), Social Actors 
Approach (van Leeuwen), Dispositive Analysis (Jager and Maier), Sociocognitive Approach 
(van Dijk), and Dialectical-Relational Approach (Fairclough) (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 20). 
Despite these differences, most researchers in CDA address the issues concerning discourse, 
critique, power and ideology. It will go beyond the purpose of this section to go into details 
about the differences and similarities between these approaches. I will briefly introduce CDA 
in this section and discuss why CDA is suitable for this research.  
 
CDA is more like a methodology other than merely a method (Fairclough, 2010: 225; Wodak 
and Meyer, 2015a: 13). The methodological approaches of CDA influence every decision 
throughout the research process, from the selection of theories to data processing. This 
research shares the same methodological position as CDA does from a critical dialectical 
perspective. The key issues in CDA - discourse, transdisciplinary, critical - are at the same 
time the main elements of this research.  
 
Despite all the differences and diversities in the paradigm, according to Wodak and Meyer 
(2015), critical discourse studies (they use this term in place of CDA to emphasis the diverse 
approaches in the paradigm or school) can be roughly defined as “fundamentally interested in 
analysing hidden, opaque, and visible structures of dominance, discrimination, power and 
control as manifested in language” (Wodak and Meyer, 2015a: 12). This characterisation 
highlights two features of CDA that are essential to this research.  
 
First of all, it is problem-oriented. It is derived from the tradition of critical theory that aims 
at enlightenment and emancipation. This thesis embeds itself in the critical dialectical 
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Marxist tradition. Theory, for discourse analysis studies, is “not only essential to formulate 
research questions that guide the data selection, data collection, analysis of data and 
interpretation”, but is “grounded in prior interpretations of empirical analyses” (ibid.: 14). It 
is also clear that in this thesis, theory plays an essential role throughout the whole process of 
the research. Moreover, the critical tradition of CDS requires it inevitably deals with the issue 
of power and ideologies that are the focal point of this thesis.  
 
Secondly, the interests in power and ideologies of CDS are represented in the analysis of 
discourse. CDS/CDA sees discourse as social practices that could, on the one hand, express, 
(re)produce and change the power relations in social structures and could, on the other hand, 
be determined by social structure. Ideology is the “more hidden and latent inherent in 
everyday-beliefs, which often appear disguised as conceptual metaphors and analogies” 
(ibid.: 8). CDS perceive discourse as “the result of jointly constructed meanings of the world” 
and they “emerge as social constructs, but do have ‘real’ consequences in social structure” 
(ibid.: 16). This understanding of language and its ideological function fits well in this 
research since it aims to reveal ideological expressions through the analysis of several types 
of discourses.  Moreover, as illustrated by Reisigl and Wodak (2016) in explaining their 
Discourse-Historical Approach, power is “discursively realized not only by grammatical 
forms, but also by a person’s control of the social occasion, by means of the genre of a text, 
or by the regulation of access to specific public spheres” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2015: 26). 
Therefore, discourse, in a broader sense, is a type of social practice in relationship with 
ideology and power.  
 
Thus, CDA suits this thesis well because of the two fundamental features of a problem-
oriented approach and an interest in power and ideologies in discourses.  
 
6.2. Researching Digital Discourse from the Government 
 
To research official documents, I will collect data from both policies and Xi’s speech. 
Section 6.3.1 will explain sampling strategies. Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough 
have developed a specific approach, on the basis of CDA, to analyse policy. Section 6.2.2 
will explain their critical policy analysis approach.  
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6.2.1. Sampling official documents 
 
The sampling process went through two steps. First of all, to get a general understanding of 
all policies regarding the Internet that are published by the government, I went through a 
throughout searching for documents on the government website.  
 
There are three categories in my search. The first category includes Law, Administrative 
ordinances and departmental regulations (both in content and industry). In particular, I search 
for the policies published by 
• the State Council  
• CAC (Cyberspace Administration of China) 
• MIIT (Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, set up in 2008) 
• SAPPRFT (State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television) 
 
• For searching policies published by the State Council, I use the official website: 
http://sousuo.gov.cn/a.htm?t=zhengce. Using the options in advanced search, my searching 
strategy is (a) to search in Titles of policies (b) for keywords: ‘Internet’ (互联网), ‘Big Data’ 
(大数据), ‘Net’ (网/网络), ‘electro-’(电子), ‘New Media’ (新媒体), ‘Digital’ (数字), (c) 
issuers: Central Committee of CCP and State Council (d) issue date: all. I have excluded 
policies not relevant to Informatisation due to the use of words, for example, the Network for 
Eco-Environmental Test. I have also excluded specific genre that is not regulation-related 
content, for example, ‘Letter’ (函), and ‘Announcement’ (会议通知). I added one new 
keyword ‘manufacturing’ ‘Made in China’ because of the importance of ICT manufacturing 
in China’s economic development. In total, I have identified 27 documents from the State 
Council, including 2 that were announced invalid.   
• CAC’s official documents published can be found on their website: 
http://www.cac.gov.cn/zcfg/sfjs/A090904index_1.htm. I have collected all laws and policies 
published by CAC, including 6 laws, 10 administrative ordinances, 13 departmental 
regulations, 17 regulatory documents, and 7 other policy paper. In total, I have identified 53 
relevant documents from CAC.  
• Regarding MIIT, I have search through all their policy documents on their official 
website http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n7280902/index.html using keywords 
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‘Internet’, ‘Net’, ‘Digital’, ‘Data’, and ‘New Media’. There are 18 documents in total from 
MIIT.  
• In terms of SAPPRFT, I used two steps. The first one is to search for the keyword 
‘Net’ (网) on their official website 
http://www.sapprft.gov.cn/sapprft/govpublic/6682_5.shtml. I found 4 departmental 
regulations and 2 laws in terms of content regulation. In the second step, I searched for 
keyword ‘Internet’ ‘New’ ‘New Media’ ‘Digital Publishing’ and ‘Data’ through ‘advanced 
search’ option. I have excluded some irrelevant documents, such as purchasing documents 
and announcements. In total, there are 37 documents in total from SAPPRFT. 
 
For the second category, I focus on the top-level policies that direct the government’s work. 
This category includes  
 
• the Outline of National IT Development Strategy (published in 2016),  
• 13th Five-Year-Plan,  
• 13th Five-Year-Plan for National Informatisation, and 
• Government Work Report (GWRs) from 2014 (the first year conducted by Premier Li 
Keqiang) to 2019.  
 
The third category focuses on Xi Jinping’s speech. There are several important speeches that 
are repetitively cited and referred to by media and official documents. For example, People’s 
Daily and CAC have published several articles and special issues on Xi’s statements on the 
Internet1. The following speeches have appeared repetitively. These speeches also include the 
most important meeting regarding a crucial leading group in the central government (1), 
Chinas’ cybersecurity and Informatization meetings (3,4) and the most important Internet-
related conference for the industry (2): 
 
1. Xi’s speech at the first meeting of the new Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity 
and Informatization (2014.02.27) 
 
1 For example, People’s Daily’s article titled: Important statements on the Internet made by Xi Jinping 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-12/05/content_5244492.htm 
Website published by CAC on Xi’s important speeches http://www.cac.gov.cn/ztzl/xzt/10/zt/index.htm  
Website published by CAC 2 http://www.cac.gov.cn/2018zt/xxgc420hy/index.htm   
Special issues published by CAC http://www.cac.gov.cn/gzzt/ztzl/More.htm 
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2. Address at the 2nd World Internet Conference (2015.12.16) 
3. Speech at the 2016 Work Conference for Cybersecurity and Informatization 
(2016.04.19)2 
4. Speech at the 2018 Work Conference for Cybersecurity and Informatization 
(2018.04.20) 
 
After going through all the documents and policies’ titles, I have chosen 21 documents for 
further thematic analysis and critical discourse analysis. My focus was on the documents that 
address the whole industry instead of specific sectors (e.g. e-commerce, or e-governance) and 
specific groups (e.g. children). I also made my judgement through how often they are 
constantly referred to by other documents. For example, in terms of content regulation, 
Provisions on Ecological Governance of Network Information Content refers to both 








1. Provisions on Ecological Governance of Network Information 
Content 
2. Administrative Measures for Internet Information Services 
(2011Revision) 
3. the Opinions on Promoting the Sound and Orderly Development 
of the Mobile Internet 
4. Cybersecurity Law 
5. Guiding Opinions on Actively Promoting the “Internet Plus” 
Action (Internet Plus Action Plan) 
6. Outline of Actions to Promote Big Data Strategy 
7. Made in China 2020 
 
2  The 4.19 speech is one of the most important speeches about the development of the Internet in China in 
several aspects. It is the first time the central government and CPC held a conference about national 
cybersecurity and informatisation. All members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC 
Central Committee participated the conference, as well as top officials from several Ministries and local 
governments. Official media have repetitively reported this event and published the whole speech. It has been 
published as a pamphlet and sold in bookshops nationwide and is often referred to subsequently. The first 
sentence from the extract above was later repetitively reported and reprinted in media, official and unofficial 
(e.g. Xinhua Net), and especially after American’s sanctions against China in April 2018, (e.g. in people.cn, 
Chinanews, Chinadaily, geekpark.com). The 4.19 speech can be taken to set a strategic, fundamental, 
comprehensive agenda for the development of the Internet and IT. 
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8. Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Innovative 
Development of Cloud Computing and Cultivating New Business 






9. the Outline of National IT Development Strategy (published in 
2016),  
10. 13th Five-Year-Plan,  
11. 13th Five-Year-Plan for National Informatisation, and 
12-17. Government Work Report (GWRs) from 2014 (the first year 
conducted by Premier Li Keqiang) to 2019.  
Xi’s speeches 18. Xi’s speech at the first meeting of the new Central Leading Group 
for Cybersecurity and Informatization (2014.02.27) 
19. Address at the 2nd World Internet Conference (2015.12.16) 
20. Speech at the 2016 Work Conference for Cybersecurity and 
Informatization (2016.04.19) 
21. Speech at the 2018 Work Conference for Cybersecurity and 
Informatization (2018.04.20) 
Total: 21 out of 148 
Table 6.1. List of Government documents. 
6.2.2. Analysing official documents with CDA  
 
There are several methods to interpret documents, including official documents from the 
State (Bryman, 2012: 556). Bryman has identified three approaches: qualitative content 
analysis; semiotics; and hermeneutics (ibid.: 557). This thesis has identified several themes of 
interest (see framework developed in Chapter 4 and 5). Therefore, on the basis of the 
methodology of this thesis, I will use CDA as the main method to analyse official documents 
from the government, especially the approach of CDA developed by Isabela Fairclough and 
Norman Fairclough.  
 
This approach of CDA sees policymaking as “having a ‘problem-solution’ character” 
(Fairclough, 2013: 183). It understands policy as arguing for action, starting from describing 
a current situation, with underlying values and concerns, and marching towards a desirable 
future. This approach of CDA focuses on practical argumentation when conducting policy 
analysis (Fairclough, 2013). Focusing on practical argumentation “has the advantage of 
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bringing to bear upon policy analysis a coherent approach to problem–solution relations” 
(ibid.). According to Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough (2012), practical arguments 
include: 
• A Circumstantial premise represents the current states of affairs and/or problems,  
• A Goal premise describes possible and desirable future states of affairs,  
• A Value premise refers to the underlying values and concerns,  
• A Means-Goal premise emphasises that if a certain Action A is pursued, it will change 
the current situation C and take us to the desirable G in according with V 
• A Claim (or conclusion) advocates pursuing this action  
 
For a typical policy or official speech to advocate a certain policy, one can identify several 
key elements in the arguments. The purpose of the policy or speech should be clear – to 
advocate certain action or actions, i.e. to solve the question of what should we do. The policy 
make proposes the answer to this question on the basis of, first of all, describing the current 
states of affairs or pointing out certain problems in the existing situation. She will also 
illustrate the desirable goals that ‘we’ want to achieve. Sometimes, she might outline several 
possible solutions and legitimate or justify the one solution she chose. She might also dismiss 
other options, claims that there are no alternatives, or argues that all other options either are 
unavailable or will cause undesirable consequences. The Value premises are important in this 
process not only “for how circumstances are problematized but also for what solutions are 
advocated” (Fairclough, 2013: 184). The means could also be complex for there are “chains 
of means-goals-circumstances relations” (ibid.). In other words, one means could be part of a 
solution that is part of a means to achieve further goals.  
 
Therefore, analysis is “a matter of identifying within an argument its premises and its 
conclusion and the relations between them” (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 11). 
Evaluation of a policy will focus on analysing these premises and the relations between them, 
as well as a critical examination of the arguments and claims (conclusions, actions). We can 
“criticize a claim by showing that the action will have negative consequences that will 
undermine the goals and values that the agent is committed to, hence the action should not be 
performed” (ibid.: 12). This type of analysis and evaluation will avoid a mere descriptive 
analysis of policy, but bridge the gap between texts and social contexts. It thus serves well 
the purpose of this thesis to connect textual analysis to critical political-economic analysis.  
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Isabela Fairclough outlines six critical questions for the evaluation of practical arguments. 
The questions include three ways to challenge a practical argument (Fairclough, 2016: 60): 
 
To challenge the rational acceptability (‘truth’) of the premises 
CQ1: Is it true that, in principle, doing A leads to G? 
CQ2: Is it true that the Agent is in circumstances C? 
CQ3: Is it true that the Agent actually has the stated goals and values (motives)?  
To challenge the reasonableness of the conclusion  
CQ4: Are the intended consequences of A (i.e. the goal) acceptable? 
CQ5: Are the foreseeable unintended consequences (e.g. risks ) of acceptable?  
To challenge the inference 
CQ6: [Among reasonable alternatives,] is A comparatively better in the context?  
Table 6.2. Critical questions for evaluating practical arguments 
I will briefly explain these critical questions.  
• The first three CQs focus on the truth of the premises. The CQ1 focuses on whether 
the proposed actions (means-goal premise) can achieve the intended goals. It also asks 
whether there is enough convincing evidence to support the decision. CQ2 
investigates the circumstances. It asks questions such as whether the current states of 
affairs are as they are being described, and whether the associated explanations for the 
current states of affairs (or the causes of the current problems) are correct. CQ3 talks 
about motives and values: are the stated motives the real motives (or, e.g. just for a 
political party to seize power)? Or does the values or concerns stated are genuine 
concerns (e.g. just a fraud or something rhetoric)?  
• The CQ4 and 5 then challenge the reasonableness of the conclusions, i.e. whether 
there will be undesirable consequences. While CQ4 asks whether the stated goals are 
acceptable, CQ5 addresses whether there will be unintended consequences (e.g. fail 
the goals, esp. clash with other political commitments, legitimate goals, or socially 
accepted values). On the other hand, defenders of the proposal could argue that even 
there are side effects, there are ways to mitigate or compensate for the side effects, or 
the side effects are outweighed/overridden by long-term benefits, or if the proposal is 
not conducted, then there will be more serious consequences. 
• Finally, CQ6 ask whether there are alternatives. It could ask are there any other facts 
about the context (that will make the proposal impossible to achieve, or there are 
other reasonable alternatives that have not been considered).  
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I would argue that these critical questions are not only useful for the evaluation of practical 
arguments in government documents, but also for investigating ideological discourses in 
general.  
6.3. Researching Digital Discourse from Companies 
 
To research digital discourse from companies, this thesis will focus on CEOs’ speeches from 
BAT, the dominant players in China’s Internet-related market. Section 6.3.1 will demonstrate 
my sampling strategies. Section 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 will explain how to combine thematic 
analysis and CDA for analysing digital discourse from BAT.  
  
6.3.1. Sampling BAT  
 
First of all, there are two most important national events about the Internet in China: The 
World Internet Conference (hereinafter WIC, launched since 2014) and Big Data Expo 
(launched since 2015). CEOs of BAT all participated in these two events almost every year. 
These two events also have an official background. For example, Xi made speeches every 
year at WIC since 2015. The analysis of these events can shed lights on ‘intertextuality’ of 
analysing BAT and government discourse. Therefore, I collected all speeches from Jack Ma, 
Pony Ma, and Robin Li at these two events.  
 
Secondly, BAT all organised events for their partners or clients. In the following sub-
sections, I will first of all briefly introduce the history of BAT, the most important events for 
them, and explains how I collect materials. I will restrict my search among Robin Li, Jack 




Established by Robin Li in 2000, Baidu spent 5 years to be listed in NASDAQ in 2005, In the 
five years, Baidu has established its position in China’s market and make profits through its 
core service – search engine and ranking. The main profits come from advertising. In 2002, 
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Baidu established Baidu Union. In 2006, Baidu for the first time launched Baidu Union 
Conference. In the same year (2006), Baidu started World Conference. 
 
In 2002, the Great Fire Wall (GFW) was launched. Since that time, Internet users started to 
have problems using Google.  Baidu gradually became more popular than Google in China. 
It also gradually expanded its businesses into the content community, including MP3 music 
(Nov 2002), Tieba (Dec 2003), Zhidao (June 2005), Baike (April 2006). While establishing 
its dominant position in creating online content community, Baidu has been trying to expand 
its businesses into other areas, including Baidu Video, Baidu Map, Baidu Hi, and so on. 
Baidu has also tried to create applications in social media (Baidu Space, launched in 2006, 
closed in 2015) and e-commerce (Baidu Youa, launched in 2008, closed in 2011) to compete 
with Tencent and Alibaba. However, all these attempts were not so successful.  
 
In 2009, Baidu launched a new service called ‘Box Computing’. This new service has 
expanded Baidu’s search engine from searching for content to searching for all types of 
services and established technology standard. If other applications want to be shown through 
Baidu Search Engine, then they all need to apply Baidu technology standards. Also, users 
don’t need to go to specific websites for information. Baidu can decide what users can see 
and use online through the only entry– Baidu search engine. One year later, Baidu further 
launched its Open Platform and mobile Box Computing. The logic behind these business 
operations is to become the entry of all online information and service, thus dominate the 
market.  
 
One year later, Google stopped its service in Mainland China. Baidu became the dominant 
player in the search engine market in China. In 2011, Baidu overtook Tencent became the 
most valuable Internet company in China on NASDAQ.  
 
According to Robin Li, Baidu started to develop and apply AI in 2010, and deep learning in 
2012. In 2013, Baidu launched IDL, the first institute that was titled with deep learning 
(Robin Li, 2018 WIC, AI panel). Since 2014, Robin Li started to emphasise Big Data and AI 
on different occasions. In 2016, Baidu launched Baidu Brain (ibid.). In 2017, Baidu officially 
changed its mission into ‘awaken everything’ (Robin Li, 2017 Baidu Union), signifying a 
fundamental change in Baidu’s developmental strategy. In2018, Robin Li claims that Baidu 
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Apollo Platform has become the first ecosystem of autonomous vehicles in the world (Robin 
Li, 2018 WIC).  
 
Throughout Baidu’s development, there are several important events. These events are also 
important discursive events given their role in delivering Robin Li and Baidu’s message to 
the whole industry. These events also receive lots of attention from the media and the public. 
There are three important events that Baidu organises every year. According to Robin Li in 
2012, Baidu has “two very important events every year: one is Baidu World, we will launch 
new products from Baidu, the other is Baidu Union in which I share my thoughts of the 
whole industry with everyone” (Robin Li, 2012 Baidu Union). In 2017, since Baidu’s 
strategy in developing AI, it started another event called Baidu AI Developer Conference. 
This conference is very technology-oriented, mainly focusing on discussions of new tech-
developments. As discussed earlier, since Baidu announced Box Computing in 2009 that 
signifies the start of its ‘open system’, I will collect data from 2009. Therefore, I will not 
include this event in my samples: 
 
• Baidu World Congress (since 2006-) (collect from 2009) 




Established in 1999, Alibaba first focused on B2B business model. It provides webpages for 
Chinese medium-sized and small businesses for international trade. It then expands 
operations overseas. However, after 2000, the huge expense overseas and Internet bubble 
made Alibaba had to retreat its focus back to China. By 2002, Alibaba has established its 
profit model on the basis of a membership fee and value-added service. 
 
In 2003, Alibaba Group founded Taobao, a shopping website facilitates C2C retail. In the 
same year, Alibaba also launched Alipay. Later in 2010, Tmall was launched to replace the 
B2C service developed out of Taobao. In 2010, Alibaba also launched YiTao, focusing on the 
search engine in the e-commerce sector.  
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Since 2005, Alibaba started to expand its business into other areas to support its core e-
commerce service, including search engine (merger Yahoo China in 2005 but failed in 2006), 
community website (purchase Koubei in 2006), advertising (founded Alimama in 2007, 
adapted into AliUnion in 2010), enterprise software (Alibaba Software in 2007), AI and 
Cloud (Alibaba Cloud in 2009), logistic (founded Cainiao in 2013). It is worth noticing that 
since 2007, Alibaba started to provide loan service for medium-sized and small businesses, 
signifying a further step into financial services. In 2008, Alibaba founded Alibaba Capital 
Partners. Since then, Alibaba expanded its business into the cultural and entertainment 
industry, O2O, and other industries through investment. By 2015, Alibaba has integrated its 
businesses into 7 main categories, including E-commerce, Ant Finance, Cainiao Logistic, Big 
Data and Cloud Computing, Advertising service, International Trade, and Internet service. 
 
As a company started from, and whose core business still is, e-commerce, Alibaba launched 
Wshang Conference in 2004 to promote its construction of ‘e-commerce ecosystem’. In 
2009, Alibaba created the ‘Double Eleven’ shopping festival. In 2008, the Wshang 
Conference announced to upgrade it to a global e-commerce conference. This study will 
collect Jack Ma’s speech in Wshang Conference since 2008-2012 (the annual conference was 
cancelled since 2013). Since 2015, Alibaba launched Apsara Conference as the most 
important events for Alibaba every year. Between 2016 to 2018, Alibaba has Investor’s Day 
where Jack Ma speaks to Investors. This is another important event to understand Alibaba’s 
discourse. Moreover, Jack Ma has published a compilation of his speeches, The Future Has 
Come (2017) to promote his ideas. I will also include this book in the materials. Therefore, I 
have collected data from the following events in Alibaba: 
 
• Apsara Conference (2015-2018) 
• Investor’s Day (2016-2018) 
• WShang Conference (2004-) (collect from 2008) 




Tencent was established in 1998, first focusing on instant messaging service OICQ, later 
adapted into QQ. Since 2003, Tencent started to expand its businesses into other areas, 
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including games, Internet portals, SNS, e-commerce, etc. It also established its profits model 
through charging for a membership fee on IM (e.g. QQ show) and through games. As shown 
in its financial reports, since 2014, more than half of Tencent’s income comes from games.  
 
During its fast developing period between 2003 and 2010, Tencent was notorious as a 
copycat. It copied ideas from start-ups and soon overpassed them. This type of developmental 
path was stopped in 2010. In November 2010, Tencent claimed to cease the operation of QQ 
software on computers that installed 360 software. This has received a lot of backlashes from 
users for Tencent exerting too much power over users’ personal computers. The backlashes 
also reflected the long-standing dissatisfaction of Tencent’s misbehaviours in the market. 
With intervention from the government authorities, QQ and 360 became compatible again. 
However, this incident has caused Tencent to rethink its business operations, as Pony Ma 
claimed.  
 
By the end of 2010, Pony Ma published 8 Guiding Principles for the future of the Internet. 
Later in 2011, Tencent announced its ‘open platform’ strategy and promised to build an open 
and sharing platform that means to share profits with Tencent’s partners. Pony Ma claims that 
a real platform is about the social network, including networks of accounts, traffic, and 
payment (Pony Ma, 2011 Tencent Global Partner Conference). It was since this year Pony 
Ma repeated the idea of ‘Tencent ecosystem’ on different occasions. With the ‘open 
platform’ strategy, Tencent further expanded its ‘ecosystem’ into other business areas, such 
as search engine (collaborate with Sougou), e-commerce (partner with JD). Partners within 
this ‘ecosystem’ can share resources (and probably customers and their data) openly and 
freely (Pony Ma, 2016 Tencent Global Partner Conference). Moreover, Tencent started to 
invest in other companies and venture capital firms. According to its official website, Tencent 
Investment has invested in the cultural and entertainment industry, retailing, service industry, 
education, finance, and high-tech in China and overseas. It claims to have invested more than 
800 enterprises, covering more than 20 countries and regions 3.  
 
Another important thing happened during Tencent’s transformation is the launch of WeChat, 
now become Tencent’s most important mobile application and the entrance to the mobile 
Internet for millions of users in China. Since 2016, Tencent published a new function within 
 
3 Tencent Investment official website https://investment.tencent.com/portfolio.html 
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the app called Mini-Programme. What is important of this Mini-programme is its capability 
to direct users to retailers. This is obviously a strategy to compete with Alibaba in e-
commerce. The launch of Mini-Programme has helped Tencent to further become 
conglomerates, especially stepping into retailing and finance.  
 
Since Tencent started to develop AI, it slightly changes its statement from connecting its 
partners and users to connecting everything, including equipment. It chooses to use the word 
“connector”. Furthermore, Tencent claims to build a ‘digital eco-community’.  
 
There were three important events for Tencent since 2011. In 2019, Tencent announced to 
integrate these three conferences into one: Tencent Global Digital Ecosystem Summit 
(TGDES, Pony Ma did not give speech in this conference) Therefore I will collect Pony Ma’s 
speeches/addresses in these three events: 
 
• Tencent Global Partner Conference (2011-2018) 
• Tencent Cloud + Future（2015-2018）(Pony Ma participated in 2016-2018) 
• Internet Plus Digital Economy（2015-2018） 
 
To sum up, I will collect the following materials for analysing digital discourse from BAT: 
 
Alibaba Apsara Conference (2015-
2018) 
4 
Investor’s day (2016-2018 3 
Wangshang (2008-2012, 
including a speech from 10 
year anniversary in 2009) 
6 
WIC (2014-2017, including 
all speeches from Jack Ma 
in several panels) 
7 
Big Data Expo (2015-2018) 3 
TFHC 41 (plus 3 speeches already 
collected in other categories) 
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Baidu Baidu World Congress 
(2009-2018) 
10 
Baidu Union (2009-2017) 9 
WIC (2014-2019, including 
all speeches from Robin Li 
in several panels) 
Total 10 
Big Data Expo (2016-2018) 3 
Tencent Partner (2011-2018) 8 
Cloud + Future (2016-2018) 3 
Internet Plus Digital 
Economy 
4 
WIC (2014-2018, including 
all speeches from Pony Ma 
in several panels) 
7 
Big Data Expo (2015-2018) 4 
Total: 122  
Table 6.1. List of documents from BAT. 
 
6.3.2. Combining thematic analysis with CDA  
 
To avoid cherry-picking in CDA, I will combine thematic analysis (Bryman, 2012: 578) with 
CDA in analysing materials from BAT. I will mainly use thematic analysis to identify the 




With the framework developed in Chapter 4 and 5, and my research question (RQ 2), I have 
applied a descriptive coding scheme on the following criteria:  
• Self-definitions:  
o What is BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, ‘we’ ‘us’) 
o how do BAT represent themselves (e.g. ‘infrastructure’ ‘platform’)  
o How do BAT describe their business expansion, their business transformations 
(e.g. ‘ecosystem’, ‘open platform’, ‘open system’; new technologies, AI) 
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• Relations with 
o Partners, other businesses  
o Users 
o Clients (advertisers)  
o Government  
o Employers  
 
Furthermore, regarding the analytical framework, I identified the following keywords: 
• Internet Economy:  
o ‘Market’ (e.g. free market, niche markets, entrepreneurship, innovation, SC, 
monopoly, oligopoly, domination, business) ;  
o ‘Production’ (especially focusing on BAT’s clashes with ‘traditional 
economy’/‘real economy’, agriculture, manufacturing, service sector; upgrade 
of the economy; flexible production; restructure of companies; workplace; 
work; labour; play); What is data and data collection for BAT, privacy 
concerns  
o ‘Consumption’ (participatory culture, participation; consumer; sharing; 
openness) 
• Internet Politics (keywords): 
o ‘International’, ‘global’, ‘foreign’ 
o ‘State’, ‘nation’, ‘China’, ‘government’ 
o ‘Society’ (poverty; rural; social issues; democratisation; liberal; class) 
o ‘Individual’ (free; expression; empowerment; ) 
 
These codes have been refined through reading through the documents. Some second-level 
codes were added. For example, poverty was not included in my first coding sets. However, it 
was covered in BAT’s narrative of upgrading the national economy. I noticed this coding and 
started to pay attention to relevant codes at the social level, such as rural areas.  
 
6.3.3. Dimensions of analysis and toolkits in CAD  
 





Figure 6.14. Fairclough’s three-dimensional conception of discourse. Source: Discourse and 
Social Change, 1992: 72. 
 
There are several levels of critical discourse analysis. Fairclough proposed a three-
dimensional conception of discourse: text, discursive practice (the production, distribution, 
consumption of discourse) and social practice (Fairclough, 1992: 72–3) (see Figure 6.1). In 
responding to the three dimensions of discourse, for Fairclough, there are three dimensions of 
critical discourse analysis: description, interpretation and explanation. Description deals with 
“formal properties of the text”; interpretation with “the relationship between text and 
interaction”; explanation with “the relationship between interaction and social context” 
(Fairclough, 2015b: 58–9).  
 
Fairclough distinguishes the “‘external’ relations of texts and the ‘internal’ relations of texts” 
(Fairclough, 2003: 36). The ‘external relations’ include the relations of texts with a) other 
elements of social events, practices, and structures, as well as b) other texts. In terms of 
understanding how the texts are related to other elements (social events), Fairclough proposes 
to analyse “how they [texts] figure in Actions, Identifications, and Representations” (ibid.). 
Texts are (part of) actions, and they can provide representations, and they can help to form 
identities. For analysing the texts’ relations to other (external) texts, Fairclough uses the term 
‘intertextuality’. The ‘internal relations’ includes analysis of “semantic relations”, 
“grammatical relations”, “vocabulary relations” and “phonological relations” (Fairclough, 
2003: 36-7, see also Fairclough, 1992: 75-7).  
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Similarly, the DHA approach argues that there are four dimensions of a ‘context’: 1) the 
immediate language texts, 2) “intertextual and interdiscursive relationships”, 3) “social 
variables and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of situation’”, and 4) the “broader 
socio-political and historical context” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2015: 30-1).  
 
Analysis in this thesis will adapt the analysis framework/dimensions from DRA and DHA. I 
will focus on four main aspects of the selected materials: 
 
a) a textual analysis of discursive strategies (e.g. the use of words, the structures of 
argumentation, assumptions, etc.); In particular, this thesis will apply the toolkits 
provided by Fairclough and Reisigl and Wodak (Fairclough, 2015b; Reisigl and 
Wodak, 2001).  
b) an intertextual and interdiscursive analysis, dealing with external relations of texts 
(especially in the analysis of data collected from focus groups, their relations to the 
government policies or Internet tycoons);  
c) a contextual analysis, including an analysis of institutional context and situational 
context (especially in the analysis of documents from government and companies, 
e.g. in what institutional frames and under what situations are the documents or 
speeches published), and an analysis of the broader social and historical situation 
(struggles and power relations). 
 
DRA and DHA focus on the use of language as indicated in the original terms used for them, 
Critical Linguistics. Compared to Fairclough’s approach, DHA includes more detailed 
linguistic operationalisation. DHA also provides a detailed selection of discursive strategies 
(see Reisigl and Wodak, 2015: 33). However, both approaches emphasise the importance of 
linguistic or semiotic analysis. Fairclough states that “one cannot research relations between 
discourse and other social elements, including the constructive effects of discourse, in the 
absence of methods for analysing linguistic, semiotic and interdiscursive features of texts in 
some detail” (Fairclough, 2010: 360). Therefore, in order to analyse data, the first step is to 
analyse linguistic strategies. 
 
On the other hand, the attention paid to linguistic analysis does not undermine the importance 
of social, including economic, political and cultural analysis. Both approaches emphasise the 
importance of social analysis. As Fairclough argues, critical discourse analysis focuses on 
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“two dialectical relations: between structure (especially social practices as an intermediate 
level of structuring) and events (or: structure and action, structure and strategy); and, within 
each, between semiotic and other elements” (Fairclough, 2015a: 88). The close dialectical 
relations between language and social change is always the main consideration of Fairclough 
in his critical analysis of discourse (see also Fairclough, 1992). Reisigl and Wodak illustrate 
the four dimensions of the concept of ‘context’ in DHA (Reisigl and Wodak, 2015: 30). Both 
of these approaches emphasise the importance of intertextuality and interdiscursivity. 
 
Another focal point of both approaches is the emphasis on history. As clearly indicated in the 
concept of DHA, historical context is important in interpreting texts and discourse for DHA. 
This historical orientation “permits the reconstruction of how recontextualization functions as 
an important process of linking texts and discourse intertextually and interdiscursively over 
time” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2015: 32). Fairclough also shows the importance of analysing 
materials in its “historical process” and the concept of “recontextualisation” (Fairclough, 
2010: 292).  
6.4. Researching Digital Discourse from Workers  
 
This section will explain the research methods I will use for collecting and analysing data 
from workers.  
 
6.4.1. Applying focus groups to this research  
 
There are several reasons to deploy focus groups to study users’ opinions and attitudes. Both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods can be used to study ideas and opinions. There 
is no simple designation of certain methods for a specific methodology. Applying a critical 
methodology does not necessarily refer to a specific research method. As Harvey points out, 
critical social research is the way “the empirical evidence is approached and interpreted”, and 
it is the methodology not the method of data collection per se, which characterizes critical 
social research” (Harvey, 1990: 8). For studying ideas and opinions, two types of methods are 
normally applied: one is a quantitative research method survey, and the other is a qualitative 
procedure interview. I will briefly discuss the differences between survey, interview and 
focus groups and argue that the focus group is the best method to collect data from users.  
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The differences between surveys and interviews are the ones between the data types gained 
by quantitative and qualitative research methods. Compared to a survey, focus groups use 
‘purposive samples’ instead of ‘probabilistic sampling’; they have more flexible and open 
questions; they involve a more subjective process of selecting, coding and presenting the 
results. Generally speaking, focus groups, compared to surveys, have the strengths of 
qualitative methods, such as “exploration and discovery, understanding things in-depth and in 
context, and interpreting why things are the way they are and how they got that way” 
(Morgan, 1998: 31). As Kvale and Brinkmann point out, interviews (including focus group 
interviews) could “go further than charting subjects’ experiences, or using the subjects as 
informants about events, and attempt to get beyond the self-presentations of the subjects and 
critically examine the personal assumptions and general ideologies expressed in their 
statements” (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009: 106). These features are more suitable for my 
study of people’s opinions and ideologies.  
 
The other widely used method to study interpretations given by people is interviewing. 
Bryman defines as a focus group as “a method of interviewing that involves more than one, 
usually at least four, interviewees” (Bryman, 2012: 501). May points out four types of 
interviews that are normally used in social research: the structured interview, semi-structured 
interview, unstructured or focused interview, and group interview or focus group (May, 2011: 
132). They all have the same feature of “maintaining and generating conversations with 
people on a specific topic or range of topics” and “the interpretations which social 
researchers make of the resultant data constitute the fundamentals of interviews and 
interviewing” (ibid.: 131).  
 
Focus groups share these features with other interviewing methods and have more advantages 
over other interviewing methods. The first one involves group dynamics. Focus groups have 
the merit of “prompting a discussion” (Babbie, 2007: 308). Participants in focus groups are 
“encouraged to talk to one another” (May, 2011: 137). Such discussion and interaction, 
questioning and reflection can reveal “the reasoning and underlying logic used by 
participants” and thus “gives the researcher an insight into not only what people think, but 
also why they hold those views” (Denscombe, 2007: 179). Through the discussions and 
comparisons, focus groups can provide “a valuable insight into both social relations in 
general and the examination of processes and social dynamics in particular” (May, 2011: 
 138 
139). The second advantage of focus groups over interviews is that the group dynamics in 
focus groups are more likely to generate a situation comparable to everyday life. One of the 
main problems about a standardised one-to-one interview is that “interviewee is separated 
from all everyday relations during the interview”, and the interaction is thus “not comparable 
in any way to everyday interactions” (Flick, 2009: 195). When “studying opinions and 
attitudes about taboo subjects”, it is “suggested that the dynamics of a group discussing such 
topics should be used, because this is more appropriate than a clear and well-ordered single 
interview situation” (ibid.).  So focus groups can generate interactions more likely to happen 
in everyday life, compared to one-to-one interviews or group interviews. This research will 
ask questions about some political issues, and these questions could be sensitive to some 
participants. So people might be more likely to talk about their own opinions when someone 
else in the group has similar or opposite views.  
 
Conducting focus groups also has certain risks. As stated, conducting focus groups requires 
participants to talk to each other and everyone’s opinion needs to be valued and encouraged. 
While it is good to have these group dynamics, in reality, there is also a risk of having one or 
several participants dominate the discussion. It is also easy to generate the problem of “group 
conformity or groupthink” which is “the tendency for people in a group to conform to 
opinions and decisions of the most outspoken members of the group” (Babbie, 2007: 309). 
Therefore, the moderator plays an important role in controlling the group dynamics to 
encourage everyone to have the opportunity to express their own opinion.  
 
There are some concerns about whether and how results gathered from focus groups can be 
generalised to a broader population. This problem of generalisation is normal to quantitative 
research. Flick distinguishes a theoretical generalisation from a numerical generalisation 
(Flick, 2009: 130). For the former situation, “the number of individuals or situations studied 
is less decisive than the differences between cases involved (maximal variation) or the 
theoretical scope of the case interpretations” (ibid.). As discussed in the subsection about 
methodology, critical social research should not constrain its results according to merely 
individual interpretations. These interpretations should be understood in relation to the 
broader social context. This indicates the importance of sampling and questioning. Concerns 
such as criteria of dividing potential participants into various categories, or comparative 
characteristics of different groups are important (see a more detailed discussion about 
sampling in the next subsection). Moreover, the main purpose of conducting focus groups is 
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“to explore rather than to describe or explain in any definitive sense” (Babbie, 2007: 309). It 
can also be seen as “an excellent device for generating questionnaire items for a subsequent 
survey” (ibid.). A much larger scale of empirical research could be used to confirm or falsify 
the results generated by focus groups. 
 
This research then uses thematic analysis to probe the topics among workers and ideologies 




According to Bryman, whereas quantitative research conduct probability sampling, 
qualitative research tends to use ‘purposive sampling’ (Bryman, 2012: 416). It uses a ‘priopi’ 
and ‘fixed’ purpose sampling strategy which means that the sample and “the criteria for 
selecting participants” are “more or less established at the outset of the research” (Bryman, 
2012: 418). Similarly, Babbie argues that social research normally uses “nonprobability 
sampling” (Babbie, 2007: 183). It refers to the technique “in which samples are selected in 
some way not suggested by probability theory” (ibid.). 
 
There are different opinions regarding what should be referred to as ‘purposive sampling’. 
For Bryman ,among the different types of purposive sampling, snowballing is one type of it 
(Bryman, 2012: 422) (see also the section of participation below). However, Babbie identifies 
four types of sampling that distinguishes these two: “reliance on available subjects”, 
“purposive or judgmental sampling”, “snowball sampling”, and “quota sampling” (Babbie, 
2007: 183). Morgan states that in focus groups, researchers use the purposive sampling 
technique to select participants “who meet the needs of a particular project” based on their 
own judgement (Morgan, 1998: 30).   
 
There are three levels of sampling I will do for this research: location, groups, and 
individuals. This research will choose Shenzhen for the research location, three types of 
workers to study and several individuals for the focus groups.  
 
Shenzhen as the location for this research  
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China is a geographically large country with a very unbalanced economic development. 
Considering this research is related to the use of and ideas about the Internet, the specific 
economic situation is important. Shenzhen was chosen as the location to conduct focus 
groups. First of all, Shenzhen is one of the most developed cities in China. It was nominated 
as a ‘Special Economic Zone’ by the Chinese government in 1980. Secondly, it is a major 
manufacturing centre in China. It has several famous manufacturing and assembling factories 
relating to ICT, such as Foxconn and ZTE. Thirdly, Shenzhen is called China’s Silicon 
Valley. It is a location for numerous high-tech companies, such as Tencent and Huawei. 
Relating to my criteria of dividing participants into groups according to their relations to ICT, 
Shenzhen is a productive location to conduct the research. 
 
Three types of young workers chosen for this research  
 
This research will choose three types of young workers in Shenzhen for conducting focus 
groups. These three types are: 
1. Manufacturing workers, 
2. Programmers, and 
3. White-collar workers  
 
I have chosen these three groups for two reasons. The first reason is that they all belong to 
subaltern and exploited working class from a Marxist tradition. My understanding of class 
then is based on Marx’s theorisation of exploitation and relations of production. As Marx 
states in the Capital, workers are free “in the double sense that they neither form part of the 
means of production themselves, as would be the case with slaves, serfs, etc., nor do they 
own the means of production, as would be the case with self-employed peasant proprietor” 
(Marx, 1867: 874). He continues that free works are “therefore free from, unencumbered by, 
any means of production of their own” (ibid.).  In another place, Marx explains that for 
capital to realise surplus-value during the process of commodity exchange, he must find the 
‘free worker’ on the commodity-market. This worker “must be free in the double sense that 
as a free individual he can dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that, on 
the other hand, he has no other commodity for sale, i.e. he is rid of them, he is free of all the 
objects needed for the realization of his labour-power” (Marx, 1867: 272–3). Workers thus 
produce surplus-value for capital. As I explained in Chapter 2 about Capitalism with Chinese 
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Characteristics, China is a de facto capitalist society in the sense that it is dominated by 
commodity, commodity-market, and free labour being exploited. This is also true in rural 
areas, because of (a) the large number of migrant workers, (b) most of the production process 
of agriculture is determined by the commodity-market. For programmers and white-collar 
workers, they are also selling free labour and getting exploited. In this sense, all these three 
categories of participants are workers. Moreover, they all belong to the broad category of 
digital labour. For example, Fuchs analysed various types of labour relating to ICTs, 
including assembly line workers at Foxconn, programmers working in the software industry, 
and social media users whose online data are sold to advertisers, and other types of labour 
(Fuchs, 2014a). Qiu explains how manufacturing workers and addicted consumers both 
belong to what he framed as ‘iSlave’ (Qiu, 2016).  
 
Secondly, they are representative categories in China’s digital capitalism. First, The 
manufacturing workers are essential for China’s development of digital capitalism, especially 
during the FDI- and export-oriented period. They also represent a large number of Internet 
user groups but who are under-represented. The second group are programmers. They 
represent China’s economic transformation to a high-tech developmental path. China has 
made efforts to develop core technologies and applications. Programmers are thus new 
emerging knowledge workers. They seem to possess new types of power and resources in 
digital capitalism. However, they are, at the same time, highly exploited. There are repetitive 
news coverages about their poor working conditions and overtime working schedule. Finally, 
white collar-workers represent the (quasi) middle-class in urban China. They are important 
workers under China’s ‘neo-industrialisation’ and the most important consumer group of the 
online prosumer, plabour, and shopping.  Under the context of China’s economic 
transformation, especially the emphasis of domestic consumption, I hope to understand how 
these three types of workers perceive the highly commercialised and politically controlled 
Internet under digital capitalism.  
 
Third, another reason to choose three groups of working-class instead of one homogeneous 
sample is to focus on structured ideology. As I discussed in Chapter 2 about ‘false 
consciousness’, according to Marx, Lukács and Adorno,  that arises from capitalist structures 
and contradictions. I would like to test whether there is any common core of experience 
among different groups while, according to various types of categorisation, they might 
belong to different classes or have different ideologies. For example, from a Gramscian 
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approach, lived experiences would provide different cultural resources for members to draw 
on. Bourdieu emphasises different forms of capital such as economic, cultural, social and 
symbolic forms. From a Weberian categorisation, education, income, status, culture are 
important elements. While acknowledging all these possible categories and the importance of 
them to understand modern society, my research question and my theoretical discussions of 




On the individual level, this study combines generic purposive sample and snowballing 
approach. Bryman cited Hood’s explanation of a ‘generic inductive qualitative model’ 
“which is relatively open-ended and emphasizes the generation of concepts and theories but 
does not entail (among other things) the iterative style of grounded theory”.  In this ‘generic 
inductive qualitative model’, sampling is “conducted purposively but not necessarily with 
regard to the generation of theory and theoretical categories” (Bryman, 2012: 422). Snowball 
sampling is, according to Bryman, a type of purposive sampling. It is “a sampling technique 
in which the researcher samples initially a small group of people relevant to the research 
questions, and these sampled participants propose other participants who have had the 
experience or characteristics relevant to the research” (Bryman, 2012: 424). Both methods 
will be employed in my fieldwork (I will show my reflections on the fieldwork in 6.5).  
 
Bryman suggests the typical focus group size is six to ten members (Bryman, 2012: 505-
507). There is no strict rule, but a group of 6-8 participants is normal. When deciding the size 
of the groups, one should also take the topic into consideration. The topic for this research is 
interesting and easy for participants to talk about in a way that relates to everyday life. It can 
also be complex at some points when explaining the issues such as online surveillance and 
privacy policies. This led me to sample a relatively smaller group of 5-8 people. Two groups 
were made for each category to avoid the “serious danger” of one group alone being “too 
atypical to offer any generalizable insights” (Babbie, 2007: 309). There were two group with 
5-8 intense users, two with 5-8 software engineers, and two with 5-8 manual workers. So six 
groups in total were involved. Table 6.4 shows the final group composition. I have attached a 










Table 6.1. Final Focus Group Composition. 
 
6.4.3. Questionnaire and stimulus materials  
 
I have attached the final focus group questionnaire and content of stimulus materials as 
appendix at the end of this thesis (see Appendix 1 for focus groups questionnaire and video 
content and Appendix 2 for Guideline for focus group questioning). The questionnaire was 
developed around three aspects regarding participants’ understanding of the Internet: 
economic, political and cultural aspects. The purpose of conducting focus groups is to probe 
workers’ ideological and non-ideological opinions about the Internet.  
 
It aims to investigate how workers legitimate the development of the highly commercialised 
and politically controlled Internet in China. What kinds of resources have they drawn upon to 
make the arguments? What kinds of ideologies could be identified from their discussions? 
What kinds of ideologies are internalised? Do they challenge the dominant discourse? If so, 
how?  
 
To answer these questions, I have made a video to list some existing discussions around the 
key issues regarding economic, political and cultural aspects of the Internet in China (for 
content of the video, see Appendix 1). The content was made based on my previous review 
and study on ‘digital discourse’ and ideologies from commercial platforms and the 
government. This video was made to (a) stimulate discussions on the topics, (b) to show 
views from both sides of the arguments. Before and after showing the video, I have reminded 
the participants that there is no right or wrong answer to the views, and any discussions 
would be welcomed. I would argue that the most important role of this video is probably to 
Group  Participant category Number of 
participants 
1 White collar user Group 1 5 
2 White collar user group 2 6 
3 Programmer  group 1 6 
4 Programmer group 2 5 
5 Assembly line worker user group 1 7 
6 Assembly line worker user group 2 8 
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relax my participants and to stimulate discussions. Rather than telling participants that both 
sides of arguments (positive, negative) could be accepted, I used this video to confirm this 
assertion. For example, one participant from the group asked me whether my work was about 
to make suggestions for big companies about how to show advertising online. Another 
participant asked me whether I wanted to build a non-commercial platform. The use of videos 
to show discussions from both side had, hopefully, to some extent, eliminate their concerns.  
 
6.5. Reflections on Methodology 
 
This research has encountered several problems and limitations. The first one is about how to 
connect critical theories to empirical research and the rationale of enquiry. This thesis has 
gone through three structural changes in the process of writing. These changes imply some 
difficulties in the research process. The first version aimed at discovering ideologies from an 
analysis of the political economy of the Internet. There was an underlying assumption, 
derived from my discussions of ideology as ‘false consciousness’, that ideologies are all 
linked and derived from structural problems. This view was later abandoned with deeper 
understandings of ideology. The second version of the study was claimed to be deductive to 
illustrate several types of ideologies in discourse. These ideologies, however, was discovered 
during the procedure of the first round of data processing. I discovered several patterns from 
my preliminary analysis of data: the nationalist, neoliberal and individualist discourse. These 
patterns have inspired me to rearrange my whole writings, including the literature review and 
theoretical framework. I then applied the new frameworks to analysis in a deductive way. 
This way of coding, however, risk the possibility of overlooking certain important themes 
and not getting a whole picture of the materials. This third version, this current one, was 
based on a new theoretical framework developed in literature review and a combination of 
political-economic analysis of China’s digital capitalism. From Chapter 4 and 5, I have 
developed a framework for coding and thematic analysis that focuses on the economic 
(market, production, consumption) and political (international relations, state, society and 
individual) aspects.  
 
The second one is the amount of data and methods used in this research. This research has 
used documents from the government (148, analysed 21 of them), BAT (122) and focus 
group interviews (6). The diversity of data poses some serious questions in analysing data. 
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While I use CDA to analyse both government documents and CEOs’ speeches, CDA itself is 
a heterogeneous method, including different approaches (Wodak and Meyer, 2015a). As 
shown in 6.2 and 6.3, I have used different approaches of CDA for analysis. Section 6.2 
explained the critical policy analysis developed by Fairclough and Fairclough (Fairclough, 
2013). This approach sees government documents as practical argumentations. CEO’s 
discourse was analysed through a combination of thematic analysis and CDA. I have referred 
to the toolkits provided by Fairclough and Reisigl and Wodak (Fairclough, 2015b; Reisigl 
and Wodak, 2001). Finally, I have used focus groups to collect data from workers and 
thematic analysis for identifying the main discourse. All these data belongs to different 
genres and requires distinct logic for enquiry.  
 
Snowball sampling was used when I stayed in Shenzhen for two months to conduct 
interviews and focus groups. To get access to manufacturing workers, at first, I went to the 
factories and tried to approach people, spread flayers during the time when they left work. 
However, it was very unsuccessful, I was either seen as a fraud or totally ignored. I only got 
one woman who was willing to talk to me privately. Then I had to change my sampling 
strategy. With the help of a friend, I gained access to a local worker NGO Qinghu Xuetang 
(unfortunately now shut down by the local authority) near Longhu Foxconn. It was from there 
I finally got talked to and gained some level of trust from workers. Snowballing was the 
strategy I used to form groups. Once I got trust from one worker, s/he managed to ask other 
friends, roommates or colleges to come together. This strategy has both cons and pros. One 
the one hand, this trusted environment and NGO backgrounds facilitate some critical 
discussions towards companies and censorship. Participants knew that they could talk more 
freely and I was not some suspicious people from authorities (though, as in any real context, 
there will still be concerns). On the other hand, it could limit the range of answers from the 
groups. They might be familiar with each other and shared some common interests or 
experiences. However, I managed to exclude managers or line managers from factories. I 
realised, from my fieldwork, experiences from other researchers and theoretical discussions, 
that the classification of managers is more complex. I spent some time in the NGO group 
after research and helped to organise some classes and taught there. I learned how they 
organise workers through providing some basic training in computers, music, painting and 
even English. They also tried to organise workers to exchange skills for free, sell products 
from hometown, etc. Another important thing is to mobilise workers with their own 
experiences. However, I constantly feel the guilt of not contributing enough to their work. I 
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do hope publishing on critical studies could raise consciousness from the whole society and 
thus push for changes for better.  
 
The difficulty in conducting focus groups with programmers come from their overtime work. 
I gained access to programmers through friends and used snowball sampling. At first in 2016, 
I only managed to conduct interviews with programmers, since they are always working 
overtime on 996 system and rarely have free time at weekends. It was also difficult to ask 
them to adjust their time for group meetings. Later in 2016 and 2017, I managed to conduct 
two groups. They are colleges from two companies. I managed to organise the first group 
after their work time in one weekday. They finished work around the same time that day and 
one of my participants managed to borrow an empty room from their company. The other 
group I conducted was during participants’ lunchtime.  
 
The white-collar group is more or less easier. I first managed to find a reliable conference 
room through a friend from the company she is working for. The room was not in use during 
weekends when the company was not working. I then spread information about my research 
on several Social Media popular among white-collar workers, such as Douban, Weibo, and 
Zhihu. I then selected the proper participants based on my criteria. Most of the participants 
are young, just graduated from university for 1 or 2 years. One of them suggested me to study 
older people’s use, experiences and understanding of WeChat. It reminds an important 
dimension of age in understanding the digital world.  
 
It poses an important question: would those who experienced the cultural revolution and the 
fast growth of the economy in the 80s and 90s have a totally different perception of China’s 
current developmental path? I thus conducted an experimental research in my hometown, a 
city located in the Rust Belt area in the Northeast. With some help from my parents who were 
born and grown up in factories, I managed to gather a group of elders who worked in 
factories until they retired. I asked some questions about their view on current development. 
They are, interesting but not surprisingly, more conscious about what they say to me, because 
I am studying in a foreign university. Yet they were still quite open in criticising the current 
housing, health caring, and education systems. The past poor living condition made them 
endorse the ‘reform and opening-up’, but their experiences with socialist nation have 
provided them with more ‘cultural resources’ to criticise and reflect on the current system. 
This was different from what I experienced with young people who lack the cultural or 
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linguistic resources to think outside the current framework and think about alternatives. This 





CHAPTER 7. GOVERNMENT DIGITAL DISCOURSE 
 
Applying Fairclough and Fairclough’s (2012) approach of critical policy analysis, this 
chapter will focus on practical argumentation (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, see also 
Fairclough 2013) in government discourse. This approach considers policy as having the 
ultimate goal of proposing a solution for current problems. The government policies or 
official speeches follow this logic: (1) what the current situation is and what the current 
problems are, (2) what the desirable goals are, (3) what actions are proposed to take us from 
the current situation to the desirable future. During the process of developing the arguments, 
there are also (4) important underlying values and concerns that direct the identification of 
current problems and possible solutions (more discussions about this method, see Chapter 6).  
 
This approach is suitable for analysing the Chinese government policies and official 
speeches. For example, in the 2015 ‘Internet Plus’ Action Plan, the first two paragraphs of 
the document describe the current situation and the problems faced by China and Chinese 
companies. The main body of the documents outlines the goals (section 1.1 and 1.3), 
principles that show values and concerns (section 1.2), and several actions (the rest of the 
whole document). Similarly, in the 2016 Outline of the National Informatisation 
Development Strategy, the document consists of several parts: (section 1) description of the 
current situation, (section 2) guiding principles and goals, and (section 3-6) actions. Though 
the official speeches might not follow this exact structure, yet the actual arguments normally 
consist of these same key elements. For example, in one of Xi’s most important Internet-
related speech, the Speech at the Work Conference for Cybersecurity and Informatisation 
(hereinafter 4.19 speech), he describes the current development of China’s Internet, what new 
goals the government has proposed, and what actions should be taken to realise these goals. 
On one specific topic of the ‘key technology’, he tries to argue against different opinions and 
claims that his proposed solution is the best option. This is a typical example of political 
speech that can be analysed by CDA from the point of view of argumentation theory 
(Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 86). Therefore, it is clear that a focus of practical 
argumentation in CDA can be applied to analyse Chinese government’s digital discourse in 
policies and official speeches.  
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7.1. The Ultimate Goal and Core Value  
 
This section will, first of all, demonstrate the description of the current digital age in 
government documents: a wave of the digital revolution. It will then introduce the ultimate 
goal of ‘Building a Cyber Superpower’4 and the core value of ‘Serving the people’. These 
three aspects – description of the current state of affairs, ultimate goal, and core value – 
provide a general understanding of the government’s digital discourse.  
 
7.1.1. Joining the wave 
 
Most government documents start with a description of the current circumstances. The 
Internet-related documents start by emphasising that we are experiencing a digital revolution; 
thus, it is pressing to join this revolution. Metaphor is an important way for policymakers to 
describe reality (Fairclough, 2016). The use of metaphors such as ‘tide’ and ‘wave’ is 
common in Internet-related policies. For example, Xi claims that 
 
[1] Informatisation and economic globalisation are promoting each other. The Internet has 
been integrated into every aspect of social life, and profoundly changed people’s 
production and lifestyle. Our country is in the middle of this tide, and will be 
influenced increasingly deeper. i (Xi, 2014, speech at the first meeting of the new 
Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatisation) 
 
It is not rare that there is an emergent tone in the discourse of the Internet- and ICT-related 
policies, to emphasise the urgency of the issues. For example, the first sentence of the Outline 
of the National Informatisation Development Strategy is that:  
 
[2] In the present world, information technology innovation changes every day. A tide of 
informatisation, characterised by digitisation, networking and smartification has 
 
4 There are several versions of the translation of Wang Luo Qiang Guo Zhan Lue (“网络强国战略”).  The 
translation “national cyber development strategy” used here comes from the State Council Information Office 
of PRC. http://www.scio.gov.cn/zhzc/35353/35354/Document/1507446/1507446.htm This document 
announces how certain important terms should be translated into foreign languages. ‘the Strategy to build 
Cyber Superpower’ is another commonly referred to the translation of this term in media (e.g. Wired, the 
Economist, Foreign Affairs). The rest of this chapter will use ‘Cyber Superpower’ to refer to Wang Luo Qiang 
Guo (“网络强国”).  
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vigorously arisen. ii (General Office of the Communist Party of China and General 
Office of the State Council, 2016, Outline of the National Informatisation Development 
Strategy) 
 
Another example is the use of ‘wave’ in the ‘Internet +’ Action Plan. The government 
identifies the current states of affairs in the following way:  
 
[3] In the new wave of global technological revolution and industrial transformation, the 
integration of the Internet with all areas has a full future and infinite potential, and has 
become an overwhelming tidal wave of the time, is exerting strategic and systematic 
influences on every country’s economic and societal development. iii (State Council, 
2015, Guiding Opinions on Actively Promoting the “Internet Plus” Action) 
 
Metaphor is a common strategy used to describe changes to imply an inevitable future. The 
metaphors used in this extract express the irresistible future brought by the Internet: you 
cannot resist such a wave, you must ride it. The Action Plan continues that one can only go 
with this flow. This metaphor of a wave is also obvious in Xi’s speeches. When mentioning 
the necessity to develop information technologies, he uses the expression “We must forge 
ahead or otherwise will be swept downstream” (Bu jin ze tui) (Xi, 2016, 4.19 speech). In 
Chinese, this expression is followed by ‘like a boat sailing against the current’ (Ni shui xing 
zhou). This is another powerful metaphor to describe the irresistible changes.   
 
There is a danger of this type of discourse to lead to techno-determinism, i.e. to join the wave 
without questioning questions such as how to develop new technologies, for what and for 
whom. The emphasis of the inevitable future brought by big data could also downplay the 
ethical concerns and political discussions of relevant issues, such as privacy issues. In other 
words, if big data and technologies will bring uncontrollable and inevitable changes, then we 
can only follow the logic of the technology, instead of seeking ways to control their 
development and to change the social relations behind them. Finally, this type of metaphors 
could also be used by governments from different countries  to emphasise nation competition, 
thus to form a narrative of ‘us vs them’.  Whether this metaphor serves such purposes need to 
be further scrutinised through analysing other premises, such as descriptions of problems, 
goals, mean-goal premises, etc.  
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7.1.2. Build a Cyber Superpower 
 
In official documents, the ultimate goal of ‘Building the country into a Cyber Superpower’ is 
part of the broader ambitious goal of the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. The term 
‘Cyber Superpower’ (Wang Luo Qiang Guo‘网络强国’, hereinafter WLQG) has become 
prominent since 2014.  In February 2014, Xi led the first meeting of the Central Leading 
Group for Cybersecurity and Informatisation (it changed its name into the Central 
Cyberspace Affairs Commission in 2018). In the meeting, Xi explicitly distinguishes ‘a 
country with Cyber Superpower’ (Wang Luo Qiang Guo)  from ‘a country with Cyber 
Power’ (Wang Luo Da Guo ‘网络大国’). The latter, according to Xi, mainly refers to the 
extensive Internet presence, and it has been achieved in China through the extraordinary 
development in Internet penetration rate. However, China has not yet become a ‘Cyber 
Superpower’. Xi, in particular, points out the following problems “that China is lagging 
behind in innovation, that there are obvious differences between rural and urban areas, that 
especially the average bandwidth per capita is largely lagging behind advanced countries, and 
there is an obvious bottleneck in the Internet development” (Xi’s speech at the first meeting 
of the new Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatisation, 2014). How Xi 
perceived the problems in current states of affairs in his first prominent speech on WLQG 
provides some basic understandings of the term.  
 
The term WLQG has then become a keyword of China’s Internet development. The 
government then discusses national Internet development, cybersecurity, and informatisation 
policies on the basis of this ultimate goal of building a ‘Cyber Superpower’. The Fifth 
Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee in 2015 
approved the Central Committee's Proposal for Formulating the 13th Five-Year Plan for 
National Economic and Social Development (2016-20). This was the first time CCP launched 
the National Big Data Strategy and National Cyber Development Strategy (WLQG Strategy). 
Then in 2015 World Internet Conference, Xi mentions that China will vigorously implement 
National Cyber Development Strategy, National Big Data Strategy, and the ‘Internet Plus’ 
Strategy. After that, Xi also repetitively emphasises the National Cyber Development 
Strategy, such as in the most two important speeches at the Work Conference for 
Cybersecurity and Informatisation in 2016 and 2018. This term has also been the top-line 
strategic concept, as shown in government reports and policies, such as the 19th Party 
Congress in 2017. It has also become an ‘umbrella term’ covering a wide terrain of the 
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Internet- and digital technology- related policies, including Internet governance, online public 
opinion, content control, cybersecurity, technology development, international competition 
and cooperation. 
 
It is thus difficult to define this term in any simple way. The emphasis and connotations of 
this term could vary depending on the circumstances. However, due to the importance of this 
term, several official interpretations have been published on Party-leading and State-owned 
media. These interpretations can shed some light on the understanding of the term.  
 
In September 2017, Qiushi, the Party’s leading journal on theory, published an article titled 
“Deepening the Implementation of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Strategic Thinking on 
Building China into a Cyber Superpower, Steadily Advancing Cybersecurity and 
Informatisation Work”5. This article was written by Theoretical Studies Centre Group under 
the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC). This article provides an important guideline 
to understand Xi’s thinking and to set agenda for discussions on the topic.  The group 
outlines six key areas regarding Xi’s WLQG thinking. These six areas are: Strengthen 
overarching planning, Strengthen the construction and management of online content, 
Construct a cybersecurity assurance system, Give full play to the leading role of 
informatisation, Strengthen China’s international voice and influence, Strengthen the Party’s 
leadership of cybersecurity and informatisation work. Overall, the CAC emphasises content 
control, cybersecurity, the leading role of the informatisation in economic development and 
China’s role in Internet governance internationally.  
 
One year later, Qiushi published another article on the topic. In explaining the strategic goal 
of building WLQG, the article cited Xi claiming that cybersecurity and Informatisation 
industries represent the new force of production and the new directions of development. It 
means that to become a Cyber Superpower, an China should, first of all, become a powerful 
nation in force of production, i.e. in technology. Secondly, China should become a powerful 
nation in Internet governance, at both domestic and international levels.  
 
 




Later on, several articles are published by official party-led state-owned media on the topic. 
For example, after Xi’s 2018 speech at the Work Conference for Cybersecurity and 
Informatisation, People’s Daily published an article to review Xi’s most important statements 
on building a national Cyber Superpower. The article has several sections, including serving 
the people, assuring cybersecurity, building strong information economy, strengthening 
technology innovations, managing the cyberspace, and strengthening international 
cooperation. Another example is from Xinhua. In 2019, Xinhua reviewed Xi’s statements on 
WLQG and divided them into seven categories. These categories are: understanding the 
current states of affair, ensuring the path through developing technologies and the economy, 
serving the people, assuring cybersecurity, managing cyberspace, cultivating talents, and 
strengthening China’s role in Internet governance internationally. Later in the same year, 
People’s Daily published an article emphasising these similar aspects of WLQG and 
republished by Qiushi. Again, the article emphasises several aspects of building the Cyber 
Superpower: the importance of developing cybersecurity and informatisation industries, 
serving the people, managing the cyberspace, assuring cybersecurity, and international 
cooperation.  These interpretations could shed light on the identification of key themes in 
government documents in the following sections.  
 
7.1.3. Serve the People 
 
Along with the ultimate goal of building a WLQG, the government claims its key value as to 
‘serve the people’. As a country that claims itself as a socialist country, the traditional 
socialist values are still important in official discourse. This is the same case for Internet-
related discourses. In particular, the Internet is expected to ‘serve the people’ by providing 
public service and reducing poverty. For example, Xi claims that developing the Internet and 
Informatisation should put the people at the centre. In the first WIC, he states that “China is 
actively pushing the development of the Internet and will China is actively advancing the 
development of the Internet and extending its benefit to the 1.3 billion Chinese people” (Xi’s 
speech at the 1st WIC, 2014). In the 4.19 speech in 2016, he re-emphasises this core value. He 
says:  
 
[4] For the cybersecurity and informatisation undertaking to develop, we must implement 
the development idea of people being central. This is an important viewpoint put 
forward at the 5th Plenum of the 18th Party Congress. We must adapt to the people’s 
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expectations and requirements, accelerate the universalisation of informatised services, 
reduce application costs, provide information services that the common people can use, 
can afford to use and can use well, and let hundreds of millions of people have an even 
greater sense of gain in sharing the development fruits of the Internet. iv (Xi, 2016, 4.19 
Speech) 
 
I have now pointed out the ultimate goal of building ‘a National Cyber Power’ (WLQG) and 
the key value of ‘serving the people’ claimed by the CPC. The following sections will not 
only provide an overview of the key aspects of government’s digital discourses but also aim 
to show a critical evaluation of the government policies surrounding this key value and 
ultimate goal. More specifically, by evaluation, I intend to address the following questions: 
What does it mean to realise WLQG? Will the proposed actions achieve the goal to realise 
WLQG? Will the proposed actions the best means to serve the people? Will there be 
unintended negative consequences happen in the process? Are these consequences violate 
CPC’s promises to serve the people or clash with CPC’s political commitments? Are there 
any other facts that need to be taken into consideration?  
 
From a thematic analysis, there are three main themes in the government’s digital discourse 
regarding how to build a national Cyber Superpower and to serve the people: the Information 
Economy (7.2), Cybersecurity (7.3), and ‘A Community of Shared Destiny in the Cyber 
Space’ (7.3). Instead of just describing these themes, I use CDA to conduct a critical 
investigation of the discourse and their implications.  
 
7.2. Information Economy 
 
Information Economy is the main theme in the government’s digital discourse. The 
government tries to develop the Chinese economy under the ‘New Normal’, to implement 
national Big Data strategy, to encourage mass entrepreneurship and innovation, to support 
key Chinese Enterprises. In order to fulfil these economic goals, the government claims to 
deepen the (political) reform.   
 
7.2.1. A ‘New Normal’ of the Chinese Economy   
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The argument of  ‘New Normal’ is based on the judgement of the current international and 
domestic situation. As Green and Stern define it, the New Normal “ is understood by China’s 
leadership and policy elite as having better quality growth at its core, with a particular 
emphasis on four sub-themes: services, innovation, reduced inequality and environmental 
sustainability” (Green and Stern, 2015: 10). Internet is seen as a useful tool to stable the 
increase of economy, as the new driving force for this new type of economic development. 
As Xi points out, the “Information Economy” has become increasingly important for the 
Chinese economy. He states: “ Our country’s economic development has entered a new 
normal. New normal requires new driving force, and the Internet could play an important role 
in this aspect” (Xi, 2016, 4.19 Speech). The Internet is seen as an instrument for economic 
development here.  More specifically, the Internet is expected to upgrade the agricultural and 
manufacturing industries, to develop the service industry, and to stimulate consumption.   
 
[5] We must strengthen the construction of our information infrastructure, strengthen the 
deep integration of information resources, and open up information “arteries” for 
economic and social development. The 5th Plenum of the 18th Party Congress and the 
“13th Five-Year Plan” outline have deployed the implementation of the national 
strategy to build a Cyber Superpower (WLQG Strategy), the “Internet Plus” Action 
Plan, the Big Data Strategy and so on, we must effectively implement these well, strive 
to promote the converged development of the Internet and the real economy, drive 
technology flows, talent flows and material flows through information flows, stimulate 
the optimisation of resource allocation, promote the improvement of the productivity of 
all factors, and play a vigorous role in promoting innovative development, the 
transformation of economic development methods and the adjustment of economic 
structures. v (Xi, 2016, 4.19 Speech) 
 
Two years later, Xi further summarises the actions as: “to promote the deep convergence of 
the Internet, Big Data, AI and the real economy, to promote digitalised, networked and AI-
enabled manufacturing, agriculture and service industries ” (Xi, 2018, 4.20 Speech). It clearly 
shows that the government has changed its developmental strategy. To develop ICT is no 
longer merely for the purpose of attracting investment and increasing export in the 
manufacturing industry. Instead, the government has planned to move China’s industries up 
to a higher level of the global value chain.  
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Furthermore, unlike the emphasis of new technologies as a way to fight against alienation 
(Fisher, 2010), the government rarely mentions how the integration of the Internet would 
benefit workers. The government digital discourse represents Internet technologies as new 
forces of production, as Xi claims in 2018:  
 
[6] Informatisation and cybersecurity undertaking represent the new forces of production 
and new directions of development. It should practice new ideas in advance, centring 
around the construction of a modern economic system, to realise high-quality 
development, to accelerate informatisation development, to drive and improve the new 
type of industrialisation, urbanisation, and agriculture modernisation as a whole.vi (Xi, 
2018, 4.20 Speech) 
 
As illustrated in this excerpt, informatisation represents the new forces of production and new 
directions of development, not relations of production. While the government discourse 
mentions using the Internet to reduce differences between rural and urban areas, to reduce 
poverty and provide better governance services to the public, there is no mention of relations 
of production, nor how the new technologies could change the alienated working conditions.  
 
7.2.2. Digital economy and Big Data 
 
Another related key concept to the ‘Information Economy’ is the ‘Digital Economy’. As Xi 
points out in the 2nd WIC China will vigorously implement the national strategy to build a 
Cyber Superpower (WLQG), national Big Data Strategy and the ‘Internet Plus’ Strategy. Big 
Data Strategy is one of the most important strategies. Based on this principle, Xi claims that 
China should “construct the Digital Economy in which data is a key element” and 
“constructing a modern economic system cannot be separated from the development and 
implementation of Big Data”6 (Xi, 2017).  
 
While emphasising the importance of data and Big Data in China’s economic development, 
there is no equal level of emphasis on the accountability principle of data, i.e. which 
stakeholder take responsibility for what has been done with the data. This is in contrast with 
the government’s discourse on cybersecurity and online content control for which the 
 
6 available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1209/c64094-29696290.html 
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responsibility and accountability of enterprises and other agents are clearly pointed out and 
emphasised.  
 
One prominent example is that data is discursively expressed as a subject which is exerting 
influence on the society through other grammatical features. For example, in one of the most 
important documents published by the State Council, the chief administrative authority of 
China, Outline of Actions to Promote Big Data Strategy, big data is seen as a crucial strategic 
resource that influences every aspect of human life: 
 
[7] The integration of Information technologies and economic society has triggered a rapid 
increase in data. Data has become a fundamental national strategic resource. Big data is 
gradually exerting a significant influence on global production, circulation, distribution, 
consumption and economic mechanisms, social life and the capacity of national 
governance. vii (State Council, Outline of Actions to Promote Big Data Strategy, italics 
added) 
 
The following sections of the document also claim that “Big data has become a new driving 
force to promote economic transformation and development”; “Big data has become a new 
opportunity to reshape national competitive advantage”; “Big data has become a new way to 
improve the capacity of governance”. Big data is seen as a cause for inevitable and 
significant changes in the world, instead of something collected by the government and 
companies via complex processes. The primary purpose of the policy documents is to point 
out how to share data, how to use data, instead of how and why to collect data.  
 
The linguistic construction of data as an independent agent and as a denial of corporate 
responsibility in the process is problematic and ideological because it leaves out the issues of 
the actual processing of data: what kinds of data are collected? Who decides what data to 
collect? How are these data collected? How are they used? Who has the power to determine 
how to use these data, and for what purpose? Instead, this type of discourse portrays data as 
an independent entity that grows by itself. It is one form of techno-determinism: technology 
(data in this case) develops in its own logic. It portrays the development or the ‘growing’ of 
data as a ‘natural’ process. However, the development of technology is never natural, and it is 
full of human ‘intentions’. Raymond Williams (1990), in his seminal study about television 
in the 1970s, puts forwards the essential role ‘intention’ plays in the development of 
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technologies. Similarly, Dallas Smythe (1994) claims the possibility to technologically 
develop a two-way TV system in history, but this intention was failed. Smythe criticises the 
tendency of the commodification of audiences in the commercial TV industry harmed the 
development of a TV system which could be more beneficial for democracy and 
participation. However, if, according to the discourse shown in excerpt [3], data and 
technology grow by themselves, both an alternative way of development and possible 
criticism of the commodification of users are elided.  
 
The reality is apparently different from what is stated: data (especially data on social media) 
is collected and utilised for specific purposes and usually by powerful companies and 
governments. For example, Premier Li Keqiang claimed in the 2016 China Big Data Industry 
Summit that the government controls more than 80% of the information and data recourses 
when he tried to promote the government to open up and share information with businesses 
and the public (Li, 2016). Big companies might not agree with this statistic. Ginni Rometty 
(Chairman, President and CEO of IBM) in the 2018 China Development Forum, claims that 
20% of data is on the Internet, while companies control the rest of the 80% (China 
Development Forum, 2018). No matter whether 80% of data is controlled by the government 
or companies, it is not controlled and utilised by the public. When the dominant class claims 
that databases are open to all, this usually refers to corporate enterprises or their partners. For 
example, one tendency in China is to open databases in the education and healthcare systems 
for commercial exploitation. However, the voices of students and patients are not considered 
in this decision. This is the same for information stored in government departments. In 
modern society, data should be a new kind of public resource and is supposed to be used for 
the good of the public. However, what used to be unsalable has been turned into commodities 
by governments and companies through the process of privatisation in accordance with the 
neoliberal trend. This process is also referred to as accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 
2005, p137).  
 
The construction of data as an independent agent whose influence is independently 
deterministic is also problematic because it indicates an uncontrollable situation: data is 
growing by itself thus out of the control of the public or simply not within their ability to 
control so such control should be left to those who have the ability to do so. This is techno-
deterministic thinking which sees data as an independent determinant responsible for other 
changes in the society. This type of arguments facilitates the existing situation that 
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technologies and data cannot be controlled by users and the public, i.e. people who contribute 
to the generation of those data, especially concerning the Internet and social media. If the 
current and future situation cannot be controlled, then the only choice is to follow the logic of 
technology and let the free market lead the future. 
 
7.2.3. Mass entrepreneurship and innovation 
 
One buzzword which is related to the Internet economy is Mass Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation (Shuang Chuang ‘双创’, hereinafter SC). SC is a term that appears in Internet-
related documents oftentimes. The Internet, according to the government, could be useful to 
promote innovation and facilitate enterprises.   
 
For example, in the ‘Internet Plus’ Action Plan, the very first key Action proposed is to use 
the Internet to promote entrepreneurialism and innovation. It claims to  
 
[8] Fully give rein to the innovation driving role of the Internet, promote the collection, 
openness and sharing of all categories of factors with stimulating start-ups and 
innovation as a focus point, forcefully develop mass creation spaces, open innovation, 
etc., guide and promote all of society to create a thick atmosphere for mass start-ups 
and mass innovation, and forge new engines for economic development.viii (State 
Council, 2015, ‘Internet Plus’ Action Plan) 
 
The Xi-Li Administration has been actively encouraging SC with the help of the Internet. 
According to the official website, the first relevant official document about SC can be traced 
back to 2012.7 SC became a buzzword in China when it was used by Prime Minister Li 
Keqiang in the 2014 World Economy Forum and written into the 2015 Government Work 
Report. The creation of this term is closely related to the Chinese government’s efforts to 
encourage the vitality of the market and withdraw some of its own control of the market.8 
The ‘Internet Plus’ is combined with the government’s promotion of innovation and 
 
7 According to search results on the government’s online archive of official documents published by the State 
Council, available at http://sousuo.gov.cn/column/30142/2.htm, last accessed on 08 Nov, 2018 
8 For more explanation of Shuang Chuang, see Premier Li Keqiang’s Meeting with the Press after the 12th 
National People’s Congress 3rd Session, 2015, available at 
http://lianghui.people.com.cn/2015npc/n/2015/0315/c394537-26695490-2.html    
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entrepreneurship. ‘Internet Plus’ refers to the application of Internet and Information 
technologies to traditional industries. It is similar to the idea of the Information 
Superhighway and Industry 4.0. The ‘Internet Plus’ is expected to promote the economy and 
public services. It is especially useful for creating new jobs and innovation. Typical 
arguments for SC and ‘Internet Plus’ made by the government use topos of usefulness: If the 
Internet brings economic benefits for the country and individuals, then the enterprise should 
be encouraged.  
 
In 2015, Opinions to promote innovation and entrepreneurship argued that to promote SC is 
(a) a necessary choice to cultivate and promote new driving forces for socio-economic 
development; (b) an essential act to expend employment and enrich people; (c) an effective 
way to stimulate the whole society’s innovation potentials and entrepreneur vitality. Premier 
Li once argued that the purpose of SC is to “make more people rich and realise their life 
value”.9 In the GWR in the same year, SC is said to be able “to enlarge employment, to 
increase residents’ income, and to promote social mobility and justice” (Li Keqiang, 2015 
GWR). According to this claim, the SC is not only beneficial for the prosperity of the nation 
and individuals to become wealthy, but also for social equality and justice. Based on this 
argument, everyone should join the wave, take advantage of the Internet and become an 
entrepreneur.  
 
There is one outstanding example of the government document that uses the term ‘relations 
of production’. While productive force and mode of production are keywords in those 
documents, the relation of production is barely mentioned. The only exception is from the 
Outline of the National Informatisation Development Strategy, which uses a strong tone to 
claim that  
 
[9] The Internet and information undertaking represent new productive forces and new 
development orientations. It promotes an unprecedented enhancement of humanity’s 
capacity to understand the world and change the world. It is currently profoundly 
changing people’s ways of production and life, it brings a qualitative leap in 
productivity, triggers a major change in the relation of production, and is becoming a 
 
9 Premiere Li Keqiang’s Meeting with the Press after the 12th National People’s Congress 3rd Session, 2015, 
available at http://lianghui.people.com.cn/2015npc/n/2015/0315/c394537-26695490-4.html  
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guiding force remoulding a new structure in the development of the international 
economy, politics, culture, society, ecology, and military affairs. ix (General Office of 
the Communist Party of China and General Office of the State Council, 2016, Outline 
of the National Informatisation Development Strategy) 
 
However, in the rest of the whole document, and any other documents in my samples, 
‘relations of production’ was never mentioned. It is not clear how the Internet and 
information undertaking would trigger major a change in the relation of production either. 
Unlike technology discourse in advanced capitalism, emancipation from exploitation for 
workers and farmers and democratisation is not a primary concern in government’s 
technology discourse. Instead, economic growth, industry upgrade, company interests are the 
main concerns. The main problems regarding inequality are outlined as no enough 
infrastructure, inequality between regions, between rural and urban areas, instead of between 
capitalists and workers and farmers (including migrant workers). What is similar to 
ideological discourses on the Information Society in advanced capitalism is the emphasises of 
new forces of production but neglect the continuous existence of the old exploitative relation 
of production (Fuchs, 2014a; Fuchs and Sandoval, 2013). 
 
7.2.4. The Chinese Enterprises  
 
Enterprises appear to be an important stakeholder in government discourse. For example, in 
4.19 speech, Xi especially emphasises the missions and responsibilities of enterprises. He 
specifically states that “to foster a sustained and healthy development of the enterprises is not 
only the objectives of entrepreneurs but also the need for national development”. Moreover, 
Xi continues as “the fate of enterprises is closely bound up with the development of the 
country” (4.19). He also emphasises the important role played by enterprises in Internet 
governance.  
 
This equivalence between China and Chinese businesses is not abnormal in the government 
discourses, especially when in relation to international competition. In ICT-related 
documents, there are implications that Chinese Internet businesses represent China’s national 
interests and represent how advanced Chinese technologies are. Chinese businesses are also 
expected to lead China’s ‘go aboard strategy’ (e.g. the BRI). This type of discourse is a 
combination of nationalism and neoliberalism. As stated in 7.1, the relationships between the 
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state and capital should not be simplified as the ruler and the controlled. The Chinese 
government is trying to build a more positive relationship with capital and businesses (Hong 
Y., 2017).  
 
This equivalence between China and Chinese businesses is shown in the government’s 
discursive events. For example, in Xi’s 4.19 speech (see 7.1), when he praises China’s 
achievements in developing new technologies, he says: 
 
[10] China’s notable achievements in the development of the Internet over the past 20 years 
or more have included a number of technological accomplishments. At present, four of 
the world’s top 10 Internet companies are Chinese. While attending the Second World 
Internet Conference last year, I visited the “Light of the Internet” Expo, where more 
than 250 companies from across the globe showcased more than 1,000 new 
technologies. It was exciting to see that many of them were ours. x (Xi, 2016, 4.19 
speech, translation from the official magazine Qiushi, italics added) 
 
This extract has no explicit claims such as 'Chinese businesses stand for China or Chinese 
people'. However, it implicitly carries such a message. According to Fairclough, local 
coherence is a level of interpretation that “establishes meaning connections between 
utterances, producing (where feasible) coherent interpretations of pairs and sequences of 
them” (Fairclough, 2015, p157). It is a matter of “local coherence relations within a particular 
part of a text” (ibid.). Moreover, local coherence is not only about formal cohesion (linguistic 
form) but also exist “even in the absence of formal cohesive cues” (ibid.). This is the case for 
this example: there is no formal cohesive cue in it. However, in the 4.19 speech, after talking 
about achievements China has made in the last 20 years, Xi soon slips into the successes 
Chinese Internet companies have achieved: 4 out of the 10 top Internet companies are from 
China, and Chinese companies have developed much new technology (all of which are 
‘ours’). In other words, Chinese companies are competing with foreign companies at the 
international level on behalf of China and ‘us’. If Chinese companies succeed in the global 
market or international competition, then China wins. This is also the case when Xi talks 
about ‘core technologies’ in 4.19 speech (see the first excerpt in 7.3) – Xi starts by talking 
about the weakness of China in not acquiring ‘core technologies’, and he then soon turns to 
the topos of threat claiming a threat due to Chinese Internet companies having to rely on the 
‘core elements’ under the control of foreign entities. This is then followed by his proposal to 
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realise a breakthrough in ‘core technologies’: “If we are to seize the initiative in the 
development of the Internet [then] we overcome the hurdle posed by core technologies”. It is 
ambivalent whether this ‘we’ means the government or the Internet companies, exhibiting a 
slippage, thus equivalence, between China, Chinese Internet companies and the government.   
 
The claim has gone beyond a mere equivalence between China and Chinese businesses. More 
than this, it claims that if China is forced into the intense and inevitable global competition 
and companies are crucial actors to represent the nation’s interests, then the government 
should encourage, support and ‘serve’ the companies. This is in accordance with the 
government’s promotion of “innovation and entrepreneurship” (Shuang Chuang) and to 
“streamline government functions and administration, delegate powers” (JianZheng 
FangQuan) which means a retreat of government power from the market (but not necessarily 
from political control).  
 
The emphasis on enterprises can also be shown from a qualitative perspective. In Xi’s 
important 4.19 speech, the Chinese word for enterprise/business (Qiye) appears 54 times (6 of 
them refers to enterprisers, or entrepreneurs, (Qiyejia), while words about research (including 
research departments and research institutions) only appear 3 times, experts (Zhuanjia) 8 
times, scholars (Xuezhe) 6 times, researchers/scientists (Keji Renyuan and Keji Rencai) 4 
times (see table 7.1). Among the six sections in Xi’s speech, enterprises (Qiye) and 
entrepreneurs (Qiyejia) appear in five of them: besides one section specially dedicated to 
enterprise (focusing on the “mission and responsibility of Internet companies”), the other four 
parts are about people’s life, core technologies, cybersecurity and resources of human talents 
(Xi, 2016, 4.19 speech). Xi talks about the essential roles enterprises should or could play in 
all these five sectors, encompassing the importance of other institutions. 
 
Specific Word Used  number total 
enterprise/business (Qiye) 48  
54 entrepreneurs: Qiyejia 6 
  




 experts (zhuanjia) 8 
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scholars (xuezhe) 6 21 
researchers/scientists (Keji Renyuan and Keji Rencai) 4 
Table 7.1. Times specific words used in Xi’s 4.19 speech. 
 
This equation also means to understand technology development through the lens of how 
‘successful’ they are in the market. This understanding of technology is techno-determinism 
because it ignores the political-economic factors that influence what can be or cannot be 
successful in the market. It also ignores the exploitative relation of production behind those 
technology companies. Though Xi claims that the “market exchange cannot bring core 
technology” (Xi, 2016, 4.19 speech), he still believes that companies are the best means for 
China to develop core technology and to participate in global competition.  
 
This indication is not rare in government discourse. In line with ‘streamlining administration 
and delegating administrative power’, the overall tone is that market can best serve the 
interest of the nation and the people and that companies should represent China’s national 
interests both in the domestic market and the International market. For example, the 
government determinates to support ‘key enterprises’ (Long Tou Qi Ye ‘龙头企业’) to “play 
a leading and driving role” to “establish research and development bodies and expand market 
abroad, effectively use global resources, and enhance their internationalised development 
levels” (2016, National Informatisation Strategy). Similarly, in the 13th Five-Year Plan for 
National Informatisation, the government plans to cultivate innovative enterprises for 
developing core technologies that could compete globally and become the top 500. Chinese 
companies are also expected to play important roles in participating International Open 
Source Organisations (see also 7.4).  
 
7.2.5. Deepening the reform  
 
One area that is related to the Information Economy in governance is deepening the reform. It 
is one of the main themes in Internet-related government documents. There are two main 
themes. The first one is to promote an open market in the Internet-related areas. The second 
one is to use the Internet to serve the ‘free market’.  
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On the one hand, the government is making it easier for business to enter the Internet-related 
market. For example, the General Office of the Communist Party of China and General 
Office of the State Council published a document emphasising the need to improve the 
market access system through the simplification of administrative procedures, delegation of 
powers to lower levels, a combination of decentralisation and control (Fang, Guang, Fu 
“放、管、服”) (2017, the Opinions on Promoting the Sound and Orderly Development of 
the Mobile Internet) . The Internet-related industries are open to the market to encourage 
entrepreneurship and innovation (SC).  
 
Deepening the transformation of the government’s role in the market is also closely related to 
the Informatisation project in China, as stated in one of the main principles of the 13th Five-
Year Plan for National Informatisation: 
 
[11] Insist on the comprehensive deep reform, strike a balance between the role of the 
government and that of the market, insist on the decisive role of the market in 
allocating resources, and let the government play its functions better. Get rid of defects 
that harm innovative development of informatisation in various systems and 
mechanisms, stimulate the vigour of innovation, strengthen the law-based social 
management system, release digital dividends, and to provide an instant drive for the 
economic and social development. xi(State Council, 2016, 13th Five-year Plan for 
National Informatisation)  
 
One the other hand, the Internet and Big Data are believed to be useful for the government to 
better serve the market. For example, the General Office of the State Council published 
Several Opinions on Strengthening the Services and Supervision over Market Entities by 
Means of Big Data Analysis in 2015. This expression – using Big Data and new technologies 
to better serve the market – exists in all types of Internet-related government documents, such 
as the Internet Plus Action Plan, Outline of National IT Development Strategy, Made in 
China 2025, Opinions on Cloud Computing, Guiding Opinions on IP, and Opinions on Big 
Data. The government plans to withdraw its power over the market in less politically 
sensitive areas. The development of big data could serve this purpose well: to improve 
government’s work efficiency and to promote the transformation of its functions. All the 
documents listed above emphasise the importance to ‘streamline administration and delegate 
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powers’. Another example is that the Opinion on BD aims at “increasing the effectiveness of 
government services and regulation by improving its ability to use big data. It aims to create a 
fair and honest market environment by offering support for administrative streamlining 
through big data as well as lowering the cost of government services and supervisory 
responsibilities by making full use of big data technologies and resources” (State Council, 
2015).  
 
The claims of opening the market and restricting government power in the Internet-related 
areas is in line with the government’s promotion of reforms in general. At the Third Plenary 
Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in November 2013, after the first year of Xi-Li 
leadership, the government made an important shift in the language used to describe the role 
of the market in China. The Session passed The Decision on Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening Reforms. It claims that economic reform is the centre of 
deepening reform comprehensively and “[The] basic economic system should evolve through 
the decisive role of the market in resource allocation” (CPC, 2013). The Session proposed to 
build a fair, open, transparent and unified market system and to reform the market regulation 
system in order to promote competition and “the survival of the fittest” (ibid.). This 
expression of ‘decisive role’ is in clear contrast with the previous expression of a ‘basic’ role 
of the market in resource allocation. The 2014 Government Work Report (GWR) explicitly 
claims that it is difficult to make decisions through ‘Microeconomic regulation and control’, 
thus should facilitate the free make, the ‘invisible hand’ to promote economic growth (Li 
Keqiang, 2014, GWR).  
 
With the transformation of the market’s role comes the change of government’s role. The 
government claims to retreat from its previous commanding role in the market. As it claims 
in the Third Plenary Session, the underlying issue is to “strike a balance between the role of 
the government and that of the market, and let the market play the decisive role in allocating 
resources and let the government play its functions better”. The Decision also makes clear to 
transform government’s functions so as to “streamline administration, delegate more powers” 
(Jian Zheng Fang Quan ‘简政放权’). The first State Council executive meeting Premier Li 
hosted in 2014 was titled ‘streamline administration, delegate more powers’. After the 
meeting, the State Council removed many administrative approval items and delegated 
administrative power. This term has since been used by Premier Li’s Report on the Work of 
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the Government every year. One strong example comes from the 2015 GWR, Premier Li, for 
the first time, uses a strong term – ‘revolution’ (the translation on ChinaDaily used below 
translates the original word Ge Ming into “bold in imposing a reform”) – to describe the 
government’s reform. He emphasises “to deepen the reform, to streamline administration, 
delegate more powers” and “to multiple the market’s vigour through reducing the 
government’s power” (Li Keqiang, 2015 GWR). Li Further claims that  
 
[12] China has a population of 1.3 billion and a workforce of 900 million. Our people are 
hardworking and talented, and there is no limit to their ingenuity. When an abundance 
of market cells spring into life, they will form a mighty driving force for development, 
ensuring China’s economy remains resilient in spite of the downward pressure on it and 
continues to be full of life and dynamism. The government should be bold in imposing 
reform on itself so as to leave ample space for the market and society to play their 
respective roles and level the playing field for fair competition. Individuals and 
enterprises must have the mettle to promote their business development and make 
innovations, and our society needs to nurture a culture of entrepreneurship and 
innovation. In this way, while creating wealth, people will be able to meet their cultural 
and intellectual needs and realise their full potential in life. xii (Li Keqiang, 2015 GWR, 
translation published on ChinaDaily) 
 
It is not difficult to find the similarity between this statement from the government and David 
Harvey’s definition of neoliberalism that believes “human well-being can best be advanced 
by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2005: 
2). The metaphor of market cells emphasises to promote entrepreneurship among individual 
and business. Another neoliberal aspect of the government’s policies is how the government 
promote the Internet for uplifting poverty. The government’s primary role, according to 
several documents, is to provide infrastructures in rural and poor areas. The government has 
retreated from providing social security, education and employment directly. Instead, with 
the help of the Internet, E-commerce and different types of business, such as education and 
healthcare, are encouraged to take the role of uplifting poverty (e.g. as shown in the Opinions 
on Promoting the Sound and Orderly Development of the Mobile Internet, and 13th five-year 
plan for national informatisation). Therefore, the market, enabled by the Internet, is seen as 




The second prominent theme in the government’s digital discourse is cybersecurity. This type 
of discourse includes discussions about developing core technologies, ensuring cyber 
Sovereignty and constructing a ‘clean environment in the cyberspace’.  
 
7.3.1. Core Internet technologies 
 
The most important discourse on the Internet is probably about core technology. In one of the 
most important speeches about informatisation given by President Xi Jinping (4.19 speech), 
he points out that  
 
[13] Core Internet technologies are our greatest weakness, and the fact we rely on others for 
core technologies is our biggest threat. It matters little how large an Internet company is 
or how much that company is worth if it relies heavily on foreign countries for core 
components and its supply chains are controlled by others. It is like building a house on 
someone else’s foundation. It might be big and impressive, but it could be torn down at 
any time. If we are to seize the initiative in the development of the Internet, and 
guarantee our cybersecurity and national security, it is imperative that we overcome the 
hurdle posed by core technologies, and try to perform an “overtake on the bend” in 
certain fields and areas. xiii (Xi, 2016, Speech at a Symposium on Cybersecurity and IT 
Application, English translation from CPC’s official magazine Qiushi)   
 
This extract is a typical argument from the Chinese government about ‘core technologies’. 
The 4.19 speech is one of the most important speeches about the development of the Internet 
in China in several aspects. It is the first time the central government and CPC held a 
conference about national cybersecurity and informatisation. All members of the Standing 
Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee participated in the 
conference, as well as top officials from several Ministries and local governments. Official 
media have repetitively reported this event and published the whole speech. It has been 
published as a pamphlet and sold in bookshops nationwide and is often referred to 
subsequently. The first sentence from the extract above was later repetitively reported and 
reprinted in media, official and unofficial (e.g. Xinhua Net), and especially after American’s 
sanctions against China in April 2018, (e.g. in people.cn, Chinanews, Chinadaily, 
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geekpark.com). The 4.19 speech can be taken to set a strategic, fundamental, comprehensive 
agenda for the development of the Internet and IT.  
 
Xi uses topos of threats in this example. According to Reisigl and Wodak, this strategy can 
be formulated as “if there are specific dangers and threats, one should do something against 
them” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p77). This is a frequently used strategy when shaping 
conflicts and antagonism between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Xi emphasises the danger of being 
restricted by or dependent on other countries in ‘core technologies’. He then stresses the 
importance to develop technologies to seize and hold the initiatives about the development of 
the Chinese Internet, to guarantee cybersecurity and national security. He also sets goals to 
surpass other countries in some areas in the future. This example also implies an equivalence 
of China and Chinese enterprises. There is a slippage between ‘us’ as a nation and the ICT 
sector. There is a local coherence relation within this text (see extract 7.2 Chinese 
enterprises). In this extract, Xi emphasises the threats to Internet companies which rely on 
foreign countries for ‘core elements’. Thus specific actions should be taken by the 
government and the whole nation to overcome these threats.  
 
It could be argued that from a historical context, nationalist discourses in China have often 
arisen out of a concern about new technology or ‘modernisation’: the humiliations suffered in 
the 19th Century are sometimes explained to be caused by or were conditional contributions 
arising out of China’s industrial and scientific backwardness. This understanding of the 
importance of technology might be best illustrated by the famous phrase: “Lagging behind 
leaves one vulnerable to attacks” (Luo Hou Jiu Yao Ai Da) which was first used by Stalin in 
1931 and then propagated by the CPC. According to this view, the reason why China was 
invaded and attacked by the ‘West’ in the 19th Century was in part due to the failure to 
develop advanced industrial processes and economies that fuelled them. One representative 
expression of this argument is the ‘The Needham Puzzle’: why the industrial revolution did 
not originate in China. Another example is He Shang (River Elegy) which brings forward the 
question why (Western) modernity did not originate in China (see also Chapter 5). 
 
This type of nationalist discourse about technological competition has an underlying techno-
deterministic tone. It ignores the politics (in a broad sense) in the development and 
application of technologies. This type of techno-determinism has been criticised by critical 
political economists of long-standing. As Smythe (1994) and Williams (1974) remind us, the 
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development and application of technology are full of historical ‘intentions’ and need 
‘cultural screening’ all the time. In other words, technology does not develop independently 
from society. Rather, technology develops out of power struggles and serves certain interests 
in society. Emphasising competition with other countries on the same type of ‘core 
technologies’ means to develop technologies in the same way as other countries do: a way 
that does not necessarily serve the interests of people. For example, as Smythe (1994) points 
out, the differences between bicycles and motors not only lie in technologies behind them but 
also social relations. The fast development of the motor industry and the wide adoption of 
motor cars facilitates the transformation of public production resources, such as investment 
and space, from the public area (e.g. education) into individualised consumption area.  
 
While international relationship and international competition are indeed important aspects to 
be considered by all policymakers, yet it risks to deviate people’s attention from domestic 
issues and to form a mentality of ‘us’ vs ‘them’. The emphasis on international confrontations 
and competition could facilitate the CPC’s attempt to build a stronger authoritarian regime. 
Since there are threats from other countries, the government should be given more power in 
order to defend Chinese people from the outside ‘enemy’. According to Zhao, this strategy of 
shaping itself as defending China’s national interests was used by the government after the 
Tiananmen incident when the West imposed sanctions on China (Zhao, 2004, p67). It was 
also used when the government fought to enter the WTO and bid for hosting the Olympic 
Games. This nationalist narrative is also associated with the historical context of the hundred 
years of suffering and humiliation brought by foreign imperialism. These narratives give 
sanction to the government to build a strong party-state at the cost of its people’s freedom.  
 
7.3.2. Cyber Sovereignty and Cyber Security 
 
Another buzzword in the Internet-related policies and Xi’s speech, and being used by the 
media and the public repetitively, is ‘Cyber Sovereignty’ (Wang Luo Zhu Quan, 网络主权). 




10 For example, http://www.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2016-09/19/c_135697024.htm 
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In his remark at the Second World Internet Conference (2nd WIC), Xi Jinping implicitly 
describes the current situation as full of conflict and antagonism between nations: 
 
[14] No double standards should be allowed in upholding cybersecurity. We cannot just 
have the security of one or some countries while leaving the rest insecure, still less 
should one seek the so-called absolute security of itself at the expense of the security of 
others. xiv (Xi, 2015, 2nd WIC, originally in Chinese with official English translation, 
italics added) 
 
It is in this 2nd WIC, that Xi made the phrase ‘Cyber Sovereignty’ known to the country and 
the world. In this remark, Xi proposes four principles to “make progress in the transformation 
of the global Internet governance system”. This is on the basis of his conceptualisation of the 
current situation, the conflicts and antagonism between nations. This extract aims to argue for 
the maintenance of secure, stable and prosperous cyberspace.  
 
At the textual analysis level, this extract applies the strategy of collectivisation (Reisigl and 
Wodak, 2001, p48): Xi Jinping uses deictic (some countries, the rest, others, etc.) to indicate 
differences between two types of nations, one of which is presented as conducting hostile 
behaviour (leaving the rest insecure, at the expense of the security of others, etc.) while the 
other is more like a victim. There is a clear narrative of ‘us’ vs ‘them’. The predicational 
strategy of explicit comparisons (ibid. p54) is also used in these two examples. It means that 
responsibilities are explicitly predicated to the first group of countries which are accused of 
pursuing cyber hegemony. A more implicit discursive strategy is the topos of threat. In this 
excerpt, Xi implies that there exist some implicit antagonisms in the current Internet 
governance system: “leaving the rest insecure” when seeking its own security. Therefore, 
every country should make efforts for the “respect for cyber sovereignty” and the 
“maintenance of peace and security” (Xi, 2015, 2nd WIC). There is little doubt that Xi is 
implying America hegemony in the speech.  
 
Cyber sovereignty is in close relation to national security. From the 2016 National 
Informatisation Development Strategy, there is one section with the title of “Retaining Cyber 
Sovereignty and National Security”. It claims to prevent and to crack down on online 
behaviour that intends to “divide the country, provoke rebellion, overthrow the regime, 
damage integrity, and leak confidential information” (2016 National Informatisation 
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Development Strategy, 2016, article 54). This cyber sovereignty then is used to legitimate the 
government’s control of the Internet in China.  
 
Xi’s invention and use of the phrase “cyber sovereignty” have attracted a lot of attention.  
The assertion of sovereignty, however, is not an innovation of the current CPC and the 
current Chinese government. National sovereignty has always been a vital issue in China. 
Zhao explains how this issue is always influential to China’s International Relations on issues 
triggered by “historical sensitivities”: “pragmatic leaders are deeply committed to the 
preservation of national sovereignty, the reunification of China, and the attainment of 
national wealth and power” (Zhao S., 2000, p16). The pragmatic nationalism, observed by 
Zhao, is assertive in issues relating to territorial integrity. In other words, the Chinese 
government is uncompromising in defending and seeking Chinese national interests (ibid., 
p14).  
 
Though Xi’s emphasis on national sovereignty is not novel, there are some new characters in 
the current government’s discourse relating to sovereignty. The first one is its expansion from 
the geographical territory into cyberspace. The language of historical territory issues 
(invasion by the imperialist countries as well as the issues of Hong Kong and Taiwan) is thus 
appropriated to have a say over the Internet. Secondly and more crucial, a discourse of 
sovereignty has been gradually used for instrumentalist nationalism. For example, in Mao’s 
era, a discourse about sovereignty was articulated as a conflict between capitalist countries 
and communist/socialist countries. In other words, there was an element of class conflict in 
the traditional Maoist-left discourses of international competition.  However, this class 
element has gradually disappeared since the Reform in the 1980s. This deletion of elements 
of class conflict turns the discourse of ‘cyber sovereignty’ into a nationalist ideological 
discourse. The emphasis on sovereignty is not for the purpose of emancipation and liberation 
of people being oppressed by imperialist countries and domestic capitalist and an aristocratic 
ruling class (as in Mao’s era) but for the purpose of diverting people’s attention from 
domestic problems and thus serves the interests of the domestic ruling class (as Xi does).  
 
While there is nothing wrong to protect national security, the mixture of cyber sovereignty 
and national security could risk the appropriation of the latter to legitimate Internet control. 
Just as nationalism could serve both the role to promote national sovereignty and freedom 
and to conceal real issues within the society, the Internet Sovereignty could play the similar 
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role as the Chinese government has tight control over the Internet (King et al., 2013; Yang, 
2015).  
 
7.3.3. A clean environment in the Cyberspace 
 
The goal to build ‘a clean environment in the cyberspace’ (WIC 2015) is related to Internet 
governance11. According to Xi, “Having a clear sky, fresh air and a good ecology in the 
cyberspace conforms to the people’s interests. A pestilent atmosphere and a deteriorating 
ecology in the cyberspace do not conform to the people’s interest” (4.19 Speech). Therefore, 
the motive, according to Xi, is to “be responsible towards the society and the people”, 
especially towards the youth. Xi further claims to strengthen governance in cyberspace, 
strengthen the construction of online content, to strengthen positive online publicity.  
 
Moreover, to build a ‘good’ environment in the cyberspace requires China to be a unitary 
nation. As Xi puts it in the 4.19 speech:  
 
[15] Attaining the “Two Centenary Goals”12 requires that our entire society works together 
in one heart and one mind. It requires that people of all ethnic groups focus the 
thoughts and efforts towards the same goal. A society that lacks common ideals, goals 
and values, and that finds itself in permanent disorder will never achieve anything. 
China has a population of more than 1.3 billion people, and neither the people nor the 
country would benefit if we ended up like that. Forming a consensus is no easy task, 
and so we all need to work together. To attain our goals, we will need to form 
concentric circles, both online and offline. What do I mean by concentric circles? I 
mean rallying all Chinese people under the leadership of the CPC, and motivating all 
parties to engage in a concerted effort to bring about the rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation. xv (Xi, 2016, Speech at a Symposium on Cybersecurity and IT Application (4.19 
speech), adapted English translation from the official magazine Qiushi, italics added)   
 
11 For example, as stated in this article on people.cn http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n1/2018/0421/c385474-
29941405-6.html 
12 “Two Centenary Goals”, according to Xinhua, means that “by 2021, to celebrate the CPC's centenary, the 
goal is to "build a moderately prosperous society in all respects" and “by 2049, the centenary of the People's 
Republic of China, the goal is to "build a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, 
culturally advanced and harmonious". Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-
10/17/c_136686770.htm, last accessed at 10 Nov., 2018.   
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In this extract, Xi uses a metaphor: the entire society has “one heart and one mind” and the 
strategy of collectivisation (we, our society, us). Chinese society is seen as one human body 
which only has one heart and one mind, and all ethnic groups must have only one and the 
same goal. It is obvious that Xi is trying to construct one unitary country through this 
metaphor. This extract also uses the topos of usefulness and the topos of threat. This is a 
typical example of his claim to form a unitary national identity: the “common ideals, goals, 
and values” are beneficial for all. If there are no common goals, then nothing will be 
achieved. This type of argument is about directing action, and all action must be to this 
purpose. In this case, the action is to “form concentric circles both online and offline”, under 
the leadership of the party.  
 
There is no explicit explanation about what these ‘concentric circles’ mean as regards taking 
action, though censorship and control of the Internet are implied. In the speech, Xi suggests 
government officials use the Internet as a way to understand opinions from netizens and the 
general public. He claims that the Internet could be used as a bridge to facilitate 
communication between the government and the general public. However, he also 
emphasises the necessity of censorship and content control: “Cyberspace is a common virtual 
home for millions upon millions of people. A clean and sound online environment is in the 
best interests of the people, while a foul and volatile one is not. Nobody wants to live in a 
space full of fraud, scams, attacks, slander, terror, obscenity, and violence” (Xi, 2016, 4.19 
speech). This statement about building “a clean and sound online environment” then appears 
repetitively in official media reports.  
 
In another occasion, Xi makes it clear which agencies should be involved in this formation of 
concentric circles and how. He claims to “improve the comprehensive capacity for online 
governance”, and to form a comprehensive management system with the participation of 
several agencies – Party Committee lead, government administrate, enterprises take 
responsibility, society to act as a watchdog, and netizens self-discipline (Xi, 2018, 4.20 
Speech). 
 
The CPC has always been trying to construct a unitary Chinese nation. It is a crucial task for 
the CPC to build a unified, collective national identity with the help of nationalism. 
According to Zhao, instrumental nationalism was first used to replace communism after the 
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1980s to maintain the stability of Chinese society (Zhao, 2000, p17-8). After that, the CPC 
repeats this strategy of using nationalism to maintain loyalty and legitimacy.  
 
Cyberspace is an arena for the government/CPC to construct a unitary nation: to both oppress 
dissidents’ opinions and to win over consent. As Carlson points out, the Chinese state has 
realised the importance of “the production of national identity” for the purpose to “maintain a 
monopoly within its borders” (Carlson, 2009, p32).  This intention to ‘maintain a monopoly’ 
is also to be seen in the contradictory aspects of the need to control online space. With the 
help of the Internet, there is more discontent expressed online, and more social activist 
movements are organised and initiated online. The state thus has to pay more attention to 
control online content and to extend its power into cyberspace (for example, to compare Xi’s 
government to his predecessors, people are experiencing stricter censorship and surveillance). 
The oppression of online expression from the state has, to some extent, given rise to more 
disputes and criticisms (for studies about this issue, see Yang G., 2009 and King, 2013). 
Therefore, for the CPC, there is an immediate need to legitimate its control. The way to fulfil 
this task of legitimation of the CPC’s power is to construct a unitary national identity and to 
propagate one single national goal that is claimed to be beneficial for all Chinese people.  
 
While actively emphasising the importance of one unitary national identity, in contrast, there 
is neglect, if not a negation, of dramatic conflicts within the society.  It is clear that the 
nationalist discourse of shaping ‘a clean and sound’ cyberspace is ideological in disguising 
struggles in society. As stated by Zhao, “pragmatic leaders have fashioned nationalism, 
because it has the effect of removing differences within the country and replacing it with a 
common, hegemonic order of political values” (Zhao, 2000, p17). The deliberate neglect of 
internal conflicts, or, of course, as re-articulating them as ‘slander, terror’, etc., can be seen in 
the official discourse. For example, in the 2016 Outline of National IT Development Strategy, 
two main inequalities are mentioned in the document. The first one is the differences between 
rural and urban areas about which the document suggests addressing by improving access and 
infrastructures in rural areas, accelerating the modernisation of agriculture, and decreasing 
differences of education in rural and urban areas. The second one is regional differences, and 
the document suggests increasing access in the central and western areas of the country, 
building a national network to connect all regions especially as regards the healthcare system 
and social security system. From a qualitative methodological perspective, the word 
'differences' (Chaju) only appears three times in the document (the first one is about 
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differences between reality and goals, the second one about differences of internet 
infrastructures between regions and rural and urban areas, and the third one about differences 
of education levels between rural and urban areas, regions and schools). Regarding poverty, 
there is one sub-section (42) about using the Internet to decrease poverty which shows some 
emphasis on the poverty issue to some extent. However, sub-section 42 implies the inequality 
exists only between different regions (mentioned as poor areas or poor regions). It also 
encourages Internet and ICT enterprises as main actors to help decrease poverty. In the same 
document, there is no mention of workers (only one mention of labour-power as a resource: 
to facilitate the migration of labour resources among regions). There is no single implication 
of class, either. On the contrary, the word ‘enterprise’ (Qiye) appears 30 times. This is hardly 
like a document put forward by a communist party which claims to lead a socialist country 
addressing the doctrines of Marxism. 
 
However, the politically and economically dominant groups’ efforts to form one unified 
national identity in China have been facing increasing domestic challenges. The neoliberal 
development and openness of China have brought more substantial inequality, class 
differences and more diversities and pluralities. The Chinese national identity is becoming 
more contested than before. The Internet and ICT related industries have generated huge 
inequalities and exploitation. These industries have become key arenas for struggle in China. 
A lot of discontent and opinion challenging the government are expressed (and also 
repressed) in these industry-related arenas. The living and working situations for Chinese 
labourers are severe, though not shown publicly in official ICT policies such as the 2016 
Outline of National IT Development Strategy. For example, Liuchuan Jack Qiu (2016) has 
studied the working and living conditions of Foxconn workers and called them modern 
iSlaves. Ping Sun (2016) has conducted research studying Chinese programmers' identities 
and their high-pressure schedules.  
 
There is also an underlying techno-determinism behind this type of nationalist discourse. 
They imply (or at least why it is believed to be able to win over people’s consent) an 
optimistic claim that technologies will eventually bring economic growth, prosperity and 
progress. What people need to do is to follow the development of technology, instead of 
shaping technology in order to achieve a more equal and free society. 
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7.4. ‘A Community of Shared Destiny in the Cyberspace’ 
 
While both arguments about core technologies and declaration of cyber sovereignty have 
constructed a more or less implicit narrative of antagonism between China and other 
countries, there are more explicit discourses about cooperation in the government discourse. 
For example, in the same remark at the 2nd WIC, Xi utters the famous phrase, which was then 
repetitively cited by Chinese media, “a community of shared destiny in cyberspace” (Wang 
Luo Kong Jian Ming Yun Gong Tong Ti). He also calls for constructing a “multilateral, 
democratic and transparent global Internet governance system” which needs to “follow the 
concept of mutual support, mutual trust and mutual benefit and reject the old mentality of the 
zero-sum game or winner takes all" (Xi, 2015, 2nd WIC). Clearly, Xi’s government 
emphasises cooperation between countries and all levels of institutions, organisations and 
individual actors (“including governments, international organisations, Internet companies, 
technology communities, non-government institutions and individual citizens”) (ibid.). This 
section will discuss China’s ‘going out’ strategy from three aspects: the global digital 
economy, soft power (culture), and the global Internet governance (politics).  
 
7.4.1. The global digital economy 
 
There are three main layers of cooperation in the government discourses. First and foremost, 
cooperation shows China’s determination to continue the integration into the global 
economy. It will continue the open up policy that aims to attract investment and to support 
Chinese capital and IT and Internet companies to operate businesses in the global market. For 
example, Xi has made a clear statement in the 2nd WIC that China will continue to welcome 
investments and companies from all over the world.  
 
[16] The robust growth of China's Internet has provided a big market for enterprises and 
business starters of all countries. China's door of opening-up will never close. Our 
policy towards foreign investment will not change. Our protection of legitimate rights 
and interests of foreign-invested enterprises will not change. And the direction of 
providing better services to foreign companies in their investment and business 
activities in China will not change. As long as they abide by China's laws, we warmly 
welcome enterprises and business starters from all countries to invest and do business 
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in China. We are ready to step up cooperation with all countries. Through the 
development of cross-border e-commerce and the building of information economy 
demonstration zones, we will be able to spur the growth of worldwide investment and 
trade and promote the global development of the digital economy. xvi (Xi, 2015 2nd 
WIC, official translation published by CGTN) 
 
Secondly, the government has dedicated to supporting Chinese capital and companies to ‘go 
out’, to invest and operate businesses in the global market. The government will provide 
support for information, law service and help on taxation service. These actions are in line 
with the Belts and Roads Initiative (BRI, previously called One Belt One Road). The BRI 
project is emphasised in these government documents. For example, in the 4.19 speech, Xi 
states that  
 
[17] China’s open gate cannot be closed and will not be closed. We must encourage and 
support our country’s cybersecurity and informatisation enterprises to ‘go out’, deepen 
international Internet exchange and collaboration, vigorously participate in the 
construction of ‘One Belt One Road’, ensure that ‘wherever there is the national 
interest, there shall be informatisation coverage’. xvii (Xi, 2016, 4.19 Speech) 
 
More specifically, the document outlines how the government could support global 
expansion, the ‘going-out’ strategy. “Give full play to the effects of governments, industrial 
alliances, industrial associations and relevant intermediaries, and form joint forces to support 
the Internet plus enterprises to go out. Encourage intermediaries to provide information 
consultancy, legal assistance, tax intermediary and other such services for enterprises to 
expand into the overseas market. Support industrial association, industrial alliances and 
enterprises to jointly promote Chinese technologies and standards and drive the overseas 
promotion and application of products and services by the going out of technical standards” 
(State Council, 2015, ‘Internet Plus’ Action Plan). 
 
Compared to the discourse to attract foreign investment, the government’s ‘going out’ 
discourse shows more elements of nationalism. As shown explicitly in the 4.19 speech 
excerpt, this ‘going out’ strategy represents national interest – ‘wherever there is the national 
interest, there shall be informatisation coverage’ (Xi, 2016, 4.19 Speech).  
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It is clear that the Chinese Internet and information companies are now integrated into the 
world economy in a much larger scale, transforming from accepting FDI and importing 
products to investing capital and operating businesses in other countries. The government’s 
role, thus, is to better support these business operations, providing consulting service, legal 
advice and tax agency. This expansion of businesses is accompanied by government 
discourse of Cyberspace governance.  
 
7.4.2. Soft Power 
 
Secondly, along with the exportation of products and services, the government is actively 
promoting ‘soft power’ project. It aims to strengthen international communication capacity, 
i.e. to use the Internet for telling the ‘Chinese stories’ (Central Office and the General Office 
of the State Council, 2016, Outline of the National Informatisation Development Strategy; 
2017, the Opinions on Promoting the Sound and Orderly Development of the Mobile 
Internet). According to a ‘dictionary’, aiming to teach Xi’s keywords, published by 
People.cn13,  at the National Publicity and Ideological Work Conference in August 2013, Xi 
Jinping indicated that we must do a better job of "telling China's stories, and conveying 
China's voice" 14.  
 
For example, regarding international communication, Xi claims that the Internet is important 
to promote mutual understandings between different people and culture and propose to “build 
an online platform for cultural exchange and mutual learning” in the 2nd World Internet 
Conference. He claims that:  
 
[18] The Internet is an important carrier to spread mankind's fine cultures and promote 
positive energy. China is willing to build, through the Internet, a bridge of international 
cultural interaction for the fine cultures of the world to learn from each other and for 
people of all countries to share their feelings and enhance mutual understanding. We 
will work with all other countries to leverage the strength of the Internet as a 
communication platform so that people of other countries will come to know more 
about China's fine culture and the Chinese people will learn more of theirs. Together, 
 
13 Available at http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/413700/, accessed on 20 June 2020 
14 Available at http://keywords.china.org.cn/2018-11/30/content_74227030.htm, accessed on 20 June 2020 
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we will promote the prosperity and development of cyberculture, which will enrich 
people's mind and thinking and advance human civilisation and progress. xviii (Xi, 2015, 
2nd World Internet Conference, official translation on CGTN) 
 
In order to ‘tell Chinese stories’, the government emphasises several aspects of actions, 
including enhancing content production and distribution capacity, supporting the 
development of several important news websites and media groups, and strengthening 
disciplines and management of online communication. China has done so through different 
media, including Television, documentary, and feature film (Thussu, 2019: 193). In 
particular, the state is funding ‘central media’ – Xinhua News Agency, China Central 
Television, China Radio International, People’s Daily and the English -language China Daily, 
for their global expansion (Shambaugh, 2013). However, as Thussu points out, “none of the 
Chinese international media has so far broken a major global story” (Thussu, 2019: 194). 
These Chinese international media are oftentimes seen as vehicles for propaganda and/or 
under state censorship, thus lack credibility to gain global influence.  
 
7.4.3. The global Internet Governance 
 
Finally, The government is actively promoting the idea to participate in global cyberspace 
governance. There are several main aspects of participating in global Internet governance. 
The first one is to participate in establishing the rule. For example, the 13th Five-Year Plan 
for National Informatisation claims to deeply participate in the establishment of Internet 
governance rules and technology standards, to actively participate in those organisations that 
are responsible for Internet Name and Numbers allocation, and those International Internet 
technology and management activities. Another example is from the ‘Internet Plus’ Action 
Plan. It specifically claims to “incessantly perfect ‘Internet Plus’ convergence standards 
systems, simultaneously move forward with international and domestic standardisation work, 
have a greater say in international organisations such as the ISO, IEC, ITU, etc. 
 
Secondly, global Internet governance is necessary for cybersecurity. For example, the 13th 
Five-Year Plan for National Informatisation states that it is necessary to establish an 
international cooperation mechanism to fight cyber-crime,  to work together to prevent and 
fight against commercial espionage, hacker attack, and terrorist crime. The final goal is thus 
to “foster peaceful, secure, open and cooperative cyberspace and put in place a multilateral, 
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democratic and transparent global Internet governance system” (Xi, 2015, speech at the 2nd 
WIC; see also in Cybersecurity Law).  
 
To sum up, the government’s digital discourse on global cooperation includes three main 
aspects, including to participate in the global digital economy (by attracting investments and 
‘going out’), to actively construct ‘soft power’ through ‘telling China’s stories’, and to 
participate in the global Internet governance under the name of cybersecurity. This type of 
discourse of ‘A Community of Shared Destiny’ reflects China’s greater integration into the 
process of globalisation and China’s efforts to make a greater impact in the world’s economy, 




So far, I have illustrated several key aspects of the Chinese government’s Internet- and ICT-
related discourses. The first section (7.1) focused on the ultimate goal stated by the 
government, i.e. to build a Cyber Superpower (Wang Luo Qiang Guo), and the main value it 
claims, i.e. to serve the people. These claims are formed on the basis a description of the 
current situation that emphasises the international technological competion ‘wave’.  
 
The following sections covered the goals (short-term), description of circumstances, means-
goal premises (proposed actions) from three main aspects of the government discourse. 
Section 7.2 illustrates the government’s digital discourse on the Information Economy. Under 
this theme, the government use topos of usefulness has emphasised the importance of 
upgrading the national economy, developing digital economy and Big Data, encouraging 
mass entrepreneurship and innovation (SC). Through an analysis of local coherence, there is 
also an implicit equivalence between China and Chinese enterprises.  
 
Section 7.3 discusses the government’s digital discourse on Cybersecurity. Several discursive 
strategies and linguistic features can be identified in the government’s digital discourse, 
illustrating the nationalist ideologies embedded. For example, Xi uses topos of threats, in his 
most important speech regarding cybersecurity and informatisation (the 4.19 speech), to 
emphasise the danger of being restricted by or dependent on other countries in ‘core 
technologies’. This strategy is also used by the government to argue for the importance to 
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guarantee cybersecurity and national security. This construction of ‘us vs them’ is normally 
combined with a further argument of ‘a unitary nation’ narrative that, according to Zhao, 
gives sanction to the government to build a strong party-state at the cost of its people’s 
freedom (Zhao, 2004). Cohesion is the key linguistic strategy in this connection between the 
‘us vs them’ and ‘a unitary nation’ narratives. For example, in Xi’s 4.19 speech, following 
the necessity for China to develop ‘core technologies’, Xi emphasised the threat to Chinese 
Internet companies which rely on foreign countries for ‘core technologies’. There is an 
implicit equivalence of China and Chinese enterprises. In this process, pronouns or strategy 
of collectivisation in Wodak’s term (some countries, other countries, our countries, etc.) and 
metaphor (‘concentric circles’, the entire society has ‘one heart and one mind’) are employed 
to emphasise the nation as a whole further. They emphasise the unity of the people, country 
and society, at the expense of recognition of divisions of interest. The government has 
repetitively used the same strategies in the digital discourse on core technologies, cyber 
sovereignty, and ‘a clean environment of cyberspace’.  
 
Finally, the governments’ discourse on globalization is quite explicit (7.4). The logic of 
capital in the nation’s expansion of power has become more apparent. For example, the 
Outline of National IT Development Strategy (2016) (Guojia Xinxihua Fazhan Zhanlue 
Gangyao) emphasises the importance of international cooperation and mutual benefits as one 
of its main principles. It claims that informatisation should serve national interests and 
improve international cooperation relating to the Internet. It also emphasises to utilise BRI, 
“the community of shared future in cyberspace”, “domestic and international market”, etc. to 
improve international influence. This emphasis on national interests confirms the pragmatic 
approach of the current leaders’ nationalism. In contrast, in the same section of six principles 
in the document, it only briefly mentioned international competition under the theme of 
innovation and no mention of international relations, even under the theme of security.  
 
My analysis raised some critical questions about the Chinese government’s digital discourse. 
Table 7.2 illustrates the main arguments and their corresponding Premises in practical 
argumentation.  
 
 • ‘Build a Cyber Superpower’  
• Realise ‘China’s great rejuvenation’ 
Ultimate Goal 
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 • ‘Serve the people’ Key Value 
 • ‘Join the Wave’ Circumstances   
Information 
Economy 
• Build the ‘New Normal’ of the 
Chinese Economy 
• Build a vigorous Digital Economy 
• Encourage Mass Entrepreneurship 
and Innovation 
• The Chinese enterprises represent 
China in the global competition 
• Deepening the reform 
Actions (what to do) 
& Circumstances 
Cybersecurity • Develop Core Technologies 
• Ensure Cyber Sovereignty 
• Construct a ‘Clean Environment in 
the Cyberspace’ 




• Participate in the Global Digital 
Economy 
• Construct a Strong National ‘Soft 
Power’ 
• Participate in the Construction of ‘A 
Community of Shared Destiny in the 
Cyberspace’ 
Actions (what to do) 
& Circumstances 
Table 7.1. The Government’s Digital Discourse and the Corresponding Premises in Practical 
Arguments. 
 
Applying the analytical framework, regarding the Internet economy and politics, developed 
in Chapter 4 and 5, Table 7.3 and 7.4 illustrate the government’s digital discourse on the New 
Economy and New Politics. As shown in this chapter, though there are some similar 
proposed actions or developments along with the Internet and digital technologies, the logic 
behind is different, so are the discourses. The digital discourse from the government 
developed out of the Chinese context and reacting to China’s political-economic situation.  
 
In this area the government claims to: 
The market • Open market and deepen reform to better serve the economy  
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• Support key Enterprises for National Interests  
• Make full use of the Innovation-driving role of the Internet to promote 
Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation for a vigorous economy 
Production  • Upgrade the agricultural and manufacturing industry and develop the 
service industry to acquire new economic growth (the ‘New Normal’) 
• Open Data as a national strategy  
Consumption • Expanding domestic consumption with the help of the Internet for 
economic development  
Table 7.2. Chinese government’s Digital Discourse on the New Economy. 
 
International  • Develop core technologies to win the international competition 
• Increase international cooperation to build “A Community of Shared 
Destiny in the Cyberspace”  
• Tightening Internet control to acquire Cyber Sovereignty and to ensure 
national security 
• Construct a strong national ‘soft power’ 
State  • Deepen reform for economic growth  
• Supporting key Chinese enterprises (oligopolies) because they represent 
China 
Societal  • Tighten Internet content control to build ‘a clean environment in the 
cyberspace’  
Individual • Reduce poverty with the help of the Internet 
• Make the Internet accessible to all  
Table 7.3. Chinese government’s Digital Discourse on the New Policies. 
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CHAPTER 8. BAT’S DIGITAL DISCOURSE 
 
This chapter will start by introducing the political economy of BAT, focusing on BAT’s data 
collection and their dominant positions in the market (8.1).  It will then investigate BAT’s 
discursive strategies under three themes with focuses on BAT’s dominant position in the 
domestic market (8.2), BAT’s expansion into new industries (8.3) and BAT’s global 
expansion (8.4). Each of these three sections will discuss BAT’s discursive strategies to 
represent the reality, their self-definitions and their relations with different stakeholders. 
From a CDA perspective, these discourses are not simply neutral reflecting or describing of 
the world, but is instead constructive and performative. BAT’s description of the world and 
themselves legitimate their domination of the market, their attempts to build multi-industry 
conglomerates, and their collection of personal data. Their discursive constructions of 
relations with other stakeholders reveal how BAT maintain an exploitative relationship 
within the companies, keep violating user privacy, keep a pragmatic relationship with the 
government, and expand businesses into the global market. Finally, this chapter (8.5) will 
provide a summary with the help of the analytical framework illustrated in Chapter 4 and 5. It 
will show how these discourses of BAT’s features fit into the main categories of digital 
discourses on the New Economy and the New Politics. Studying BAT’s discursive strategies 
reveal some important features of China’s digital discourses.  
8.1. The Political Economy of BAT  
 
This section will briefly introduce two key aspects of the political economy of BAT: their 
data collection and expansion of businesses.  
 
8.1.1. BAT’s data collection  
 
Data is probably one of the most important resources for BAT. As Jack Ma once speaks out 
boldly that “Alibaba is not a GMV company. Instead, it is a data company… We sell 
products is because we want to acquire data”  (Jack Ma, 2016 Investor’s Day).  The 
importance of this exchange value can be demonstrated by how much revenue platforms 
make from selling advertising.  QQ and WeChat are not operated as independent companies 
and thus do not have revenue reports separate from Tencent. However, we can examine 
another major Chinese social media platform, Weibo. The importance of revenue in relation 
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to advertising is clearly shown by Weibo’s financial report (see Table 8.1). The figure shows 
that a large proportion of revenue (77-87%) comes from online advertising services Weibo 
provides. Notice that Ali WB Investment Holding Limited (Alibaba) is the second-largest 
shareholder of Sina Weibo, which holds 30.4% of ordinary shares with 15.9% voting power 
(Weibo Corp, Financial Report, 2017). Weibo’s financial report emphasises that “Alibaba is 
our largest customer and an important strategic partner. If we fail to maintain our 
collaboration with Alibaba, our results of operations and growth prospects may be adversely 
and materially affected” (ibid. p10). Advertising revenue is also important for Baidu (see 
Table 8.2). As the largest online search engine in China, more than 85% of revenue comes 
from online marketing. 
 
 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
Revenue from 
advertising 
$996,745 $570,982 $402,415 $264,782 $148,426 $51,049 




86.67% 87.07% 84.21% 79.24% 78.82% 77.43% 
Table 8.1. Weibo revenue, source: annual report 2017-2014, data source: Weibo Form 20-F 
(revenue in $000). 
 
 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
Revenues from Online 
marketing 
$73,146 $64,525 $64,037 $48,495 $31,802 $22,246 
Total Revenues $84,809 $70,549 $66,3812 $49,052 $31,944 $22,306 
Percentage  86.25% 91.46% 96.47% 98.86% 99.56% 99.73% 
Net Income (profits) $18,288 $11,596 $32,432 $12,253 $10,389 $10.391 
Table 8.2. Baidu Revenues. Source: Annual Report 2017-2014, Form 20-F (in millions, 
RMB) 
 
The importance of this exchange value could also be shown from an investigation of the 
marketing industry from a different angle. The exchange of audience/user online behaviour 
and online data into advertising income used to be called “monetisation of traffic” (Liuliang 
Bianxian in Chinese). This kind of language is prevalent in the digital media and advertising 
industries. Now ‘Big Data’ and ‘AI’ have become buzz words in the marketing area. Not 
surprisingly, Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (BAT) have their marketing services for advertising 
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customers, based on their control of a large amount of user data and algorithms to harvest 
them.  
 
Baidu has two main services devoted to advertising and data: Baidu Union (BU) and Baidu 
Advertising (Baidu Tuiguang). Baidu Union consists of several third-party websites and 
software applications: it mainly provides platforms to display online advertising arranged by 
Baidu and obtain profits from this. Baidu Tuiguang is Baidu’s primary advertising service 
which offers marketing services to advertisers to show advertising on Baidu search results 
pages and partners of Baidu Union. Both Baidu Union and Baidu Tuiguang emphasise that 
Baidu can conduct precise and accurate analyses of users’ needs and interests, facilitating a 
directed or targeted advertising service. This is claimed to be achieved with the help of large 
databases and AI technologies.   
 
Similarly, Tencent also has two services: Tencent Social Ads for partners (third-party 
websites and apps) and for advertisers. The capability to target specific groups of users is 
emphasised. It also stresses the large number of users of Tencent social media networks, 
including QQ and WeChat.  
 
Alibaba’s marketing platform Alimama (a marketing service providing platform owned by 
Alibaba), claims that it is a “data-powered marketing technology platform”. It also claims 
that a “data marketing era” has come, and Alimama will realise its marketing services by 
using big data and AI technologies. It emphasises the Ali Group’s capacity to “provide a 
complete picture” of individual consumers, “from consumer consumption patterns and 
preferences to insights on their geographical location and social media activities” (Alimama, 
PR video15). It thus enables more effective business harvesting of consumer behaviour. As 
shown in one of its PR videos, Alimama is watching every consumer closely (Figure 8.1). 
This first figure shows an image of an eye, in the core of which is a representation of 
information Ali has gathered from consumers via its own or cooperate platforms (see the last 
image in Figure 8.1). 
 
 





Figure 8.15. Screenshots from Alimama’s PR video. 
 
Though with slight differences, the core mechanisms behind BAT’s concept of AI and big 
data marketing are similar: selling people’s personal data that BAT collect from their 
platforms and their partners to advertisers. These companies thus make huge profits from this 
mechanism. As early as 1977, Smythe pointed out the neglect of perceiving users as 
commodities as a blind spot in communication studies (Dallas W. Smythe, 1994). Fuchs 
conducts a comprehensive study, applying Marx’s theory of value and exploitation, to 
demonstrate that users do generate both value and use value for their platforms (Fuchs, 
2014a). Exploitation happens when value is generated by workers but expropriated by 
capitalists. The commercial use of users’ personal information is a type of exploitation 
(Andrejevic, 2013; Fuchs, 2014a). 
 
Finally, user labour is not the only problem of the use of new technologies as privacy 
violations caused by big data and algorithms in marketing is another issue. Data can be 
 189 
misused by big companies in another way. A recent debate about big data in China is about a 
new type of ‘price discrimination’ based on big data (Dashuju Shashu). Users of some 
platforms found that different prices were shown based on some of their characteristics: such 
as devices used (e.g. the IOS system or Android system), 16 or new users or frequent users.17 
Prices shown to frequent users are higher than new users which can be even higher than the 
normal standard prices. Once cookies are cleared or once changed to another device, the 
prices then decrease to the normal level. It is clear that the more data ‘understands’ users, the 
better companies can set ‘more proper’ (i.e. higher) prices for frequent users. 
 
8.1.2. BAT’s expansion 
 
BAT are oligopolies, cross-industry conglomerates and multi-national corporations. There is 
no doubt about the dominant position of BAT in the market in China. According to CNNIC 
(41st), for the financial year ended December 2017, Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu have the 
market value of RMB 3.1 trillion, 2.9 trillion and 0.5 trillion, respectively. Together BAT 
account for 73.9% of the total market value of China’s listed Internet companies (CNNIC, 
The 41st China Statistical Report on Internet Development, p71, my translation). Baidu.com 
ranks the first place in Alexa’s top site rankings in China.18. According to the CNNIC 
statistics, the three most frequently used social media platforms are WeChat Moments, QQ 
zone and Weibo (used by 87.3%, 64.4%, 40.9% of netizens, respectively) in 2017 (CNNIC, 
41st report, 2017). Tencent owns WeChat and QQ and Alibaba holds 30.4% of Weibo 
ordinary shares with 15.9 voting power (Weibo Corp, Financial report, 2017). Alibaba also 
owns the largest online shopping website Taobao.com in China which ranks third in the 
Alexa top sites ranking. 
 
Not satisfied with their current dominant positions, all company groups are seeking to expand 
into new industries and areas. For example, Baidu is extending from the online search area to 
online entertainment area. According to its financial report, Baidu’s business consists of two 
segments: Baidu Core and iQIYI. Baidu Core is “primarily comprised of keyword-based 
 
16Alimama, PR video, official website: 
https://www.alimama.com/index.htm?spm=a2320.9441193.ca214tr8.d9bda87b1.4b8c2030N8f34O 
17Alimama, PR video, official website: 
https://www.alimama.com/index.htm?spm=a2320.9441193.ca214tr8.d9bda87b1.4b8c2030N8f34O 
18 Alexa, Top Sites in China, accessed 15 June 2018 
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marketing services, which target and are triggered by internet users’ search queries” and 
IQIYI is “an innovative market-leading online entertainment service provider in China” 
(Baidu, Annual Report, Form 20-F, 2017). According to the report, Baidu Core consists of 19 
main products and services provided to users through Baidu App and Baidu.com on PCs, 
mobile and smart devices (including search, news feed, videos, encyclopaedia, education, e-
wallet, etc.). IQIYI mainly provides online entertainment content. Figure 8.2 shows the 
complex organisational structure of Baidu, including its principal subsidiaries and 
consolidated affiliated entities (Baidu, Annual Report, Form 20-F). 
 
 
Figure 8.16. Organisational Structure of Baidu, data source: Annual Report, Form 20-F, 
2017. 
 
Similarly, Alibaba started its business with e-commerce and then expanded its business into 
other areas. According to their Financial Report 2017, their businesses consist of (a) ‘core 
commerce’, including retail commerce in China and the global market and wholesale 
commerce in China and the global market; (b) 'cloud computing'; (c) 'Digital Media and 
Entertainment'; (d) 'Innovation Initiatives and Others', including operating systems, digital 
maps, etc. Moreover, through investee affiliates, Alibaba also participates in the logistics (the 
Cainiao Network) and local service sectors (Koubei), as well as online financial services (Ant 
Financial Services) through Alipay (an online payment platform). It claims its ‘ecosystem’ 
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“has developed around our platforms and businesses that consist of consumers, merchants, 
brands, other businesses, third-party service providers and strategic alliance partners” (ibid., 
p60). Figure 8.3 shows Ali's main business bands and affiliates. The cover of Ali’s 2018 
March Quarter Financial Report (Figure 8.4) gives a straightforward illustration of Ali's 
Ecosystem: it aims to cover all aspects of people’s lives, from shopping to entertainment, in 
both the domestic and global market. 
 
 
Figure 8.17. The Ali ‘Ecosystem’ (including Alibaba’s key businesses and selected major 
investee companies and cooperative partners), data sources: Annual Report Form 20-F, 




Figure 8.18. The Alibaba Ecosystem and life. Image Source: 2018 March Quarter Financial 
Report.  
 
While acknowledging that Internet oligopolies exist, there are differences between such new 
oligopolistic tendencies and traditional ones. Different from oligopolies in traditional 
industries, businesses in the media and communication industries are more flexible in 
expanding control and exerting power (Mosco, 2009, p169). Technology or Internet 
companies expand their power through obtaining more data. A new type of oligopoly is 
emerging from the obsession with data: ‘data oligopoly’. Big companies are constantly 
competing to ‘cooperate’ with more partners to connect through the Application 
Programming Interface (API) and ‘share’ data with each other. This is different from 
traditional an oligopoly which is pursued through acquisition and mergers. For technology 
and Internet companies, such as BAT, it is not necessary to control or obtain other companies 
(though they do so sometimes), and that is why they use the metaphor of an ‘ecosystem’. 
They claim that small businesses and enterprises can ‘grow’ and develop by themselves. 
They claim that the BATs will not intervene in their business because what they want is data. 
It aims to get a ‘complete picture’ of each customer or users, as shown in Figure 8.4.  
 
Data is also crucial for Tencent. One advantage of Tencent is its control of two of the largest 
social media platforms in China: QQ and WeChat. Both platforms are convenient tools to 
apply API to direct users to other websites, Apps, as well as advertising. For example, the 
launch of Mini Programs in January 2017 “connect users across a wide spectrum of online 
and offline services including retail, eCommerce, lifestyle services, municipal services and 
games” (Financial Report, 2017, p5). Tencent tries to build its own ‘ecosystem’ (see 8.2). 
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Tencent has hosted the Tencent Global Partner Conference since 2011 when Pony Ma 
officially launched his idea of “building a new open and shared Internet ecosystem without 
boundaries” (Pony Ma, 2011 TGPC). Since then, Tencent has held this conference for its 
partners every year. Pony Ma once stated Tencent’s position clearly: “We hope we can work 
together with co-partners in the future. Tencent has its clear position: we only make 
connections. We hope to co-construct the ecosystem of big data together with everyone” 
(Pony Ma, 2016 Big Data Expo). In its 2017 Annual Report, the first “Company Outlook and 
Strategies for 2018” is “strengthening our social platforms to encourage user sharing, 
enhancing connections with users’ daily lives and facilitating interactions with ecosystem 
partners” (Tencent Annual Report Form 20-F, 2017, italics added).  
 
There is a reason behind this enthusiasm in building the ‘ecosystem’: to increase profit. 
Tencent has two major sources of revenue: ‘value added services’ (VAS) and advertising. For 
the year ended 31 December 2017, 65% of Tencent total revenue came from VAS, 17% from 
online advertising and 18% from other sources. VAS mainly refers to games and online 
content subscriptions. The ‘other’ sources of revenue are mainly related to Cloud services 
(ibid.).  The online advertising revenue is our interest here. According to Tencent, “social and 
other advertising revenues increased by 65%” in 2017, and this increase was primarily driven 
by growth in Wexin (WeChat), other mobile apps and advertising networks (ibid. p13). In the 
Chairman’s Statement in the financial report, Pony Ma explains in more detail about this 
increase in ‘social and other advertising’: “Our advertising revenue year-on-year increase was 
primarily driven by higher advertising demand due to the enhanced targeting capability of our 
platforms and an expanded advertiser base leveraging our partner platforms… Advertising 
impressions also increased in Weixin Moments and Official Accounts, and on our mobile 
advertising network. We are now testing CPC-based advertising links in Official Accounts 
which connect users to advertisers’ Mini Programs” (ibid., p10). This clearly states that 
Tencent is trying to enhance its targeting capability with the help of gathering more data, 
from its own platforms and its partners. 
 
8.2. A Boundaryless Internet or A Centralised Market?  
 
Through a critical political-economic view, BAT are oligopolies dominating the Chinese 
Internet industry. In response to the accusation of suppressing innovations and competition, 
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BAT use several discursive strategies to mitigate the negative sides of their de facto dominant 
market position in China. They claim the necessity to build online ‘ecosystems’ because of 
the Internet’s feature of boundarylessness. BAT define themselves as ‘connectors’, 
‘community’, ‘infrastructure’, ‘utility’ and ‘ecosystems’ that enable the functions of the 
whole Internet system. On the basis of this argument, BAT claims that they are building, or 
part of, a de-centralised Internet ecosystem that helps and facilitates small businesses. Instead 
of anti-competition, according to BAT, they are encouraging innovations and supporting new 
businesses. However, this language appropriates the Internet’s de-centralised and 
boundaryless features to describe BAT’s own organisational structures. This type of digital 
discourse not only disguise their past and continuous purchase of small businesses and 
suppression of competition, but also deliberately confuse the Internet as a public space for 
communication with BAT as private entities for making profits. 
 
8.2.1. The Internet is boundaryless  
 
BAT choose words carefully to describe and legitimate the expansion of their businesses, and 
to avoid straightforward terms – ‘oligopolies’ or/and ‘monopolies’. Rewording of vocabulary 
is a frequently used linguistic strategy in this case. It is a strategy to represent the world 
according to specific perspectives (Fairclough, 2015b: 131). Language ‘constructs’ the reality 
it seeks to make sense of and thus builds a particular representation of that reality.  
 
More specifically, BAT are using different but similar words to describe the expansions of 
their business operations. Pony Ma claims that Tencent’s dream after transformation in 2011 
is “to build a boundaryless, open and sharing Internet new ecosystem (Pony Ma, 2011 
TGPC). He continuously called Tencent as ‘connector’ of the Internet (Pony Ma, 2012 
TGPC). Alibaba, whose core business is e-commerce, share this rhetoric of sharing and 
openness. For example,  Jack Ma uses terms such as ‘community’ to emphasise that Alibaba 
is a platform for sharing and participation. When compared Alibaba to Tencent (Alibaba has 
been investing in Sina Weibo since 2013 to compete with Tencent WeChat and other social 
media platforms), Jack ma claims that Alibaba is trying “to build a widely participatory 
community” and the Internet will become a society (Jack Ma, 2016, TFHC, p186). As a 
company that started its business from search engine, Baidu is promoting itself as an open 
platform. Robin Li presents Baidu as a ‘medium’ between users and content providers (Robin 
Li, 2010 BWC). Baidu is also an ‘open platform’ and the ‘best entry’ to connect people and 
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service (Robin Li, 2015 BWC). Furthermore, since 2014, Baidu started to promote the 
concept of ‘connecting people and service’. According to its own explanation, ‘connecting 
people and service’ means to serve as a platform to facilitate the gig economy and the so-
called ‘sharing economy’ (Robin Li, 2015 BU). This ‘connectivity’ to service has paved the 
way for Baidu to extend its businesses to the AI industry. Since 2014, Robin Li started to 
mention AI and Big Data in his speeches to Baidu Union. In 2017, Baidu officially 
announced to change its mission from “connecting information” to “awakening all thing” 
(Robin Li, 2017 BU) (for more discussions on BAT’s expansion with AI, see 8.3).   
 
What is most interesting is the use of ‘infrastructure’ and ‘utility’ to describe the Internet and 
BAT. For example, according to Jack Ma, Alibaba needs to be boundaryless because it wants 
to become the infrastructure for e-commerce (Jack Ma, 2014 WIC). Later on, Jack Ma further 
claims that big companies should take the “social responsibility” to build infrastructures to 
facilitate entrepreneurship and to provide resources (Jack Ma, 2016, TFHC, p32). In response 
to  the question of dominating the market, Jack Ma states that: 
 
[1] People always ask me that is there any boundary for Internet companies? Alibaba 
seems to be ubiquitous, Tencent seems to be ubiquitous, and so does Facebook. Do you 
Internet companies have boundaries? My answer is that the Internet has no boundaries, 
just like electricity has no boundaries. 100 years ago, you wouldn’t say that this 
industry could use electricity and that one couldn’t, because electricity has no 
boundaries. xix 
 
Jack Ma is not the only one among CEOs who claim to build the ‘new infrastructure’ in the 
digital age. Pony Ma also claims that Tencent wants to be the “bottom layer” where 
traditional sectors can build their own applications on it. For example, Pony Ma claims to 
build “a boundaryless ecosystem-like organisation” on which “Tencent Functions as a 
‘connector’ to build a new type of infrastructure in the new era” (Pony Ma, 2015, TGPC). 
The latest argument about infrastructure comes from Robin Li’s discourse on Baidu’s 
development of AI. In this new area of AI, Baidu claims to have been strategically making 
efforts to build AI infrastructures – “Baidu Brain and PaddlePaddle Deep Learning 




One can easily identify the fallacy of ignoration elenchi, or ‘irrelevant conclusion’ in these 
statements. The fallacy of ‘irrelevant conclusion’, according to Reisigl and Wodak, refers to 
the ignorance of “the counter-proof or counter-argument”, consisting of “discussing or 
proving a thesis or standpoint that is not the thesis or standpoint in question, but a totally 
different and irrelevant one that is ascribed to the antagonist and does not matter in the actual 
‘discourse’ (in the sense of ‘discussion’)” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 73). In Jack Ma’s 
argument, for example, it is obvious that he disguisedly changed the topic of Internet 
companies to the Internet. In this way, he managed to confuse the open Internet as a public 
common with the private for-profit Internet companies. For Pony Ma and Robin Li, they also 
claim to build online infrastructure on which other application and industries can be 
developed. However, none of the CEOs points out the essential question of who should own 
this infrastructure, or whether such an important ‘utility’ should be owned by for-profit 
private companies. In other words, they all omit the point of power relations and public 
ownership with the new technological development.  
 
8.2.2. BAT and their partners 
 
The discursive construction of BAT as ‘infrastructure’ is always connected with their 
language of ‘helping small businesses’. These small businesses are BAT’s partners, including 
those who provide products and services (developers) to Internet users through BAT and 
advertisers. Every year, the most important events for BAT are those about their partners, 
such as the Tencent Global Partner Conference (TGPC), Baidu Union (BU), Alibaba’s 
Wshang and Apsara Conference (AC). These events clearly show how much attention BAT 
pay to their partners.  
 
Jack Ma emphasises in several occasions that since the beginning of Alibaba, its dream or 
aim is to ‘help small businesses’ and start-ups (Jack Ma, 2013, TFHC, p55, p175) and to 
make doing businesses easier for middle and small enterprises (Jack Ma, 2015, TFHC, p194). 
This is, of course, because Alibaba starts its business with a focus on e-commerce. Jack Ma 
explains the logic in this way – in order to help small businesses, Alibaba has to build an 
ecosystem and they are ‘forced’ to become an infrastructure provider of e-commerce (Jack 
Ma, 2014, WIC). In other occasions, Alibaba is a ‘platform’ (Jack Ma, 2014, TFHC, p124) 
that ‘enables’ other businesses and helps these businesses to fulfil their dreams (Jack Ma, 
2015, TFHC, p156). In 2015 Davos, Jack Ma emphasises that Alibaba’s mission is “to make 
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running businesses easier for small and medium-sized companies” (Jack Ma, 2015, TFHC, 
p194). Another strong statement comes from Jack Ma’s speech to all employees in 2015. He 
claims that:  
 
[2] Many say that Alibaba is always investing in other companies and buying stocks. It 
seems like we are everywhere. In fact, this is true… Only when we are everywhere, our 
clients can benefit, our small and medium-sized company clients can develop. 
Therefore, we must be omnipresent (Jack Ma, 2015, TFHC, p67). xx 
 
This extract from Jack Ma reveals the logic behind this type of discourse. To claim that 
Alibaba is helping small businesses, it can easily legitimate its expansion of businesses and 
its de facto domination of the market.  
 
Similarly, Tencent claims that it has created opportunities for businesses. According to Pony 
Ma, Tencent “chooses to prioritise its partners’ success and then its own success” (Pony Ma, 
2011 TGPC). It wants to become the ‘connector’ between partners and users. Tencent puts 
partners’ interests prior to its own interests (Pony Ma, 2012 TGPC). Tencent is able to help to 
build small businesses and to make sure these businesses maintain loyal user groups, 
according to Pony Ma, because Tencent’s ‘social gene’ encourages openness and sharing 
among friends (Pony Ma, 2016 TGPC). The keywords for Tencent is to ‘enable people’, a 
phrase first used by Pony Ma in 2015 TGPC. After the launch of Mini-programme, Tencent 
claims itself to also ‘enable’ brands and retailers (Pony Ma, 2017 TGPC). According to Pony 
Ma, Tencent will be able to provide more sustainable business environments where 
businesses could gain and maintain loyalty among consumers and users. This is clearly a step 
for Tencent to become conglomerates, not only specialising in online games and social 
network, but also step in retailing. Furthermore, in 2017, Pony Ma states that Internet 
companies will ‘enable all traditional industries’ (Pony Ma, 2017 WIC). It will help 
manufacturing companies to better converge into the digital world.   
 
Baidu, as a company started from search engine, claims itself to be an open platform from an 
early stage. Every year in Baidu Union Conference, Robin Li ‘shares some thought about the 
industry in Union’ as an entrepreneur himself  (Robin Li, 2011 BU). The main purpose of 
this conference is to promote Baidu Union and attract new companies to join the Union.  As 
an ‘open platform’, Baidu claims to have supported application and programme developers 
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and content providers. In this way, developers and content providers could approach a large 
number of users (Robin Li, 2010 BU). In a different occasion in the same year (2010 was the 
year when Google terminated its service in mainland China), Robin Li emphasises that Baidu 
is providing the “most open information on China’s Internet”. Baidu is playing the role of “a 
medium” between users, developers, and advertisers, as well as between businesses and 
individuals (Robin Li, 2010 BWC).  Since 2012, Baidu launched Baidu Cloud, claiming to 
provide developers open access to Baidu’s capacity of ‘Could’ storage, calculation, AI and 
Big Data (Robin Li, 2012 BWC). This open-access will further help developers to provide 
applications to users. It also paves the way for Baidu to develop AI and Big Data thus 
provides services to other industries. Since Baidu started to expand its business into 
traditional industries, such as manufacturing and service industries, similar to Alibaba and 
Tencent, it also states its aim to help businesses. This transformation has broadened its 
partners from developers, advertisers or content providers to all types of different businesses.  
 
8.2.3. Participating online and sharing data 
 
Users participation and data sharing are crucial for Internet companies. Many scholars have 
discussed how Internet companies use positive languages, such as ‘connection’, ‘sharing’, 
and ‘participation’, to encourage users to upload more personal data and networks online 
(e.g. Van Dijck, 2013), and to confuse the use value and exchange value of data (e.g. Fuchs, 
2014). This section aims to show how BAT apply these discursive strategies. Moreover, as 
China lacks efficient methods for civic participation, including consumers’ rights groups, or 
effective legal system for political participation to file a lawsuit against large companies 
(there are few attempts though), big companies are less responsive to public criticisms. 
Regarding user privacy specifically, for example, BAT are less likely to be held accountable 
when violating users’ rights. CEO’s statements about data also demonstrate the neglect of 
users’ voices and thus the power relations between BAT and users.  
 
To represent the positive side of data collection and the for-profit Internet platforms in 
general, linguistic and semantic choices are crucial. Rewording of vocabulary is a frequently 
used linguistic strategy in this case. It is a strategy to represent the world according to 
specific perspectives (Fairclough, 2015, p131). Language ‘constructs’ the reality it seeks to 
make sense of and thus builds a particular representation of that reality. Under the particular 
theme of data, ‘sharing’ is a most frequently used word when CEOs refer to the Internet. 
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Huateng Pony Ma, CEO of Tencent that owns the largest Chinese social media platforms QQ 
and Wechat, frequently expresses this kind of discourse: 
 
[3] From 2010 to 2011, I spent an entire year to think about how to make Tencent an open 
platform that could facilitate more partners to create their own businesses freely and 
more users to share freely. xxi  (Pony Ma, 2014,  TGPC, italics added) 
 
[4] …the Tencent Open Platform insists on facilitating a ‘de-centralised’ open and sharing 
network. This is related to the embedded gene of social networking in Tencent. Our 
open platform was based on QQ and later WeChat at the beginning, deriving from the 
structure of social networks. Social networks are naturally net-like and encourage 
friends to share openlyxxii. (Pony Ma, 2016, TGPC, italics added)  
 
These are typical arguments from for-profit social media platforms, such as Facebook: they 
encourage users to participate in social connections and to share openly on their platforms. 
Similarly, in the 2014 WIC, Ma evokes two principles for Tencent: connection and openness. 
These two principles have one and the same goal: to ‘connect’ is to gather a significant 
amount of data that therefore needs to be openly available. The preferred discourse 
accentuates the positive side of uploading personal information online and elides the 
extremely complex processes of the tracking of user online behaviour, analysing personal 
data and the selling of this information to advertising and other companies to make profits.  
 
Another way to represent the data collection positively is through the topos of usefulness. 
Yanhong Robin Li, CEO of Baidu, encourages companies to collect data and develop new 
tools to collect data for the good of people: 
 
[5] The new generation of data collection – whether it is about tools of collection or data 
itself – will develop significantly. The difficult point, however, is not to manufacture a 
new type of hardware, but to find what data is valuable to people.xxiii (Robin Li, 2014 
BU, my translation) 
 
According to Reisigl and Wodak, the topos of usefulness is when one wants to argue that if a 
certain action is seen as useful, then it should be conducted. There are also subtypes of topos 
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that this extract articulates: the topos of ‘pro bono publico’ (to the advantage of all), the topos 
of ‘pro bono nobis’ (to the advantage of ‘us’)(Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 75). 
 
Both rewording and the topos of usefulness represent data collection partially and positively. 
These representations are ideological because they hide the full features of reality. They hide 
the exchange value commercial platforms gain through selling users’ data. Adapted from 
Marx’s theory of commodity, Fuchs (2014) distinguishes two types of value of data: the use 
value and the exchange value. While the use value refers to the usefulness of data in people’s 
social activities for sharing, connecting and participating, the exchange value mainly means 
the value social media companies obtain in the exchange process when selling data to 
advertising companies. The topos of usefulness emphasises the first kind of use value of data, 
but intentionally neglects the second kind of exchange value. As Van Dijck has pointed out, 
Internet companies have discursively rhetorically stressed the importance of “human 
connectedness”, transparency and openness to actually promote the “automated connectivity” 
that “engineer and manipulate connections”.  It is a “conflation that is cultivated by many 
CEOs” and a “deliberate ambiguity” (Van Dijck, 2013, p12). This second type of discourse is 
a typical ideological expression in the sense that it partially represents reality.  
 
More recently, BAT have brought data collection onto a different level. For Alibaba and 
Tencent, data is now used to build ‘credit system’ and to provide financial service. For BAT, 
data is also used to develop AI and to train machines. For example, Pony Ma claims that a 
‘real open platform’ has its own network chains and network of payment (Pony Ma, 2011 
TGPC). Jack Ma claims to Alibaba’s investors that Alibaba is a “data company”. The reason 
why Alibaba sells products is “because it wants to acquire data” (Jack Ma, 2016 Investor’s 
Day). Jack Ma not only claims that Alibaba is a data-driven company (Jack Ma, 2017 AC) 
and a manufacturing company of data (Jack Ma, 2017 WIC, Entrepreneur Session). More 
importantly, he explicitly explains that a new credit system based on varieties of data is 
necessary for the New Finance in the future (Jack Ma, 2017 BDE). Therefore, with a large 
amount of data, BAT is expanding their businesses into new areas, especially finance and AI, 
and goes further to become cross-industry conglomerates.  
 
8.2.4. Relationship with government  
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CEOs of BAT have a slightly different approach towards the Chinese central and local 
governments. While Robin Li and Pony Ma are more cautious in commenting on the 
government’s involvements, Jack Ma’s statements are much bolder. First of all, Jack Ma 
clearly follows the neoliberal arguments that the free market is the best way to advance 
human well-being. According to Jack Ma, the government is not so effective in solving 
problems and developing the economy. He mentions several times that China’s economy is 
now depending on domestic consumptions, and the government is not effective in pushing 
consumption. Therefore, it should leave the market and entrepreneurs to solve this problem 
(Jack Ma, 2015 WIC; Jack MA, 2016, TFHC, p182-6). Moreover, the invention from the 
government could harm China’s economy. As early as 2010, Jack Ma claims that if the 
government started to publish policies on one specific area then it won’t work (Jack Ma, 
2010 Wshang). In another occasion, he explicitly claims that “running businesses should 
depend on the market” and “in principle, businesses should comply with the market and the 
mayor (government), but I choose to rely more on the market since the mayor could be 
wrong” (Jack Ma, 2015, TFHC, p110-5). Furthermore, Jack Ma proposes to self-regulate the 
market, especially trade, e-commerce and the ‘commercial society’ (Jack Ma, 2014 WIC; 
2016 Investor’s Day; Jack Ma, 2016, TFHC, p140).  
 
What is distinguishing in Jack Ma’s neoliberal discourse is that he connects it to the Internet. 
According to Jack Ma, the Internet and Big Data could help the market to do what the 
government cannot do, to make it possible to predict and plan the economy (Jack Ma, 2017 
BDE). Governments all over the world should retreat from the market and let businessmen 
make deals:  
 
[6] We must build a real commercial society through the market economy and by 
entrepreneurs. The Internet today has provided such an opportunity… The Internet will 
change the whole trend and pattern of global trade… In the next 30 to 50 years, nobody 
could stop the Internet. The Internet itself is a huge ecosystem, and it could improve by 
itself. xxiv (Jack Ma, 2014 WIC)  
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In order to facilitate this e-trade rule, Jack Ma even started the e-WTP (Electronic World 
Trade Platform), a private sector-led and multi-stakeholder involved initiative to incubate 
transnational e-commerce rules19. As Jack Ma explains this e-WTP:  
 
[7] …We hope to support 80% of the small global companies, so we want to build e-WTP, 
it’s not e-WTO, WTO is an organisation that governments sit together and negotiate... 
Taobao’s business covers 30 provinces in China, but we never put the 30 governors in 
the same room negotiate. We just do it through the business way, using the market 
economy.xxv (Jack Ma, 2016 Investor’s Day)    
 
Another feature is how Jack Ma promotes deregulation through the warning about the 
possible negative consequences of regulation. For example, in an address to the first World 
Internet Conference in 2014, Wuzhen, China, Jack Ma talks about privacy issues on the 
Internet: 
 
[8] “In the 21 century, because of data and the Internet, whatever you want to do, you 
cannot hide anything or escape. Therefore, privacy has become a very interesting issue. 
Today we talk about concerns about privacy. But after 20 years, all the basic ideas will 
change. I remember in 1995 I went to an Internet conference in Beijing for the first 
time. There were some experts assembled by the Chinese Science Association. There 
were about 20 experts invited to talk about the Internet, including me. I was thinking 
how come the Internet in China has not come yet, but the 20 experts have already 
started to talk about what’s wrong with the Internet and what needs to be controlled. I 
didn’t take them seriously at that time anyway. Because firstly I believed there were no 
experts in China back then, and secondly I believed they worried too much – they 
started to worry even before the Internet appeared. In fact, what they worried about 20 
years ago didn’t appear, and what they didn’t worry about appears now.”xxvi (Ma, 
2014a, my translation). 
 
Several linguistic features are worth noticing in this quotation. First of all, there is a clear 
cohesion in the first two sentences. Cohesion is a term used by Fairclough to refer to “general 
formal connections between sentences in a text” (Fairclough, 2015, p145). It involves 
 
19 From EWTP official website: https://www.ewtp.org/about/introduction.html 
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vocabulary links between sentences, connectors marking relationships between sentences, or 
a reference referring back to an earlier sentence or foreshadowing a later one (ibid.). It is 
interesting to notice the word Ma uses to connect the first two sentences: “therefore”. In the 
first sentence, he talks about hiding things and then uses the word “therefore” to connect to 
the second sentence about the privacy issue. This connection implies that Ma equates privacy 
issues to “hiding anything or escape”. Hiding or escape is more often used for people who are 
doing something wrong, so if you did not do anything wrong, you do not need to hide, and 
thus you do not need privacy. After establishing a fundamental tone for dismissing or indeed 
ignoring privacy issues, he then goes on to describe one conference he attended in 1995 
where experts discussed some concerns about the Internet and how all the problems they 
worried about did not come true. With the help of this example, Ma implies that: 1) the 
Internet should not be controlled, 2) there is no need to worry about privacy issues. He does 
so by telling a story about what the experts worried decades ago did not come true. In this 
way, Ma argues that privacy concerns are misdirected or simply bad thinking and thus argues 
any proposed regulation related to it is unnecessary or even mistaken.  
 
The topos of history is another strategy to argue for deregulation. According to Reisigl and 
Wodak, the topos of history means: “because history teaches that specific actions have 
specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation 
(allegedly) comparable with the historical example referred to” and it is sometimes used to 
“warn of a repetition of the past” (2001, p80). Ma uses this example or ‘lessons’ from the 
past several times. Besides the example above, Red Flag Traffic Law is another example he 
uses several times. This Law refers to the laws enacted in the 19th Century in the UK and US 
that limits the maximum speed of automobiles and wave a red flag in front of the vehicle as a 
safety warning. Jack Ma claims that the Red Flag Traffic Law was the reason why Britain 
missed the opportunity to develop its auto manufacture industry and thus was bypassed by 
Germany. Therefore, China should avoid the same mistakes and should not set regulations 
similar to the Red Flag Traffic Law which he claims will prohibit the development of the 
Internet in China. There is also an underlying nationalist tone on deregulation – to maintain 
competitiveness in the global market, China should not restrict the development of new 
technologies (in fact, practices of companies).  
 
The economic elites’ appeal for no regulation or deregulation seems to be bold at first glance, 
as China is always referred to as an authoritarian state with tight control of the market and 
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‘information’ itself. However, it is actually in line with the general tendency within the state. 
The recent guidelines or/and opinions about the development of the Internet and big data 
build on significant decisions made and published at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th 
Central Committee of CPC in November 2013: “[T]he basic economic system should evolve 
through the decisive role of the market in resource allocation” (CPC, 2013). First of all, the 
Session proposed to build a fair, open, transparent and unified market system and to reform 
the market regulation system in order to promote competition and “the survival of the fittest” 
(ibid.). This expression ‘decisive role’ is in clear contrast with the previous expression of a 
‘basic’ role of the market in resource allocation. Moreover, the government will retreat from 
its previous powerful role in the market. This point is further developed so as to “streamline 
administration, delegate more powers, improve regulation and provide better services” 
(JianZheng FangQuan) in Premier Li’s Report on the Work of the Government in 2016 (Li, 
2016) (more discussions on the government discourse, see Chapter 7). 
 
8.2.5. Sum up 
 
To sum up, BAT describe the Internet as boundaryless and de-centralised and emphasise the 
positive aspects of online participation and data sharing. Throughout BAT’s developments, 
they all claim to build infrastructure and to expand business areas in order to better help 
small businesses and facilitate innovations. As van Dijck points out, to “call a platform 
‘social’ or liken it to a ‘utility’ is part of the battle to define the corporate in terms of the 
public and the nonprofit” (Van Dijck, 2013: 166). As shown in the examples, BAT try to 
define themselves as ‘utilities’ of the Internet era.  It is easy to find the fallacy of ‘irrelevant 
conclusion’ in BAT’s discourses and how BAT reword oligopolies using more positive 
words. As shown in the discussions, instead of responding to the accusation of BAT’s 
dominant positions in the market, their CEOs disguisedly replace BAT with the Internet. If 
the Internet is boundaryless, then BAT should be the same because they serve as ‘utilities’ in 
the Internet era. Through these positive self-representations that linked to the Internet’s 
characteristics, BAT disguise the reality of themselves being for-profit private companies, 
instead of neutral public utility providers. Their discourse also shows the complex relations 
with the government, their neglect of users’ rights of control over data and partnership with 
advertisers and developers.  
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8.3. Industry Upgrading or BAT Expanding?  
 
BAT develop through their constant clashes with the so-called traditional industries. BAT’s 
relations with traditional industries roughly experienced two phrases. Since an early stage, 
BAT are accused of depriving opportunities of the real economy or taking customers away 
from traditional industries. There were severe competitions between BAT and traditional 
industries. BAT denied the accusation and claimed that they are providing a larger market for 
traditional industries through, for example, providing selling platforms (Alibaba, Tencent) 
and advertising platforms (Baidu). BAT also urged the traditional industries to adapt to the 
new trends. Later on, especially after the government launched the ‘Internet Plus’ Action 
Plan, BAT started to propose to converge with traditional industries. BAT claims that they 
could provide new technologies and data to enable traditional industries to upgrade. The 
changes in discourse reflect BAT’s development from Internet platforms into conglomerates 
that expand their businesses into various sectors, such as logistics, finance, and high-
technology. 
 
8.3.1. Clashes with the ‘Real Economy’  
 
In the early stage,  as illustrated in the last section, BAT aim to become ‘platforms’ through 
which people and services can get connected. Baidu focuses on search engine, Tencent 
concentrates on online gaming and social media, and Alibaba specialises in e-commerce. 
However, as BAT develop fast, they started to expand their businesses into various areas and 
attempted to establish themselves as conglomerates. For example, Baidu has expanded its 
‘core business’ from search engine into online entertainment (iQiyi) and AI technology 
(Baidu Brain and PaddlePaddle Deep Learning). Alibaba ‘ecosystem’ goes far beyond e-
commerce, including finance (Ant Financial Service and Alipay), logistics (Cainiao), 
entertainment (Weibo and Youku) and cloud computing (Alibaba Cloud). Tencent has taken 
advantage of its ubiquitous social media network to launch Mini-programmes, financial 
services, AI-enabled services (see also 8.1).  
 
BAT’s discourse has also changed correspondingly. The changes can best be illustrated 
through BAT’s involvement in the debate between traditional (real economy) and new 
industries (virtue economy). Since the very beginning, Alibaba is at the centre of this debate. 
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Jack Ma was the first to emphasise the importance of flexible production. For example, in 
2012, he claims that e-commerce will transform from B2C to C2B:  
 
[9] We will entre from the consumption area to the manufacturing area, and to changes in 
lifestyle. We will entre from B2C to C2B. There must be flexible production, to solve 
problems for consumers, to realise the real personalised production. This will be 
realised gradually in 3 to 5 years. No matter we do it or not, this is an inevitable trend 
of society (Jack Ma, 2012 Wshang)xxvii.  
 
Having received constant accusation from traditional industries, Jack Ma claims that the 
traditional industry should accept new technologies to conduct flexible and personalised 
production. If they failed in the market, they should ask themselves why they didn’t catch up 
with the new trend (Jack Ma, 2016, TFHC, p76). Later on, Jack Ma goes further to promote 
the idea that traditional manufacturing companies should learn to use data to provide 
personalised products.  
 
[10] Manufacturers must be personalised, or otherwise, it will be very difficult for them to 
survive. Machines produced by manufacturers in the future not only need to produce 
but also ‘talk’ and ‘think’. Machines will not only be driven by oil and electricity, but 
also by data. Enterprises in the future will not only focus on scale and standardisation 
but also on flexibility, agility and personalisation (Jack Ma, 2015, TFHC, p82, italics 
added). xxviii 
 
We see the use of topos of usefulness here: personalisation could solve problems for 
consumers. Moreover, these two quotes show strong a expressive value which is “a trace of 
and a cue to the producers’ evaluation of the bit of the reality it relates to” (Fairclough, 
2015b: 130). Expressive value illustrates the producers “subjects and social identities” (ibid.). 
These two extracts clearly illustrate Jack Ma’s certainty and authenticity. Through 
representing the reality and the future, in an authoritative way, and to identify Alibaba’s 
business with this future, Jack Ma paves the way for Alibaba’s further business expansion.   
 
8.3.2. BAT help to upgrade traditional industries 
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Gradually, Jack Ma softens his tone and claims that traditional industries still have 
opportunities (Jack Ma, 2015 AC). There also comes a certain nationalist tone in the 
discourse, especially after the government’s release of the ‘Internet Plus’ project. For 
example, in 2016, Jack Ma claims that the Internet industry (virtue economy) is part of the 
service sector (real economy).   
 
[11] I think that it is a necessary process that China’s economy transforms from 
manufacturing-powered real economy to service-centric economy. It is society’s need. 
There is no need to oppose the real economy to virtue economy. In fact, bank and 
Internet industry are also parts of the service economy (Jack Ma, 2016, TFHC, p52).xxix 
 
More recently, Jack Ma emphasises the transformation of the traditional economy to digital 
economy, and the importance of the traditional companies to use the Internet. He claims that 
the future belongs to those companies who can make good use of the Internet (Jack Ma, 
2016, WIC). He also states the importance of convergence of the manufacturing and service 
economy. He claims that to develop the real economy should not only include the 
manufacturing sector but also include the service sector. He even claims that BAT are 
manufacturing companies.  
 
[12] There is no pure manufacturing sector nor pure service sector. In the future, the 
manufacturing sector must also be the service sector, especially with IoT (Internet of 
Things). There is no pure manufacturing industry in the future. The future service 
sector must be manufacturing sector… How to tell that BAT belong to the 
manufacturing sector or the service sector? We are manufacturing sector. We produce a 
large amount of data, process the information and share with others (Jack Ma, 2017 
WIF, Entrepreneur Session).xxx 
 
Pony Ma claims that he is the first person to come up with the term ‘Internet Plus’ which then 
became a phenomenon in 2015 after Premier Li Keqiang used the term (Pony Ma, 2015 
BDE). Tencent’s ambition to converge into traditional industries is illustrated most clearly in 
its 2018 TGPC when Pony Ma states that Tencent’s new aim is to “take roots in Internet-
enabled consumption and embrace Internet-enabled industrialisation” (Pony Ma, 2018 
TGPC). As he states, Tencent is constantly promoting the convergence of traditional 
industries with the Internet in response to the clashes between traditional and new industries. 
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He uses this term to help the government and companies better to understand the ‘utility’ 
feature of the Internet. He then encourages traditional industries to upgrade through joining 
Tencent ecosystem, using the platforms and technologies provided by Tencent (Pony Ma, 
2016 TGPC, 2017 WIC, 2017 BDE). The Internet, according to Pony Ma, can benefit 
traditional industries:  
 
[13] In the future, the traditional industries…will need to converge with Internet companies, 
to reach massive users, to realise the capability of building an ecosystem with 
hardware, software and service (Pony MA, 2018 TGPC).xxxi 
 
In the 2019 Tencent Global Digital Ecosystem Summit (TGDES), Martin Lau, the current 
president and the Executive Director of Tencent, explains this point well. In the conference, 
Lau connects the upgrade of China’s economy with the Internet and new manufacturing. He 
claims that the Internet will become a “core capacity” of all industries: 
 
[14] We believe that the Internet will be important for all industries to upgrade productivity 
and for digital transformation. It will transform China’s economic development from 
relying on fast speed to high quality. If we can effectively connect personalised 
demands and production on a large scale, we will create many new business models 
and increase productivity. This is difficult to realise in the industrial age. Therefore, the 
Internet won’t be just an industry. Rather it will be a core capacity of all industries. In 
the future, all successful enterprises will be digitalised enterprises (Lau, 2019 
TGDES).xxxii 
 
Similarly, Robin Li has changed his claim that “China’s Internet is replacing traditional 
industries” (Robin Li, 2013 BU) to the statement that a future where “traditional companies 
figure out how to embrace the Internet and use the Internet to develop themselves” is more 
desirable (Robin Li, 2015 BU). Later on, Robin Li claims that for China to transform and 
upgrade its economy, it is necessary to use the Internet and AI, to maintain the fast 
development of the economy. In the more recent World Internet Conference in 2019, he 
explains AI’s importance in driving China’s economic development.  
 
[15] AI and other technologies will become important forces to drive high-quality economic 
development. On the one hand, the essential requirement of economic transformation 
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and upgrade provides huge potentials for AI-powered real economy. On the other hand, 
China’s market provides technology companies with great opportunities to develop 
applications. Millions of Internet users produce massive data as raw materials for 
machine learning. These have accelerated the development of technologies and AI 
economy (Robin Li, 2019 WIC).xxxiii 
 
It is clear that, as BAT expanded their business into various areas and especially AI 
technologies, their discourses have gradually changed. They have paid more attention to how 
traditional industries can be converged with the Internet. Moreover, there is an underlying 
nationalist tone in BAT’s discourses – the convergence or upgrading of traditional industries 
are beneficial for China’s economic development. It will help China’s economy to grow in a 
faster way with higher qualities.  
 
This nationalist language can also be illustrated through BAT’s discourses on the agriculture 
industry. For example, BAT all, to some extent, pay attention to the transformation of 
agriculture and how to use the Internet to develop rural areas. Tencent comes up with the plan 
of ‘Internet Plus villages’ as one of its main non-profit projects. Baidu claims to use AI and 
remote sensing technology to help farmers know how and when to use pesticide. Alibaba has 
launched its plan to help to reduce poverty in rural areas by selling agricultural products for 
farmers. These new developments, on the one hand, reflect their responses to the 
government’s ‘Internet Plus’ project in rural areas. The government has proposed to develop 
‘Internet Plus Agriculture’ and made efforts to develop rural areas with the help of the 
Internet. On the other hand, it also shows how BAT try to expand their businesses into 
agricultural industries. BAT all pay attention to the huge market and development potentials 
in rural areas in China. They strategically expand their businesses into agriculture- or 
country-related sectors. However, the essential question about social relations and ownership 
of land is rarely mentioned.   
 
This nationalist discourse of ‘upgrading China’s economy’ is linked to Baidu and Tencent’s 
discursive construction of their relations with the government (for BAT’s relations with the 
government, see also 8.2). The support from the governments, according to Robin Li and 
Pony Ma, is important. Moreover, they are seeking active cooperation with governments of 
different levels.  
 
 210 
Baidu, like other Chinese companies, pays a lot of attention to government policies and 
government intentions. Robin Li states several times how his interpretation of the 
government’s intentions guides Baidu’s development strategy. He is also using his 
interpretation to persuade partners. For example, in 2010, when he tries to illustrate the 
importance of Baidu search engine and Baidu’s contribution to China’s economy, he argues 
how “governments at all levels” are not willing to continue the export-driven economy and 
thus will turn to domestic consumption (Robin Li, 2010 BU). In another occasion, he uses the 
government’s ‘Internet Plus’ project to endorse Baidu’s expansion into traditional industries.  
 
The most explicit examples come from Baidu’s recent development in AI and its application. 
Robin Li clearly points out the importance of support from local governments for Baidu to 
develop its AI applications. He further identifies Baidu’s technology development with 
China’s technology advancement. In this way, Baidu has represented China – the government 
should and must support Baidu’s experiments. For example, Robin Li mentions Baidu’s 
cooperation with local governments in Shanghai, Wuhu (in Anhui Province), Gui Yang (in 
Guizhou Province) to carry out AI applications’ experiments. He mentions Baidu’s 
cooperation with Wuhu government and emphasises that the government will provide an area 
that only unmanned cars are allowed to enter. He claims that because of the strong 
government support of Baidu, China could be the first country to have AI-powered 
unmanned-car-only city (Robin Li, 2016 BDE). Two years later, Robin Li repeats his 
argument, saying that the development of AI needs support from different stakeholders, 
including government, manufacturing factors, research institutions, and so on. He especially 
emphasises the importance of government support: 
 
[16]  [The development of] unmanned cars does not only rely on one company. It needs a 
huge ecosystem that includes all actors. I believe China is most likely to realise this 
development because we have a strong government that could provide world-leading 
construction of infrastructures. xxxiv (Robin Li, 2018 BDE) 
 
Tencent clearly treats the government as an important partner and client. Tony Ma hopes the 
Cloud + Future Conference could facilitate Tencent’s cooperation with the government (Pony 
Ma, 2016 C+F). According to Pony Ma, digitalisation has expanded the idea of user from 
individual costumer (to C), to business (to B), and even government (to G). Therefore, 
Tencent wants to be the connector for C, B and G types of users (Pony MA, 2018 BDE). The 
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cooperation with governments is important for Tencent as Pony Ma provides different 
examples. One is ‘Digital Guangdong’, a new type of e-commerce through using WeChat 
mini-programme (Pony MA, 2018 C+F). Another cooperation is with Yunnan Province. 
Tencent connects apps, WeChat mini-programme, WeChat public Accounts with government 
departments and businesses in Yunnan. This project aims to promote tourism in Yunnan 
(Pony MA, 2018 BDE). In 2019 BDE, Dowson Tong,  as the representative of Tencent, also 
provides examples of Tencent’s cooperation with Guiyang to provide new types of e-
commerce (Dowson Tong, 2019 BDE). Tencent claims to use these successful examples to 
spread Tencent’s service to the whole of China (Pony Ma, 2018 C+F; Dowson Tong, 2019 
BDE).  
 
While as a company whose headquarter located in China, it would be inevitable to have some 
extent of involvements with the Chinese government. For example, Jack Ma expresses 
appreciation for support Alibaba received from HangZhou local government (Jack Ma, 2006 
Wshang; 2009 Alibaba Ten Years; 2015 AC). However, Jack Ma clearly tries to keep a 
distance with the government. For example, Jack Ma was asked at 2015 Davos about 
Alibaba’s relations with the Chinese government. He states that Alibaba never got money 
from the government. He also claims that if the government asks Alibaba to provide services, 
Ali will make it free as a way to serve the public (Jack Ma, 2015, TFHC, p192) (see also 8.2).  
 
8.3.3. Saving costs with AI 
 
BAT all mention the usefulness of the Internet to help restructure companies’ organisations 
and to save management cost. For example, Robin Li once emphasised the potentials of 
enterprise software in China’s Internet Industry. The Internet was claimed to be able to solve 
the ‘big problem’ China’s economy will face that is the increase in labour cost.  
 
[17] …In the past, labour cost in China was very low. Enterprise software could solve the 
problem of improving operational efficiency. If the operational efficiency increased, 
then enterprises could hire fewer people…China’s labour cost is increasing very, very 
fast recently. This will be a huge problem in China’s economic development (Robin Li, 
2014 BU). xxxv 
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Pony Ma provides another example to illustrate the benefits of saving labour costs with the 
help of the Internet economy. Pony Ma uses an example when he explains ‘Tencent Cloud’ – 
a cloud computing service provided by Tencent. He mentioned that Tencent purchased a 
majority stock of the largest mobile game company, Supercell. It has only about 180 
employees, but the evaluated value in the stock market of Supercell is more than $10 billion. 
Pony Ma claims that it was unimaginable in the past that a company with only 180 
employees would have an annual income of $ 2 billion and a net income of $1 billion. 
According to Pony Ma, it is because of the use of cloud service:  
 
[18] It was unimaginable in traditional companies. In the past, how could one company that 
earns more than 10 billion Yuan has only 100 employees? Any department within the 
company would have more people than this. It is exactly because of the use of Cloud 
technologies. All of its [Supercell] operations and services use hosting services on the 
Cloud. Therefore its headquarter is very simple with only a small number of 
developers. This is a very good case of the social division of labour and the use of 
Cloud.xxxvi (Pony Ma, 2016 C+F) 
 
Jack Ma uses its own example to show how to save money by restricting employee numbers 
while expanding business scale several times. For example, in its 2015 employee conference, 
Jack Ma uses interesting rhetoric to explain why Alibaba is restricting the number of 
employees.  
 
[19] Having more employees does not necessarily mean a good thing. The more employees 
we have, the fewer jobs could be created for society. There will be at least 10 million 
people in the logistic industry, why I only give Cainiao (a logistic network owned by 
Alibaba) the budgets of 5,000 employees? Because only if I do so, there could be 10 
million job opportunities created for the world. The more employees we have within 
our company, the fewer opportunities could be created outside the company. We should 
create jobs for others. This is what our company is going to do. We will not hire any 
more people in 2015…xxxvii (Jack Ma, 2015, TFHC, p65-6) 
 
This language is different from the more frequently used rhetoric of flexibility in the West. It 
is not so clear what does “jobs opportunities created for the world” mean. Does it mean 
Alibaba or Cainiao will outsource these work to other companies? Or will these work be done 
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through ‘sharing economy’? While Jack Ma tries to explain the restriction of employee 
numbers as ‘saving jobs for the society’, the real reason might be different, as he explained in 
a different occasion for other businessmen one year later:  
 
[20] Alibaba made a budget in 2012 that in 2013 all targets, benefit and income indexes will 
double. In 2012 Taobao and Tmall were performing more than good. I said we must 
double though I know that it will realise even I don’t say so. But what is the basis for 
doubling these indexes? I ask them to do a ‘budget’ on employees. How many people 
will we need for these sales numbers to be doubled? At that time, Alibaba has already 
had 20 thousand employees. They made the budget and told me that we need 8700 
more people to reach the goal. I said no, I don’t accept it. The second time they tried 
7800 people, I still didn’t accept. The last time they said 5000, I still said no. I said I 
only accept 200 people. If it goes beyond 200 people, all employees, including 
managers and myself, will receive no bonus of the year. What is the final result? All 
indexes have doubled with only 300 more employees. This proves that reforms of the 
company need to be pushed. xxxviii (Jack Ma, 2016, TFHC, p138) 
 
What is striking is that there are few statements about what kind of work BAT have in their 
discourse. Unlike the rhetoric discourses of fun work, democratic work process, and freedom 
used by Silicon Valley, BAT pay little attention to promote how jobs have changed in the 
‘information age’ or in their own companies. There is no sign of ‘post-industrialisation’ in 
this aspect in these Internet giants. Instead, they perform exactly like other traditional 
companies. This shows the real essence of these Internet companies. They use the old 
language of flexibility and saving labour costs to describe workplace. In some occasions 
when they want to encourage employees, they emphasise employee’s payment and benefits 
as the main attraction. 
 
One Campaign in March 2019 reveals the real working conditions for developers in China. 
On March 2019, a web page on Github was created called 996. ICU. This name refers to the 
developers who work under the intensive 996 system (working from 9 am to 9 pm, and six 
days per week) would risk a possibility to be hospitalised in an intensive care unit (ICU). 
There are already studies about programmers’ work in China (e.g. Sun Ping). What is even 
more revealing is the responses to this campaign from the CEOs of some largest Chinese 
Internet companies, including Alibaba and JingDong (another Chinese e-commerce company 
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and partly owned by Tencent). Jack Ma claims that “996 in BAT is a blessing for 
everyone”20. This type of language reveals his understanding of work and employee’s 
identities in the digital age.  
  
8.3.4. BAT help to increase domestic consumption  
 
To increase domestic consumption is another theme under BAT’s discourse on upgrading 
China’s economy. For example, In Jack Ma’s speech in Alibaba’s 2015 Apsara Conference 
(AC) he encourages his audience to start their own businesses, and claims that stimulating 
domestic demand opens great opportunities for innovators and enterprises:  
 
[21] The three driving forces of the Chinese economy used to be investment, export and 
domestic demand. Investment and export are the strengths of the government, but the 
government can hardly force people to spend money to consume. Today we can use 
new technologies, use the ‘cloud’ to stimulate domestic demand, use the ‘cloud’ to start 
domestic demand, use cloud computing and the Internet to cultivate domestic demand. I 
believe, in the coming 20 years, China will enter an era of real domestic demand. This 
is a huge opportunity for innovators and entrepreneurs.xxxix (Jack Ma, 2015, The Future 
Has Come, p44) 
 
He uses the topos of usefulness and advantage in his argument. According to him, 
consumption facilitated by new technologies (e.g., the ‘cloud’) is not only good for the 
Chinese economy, but also for people’s lives and a great opportunity for innovators and 
enterprises. It is also a combination of nationalist, neoliberal and individualist language. He 
also points out that it is hard for the government to ‘force’ people to consume, but it is the 
strength of new technologies (as well as businesses) to promote domestic consumption. This 
quotation shows a clear direction to develop technologies for facilitating consumption: the 
innovators and start-ups should participate in promoting consumption demand through new 
technologies.  
 
The most interesting statement comes from Robin Li. His attitude towards domestic 
consumption to some extent reflects Baidu’s expansion of businesses. As Baidu officially 
 
20 See the report of Jack Ma’s statements https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_3291793 
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started its open platform in 2010 to connect businesses and services, Robin Li’s statement 
changes from a negative tone towards domestic consumption (in order to advocate that 
Baidu’s business model of utilising user-generated data is more promising) to a more positive 
tone of stating domestic consumption’s role in developing China’s economy:  
 
[22] In the first 50 years, people are trying hard to produce the same things in large scales to 
satisfy needs, and to some point, there is no more consumption need. In the last 50 
years, we think about how to release consumption needs from consumers, how to make 
him buy stuff, so there came the credit card and eventually led to the financial crisis. 
The new financial services and unlimited leverage produced the victims of over-
consumption.xl (Robin L, 2009 BU) 
 
[23] … The search engine is all about driving industries related to domestic demand. The 
300 thousand clients of Baidu are all related to domestic demand. In other words, we 
make contributions to the economy entirely through increasing domestic demand – and 
this is the best way for China’s economic growth. xli (Robin Li, 2010 BU)  
 
In promoting consumer culture, Pony Ma even equates the spirit of the Internet to instruments 
for business: he claims that the communicative functions of the Internet, freely expressing 
opinions and communicating with each other, exist for marketing. For example, in his open 
letter to Partners in 2014, Huateng Pony Ma emphasises the importance of understanding 
young consumer groups, because:  
 
[24] Consumers interact fast through the Internet to convey their preferences and feedback. 
This reflects the spirit of the Internet, which is to pursue an extremely good experience 
of products and extremely good feedback from users. The first-class products created by 
word-of-mouth marketing and fan culture will make people talk with each other about 
it. Moreover, making consumers participate in decision making is also very important 
for the competitive capability of mobile Internet products.xlii (Pony Ma, 2014 TGPC, 
italics added) 
 
According to him, consumer culture represents the spirit of the Internet. Coherence is used to 
build an equivalence in the first several sentences: consumer preference and feedback 
constitutes the spirit of the Internet and equates with pursuing consumption experience and 
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user feedback. What is behind this equivalence is a neoliberal and instrumentalist 
understanding of the Internet as something merely for business and consumption. The geek 
spirit and the spirit of openness, freedom of the Internet are totally ignored. It is also worth 
noticing the use of the ideologically contested word ‘participate’ by Pony Ma in this extract. 
The use of ‘participate in decision making’ is normally used in politics, referring to people’s 
democratic participation. However, in this extract, Pony Ma is using it to refer to 
consumption and people’s economics behaviour and eliminate its political meanings. This 
implicit change of meaning of ‘participation’ appears to be a “surreptitious piece of 
ideological struggle under the veil of semantics” (Fairclough, 2015, p132). The extract also 
implies that user power lies in their identity as consumers, through a ‘participation in decision 
making in consumption’ instead of participation in political activities to change the way the 
Internet develops.  
 
The increasing consumption culture could be shown from a glimpse of Alibaba’s rapid 
increase of volume of transactions on the Singles’ Day or Double Eleven event. The 
phenomenon of Double Eleven has thus become an important phenomenon to understand the 
current political economy and ideological hegemony in China. Since the first year of the 
celebration, the volume of transition (sales within 24 hours) has increased year on year (see 
Figure 8.5). Only three minutes after 12 pm on 11th November 2017, sales in Alibaba’s sites 
Tmall reached 10billion Yuan, and this sales number took 6 mins and 58 secs in 2016.  
 
Figure 8.19.Volume of sales transaction within 24 hours on Singles’ Day in Alibaba’s 
websites (in Billions Yuan) 
 
It is clear that Internet companies welcome this fast increase of consumerism, especially 
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Table 8.3 focuses on Alibaba’s retail commerce’s development in China. Annual active 
consumers (buyers) on Alibaba’s retail platforms are increasing fast, and along with the 
increase in annual active consumers is the faster increase of revenue generated from retail 
commerce in China. As claimed in its 2015 Form 20-F, Alibaba aims to “attract new buyers 
as well as increase the wallet share of existing buyers through more frequent buying and 
buying across more product categories. We intend to achieve growth through customer 
loyalty programs, high-quality customer service, marketplace security upgrades, marketing 
and promoting our China retail marketplaces, especially in lower-tier cities and rural areas, as 
well as by promoting the use of our various mobile commerce apps such as our Mobile 
Taobao App” (Alibaba Financial Report Form 20-F, 2015).  
 
There has always been a focus on how to use new technologies to expand their market and 
attract more consumers. While in 2015, the focus was mobile apps, in 2018, the technology 
focus is big data. In its 2018 Financial Report, Alibaba claims to increase active consumers 
“by leveraging our data capabilities to identify better, analyse and serve their needs through 
personalisation across channels” (Alibaba Financial Report Form 20-F, 2018). 
 
 Year ended March 31, 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Annual active 
consumers21 (million) 
255 350 423 454 522 
Revenue generated from 
China commerce retail 
(RMB, in millions) 
¥42,832 ¥59,732 ¥80,033 ¥114,109 ¥176,559 
% of Revenue generated 
from retail commerce 
82% 78% 79% 72% 71% 
Table 8.1. Alibaba’s retail commerce in China, resources: Form 20-F, financial report 2015-
2018 
 
8.3.5. Sum up 
 
 
21 "annual active consumers", according to Alibaba, are “user accounts that had one or more confirmed orders 
on the relevant platform during the previous twelve months, regardless of whether or not the buyer and seller 
settles the transaction” 
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To sum up, this section demonstrated how BAT changed their discourse on traditional 
industries. As BAT expanded their business into areas beyond their original focuses (e-
commerce, social media, online gaming and search engine), their discourse has changed 
accordingly. This is best illustrated through their discourse on the relationship between 
traditional industries and the Internet. While they first claimed that virtue economy would 
replace the real economy, the discourse gradually changed into that traditional economy 
should converge with the Internet. In particular, this section showed BAT’s nationalist 
emphasis of the necessity to utilise the Internet and digital technologies to develop China’s 
economy, through upgrading manufacturing and agriculture industry and increasing domestic 
consumption. BAT described the urgency in the current situation to upgrade China’s 
economic development. They also emphasise the positive consequences of using AI for 
companies to save costs. Accordingly, BAT represent themselves as being able to help 
traditional industries to upgrade and restructure and to increase domestic consumption. Baidu 
and Tencent use this nationalist self-representation to legitimate their relations with the 
government. There is little mention of how new technologies could change the workplace.  
 
This type of discourse is different from the Western digital discourse that emphasises de-
industrialisation or new services. Embedded in China’s social context where agriculture and 
manufacturing industries are still a crucial part of the economy (see Chapter 3), BAT’s 
discourse has gradually developed its characteristics. They have changed to focus more on 
how the traditional industries could benefit from ‘embracing’ the Internet, instead of how the 
Internet could overturn or replace traditional industries.  
 
8.4. Globalised or Chinese Companies 
 
There are two different types of discourse in BAT’s description of their identity. The first one 
states that BAT are global companies, especially with the development of AI. While BAT are 
de facto transnational companies, BAT also emphasises their Chinese identity to legitimate 
their domination in the Chinese market and support from the government and industries.  
 
8.4.1. Globalised BAT 
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This section will demonstrate the transformation in BAT’s discourse as they gradually 
developed into cross-industry multi-national corporations. BAT’s discourse on globalisation 
changes over time. BAT have transformed from copying Western platforms, to exploiting 
unique features of China’s domestic market, to expanding businesses into the global market.  
 
From the beginning, BAT all learned from the Western platforms. As Robin Li speaks out 
straightforward “in the past, many Chinese companies just copy what successful foreign 
companies do” (Robin Li, 2011 BU). One common strategy in his language is to use the 
market analysis and statistics from America or global Internet industries to persuade partners 
about the huge potential of Baidu’s model (Robin Li, 2009 BU, 2012 BU).  
 
After a while, Robin Li started to emphasise the differences between China and America, and 
the unique opportunities provided by China’s huge market (Robin Li, 2011 BU, 2013 BU). 
Google, as the major competitor to Baidu, was one key theme in Robin Li’s speech even after 
Google terminated its service in Mainland China. Robin Li states that Baidu is different from 
Google as early as 2003, and Baidu understands Chinese users better (Robin Li, 2011 BU). In 
2013, he continued that Baidu can provide better search results due to innovation. He 
provides examples to use Chinese on Baidu and English on Google to search for the same 
question about people’s networks and relationships (Robin Li, 2013 BWC). Similarly, Pony 
Ma claims that he hopes Tencent and its partners could ‘take root in China’ (Pony MA, 2013 
TGPC). He later claims that the reason why China’s Internet companies could succeed is that 
their innovations are catered to domestic consumers (Pony Ma, 2015 WIC, interview).   
 
With the fast development of China’s Internet economy and technologies in more recent 
years, BAT started to compete with global companies. This competition has been reflected in 
their discourse. For example, in 2015, Robin Li claims that in some O2O (online to offline) 
areas, China’s Internet is on the top in the world. One year later, in the WIC, he further 
claims that the global centre of innovation will transfer from America to other places. He 
hopes that Chinese companies could compete with Silicon Valley to attract global talents and 
migrants (Robin Li, 2016 WIC, Entrepreneur Section). This global vision is clearly illustrated 
by Robin Li when he points out Baidu’s new slogan – “make the complex world simpler” 
(Robin Li, 2017 BWC). He later reemphasises that Baidu’s mid- to long- term aim is “to 
become a leading AI platform company in the world, to accelerate AI’s application, to 
practice Baidu’s mission – using technology to make the complex world simpler”  (Robin Li, 
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2019 WIC). Similarly, Pony Ma claims that in the past Chinese companies mainly followed 
and learned from others, and now need to become innovators and contributors to new 
technologies (Pony Ma, 2017 TGPC).  He then talks about Tencent’s technological 
innovations and its AI Lab. He especially emphasises the competitiveness of Tencent’s AI 
technologies in the world.  
 
Slightly different from Baidu and Tencent, Alibaba embraced globalisation from an early 
stage as an e-commerce company. Like Pony Ma and Robin Li, Jack Ma also emphasises the 
differences between China and other countries and the importance the China’s local market. 
He explains why e-commerce in China is different from Japan and America – because China 
doesn’t have good credit, payment and logistic system (Jack Ma, 2007 Wshang). Jack Ma 
claims several times that Alibaba is born unique and different from American companies 
(Jack Ma, 2014 WIC). It is because it was born in China, in a different context (Jack Ma, 
2011 Wshang).   
 
However, in general, Jack Ma emphasises that Alibaba is a global company. For example, in 
2007 Wshang, Jack Ma claims that e-commerce should not only develop in Hangzhou and 
China, but all over the world. Because the Internet is global, so should be the e-commerce 
(Jack Ma, 2007 Wshang). Companies should have the spirit of open and sharing, and global 
vision (Jack Ma, 2008 Wshang, 2009 Alibaba Ten Years). Since 2008, the Chinese Wshang 
officially changed its name into Global Wshang. In 2009, when Alibaba celebrates its 10th 
anniversary, Jack Ma claims that Alibaba will create “an e-commerce platform for 10 million 
small businesses and 100 million jobs for the whole world” and “a consumption platform for 
one billion population all over the world”. Several years later, Jack Ma expanded this aim to 
create a platform which will “provide 100 million job opportunities, serve 2 billion 
population, and profit 1o million businesses”. He also claims that Alibaba’s aim in 20 years is 
to become the fifth-largest economy entity (Jack Ma, 2017 AC). He claims that Alibaba is 
“the company of the century” and “we must be a globalised company” (Jack Ma, 2017 AC). 
He also claims that Alibaba can connect China’s domestic market with global businesses 
(Jack Ma, 2015, TFHC, p62). As Jack Ma stated in 2016:  
 
[25] “Alibaba was born in China, but Alibaba is not a Chinese company, nor an American 
company, of course. People ask to which country Alibaba belongs. My answer is that 
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our investors come from all over the world. I tell people, though Alibaba was born in 
China, yet it is a globalised company”. xliii (Jack MA, 2016, TFHC, p72) 
 
There is little doubt that BAT are expanding their businesses all over the world.   
 
8.4.2. AI for global expansion  
 
One recent prominent theme in BAT’s discourses on global expansion is AI. AI has opened 
new opportunities for BAT to enter the global market. As they all started to develop AI 
technologies, their language has shown a shift from domestic to a global market. AI has 
enabled Baidu to provide services and technologies to the global auto manufacturing 
industry, through its Apollo Platform. According to Robin Li, there are more than 113 
partners and more than 11 thousands developers in Baidu’s AI system. He claims that almost 
all auto-related companies have joined Apollo Platform (Robin Li, 2018 WIC). As Robin Li 
points it out:  
 
[26] AI is different from the Internet in the past – it has a strong capability for vertical 
convergence. In other words…[AI is useful to build] a community of shared future in 
cyberspace (Robin Li, 2017 WIC).xliv 
 
This language is interesting since it clearly shows why Baidu has put so many efforts in 
developing AI and how AI could benefit Baidu in its global expansion. It also shows how and 
what kind of technology attract big tech giants attention – those have most market potentials 
for global expansion. Martin Lau from Tencent made a similar statement:  
 
[27] In the next 20 years, the digital world and the physical world will be deeply converged. 
The boundaries between commodities and services will be further blurred. Global 
digitalisation process will fully start. At that time, not only the Internet and technology 
companies, but all industries will accelerate their process of digitalisation. Along with 
the global digitalisation, digital technology and information technology will become 
important ties to connect the global economy. Many traditional industries and newly 
developed regions will be able to realise leapfrog development. I believe this is an 
important opportunity for Chinese companies to engage with the world, and to open the 
global market. We must seize this good opportunity (Lau, 2019 TGDES). xlv 
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This is in line with Pony Ma’s earlier statements to urge Chinese companies to enter the 
global market. For example, Pony Ma mentions that the digital economy has provided more 
possibilities for trans-regional cooperation. He urges Chinese companies to “coil into a fist” 
to enter the global market and to attract global talents. The aim of competition in the digital 
‘community’ (gong tong ti, a term used in President Xi Jinping’s speech), according to Pony 
Ma, is to make the whole ecosystem more sustainable (Pony Ma, 2017 TGPC). One year 
later, Pony Ma referred to President Xi’s speech again, claiming that China’s economy 
provides huge market opportunities and space for innovations. He says that it is not only the 
opportunities for Chinese companies but also for global companies (Pony Ma, 2018 WIC).  
 
As Baidu and Tencent, Jack Ma also noticed the importance of new technologies for Alibaba 
to realise its global ambitions. Jack Ma is good at creating new terms, in 2017 when Alibaba 
redefined itself from e-commerce company to e-commerce infrastructure provider, Alibaba 
restarted Wshang with the theme ‘Made in Internet’, In this year, Jack Ma used this term 
‘Made in the Internet’ in several occasions. He explained the term with connection to the 
“community with shared destiny”:  
 
[28] We will face new problems in the new era, but also new opportunities. Only through 
becoming a ‘community with shared destiny’, through building this shared community, 
mankind can face the new era and challenges together. The problems faced by mankind 
are common – the global value chain is going to be revolutionised for sure. There will 
not be huge containers, but fast deliveries for small parcels, not Made in China or Made 
in America, but Made in Internet, not B2C, but C2B xlvi. (Jack Ma, 2017 WIC)  
 
He further explains how AI technology will enable this ‘Made in Internet’ , and this is after 
Jack Ma claims that Alibaba is a data-driven and data-processing company: 
 
[29] In the future, all small and medium-sized businesses will be transnational enterprises. 
There will be no Made in China, Made in America, but only Made in Internet. What 
DAMO (Alibaba’s 2017 established research and innovation centre) wants to do is to 
make technologies inclusive (Jack Ma, 2017 AC)xlvii.  
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To sum up, the changes in BAT’s language illustrate BAT’s globalisation process. BAT have 
transformed from learning and following Western platforms, to focusing on the domestic 
market and developing unique features, to competing in the global market. Moreover, AI has 
become increasingly important for BAT, as it opens up new opportunities for BAT’s 
globalisation.  
 
8.4.3. Chinese companies 
 
However, in their CEO’s speeches, BAT are not only discursively constructed as Chinese 
companies (as Facebook is normally referred to as American company although its 
businesses expand all over the world), but also constructed as representations of China, 
Chinese entrepreneurship and Chinese technology development. BAT use this type of 
nationalist discourse to legitimate their dominant positions in the market and their expansion 
of businesses into new areas (see also 8.2).  
 
On the other hand, in spite of BAT’s de facto status as multi-national corporations, they 
discursively construct themselves as Chinese companies that are representatives of China in 
the global competition and global market. It is not only a description of their national identity 
as they enter into the global competition, but also a strategy to positively frame their 
dominant position in the domestic market and their status as conglomerates. In other words, 
the underlying logic by BAT is that if they are competing in the global market to represent 
China, they should be supported by the government and the industries.   
 
One prominent example is from Jack Ma. It shows how Jack Ma links Alibaba to the future 
of China, and this identification legitimates Alibaba’s dominant position in the market. It is in 
clear contrast with Jack Ma’s claim that Alibaba is a globalised company: 
 
[30] Alibaba is not a normal business company. We have huge responsibilities in this 
country and this age. Even from 10 years ago, I was speaking inside Alibaba that if 
China’s e-commerce developed well, it has nothing to do with Alibaba. But if China’s 
e-commerce developed badly, then it has relations with Alibaba. Because at that time, 
90% of e-commerce talents were in Alibaba, if we did things wrong, it means the whole 
country did things wrong.xlviii (Jack Ma, 2017 AC) 
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Similarly, while the global market and investment are important for Baidu, it also emphasises 
its Chinese identity and the contribution it makes to China’s economy. To identify itself with 
China’s development serves Baidu’s interests to establish its dominant position in the market 
and to expand businesses into different industries. For example, Robin Li claims that Baidu 
makes a large contribution to stimulating the domestic economy in China (Robin Li, 2010 
BU). Baidu has made China’s mobile Internet ecosystem better, prosper and healthier (Robin 
Li, 2013 BWC). Pony Ma also claims several times to take more responsibilities to realise the 
‘Chinese Dream’. In 2017 WIC, Pony Ma states that he hopes “Tencent could take more 
responsibility to become part of the ‘Chinese power’ and ‘Chinese Scheme’, to make bigger 
contributions to build and maintain the ‘community of shared future in cyberspace’” (Pony 
Ma, 2017 WIC). One year later in the same conference, he appreciates Chinese government’s 
support for the private economy, and encourages Chinese companies, including Tencent, to 
build China into a country that is strong in the Internet and technology (Pony Ma, 2018 
WIC).  
 
The pronoun ‘we’ is, in particular, used when BAT want to expand their businesses into new 
areas. BAT need to use the discursive strategy of constructing an in-group to legitimate their 
expansion into other industries in China. For example, Tony Ma claims that Tencent is a 
representative of China’s Internet Company, not only in terms of technology but also Internet 
culture and the whole cultural industry (Pony Ma, 2018 WIC). In 2017 WIC, the conference 
in which President Xi addresses every year since 2015, Pony Ma claims that: 
 
[31] In the past, Chinese companies mainly play the role of followers of new technologies, 
but today we need to become the drivers and contributors to new technologies. For 
example, Tencent uses Cloud technology to provide our products and technologies to 
enterprises in our ecosystem. We will also use the open content platform to promote the 
development of the creative cultural industry. xlix (Pony Ma, 2017 WIC) 
 
There are clearly two types of ‘we’ in this excerpt. The first one is an ‘inclusive’ we that 
includes the whole country. The others are more ‘exclusive’ we that refers to Tencent. The 
inclusive we makes an implicit authority claim – that Tencent has the authority to speak for 
(the technology development of) the country and to identify with the whole nation. The 
purpose of this type of discourse is illustrated clearly when in 2017 TGPC Pony Ma points 
out that Chinese companies should work together to “coil into a fist to attract market and 
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talents from all over the world” and “to make the digital technology ecosystem of innovation 
bigger” (Pony Ma, 2017 TGPC) l.  
 
Since Baidu expanded its businesses into new areas through AI, Robin Li emphasises how 
Baidu AI has helped to upgrade China’s economy (see also 8.3). He uses ‘we’ to emphasises 
Baidu’s Chinese identity. For example, when he mentions the example of Baidu AI in the 
agricultural and manufacturing industries, he says: 
 
[32] The use of AI in the agricultural industry is very obvious. If we want to harvest good 
Chinese grain, and to provide good Chinese food, using AI is inevitable (Robin Li, 
2018 BWC). li 
 
[33] Baidu has been working on investing in AI for more than ten years. We hope to work 
together with other entrepreneurs here to do what we should do for China’s AI 
technology development and advancement in the future. We expect China to become 
the world-leading country in AI technology, and hope the first city that only allows 
driverless cars on the road to appear in China in the future. lii (Robin Li, 2016 BDE)  
  
Jack Ma also uses nationalist discourse to promote the new Damo Lab that was established 
by Alibaba in 2017. One remarkable phenomenon is how often Jack Ma talks about China’s 
technology development after he announced to establish DAMO Lab. For example, in 2017 
AC, he asks “why China can’t develop its own road”. He then continues that “DAMO must 
surpass Intel, Microsoft and IBM” (Jack Ma, 2017 AC). In another occasion in 2017 BDE, he 
claims that China now has technology, funding, and market, so China should redefine the 
future (Jack Ma, 2017 BDE). He especially appeals to the nationalist statements that China 
should develop “our own core technology”. It is not difficult to recognise the similarity in 
this type of discourses on ‘core technology’ between Alibaba and China’s government, 
between President Xi and Jack Ma:  
 
[34] Chip is the core technology, and there is indeed a huge difference between us and 
developed countries. However, in the area of IoT chip, we do have an opportunity to 
catch up. liii (Jack Ma, 2018 AC) 
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Again, in these excerpts from Robin Li and Jack Ma, the pronoun ‘we’ is used to include the 
whole nation and to identify their companies with the whole nation, their technological 
developments with the nation’s developments, their business interests as the whole nation’s 
interests.  
 
8.4.4. Sum up 
 
To sum up, while BAT are de facto globalised companies in terms of business operations and 
investors, they all emphasise their Chinese identities in their discourse. This is especially true 
when they try to enter new business areas and industries. It is clear that BAT use this type of 
nationalist discourse to legitimate their dominant position in China’s domestic market and 
their ever-lasting expansion into new areas, such as cultural industries and traditional 
industries, through AI and Big Data. This type of discourse can also deviate criticisms in the 
domestic market. It also legitimates BAT’s relations with the government – receiving support 




This chapter has investigated BAT’s digital discourse. It reveals BAT’s discursive 
construction of the current state of affairs, self-definition, and relations with other 
stakeholders to legitimate their dominant position in the market (8.2), their expansion into 
new industries (8.3) and their global expansion (8.4). First, BAT use rewording to claim that 
they are ‘infrastructure’ and ‘utility’ of the Internet and are helping medium sized and small 
businesses. Second, BAT emphasises its usefulness for companies to restructure, traditional 
industries to upgrade and the whole Chinese economy to develop. Third, while they are 
global companies, BAT employ nationalist discourse to legitimate their expansion and to gain 
support from the government.  
 
According to the analytical framework provided in Chapter 4 and 5, BAT’s digital discourse 
can be summarised as below: 
 
 What the BAT says about it:  
Market • The Internet is boundaryless, so should be the BAT 
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• BAT are providing Internet infrastructures, not dominating the market 
• The Internet is de-centralised, so is the BAT 
• BAT are facilitating niche markets and helping small businesses 
(partners) 
• De-regulation (Jack Ma) 
Production  • The Information Age requires companies to rethink production modes 
(e.g. convergence with the Internet; flexible and personalised 
production; prosumption) 
• BAT can help companies to save operational costs with AI and digital 
technologies 
• BAT are helping agricultural and manufacturing industries to upgrade  
• Data is an important resource for the Information Age thus should be 
open to all 
Consumption • Participatory culture is one important spirit of the Internet 
• BAT are contributing to China’s economic growth by promoting 
domestic consumption  
Table 8.1. BAT’s Digital Discourse on the New Economy. 
 
 How BAT describe these agencies and construct relations with them:  
International 
level 
• BAT are globalised companies 
• BAT are representing China in global competition and market 
State level • Keeping distance with the government, de-regulation (Alibaba) 
• Getting support from the state and provide services to the government 
(Baidu and Tencent’s AI development, cooperation with the 
government) 
Societal level  • Online participation is restricted to prosumption   
• Little mention of how new technologies could change the workplace 
and exploitative, alienated work 
Individual 
level 
• Users are consumers not active citizens  
• Little mention of users’ privacy and rights of control over data 





CHAPTER 9. NEGOTIATING DIGITAL DISCOURSE 
 
So far, I have discussed digital discourse from the government and BAT. What, then, do 
workers think about the Internet in their everyday use of it. As discussed in Chapter 5 and 8, 
BAT are dominating the market and ubiquitous in people’s everyday life. Issues such as 
personal data, targeted advertising, appropriation of user generated content, and alternative 
platforms are under some heated debate. How do workers legitimate these business 
behaviours conducted by Internet companies? From a political aspect, how do workers 
conceive the government’s control of the Internet? Do they believe the Internet is a free space 
for democracy and freedom? How do they, if they do,  legitimate the current power relations 
regarding the highly commercialised and politically controlled Internet? This chapter will 
focus on workers’ statements on these issues.  
 
I have used focus groups to collect data from workers. The focus group questionnaire focuses 
on three aspects: the cultural, economic and political aspects (see Appendix 1). The questions 
focus on the online experiences of three types of workers in China’s digital capitalism, and 
how they interpret/understand these experiences. This chapter will focus on their digital 
discourse on the Internet Economy (9.1), and Internet Politics, regarding both content control 
and market regulation (9.2). Furthermore, this chapter will also identify one specific salient 
ideology among participants: There Is No Alternative (TINA). Finally, I will provide a 
summary of participants’ digital discourse with the help of the framework developed in 
Chapter 4 and 5.  
9.1. The Internet Economy  
 
This section will analyse three types of workers’ digital discourse on the Internet economy. It 
will try to answer the following questions:  
 
• What do they think about the New Economy, and in particular, SC? (9.1.1) 
• What do they feel about Internet companies (9.1.2) 
• What do they think about data collection (9.1.3) 
• How do they discursively construct their relationship with companies? (9.1.4) 
 
 230 
9.1.1. A de-centralised market with new opportunities?  
 
It is not surprising that, under the neoliberal paradigm of the Internet, as well as the active 
promotion of mass innovation and entrepreneurship (SC) by the government and companies 
(see Chapter 7), people consider the Internet and ICT provide new opportunities for 
individuals and economic growth for companies and nations. This section focuses on how 
participants perceive the Internet as providing new opportunities in the market. This type of 
argument from workers is consistent with the propagation of the ideology of the ‘New 
Economy’ or ‘Digital Economy’ from the dominant groups. With the help of the Internet, it is 
claimed, there are new opportunities and niche markets for individuals to start their 
businesses. By emphasising economic benefits brought by the Internet, individuals are 
encouraged to participate in the wave to start their businesses. This argument also shows a 
one-dimensional understanding of the Internet as economic instruments. 
 
One most direct expression comes from one programmer group. When asked to use three 
words to describe their impressions about the Internet, one programmer argues that:  
 
[1] I think that the Internet is all about making money [Moderator: can you explain 
more?]. The Internet, I mean from the perspective of companies, many high-tech 
things have shaken traditional industries heavily. They are very good at making 
money… We know Xiaomi [a large ICT] right? It is great (Lihai)! When it first came 
out, Xiaomi used hungry marketing … Someone says it uses the spirit of the 
Internet … then it makes a lot of money. I mean after the Internet comes out, the 
whole industry, a lot of production patterns, a lot of production modes emerge.liv 
 
Another participant from white-collar group uses the example of Guokr, an online website 
provides scientific and educational knowledge to the public, and Douban, a Chinese social 
media. According to the participant, starting their brands and selling products is a new 
business model for platforms to make profits (While collar group 2, #4, 21’26’’).  This 
participant holds a positive attitude towards the ‘new economic forms’, with a positive 
conception of the companies and their developers because they win the competition in the 
market and make a lot of money through beating other competitors.   
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Several participants talked of their experiences of using the Internet to find opportunities to 
make money, such as joining Weishang (businesses built through WeChat networks), 
opening shops on Taobao, or engaging in other types of the ‘gig economy’ concerning the 
Internet.  
 
For example, one participant from the manufacturing worker groups, when asked to express 
their impressions of the Internet in general, claims that: 
 
[2] It means more opportunities to make money. I mean because of the development of 
the Internet, it drives the growth of online shopping and provides many people 
opportunities for employment.lv 
 
Note this is an answer to the question about impressions about the Internet in general. This 
participant answers from a mere economic perspective. There is no mention of what kind of 
opportunities and jobs the Internet economy is providing. The coherence between texts 
(question and answer) implies a presupposition of an instrumentalist view of the Internet.  
 
However, the discussions of new opportunities and business models do not necessarily mean 
that participants believe in the de-centralised market or niche markets. For example, one 
programmer points out:  
 
[3] … So all industries start with lots of new businesses, and after a whole, who seize the 
largest group of users, who become the tycoon of this industry (programmer group 2, 
#4, 29.00)lvi.  
 
There are also discussions, especially within manufacturing worker groups, about the reality 
of start-ups through e-commerce and new jobs created by the Internet, such as jobs in 
logistics. This is probably related to their lived experience. A lot of manufacturing workers 
try to find other life opportunities through e-commerce, such as opening online shops through 
Taobao or WeChat (Weishang). However, while the ruling class are celebrating how the 
Internet creates more small businesses and opportunities, some participants have more 
concerns and are more critical about this argument.  
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For example, one manufacturing worker from group 2 states that she started a small online 
shop on Taobao, but it is “difficult to make money” by selling products on Taobao: 
 
[4] “I didn’t make any money, because [if you open a shop] on Taobao, if you always 
stay in front of your computer, then there might be some business, but it also requires 
you to have high credibility or profile … If you are a new shop, it is hardly visited … 
Millions of people are opening shops on Taobao, I mean, there is little chance that 
your shop will be paid attention to, it is very hard to make money, you need to invest 
a lot of money, and to Shuadan [to construct fake visiting and buying numbers]”.lvii 
 
Another participant uses her friend’s experience to be Weishang, saying that “she invested 
tens of thousands of Yuan and didn’t make money” (#8, manufacturing worker group 2). 
Weishang is a new phenomenon relating to the development of WeChat. Through WeChat, 
people can post advertising on their timeline available to all the friends on WeChat. Because 
WeChat is a relatively private communication tool in China, it means that Weishang shows 
such advertising to their friends, relatives or acquaintances. Weishang literally means ‘small 
business(men)’. There are discussions about Weishang in most of the groups. While in other 
groups there are more complains about Weishang advertisings in their timeline on Wechat 
moments, in manufacturing worker groups, there are more participants who tried or whose 
friends tried to start Weishang business before.   
 
To sum up, while there are arguments about how the Internet brings new opportunities in the 
market, there are also critical concerns. In particular, manufacturing worker group are more 
critical about the working situation of this type of ‘new job’ created by the Internet because 
they are more familiar with the real situation of these ‘new jobs’.  
 
9.1.2. “We trust big companies” 
 
Different from companies’ legitimation of oligopolies through talking about the Internet 
features (see 8.2), participants legitimate the oligopolies with the discourse of ‘trust’. 
According to this type of discourse, participants willingly express that they give up their 
privacy to big companies as an exchange for convenience and security. This is because, 
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according to participants, big companies have better technologies to protect their personal 
data.  
 
For example, participants would like to use one or two social media accounts (normally a 
WeChat or Weibo account) to sign up to other platforms (through API) because it is 
convenient and they believe the big companies can best protect their personal information. 
Application programme interface (API) is a set of procedures that allow the application to 
connect to and exchange data with an open operating system. On social media, when users 
use one social media account to sign in to another application, it is through API. Platforms 
then share user data and information and show advertising to users based on the integrated 
information about individuals gathered from different platforms, also through API. The 
concerns about information security, ironically, facilitate the commercialised collection of 
personal data by big companies, through API. 
 
This type of argument prevails in all groups of participants researched, among programmers, 
white-collars and manufacturing workers. For example, in the first group of programmers, 
when asked about how they protect personal information online, #4 states that Alibaba has 
great technologies and thus there is no need to worry about information uploaded to Alibaba: 
 
[5] I will first check whether the website has some basic encryption… such as protocols, 
whether encrypted or not, whether it’s https or not, and if it is a big platform, such as 
Alibaba and such, they have good technologies, then they must be fine in these 
aspects, there is no need to worry, but if it’s a small website, it doesn’t even register 
with the police office, then I would rather fill in fake information or minimum 
information.lviii  
 
One participant from the manufacturing worker group expressed a similar view: 
 
[6] I trust QQ and WeChat more. I know as a bigger company, Tencent is unlikely to 
cheat you, I feel I trust it more, but about those less popular platforms, if I have never 
seen their name before, I will definitely never give them [personal information].lix 
 
Another example comes from programmers:  
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[7] I think, for now, big companies have relatively better protection of users’ information, 
but small companies are totally irresponsible … I think if one day Alibaba leaks tens 
of thousands or hundreds of thousands people’s information, it might fail because of 
this … such big companies.… they will definitely protect users’ information well.lx 
 
The extract [5-7] show participants’ trust in big companies to have better technological 
means to protect their personal data. Participants equate information security issues to private 
data issues. Therefore, concerns about information security could lead participants to ‘trust’ 
big companies because they are supposed to have better technologies to protect users’ data 
from leaking or being stolen by hackers. This argument deflects a focus of discussion from 
violation of privacy by big companies to information security issues concerning hacking and 
thus also favours oligopolistic practices, as ‘big’ is perceived as both more secure and more 
convenient (the convenience of media convergence via API). 
 
However, this argument is only partially true and functions as ideology. Big companies, 
indeed, are less likely to steal users’ data and sell sensitive personal information (such as 
credit card information or names) to the third party directly or use the information for illegal 
financial fraud. However, they do collect as much information as they can, analyse these 
data, sell these data to advertisers, and display targeted advertisings to users. This is a more 
indirect, underlying, disguised way of making profits from users’ data. As another 
programmer in group one (#6) points out that users are not fully informed about what 
information is collected from them and what risks are there behind this collection of data 
(programmer group 1, #6, 19’07’’). I will also argue that this ‘trust’ is based on a deeper 
ideology of ‘there is no alternative’ (see section 9.3).  
 
To sum up, participants legitimate Internet companies’ oligopolies through the language of 
‘trust’. This type of argument functions to facilitate Internet oligopolies by partially and 
positively representing the companies’ business operations. It describes big companies as 
trustworthy and reliable. Thus people could put all information through one platform or open 
system. Linking to my discussions in Chapter 8 about how Baidu, Tencent and Alibaba build 




9.1.3. Data Collection: ‘There is simply no privacy online’ and ‘Internet 
companies need advertising to survive’ 
 
There are two ways among the participants to legitimate Internet companies’ collection of 
user data. First of all, there is one salient phenomenon detected from my user groups which 
are to confuse data security issues with companies’ for-profit operations of data collection. 
This section demonstrates how these specific concerns of data security could be misused to 
legitimate Internet companies’ data collection.  
 
Since data collection is the foundation of commercial online platforms, opinions about data 
commodification (data collection) are my first question addressed to participants in the focus 
groups. While acknowledging that personal data are collected by the platforms to make 
money, most of the participants’ concerns focus on data security, disruptive advertising, or 
data leaks, instead of companies making profits from those data, though these issues are 
highly related. Therefore, it is necessary to, first of all, clarify the differences between the 
collection of personal data conducted by commercial Internet companies and leaks of data by 
hackers. The Internet companies collect data, encourage users to give more information about 
themselves and sell those data to advertising companies. This is different from what hackers 
do to break security and steal personal data. However, when discussing concerns of online 
privacy data, participants always mix these two issues up.  
 
This conflation is especially prominent among programmer groups. For example, when asked 
about their concerns about private data online and their knowledge of how platforms acquire 
users’ personal data, one programmer (group1, #4) claims that people who study Internet 
security might have fewer concerns or worries. It is because, as he works in a cybersecurity 
company and thus more familiar with technologies about cybersecurity, it is possible to get 
any information from users with some techniques. He claimed that according to his expert 
knowledge about cybersecurity: 
 
[8] Although we keep emphasising users’ privacy, yet actually on the Internet, every user 




This is a typical argument from programmer groups: data breaches or data leaks are 
inevitable. As #4 further explained why he has few cares about collection and leaks of 
personal data. He gives two reasons, one of which is that data leakage is inevitable: 
 
[9] If people don’t consider, for example, mobile numbers, QQ numbers, date of birth, 
etc., information as private, then there won’t be any issues, because it is unrealistic to 
consider these as private. There are so many ways to leak the information. Several 
years ago in China, many websites used unreliable security protection, so, if you used, 
including QQ, if you registered, you filled your information online, if there were 
leakage incidents a few years ago on these websites, they called it ‘Drag 
Database’…then this information has already been leaked, your [information] has 
already been leaked, then [after the leak] you made some extra security protections in 
other occasions, what is the result? It just means that [your information] will be 
leaked fewer times, but eventually, it will be leaked anyway.lxii  
 
He also uses the example of the leakage of personal data of Mark Zuckerberg to emphasise 
that hackers will always have opportunities, and there is no absolute security online. 
Therefore, according to him, people should give up their concerns about privacy online since 
it is impossible to have absolute security online. Statements in extracts [8] and [9] falsely 
equate the issue of personal data collection and violation of privacy caused by the companies 
to personal data-stealing by hackers. While asked about how the commercial platforms 
collect and analyse users’ personal data, the programmer immediately linked it to security 
issues and argues that data leaks are inevitable. The argument that there is no absolute 
security to protect personal data blurs the focus of discussion about how companies collect 
and sell personal data ‘legally’ in the interests of profit. This type of discourse is thus 
ideological because it deflects the attention from the problematic practice of commercial 
companies to hacking issues. According to this argument, as long as people use the Internet, 
there are traces online, and any behaviour and information online can be leaked. Therefore, it 
is useless to worry about privacy and personal data online because of the inevitability arising 
out of the technologies as they exist. Furthermore, this type of argument also implies that the 
commercial platforms’ practice of collecting data is acceptable, or less harmful, as the very 
consequence of this inevitability, and thus is a kind of technologically determinant argument. 
Interestingly, it is a kind of ‘pessimistic’ one that is then turned around as if to say “It’s OK”. 
It thus helps to legitimate the collection, analysis and commodification of personal data. 
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Another type of arguments to legitimate companies’ data collection is to claim that the 
market rules are dominant. Thus Internet platforms have to survive by selling users to 
advertisers. This type of argument accepts the neoliberal logic that data collection is the 
necessary foundation of Internet-related business: selling advertising is the inevitable way for 
the platforms to survive in the market. The main argument here is that if one Internet 
platform or company wants to survive, it has to collect data and sell them for advertising 
purposes. For example, one participant from the manufacturing workers group, after 
describing some forms of disruptive and disturbing advertising he experienced before, argued 
that “these ads might be its [the companies/platforms] ways of survival” and “ways to make 
money”. Another participant adds that it is “their important way to survive” (see also 9.3).  
 
However, there are oppositional positions about companies collecting user data for their 
benefit. Programmers are probably more familiar about how Internet companies ‘mislead’ 
users to upload or ‘share’ more personal information with them. For example, one 
programmer (#6) in programmer group 1 disagrees with #4 who used the metaphor of users 
running naked online and equates user privacy to information security. He argues that: 
 
[10] The companies are probably misleading [users] (Moderator: Why?) because, as they 
[other participants] discussed earlier, to make themselves easier for users to use, 
many apps can be installed by only one click … If you want to use the new apps, 
normally you need to register, but if you use WeChat or QQ to authorise the app, 
you can skip all the steps, so before you log in to a new app, it asks whether you 
agree to use QQ or WeChat to log in … You think it’s convenient, then you 
authorise the app, then because it’s authorised, then they can get your information on 
social media such as WeChat and QQ, and through this way, they can gain some 
personal private information, but as a normal user, you probably think [it’s fine], but 
they don’t tell you what the risks behind this authorisation are, they didn’t tell you 
that actually, they have gained your privacy .lxiii  
 
Moreover, besides acquiring the knowledge of companies’ data collection, there is also 
oppositional behaviour against data collection through a more passive use of social media. 
There are participants who hold oppositional positions by claiming to use social media 
platforms less frequently (who exhibit a kind of critical consciousness and do not follow 
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ideologies in Fuchs’ 16 categories). These participants’ behaviours show that the collection 
of data and violence of user privacy conducted by commercial platforms could harm the 
connective functions of the Internet. 
 
One phenomenon that deserves more attention is that while all types of participants are 
critical about online advertising and data commodification, white-collar groups and 
programmers are more capable of conducting oppositional behaviour (e.g. the use of ad-block 
software or browser extension add-ons) compared to assembly line workers. For example, all 
participants in white-collar  group 1 state that they use some kind of software to block 
advertising online (e.g. 360, Tencent PC Manager, add-ons on Chrome, etc.). In addition, one 
participant of group 2 mentions using VPN to go to YouTube because then she can use iblock 
on YouTube instead of watching videos on Chinese websites on which ads cannot be 
blocked.  Another participant from white-collar group 2 mentions he learned how to ‘opt-out’ 
on Baidu after the death of Wei Zexi who went to an unqualified private hospital because of 
the promoted advertising on the Baidu search engine. Programmer groups also manifest a 
general knowledge and use of blocking software. 
 
In marked distinction from white-collar and programmer groups, participants from the 
assembly line worker groups all claimed that there is no way to block advertising. For 
example, when asked about whether they knew any way to block online advertising, one 
manufacturing worker claimed that “there is no way to block [ads]” (group 2, #8,56’04’’). 
Another worker claimed that “it needs professionals/experts [to block online ads]” (assembly 
line worker group 2, #4, 57’05).  
 
To sum up, there are two types of arguments to justify Internet companies’ data collection: to 
claim that ‘privacy’ in the digital age is impossible and to claim that being funded by 
advertising is the only way for Internet companies to survive. However, participants are also 
critical about online advertising. There are obvious differences in the expressed behaviour 
between white-collar, programmer and assembly line worker groups. While participants from 
white-collar and programmer groups are more likely to know and to use blocking software or 




9.1.4. ‘We are powerful consumers’ 
 
One prominent concept articulated in the focus groups is that participants, to a large extent, 
view themselves as consumers of commercial platforms or Internet companies. When asked 
about their opinions of the Internet in general, and their concerns about privacy or security 
issues, participants discuss these issues from their perspective as consumers. This exactly 
reflects the neoliberal understanding of the market and human well-being that human well-
being can best be advanced through the market (Harvey, 2005: 2). 
 
For example, when asked questions about alternative platforms not carrying advertising, 
some participants asked whether such platforms are membership or subscription funded. In 
other words, they see users as members or consumers who buy a service from Internet 
companies. One participant, who used to donate for two free, community-built CC software, 
specifically emphasises that she perceives her actions as paying for the service instead of 
donating: 
 
[11] Moderator: So did you donate for the software because you think it was helpful for 
you? 
(#5): It is not like a donation; I think it is worth it spending money to purchase 
their products 
(#2): [we are] willing to pay for our use 
(#5): yes, I think I am really willing to pay for it, and also they didn’t charge a 
lot, or maybe it’s just me, I think my current situation is that if the product is worth 
the money. I wouldn’t waste a lot of energy to find a free replacement, to find free 
software for bypassing the GFW [She donated to the software for this purpose]. If 
there is a good service, I would like to pay for it.lxiv  
  
This is an extraordinary example because the Moderator asked the participants’ opinions 
about non-commercial platforms such as Wikipedia and whether they think the Wikipedia 
model is feasible in China. In response to this question, participant [#5] gives two examples 
of software she donated to and supported, but explicitly points out she perceives her actions 
as purchasing the service: if the service is worth spending money for, then she would like to 
pay for it. Notice the first two lines in the extract [12]. #5 does not answer the Moderator’s 
 240 
question but reframes the Moderator’s use of the word ‘donate’. There is a strong negation in 
the sentence, which implies her perception of her identity as a consumer. The identity 
constructed in the discourse is a user as a consumer. In this way, she positions herself as a 
consumer, even of the two free, non-commercial, community-supported software. It is not 
surprising that on the basis of the current situation where commercial Internet platforms 
dominate the market in China, there is a general lack of imagination of alternative, not for 
profit, and publicly owned or shared Internet platforms.  
 
Moreover, many participants believe that the power of Internet users lies in their economic 
identity as consumers, instead of more political identities such as active citizens or netizens. 
For example, one programmer says: 
 
[12] I think, from now on, Internet companies and some big companies will pay a lot of 
attention on issues about Internet security, including individual privacy, because 
since they have attracted these user groups, then the privacy of these user groups and 
the security of these individuals’ information have become an important task of the 
company, as if one day they lose this information, they will lose a majority of users, 
and for Internet companies, if they don't have users, then they don’t have a future.lxv 
(programmer group 2, 40.53, #4) 
 
There are two main types of subject identities involved: commercial Internet companies 
(instead of, e.g. public-owned platforms or not-for-profit platforms) as product/service 
providers, and users as consumers who receive the services (instead of, e.g. more politically 
involved citizens or netizens). As shown in this example, the programmer believes that as 
Internet users, their power lies in their consumer choice. Their choices as consumers require 
or ‘force’ the companies to provide better services and carefully protect their personal 
information and ensure not to misuse this information. This echoes the ‘positive’ dynamic of 
a free market/neoliberal economic philosophy which is a philosophy because it is considered 
to be based on the uncontrolled free will that defines a particular social contract: a product or 
service is developed by a creative entrepreneur; individuals freely decide to pay for that 
product if they want it and can pay for it; entrepreneurs further refine or develop their product 
to more fully meet the needs of the purchaser; if they do not, buyers will look elsewhere for a 
better product; and so on. In contrast to this perception, there are few discussions about how 
to involve in political decision making in legislation to restrict the companies’ collection and 
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use of personal data. Rather, when talking about laws or regulations on the Internet, it is 
something for the government to solve (or even to ignore, by leaving to all to business 
practice), and not for the people to participate in. This also demonstrates a deeper ideology of 
‘there is no alternative’ (see section 9.3).  
 
To sum up, participants construct their identity as consumers who purchase service online, 
instead of citizens who use the Internet for civic participation. This is an instrumental 
understanding of the Internet and ignores its communicative function as a public sphere 
(Habermas, 1991). 
 
9.2. Internet Politics  
 
This section will focus on participants’ experience with online censorship and content control 
in China. My questions focused on how participants justify this content control conducted by 
both the government and the companies. In particular, these are three salient themes of 
arguments: threats and negative influences from ‘enemy states’, threats of instability, and 
China’s unique ‘national condition’ (Guo Qing ‘国情’).  
 
While the main focus of this section is to illustrate participants’ ideological acceptance of the 
government’s censorship, I by no means claim that this is the case for everyone. I have no 
intention to claim those participants who hold ideological opinions have narrow 
understandings or practices against censorship. As theorised by Gramsci and explained by 
Hall, ideology could be spontaneous and chaotic (see Chapter 2). While the participants argue 
that it is necessary to censor and control the Internet in China for several reasons, such as 
negative influences from the West on people’s thinking, national security, etc., the focus 
groups show that many participants hold negotiated positions. It means that while accepting 
the ideologies at an abstract level, participants make their rules at the situational level, such 
as supporting the use of VPN to bypass the GFW.  This is a negotiated position illustrated by 
Hall (1980). More specifically, participants holding this type of negotiated position might 
have different knowledge of an ideology (unconscious, conscious, partly conscious or 
critically conscious), and only partly accede to the nationalist ideology. For example, the 
participant in the extract [15] below (who uses the term ‘enemy state’) also legitimated 
 242 
people’s behaviour to use VPN to know “the truth about history” (white-collar group 1, #3, 
01:23’50’’). Therefore, his acceptance of censorship only works at an abstract level. 
 
9.2.1. The ‘Enemy State’ 
 
One prominent theme in the discussions of  international relationship and the Internet is 
participants’ construction of a friend/enemy scheme. It represents other countries (especially 
from the West) as enemies that should be opposed. Interviewees from the focus groups 
legitimate the Chinese government’s control of the Internet through a narrative of antagonism 
between China (as ‘us’) and other countries, especially America (as ‘them’). This section 
identifies two ways to build this narrative. The first way is to claim that some online content 
(mainly from the West) has negative influences on Chinese people’s worldview. The second 
one is to describe threats from other countries to China’s national security.  
 
First of all, censorship is claimed to be ‘necessary’ by some participants because the West 
tries to ‘corrupt’ Chinese people’s thinking. One salient example is that one participant in the 
white-collar  group used the term “enemy state” (Di Guo ‘敌国’) when he expressed his 
opinions about censorship:  
 
[13] First of all, one country’s own politics surely serves the interests of its own country. 
And enemy states’ (slight laughter), I mean other country’s politics (slight laughter) 
surely also serves the interests of their own country. First of all, just one simple 
example, often some foreign anti-China forces influence Chinese people’s thinking 
on some websites, such as Weibo. Therefore, it [the government] needs [to apply 
censorship]. lxvi 
 
These expressions construct a clear narrative of other countries as enemies. The participant 
uses the deictic ‘them’ to distinguish China from other countries. This construction is what is 
called by Reisigl and Wodak as strategies of collectivisation (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p48). 
Using pronouns, this strategy of collectivisation indicates the similarities among ‘us’ and 
differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Moreover, this extract also uses topos of threat: the 
participant negatively typifies ‘enemy states’ as “foreign anti-China forces”, and they want to 
“influence [meaning corrupt] Chinese people’s thinking”. There is also one implication about 
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the equivalence between China and the Chinese government. He understands politics that 
serves the interests of the ‘state’, instead of serving the interests of its people.  
 
The second way to construct the confrontational relations between China and other countries 
is through the claims of national security. From this perspective, Internet control conducted 
by the government is ‘necessary’ to protect national security and national interests. For 
example, one programmer expresses the reason why she supports the government to ban 
Facebook and Google in China: 
 
[14] I have different opinions [about whether the Chinese government should allow 
Facebook to enter China or not]. I think there are some concerns at the state level to 
ban Facebook because if people use some means for social communication so 
widely, there are some very, very important issues about information, for example, 
some officials, if [they] all chat through Facebook, America can gain our 
information easily, then it can do something about this information, for example, 
two Chinese officials talk to each other, and talk about something, then Facebook, it, 
after all, it is from a foreign country, we cannot have full control, perhaps, maybe, 
Facebook, for example, it and America, it and its government, conduct some 
[exchange of information] and its information must not only be stored in Facebook 
but also in some of its national stuff, right? It perhaps could collect this information, 
or do something, for example [if] China has some issues with some other countries, 
it [Facebook/America] could conduct some actions, I think from the national level, it 
[the Chinese government] should not want it [Facebook] to come in… lxvii  
 
In this extract, the participant points out straightforwardly that Facebook is a “foreign” 
company and to co-operates with the American government or that it is very likely to be 
doing so. There is an equivalence of the American government and an American company. 
On a discursive level, she uses several times the deictics ‘we’ and ‘our’ to distinguish China 
from other countries, especially America. There is a strong distinction between ‘we’ as China 
and Chinese state versus ‘them’ as America, American companies (Facebook), and the 
American government (strategies of collectivisation). 
 
I then followed up with the question of whether the interviewee thinks that Facebook could 
represent the interests of the American government. She explains that America Intelligent 
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Agencies could get information about China if Chinese people and officials use Facebook. 
She also claims that Facebook can also spread ‘some information’ (that could be harmful to 
the Chinese government) for American government through Facebook easier (as shown in the 
excerpt [16]).  
 
This ideological construction simplifies the relationships between America, the FBI (or out of 
a certain understandable lack of knowledge, the speaker implies other US government 
intelligence agencies) and American companies (such as Facebook, Apple).22 This (possible) 
misunderstanding of the complex relations between government and businesses might relate 
to a more direct relationship between the Chinese government and Chinese companies. In 
China, the government has more power over companies (though, of course, the US 
government has its own powers of access to all electronic flows of information). One famous 
case is that Google left China because of its disputes with the Chinese government.23 A more 
recent example is Apple agreeing to build a new database within mainland China and store all 
its Chinese user data in this database. This perception of state power as primary over the 
business power is prevalent among Chinese Internet users, and there is a tendency to identify 
with its positive necessity by internalising as a friend/enemy nationalist discourse.  
 
However, there are also explicit arguments against the equivalence between China and 
Chinese Internet companies. There are also expectations that some banned foreign platforms, 
such as Google and Facebook, will gain entry to China and provide unfiltered information for 
Chinese people. The most common complaint is to compare Baidu to Google and the 
expectation of Google returning to China.  For example, #2 in white-collar group 2 argues 
that Wikipedia and Google are much more reliable than Baidu-Baike and Baidu (white-collar 
group 2, #2, 59.58).  One programmer criticises that Baidu charges money for the documents 
shared by other users for free on the Baidu platform. It is, according to him, against the spirit 
of the Internet (programmer group 1, #4, 01.28.30). Therefore, from participants’ non-
 
22 About the complex relations between Apple, Facebook and American government, see reports for example: 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/22/mark-zuckerberg-sympathetic-apple-fbi-encryption-
battle, and https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/17/inside-the-fbis-encryption-battle-with-apple, 
accessed 18 Sep. 2018.  
23 The latest news about Google and China is a confirmation of Google’s plan return to China with a censored 
Chinese search engine. See reports on this project, for example, from the Guardian: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/02/google-working-on-censored-search-engine-for-china  
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ideological opinions, the Chinese Internet companies do not equal to China and are not 
serving for Chinese people’s interests. 
 
To sum up, there are two types of arguments regarding Internet control from an international 
perspective. The first one is to claim that censorship and surveillance are necessary to protect 
Chinese people’s thinking from negative Western influences. The second one endorses online 
control through the claims of national security and national interests. 
 
9.2.2. ‘We need a Stable Country.’   
 
This type of discourse argues that government control of the Internet (including censorship 
and surveillance) is necessary for China to maintain necessary stability. According to this 
view, a stable environment surpasses any other demands of Chinese people, such as freedom 
and democracy or even to claim the ‘right’ to be able to ‘struggle’ (even if only in the realm 
of ideas). There are two main types of assertions. Firstly, oppression is necessary for social 
stability. Secondly, instability caused by any fight for democracy is just a threat rather than 
one that can be positively explained.  
 
First of all, a nationalist construction of one nation claims that oppression is necessary to 
keep China stable. One salient phenomenon discovered in the focus groups is how the 
necessity of oppression to keep social stability is taken as common sense (a basic ideological 
construction) and ‘background knowledge’ for participants. Almost all participants perceive 
stability as an undisputed priority, and Internet control is necessary to maintain this stability 
(ironically echoing similar notions of social media use in the supposedly entirely free-
market/capitalist West, that social media pacifies a happy consumer population through them 
acceding to adopting consumer and individualist identities).  
 
In contrast, there are few discussions about, for example, where the discontent that causes the 
instability comes from, who benefits most from the oppression of dissidents, who loses rights 
and freedom when under a regime of strict control, and what consequences this control can 
bring. One specific topic of the argument about national stability is the claim for the necessity 
to oppress certain ethnic minority groups. This type of discourse is a racist one. For example, 
one participant claims that some ethnic minority groups might make the country more 
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unstable. Thus some information about these ethnic minority groups needs to be controlled or 
censored online [programmer group 1, #2, 01:05:04]. The focus group was asked to discuss 
issues about the government’s censorship and closing down of websites (not relevant to 
ethnic groups), but the participant spontaneously started to legitimate the government’s 
censorship by referring to ethnic minorities. This spontaneous connection demonstrates how 
some people presuppose the link between ethnic issues and Internet control. The former is 
used to legitimate the latter. 
 
Another typical example comes from a manufacturing worker group. The participant states 
that some online posts are ‘extreme’ and are related to ‘sensitive’ issues and thus should be 
censored in case they cause instability:  
 
[15] If some individuals make extreme [statements], or use some sensitive terms, I mean, 
if [the statements and terms are] browsed by other people, I mean [they] might cause 
others’ to have, similar attitudes or similar opinions, so it is normal to have some 
information deleted, and then now there is a lot of ‘positive energy’ (slight 
laughter).lxviii 
 
This participant argues that if people’s speech is not controlled, the society will become 
unstable. Therefore, it is ‘normal’ (reasonable, right), even necessary, for the government to 
conduct censorship. There are no further explanations about the problem of instability: it is 
‘common sense’ that stability takes priority over everything else in the development of the 
Chinese economy (and well-being).  Furthermore, the participant uses the term ‘positive 
energy’ to refer to the government’s behaviour in conducting censorship. ‘Positive energy’ is 
a word promoted by the government to describe how to shape ‘Internet culture’. For example, 
in Xi’s 4.19 speech, he claims that “Cyberspace is a common virtual home for millions upon 
millions of people… [we need to] ensure that positive energy and mainstream values prevail. 
By doing so, we will be able to create clean and upright cyberspace for Internet users, 
especially young ones”.  There is no clear explanation of what ‘positive energy’ means in this 
speech. However, it can be indicated from his speech that only a controlled Internet can be 
“full of positive energy”. In the same paragraph, he claims that “The Internet is not a lawless 
place: the use of the Internet to advocate, incite and preach the toppling of the government, 
religious extremism, separatism, and terrorism must be resolutely stopped and cracked down 
upon. Under absolutely no circumstances can such activities be allowed to go unchecked”. 
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Therefore, the participant’s attitude towards Internet control can also be identified from the 
specific use of the term ‘positive energy’.  
 
Another way to argue for the importance of stability in China is to emphasise the negative 
consequences of instability in other countries, especially in countries where instability is 
caused by pro-democracy movements. For example, one programmer uses the example of the 
Arab Spring movements to emphasise the necessity to control the Internet:  
 
[16] For example a few years ago, like Syria in the Middle East, what is it called, hmm, 
such as the Middle East Spring (Moderator: Arab Spring), in fact, it was because the 
local government lost discourse power over the Internet, I mean [the local 
government did] not intervene to control this special type of capital [he explicitly 
refers to information as a special type of capital in his previous statements] to exert 
its power, it leads to continuous wars in the Middle East, all the governments were 
overthrown. Therefore I think this type of capital [information] must be controlled. 
lxix 
 
The example of the Arab Spring is seen as a history lesson or a warning for people who want 
a looser control of the Internet in China: it will lead to war and instability. Therefore, the 
Internet in China should be subject to government control. However, The participant says 
nothing about the complex processes giving rise to the Arab Spring and why people rebelled. 
He then comes to the conclusion that the lack of control of the Internet would lead to 
instability and implies that stability should surpass any other concern in China. 
 
At a sociological level, this type of argument about the priority of stability in China has 
existed long before it is adapted to Internet-related arguments. Some scholars have tried to 
explain the possibly very long history of this dominant idea and how it has gained such 
ideological power in China. In the very long term it could be traced back as far as Confucian 
thought, when, taking Confucius as a political philosopher, rather than just a ‘wise man’, he 
teaches the necessity of hierarchical stability as a primary function of a state, based on correct 
ethical behaviour and ritual. In the short term, it is related to (1) the disaster of the Cultural 
Revolution and (2) the social upheavals and instability of the 1980s all over the world and in 
China. Zheng Yongnian (2004) illustrates the formation of “China’s model of reform” for the 
Jiang Zemin-centred third-generation leadership, which is “economic reform without political 
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reform” (Zheng, 2004, p54). He points out that one characteristic of the legitimation of 
“China’s model of reform” was to emphasise the issue of socio-political stability. At first, in 
the 1980s, it was difficult for the CPC to justify “the use of stability as a prerequisite of 
economic reform”. Some social forces emerged during that time to call for political reform 
and finally grew into pre-democracy movements in the late 1980s. However, the situation 
changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. As Zheng puts it “the 
necessity of political stability seemed to have been ‘naturally’ justified by what happened 
outside China” (ibid., p56). Popular perceptions of stability have changed: radical political 
reform would lead China along the same path as the Soviet Union, and thus “authoritarian 
rule became more acceptable as a price to pay for continuing economic improvement” (ibid.). 
Wang Hui also argues how the state utilised the upheaval of 1989 “as the premise of its own 
legitimacy” (Wang, 2003, p62). He further points out how ironically this request for 
maintaining stability “eventually obscured the crisis of state legitimacy that had gradually 
come into being since the onset of the (neoliberal) reforms” (ibid.). Therefore, arguments 
about the necessity to keep stability through tighter control in China has its historical context 
and has always been an ideological discourse. 
 
However, there are also arguments that identify the fallacy within this type of arguments 
about stability and claim that there are oppressed interests from minority groups that should 
be recognised. The confrontational arguments are more prevalent in manufacturing worker 
groups. The manufacturing worker groups, in general, express a stronger attitude and 
behaviour to fight against censorship. Many participants from the manufacturing worker 
groups claim that they have experienced accounts being banned or deleted, posts being 
deleted, etc. Then they choose to change an account or wait for some time until their accounts 
are active again. Compared to other groups, manufacturing worker groups are more likely to 
hold oppositional positions (deconstruct the message and reconstruct the meanings within 
alternative and contrary frameworks) to the dominant ideology, instead of, for example, a 
negotiated position (acceptance of dominant ideology at an abstract level but make its own 
rules at a situational level based on their life experiences and self-interests) from the white-
collar group (explanation of these two positions, see Chapter 2). The main reason why 
manufacturing worker groups hold more confrontational attitudes might be that they are more 
severely exploited in China’s integration into the world of informational capitalism. What 
they post online and later deleted by platforms and the government are closely related to their 
lived experience, such as their life in factories, human rights movements, the revelation of 
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exploitation by the factories, etc. Compared to the situation of assembly line worker groups 
workers, posts censored or deleted from white-collar workers and programmers are more 
about freedom of expression, rights to information, etc. Moreover, the government has 
intentionally looser control about the rights movement concerning single, individual, urban, 
middle-class issues, compared to collective farmers and worker issues relating to provocative 
social movements (Yan, 2009, p292). Therefore, the other two groups, in general, hold more 
negotiated positions.  
 
To sum up, the second type of arguments to justify Internet control emphasises the 
importance of stability and thus the necessity of the control.  
 
9.2.3. ‘We have a Unique National Condition’ (Guoqing) 
 
The third type of discourse to justify online content control is the claim for China’s unique 
‘national condition’ (Guoqing) among focus groups. Participants argue that China has a 
unique ‘national condition’ and thus ‘Western’ liberal democracy is not suitable for China. 
One term related to ‘national condition’ is ‘national quality’ (Guomin Suzhi) which refers to 
the whole population’s ‘quality’. It is claimed that because of the low level of ‘national 
quality’, Chinese people are not ready for democracy and need a strong authoritarian state. 
This section will focus on discourse about these two terms: ‘national condition’ (Guoqing) 
and ‘national quality’ (Guomin Suzhi).  
 
First of all, when asked about the group’s opinions about online censorship and surveillance, 
one programmer deployed the argument that China has a unique ‘national condition’: 
 
[17] #3: This is, I think related to the national condition (Guoqing), China… there are 
many ethnic groups, the national condition is more complex, indeed, if there are 
some rumours and you don’t block it, let it spread, this is a very serious issue, easy 
to cause social instability and such like, therefore, about things such as spreading 
rumours, I personally think, they should be blocked, other things such as what you 
said about history issues, these things are harder to say.lxx 
 
Another programmer follows with: 
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[18] I think this (censorship) is one stage of the development of society, I mean perhaps, 
our country is experiencing a stage from isolation to openness, perhaps now it is in 
the stage of somewhere in between, so perhaps now every aspect, because of 
national quality (Suzhi), or domestic or external environments are not ready, so [the 
government] conducts some control. I think it is reasonable or it suits the current 
situation. I think in the future, when the environment or the nation or people, etc. are 
ready, when it has reached a certain stage, it should be when the society develops or 
the politics develop to a certain stage, hmm, then the problem [of censorship] will be 
solved easily, then [the society] will be more open, I think so.lxxi 
 
The main claim of the extract [19] and [20] is that China has a unique ‘national condition’; 
thus censorship is necessary. These two excerpts are typical – [19] claims about the unique 
‘national condition’, [20] argues for the ‘China’s stage of development’. In extract [19], what 
is unique about China’s ‘national condition’ is a large number of ethnic minority groups. 
Although extract [20] does not use the term Guoqing, yet it exhibits a typical argument about 
‘national condition’: China is going through a specific development stage (in terms of both 
the internal and external environment), so China is not ready for a more open and free 
society. In discussions in the focus groups, the ‘national condition’ also refers to, for 
example, Chinese traditional culture, China’s political culture, or ‘national quality’ (Guomin 
Suzhi) and so on. However, there is no one single understanding of ‘national condition’. 
Rather, it is an ambiguous term that allows so many factors to be claimed as a unique 
condition. Despite the variety of differences in defining ‘national condition’, the purpose of 
claiming it is clear: censorship is necessary for China’ unique Guoqing. 
 
While most arguments about ‘national condition’, as shown in [19] and [20], see the society 
as a whole, thus focus on why the society cannot be democratised, there is one specific type 
of argument concentrate on individuals. The discourse on ‘quality’ (Suzhi) specifically argues 
that individuals in China are not ready for democratisation. For example, when asked about 
the group’s opinions and attitudes towards the government’s online censorship, one 
programmer draws on a typical discourse of ‘national quality’ (Suzhi): 
 
[19] In fact, perhaps compared to foreign countries, [China] is not free enough in terms 
of speech, but in fact, this is due to the national quality (Suzhi). If national quality 
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(Suzhi) rises to a certain (higher) level, then there will be more freedom of speech. 
Freedom is relative, if the national quality is not (high) enough, is low, it (the state) 
gives you freedom it will actually bring more harm to society, for example, if the 
whole or average national education level keeps increasing, from the previous 
primary school average gradually to the current high school and university level, if 
when the country, or say from our generation, I think gradually, when in the future 
everyone can go to university, I think when in that way the national quality (Suzhi) 
increases to a certain level, then the state will give you much greater freedom of 
speech, including, for example, though our country has voting rights now, we 
actually don’t have it, meaning there are some delegates, who represent us to vote, 
that is because it [the state] thinks we can’t make decisions, can’t vote. In the future 
I think, after our government and nation gradually develop, including our whole 
level comes up, gradually [the state] will give us more freedom and rights, and this is 
also for the purpose to maintain social stability.lxxii   
 
This participant argues that Chinese people are not ready for pro-democracy reform because 
of the low level of suzhi, and if people are given freedom, it will be harmful to society. For 
people who hold this argument, democracy needs people in the country to have a high level 
of Suzhi. However, it is worth asking what type of institution can cultivate and increase 
people’s Suzhi for democracy: a perfect authoritarian one or an imperfect democratic one?  
 
Therefore, claims about the national quality of the population (Guomin Suzhi) is ideological 
in terms that legitimate the undemocratic situation in China. This can be taken as a 
mainstream argument in China. According to Kipnis, there are more than 32 different 
translations of Suzhi into English as early as 1999, but no one single English term can fully 
explain the exact meaning of this word (Kipnis, 2006, p296). Several studies are dedicated to 
explaining the meaning of Suzhi in the socio-political context in China (for example, 
Anagnost 1997; Judd, 2002; Murphy 2004, Kipnis 200624). Suzhi, according to these studies, 
is used to legitimate neoliberal tendency and increasing inequality in China (e.g. Judd 2002, 
 
24 For example, Ellen Judd (2002) examines the rural reforms in the early 1980s in China how low Suzhi 
(quality) was seen as a decisive factor in women’s disadvantages, and how a set of policies and programmes 
were set to improve women’s quality to make them more competitive in China’s ‘Socialist market economy’. 
Another example is from Ann Anagnost (1997) shows how the improvement of national quality of the 
population, especially that of its children, is linked to the survival of China as a nation. Murphy, Rachel (2004) 
shows how suzhi is central to legitimise party-state and its policies in rural areas in four aspects.  
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Murphy 2004, Kipnis,2006). Suzhi is also seen as crucial for the survival of the nation in 
nationalistic discourses (e.g. Anagnost 1997, see also a popular book embedded in this 
argument written by Xie Sizhong, The Quality Crisis of Our Nation). In other situations, 
Suzhi is deployed as an evaluation of patriotism by the Chinese government (Kipnis, 2006, 
p311, Murphy 2004, p16). Whatever the exact meaning of Suzhi is, the main purpose of this 
term is clear: to legitimate the current situation in China. It is a nationalist discourse used to 
support the authoritarian socio-political arrangements in China.  
 
In extract [21], Suzhi has two main meanings concerning nationalist ideology. First of all, it is 
related to technocracy and patriarchy in Chinese politics. As stated by Yan Hairong, the 
phrase Guomin Suzhi (the quality of the national population) is “appropriately technocratic in 
a context where technocratic leaders dominate national politics and politics is itself deployed 
as a technocracy” (Yan, 2003, p514). Extract [21] makes the argument that the low level of 
the quality of the national population makes it inappropriate for the population to have more 
freedom of speech and rights. This is a highly technocratic argument. It implies that the 
government (or people with a higher level of Suzhi) could and should make decisions for the 
country and the population because of the average low level of national quality. Moreover, 
extract [21] argues that the government “will give people more freedom and rights”. This is a 
patriarchal argument. The government is seen as an active subject while the people are seen 
as a passive receiver/object. This sentence expresses a ‘relational value’ which indicates a 
specific relationship between the government and the population. 
  
Secondly, the vagueness of the term Suzhi in this extract further reveals its function as an 
ideology to legitimate the government’s domination and control. The vagueness of its 
meaning makes it hard to envisage any detailed institutional reforms. In extract [21] for 
example, the participant wavers about when is a proper time for democratic reform: 
“gradually in the future”, “our generation”, or “when everyone can go to universities”, etc. 
There is no settled standard or time for reform; improving the national quality of the 
population is an ambiguous concept. This lack of specificity reveals a key point in the 
discursive function of Suzhi: whenever may be a proper time for reform, it is not now. 
Because of the vagueness of measurement of Suzhi, the Chinese people will never be ready 
for reform. This ideological function of suzhi as a way to prevent reform can be shown from 
popular intellectual writings. For example, the popular intellectual Xie Sizhong in his famous 
book about Chinese national quality in 2004 argued that improving people’s Suzhi is more 
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important than institutional reform.25 This argument, however, could be used as an ideology 
to postpone or decline any possible political pro-democratic reforms in China.  
 
To sum up, the third type of discourse to justify online censorship and content control argues 
that China has a unique ‘national condition’ (Guoqing) and low level of ‘national quality’ 
(Guomin Suzhi) and thus both the society and individuals are not suitable for or not ready for 
(‘Western’) democracy. 
 
9.2.4. The State or the Companies?  
 
While the last three sub-sections discussed participants’ legitimation of Internet content 
control, this part will focus on participants’ discourse on the relations between the state and 
companies. The relations between the Chinese state and Internet companies are more 
complex than deregulation or regulation in the neoliberal sense. Besides the regulation in the 
marketplace, there are issues about content control struggles among the users, the State, 
International companies, and domestic Internet companies.  
 
The relationship between the government and the market in China has been a focal point in 
discussions about neoliberalism between the right and the left (especially there are several 
debates between the New Left and the neoliberal side26). The neoliberal side argues that the 
government should not intervene too much in market competition and ‘only’ guarantee a free 
market. One the other hand, the left argues that the government should limit the expansion of 
the market as regards its neoliberal tendency and represent the rights of the people more 
(more discussions, see Chapter 3).  
 
Whether to regulate the market or not and the government’s role have always been a focal 
point in Internet-related discussions. There are two main types of arguments among 
participants regarding the relations between the state and the companies. First of all, there are 
expectations from participants that the government could intervene to protect the security of 
their personal data. Unlike the heated debate in liberal democracies about whether the 
 
25 See Xie Sizhong, 2004, The Crisis of China’s National Quality (Zhongguo Guomin Suzhi Weiji), Beijing: 
China’s Changan Publishing House)  
26 See debates between New Left and Neoliberalists, Pan, Li, Lu, Lao, etc. 
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government should intervene in Internet platforms’ operations, appeals for government 
intervention of some extent or aspects of content regulation is prevailing among participants. 
This type of discourse usually resonates the government and official’s discourse of ‘positive 
energy’ or ‘a clean environment in the cyberspace’. Internet fraud, gambling, sexual content 
and personal information leak are the most concerned content. The government thus are 
expected to govern and intervene the Internet from a more or less authoritative way. 
 
Secondly, a more important and interesting discussion is participants’ expectations of 
companies. If Google’s entre into the Chinese market in 2006 and the commercial social 
media platform Sina Weibo attracted heated public issue debate since its launch in 2009 
demonstrate some liberation and empowerment brought by a free Internet market, then the 
end of Google China’s service in 2010 and the decline of Weibo’s function as a public sphere 
shed light on the bankruptcy of the neoliberal claim that free-market must automatically bring 
freedom of speech and thus democracy. While there used to be such a hope, it is now tending 
to decline, especially after some recent parallel developments of more intensive control of 
content and loosened control of the market in China. For example, one participant expressed 
her disappointment after Apple gives users’ data to the Chinese government.  
 
[20] In China no company can fight the government’s power, for example, Apple said 
they didn’t want to give away users’ information, but if you don’t give it [to the 
government], you will die [other participants: Yes], so there is no other way. The big 
companies also can’t protect personal data, individual privacy.lxxiii (white-collar  
group 2, 39’48’’) 
 
The neoliberal development of the Internet and increasing corporate power is not necessarily 
followed by a loosening of content control from the government. Rather, government power 
and corporate power work together to appropriate power from the public through, for 
example, online advertising, surveillance and censorship from both the government and the 
platforms.  
 
Participants are also aware that platforms conduct self-censorship to meet the government’s 
needs or demands. For example, one programmer argues that censorship does not only come 
from the government: 
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[21] There is also some [censorship], maybe because platforms have some concerns 
about their profits, for example, Douban [a community-oriented social media 
platform in China], maybe if it feels that if you post something on my platform and 
attract a lot of attention and followers, probably the government will put some 
pressures on Douban. lxxiv(programmer group 1, 01:03’25’’) 
 
From the focus groups, there are indications that some participants expected the free market 
and the Internet would bring democracy to China. However, this expectation or myth has 
been broken by reality. Participants realise that the companies and government work together 
in terms of censorship and control. The myth that the free market could bring free Internet 
and freedom of speech has lessened in its ideological power. Though the companies are 
gaining more power and expanding fast in the neoliberal tendency, it is unlikely for the 
Internet to equally empower users in China. Under this situation, deregulation could bring 
more harm than benefits to users.  
 
Therefore, there are some sways between regulation and deregulation, the state and 
commercial companies among participants. While expecting the confrontations of power 
between the political and economic elites could bring some public space for the civic society, 
there is also stated that no power could change the censorship and surveillance conducted by 
the state. What is more common is the techno-deterministic claims about relations between 
technology and society and thus between the economically and politically dominant class and 
subaltern groups as I will show in the next section.   
9.3. TINA  
 
One salient theme in participants’ discussions is ‘There is no alternative’. This section will 
illustrate this type of discourse among the focus groups. More specifically, I identify three 
types of ‘no alternative’ discourse.  
 
First of all, participants legitimate companies’ business operations of data collection because 
there are no other ways for the companies to survive in the market. As shown in 9.1.3, 
participants claim that collecting data is the way for Internet companies to ‘survive’. A 
similar conclusion is argued from a different perspective: Internet companies cannot survive 
without advertising. The questions in focus groups about participants’ opinions of current 
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predominant commercialised platforms are followed by questions about alternatives. It is 
perhaps not surprising that the current neoliberal situation leads to a paucity of the 
imagination of possible alternative futures involving non-commercialised platforms.  
 
For example, when asked about whether they have used not-for-profit platforms without 
advertising, one programmer stated that there are no such platforms: “As long as it wants to 
make money, they must have advertising (laughter)”. When asked then to imagine a similar 
website like Wikipedia in China, another programmer soon argues that “it might cost a lot of 
money.” He then explains that there are some online forums about computer technologies, 
and there is no advertising online, but he further poses the question where the income could 
come from:  
 
[22] There are some websites (with no advertising), such as some online forums about 
technologies. They don’t have advertising, but without advertising, how do they get 
income? Although they don’t make a profit, such as [forum name], it can be used all 
over the world (Moderator: Does it rely on donations?). Yes, it might still cost a 
lot.lxxv 
 
When asked about alternative non-commercial platforms without advertising, the 
manufacturing worker group gave rise to similar one-sided reactions: 
 
[23] (Participant #2): Such a website won’t appear, and even if there will be one, I think, 
after a while, it will have to charge a fee in some way or other. 
(#1): There can’t be such websites at the moment, there are none now. 
(#2): No, there are no such websites. 
(#7): There will be no such websites that you can watch videos online for free, 
without advertising, free. lxxvi 
 
In these two extracts, the premise that Internet companies have to survive by selling data to 
advertisers is not true, as alternative non-profit user-owned platforms such as Wikipedia and 
Diaspora are existing successful examples. However, it has to be pointed out that it might be 
harder for Chinese Internet users to imagine alternative platforms since Wikipedia in the 
Chinese language cannot be accessed (zh.wikipedia) though the English version can be 
accessed. This type of argument is thus an accurate observation about the current industry, 
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for most of the websites are built on being able to sell advertising in various ways. As the 
BAT companies continuously declare, any website can cooperate with them (through API), 
inserting a series of codes in the website and showing targeted advertising to users. The 
neoliberalist sphere (both its ‘reality’ and its discourse) has left little space for non-
commercial corporations and alternatives, almost by definition, as the ‘ideal’ of neoliberalism 
is that the free market gives rise to the best of all possible worlds because it rewards talent 
and invention that meet the requirements of consumers who freely choose via the market to 
reward that product by paying for it (in one way or another).  Of course, a non-commercial 
enterprise that survives through (individual) voluntary donations might not be seen as 
contradicting a neoliberal economic climate as, in effect, the donors can be seen to be 
‘paying’ for something they want.    
 
The second and most straightforward one is that there are no alternative public service 
Internet platforms in China. For example, when asked about whether they have concerns 
about online personal data and how they protect and use their personal data on different 
platforms, #6 in programmer group 1 states that he has more trust in big companies compared 
to small ones because he has to use their platforms for communication: 
 
[24] I believe … those big companies, big brands are trustworthy, and if we can’t even 
trust them, then basically you lose connections with the outside world in the Internet 
society.lxxvii  
 
This excerpt shows exactly the conflict between participants’ need of a public-owned social 
and communicative platform and the private companies’ appropriation of their personal data 
for profits making purpose. Linking back to companies’ digital discourse of describing 
themselves as ‘public utility’ (see 8.2), participants clearly recognise that these companies are 
not providing ‘public utility’ but to exploit this public need to make profits. As Van Dijck 
points out, the public’s “need for connectedness is what drove many users to these sites” yet 
soon appropriated by platforms for ‘connectivity’ of data as a valuable recourse (Van Dijck, 
2013: 4). In other words, as Fuchs distinguishes the differences, while participants choose 
social media for its use value, the companies are making profits from the exchange value of 
users’ data and connection (Fuchs, 2014a). According to the participants, their trust of big 
companies is more like a choice but without other options as the only other ‘option’ is to 
withdraw entirely from a society defined by the necessity of social media use. 
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Finally and the most important TINA discourse among participants is that there is no 
effective direct method for political participation (in a broader sense) thus for political 
solutions. This type of argument claims that the collection of personal information by 
platforms has already happened and will happen all the time. Thus participants have to accept 
the ‘fact’ and nothing can be changed. It believes that participants have no power to stop 
companies from collect personal data. One participant from white-collar  group 1 argues that: 
 
[25] It [Internet platform] records my browsing history, and it will recommend me 
relevant things [through ads]. I think it is acceptable because you can’t totally stop 
websites from recording your information anyway, because it is already a default 
option that you can’t say no and have to say yes.lxxviii 
 
When asked about whether they have concerns that Internet companies get information about 
their location, one participant from the same group argues that:  
 
[26] #1: You mean that [the platforms] use your information to find out your location? 
It’s useless to worry about it, because they do whatever they want, you can only 
accept passively, you know, you can’t do anything, even if you are worried 
#5: [users are] are at the mercy of [the platforms]  
#Moderator: is that because they are in charge of algorithms and design of the 
programmes?  
#5: Because in China I think it’s useless to fight against these things, also there 
is only one platform, and if you don’t want to accept their terms, then you don’t use it. 
The platform will never change for you.lxxix 
 
When asked about whether they care about the collection of personal data and the companies’ 
violation of privacy after some participants’ legitimating the ‘business models’, one 
participant from the other white-collar  group expressed her attitude through one extreme 
metaphoric expression: 
 
[27] It doesn’t mean we don’t care. How to say, it’s like you are getting used to being 




These excerpts claim that users have no or few controls over the development of the Internet 
and platforms. The conclusion is thus that if users do not have the power to influence or 
change the companies anyway, then no action should be taken or even considered because it 
is useless. For example, One programmer from group 2 claims that he tries as much as he can 
to use QQ and WeChat to log in to all possible websites and apps (through API) because 
information on these two social media has been leaked anyway.  
 
This type of pessimistic view about user control and political participation is prevalence. 
Participants find that there is no way they can control how the platforms collect and use their 
information ‘legally’ to display advertising. Although participants find targeted advertising as 
‘annoying’ and sometimes ‘embarrassing’, yet there is no effective direct way for political 
participation and changes. A recent example indicative of this situation is the huge dispute 
caused by Baidu CEO Robin Yanhong Lee, who claimed that Chinese users are willing to 
give up their privacy in exchange for convenience27. This statement caused heated discussion 
online, and a lot of people criticised this arrogant formula, arguing that Baidu dominates the 
market only because there are no other options, other than of course ‘no option’.   
 
Participants also realise the inequality of power relationships involved in practice and chose 
‘passives reactions’. For example, one participant from a white-collar group explains his 
reactions to social media platforms as “passive reactions”. He claims that since Weibo and 
other platform require more and more personal information from users, including location, he 
tries to turn all these functions off, and use them less frequently. He argues that these 
demands have pushed him away from using those platforms. However, he also claims that it 
is “almost impossible” not to use them, because of the social needs of ICT and Internet 
participation, but he pays extra attention not to post anything or as little as possible about 
himself on the platforms (white-collar group 1, 54.17).  
 
This type of argument falls into the category illustrated by Fuchs as being “critically 
conscious of an ideology and they (still, partly) do it” (Fuchs, 2015, p87). It is different from 
the negotiated position described by Hall (1980) because users are seemingly fully aware of 
 
27 See reports of Robin Li’s statement: https://www.abacusnews.com/big-guns/chinese-internet-users-criticize-
baidu-ceo-saying-people-china-are-willing-give-data-privacy/article/2139313 
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ideological coercion and do not like it, but in reality, they accept and submit to the 
ideological behaviour under concrete situations. This type of argument is ideological not 
because users who hold them are unconscious of or uncritical about the neoliberal ideology, 
but because users submit to that discourse or the behaviour it makes possible without 
alternatives other than not to engage at all with the ‘system’. The argument that ‘there is no 
alternative’ (TINA) functions as an ideology because it facilitates ideological behaviour as 
regards the neoliberal development of the Chinese Internet. At the other end of ‘response’ it 
discourages people to actively participate in building alternative non-commercial platforms 
and thus facilitates the arguments of deregulation. 
 
This pessimistic thinking about technology and Internet platforms has led to individualist 
solutions to information collection and data leak problems. For example, participants shared 
their solutions of how to avoid information leaks from an individualist sphere of action: use 
fake information, check whether the website is secured (https instead of http), trust larger 
companies (to avoid fraudulent websites and greater security of information), etc. It is a 
prevalent argument among all groups that people should take their responsibility to try to 
avoid leaks of personal data. This is a highly depoliticised solution as regards data and 
privacy issues.  
 
These individualist solutions reflect the lack of social protection from the government. While 
some participants from focus groups call for government protection (9.2.4), the actual actions 
taken by the Chinese government or judicial system are rare. While the EU has applied the 
General Data Protection Regulation, the Chinese government is still lagging behind. One 
prominent example is the first law case in China about privacy violation by an Internet 
company (2014). One user sued Baidu for using her browsing history and cookies for 
targeted advertising as a violation of her privacy. She won her case in the court at the first 
instance, but a final judgement went against her after Baidu appealed. In the verdict of the 
final judgement, the Nanjing Gulou People's Court pronounced that “The original verdict will 
greatly hinder a normal healthy development of Internet innovative technologies and 
services. The more personalised service for users in the Internet era represents a universal 
need of users. The original verdict will largely shrink the development space for new services 
of the Internet” (Nanjing Gulou People’s Court, 2014). In other words, this verdict claims to 
protect the Internet industry. This verdict is in line with the government’s strategy to develop 
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the Internet-related industries where economic aims are weighted much more than social 
concerns.  
 
The deterministic arguments about technology’s development and the powerlessness of 
participants are ideological for two main reasons. First, they deflect people’s attention from 
Internet companies’ operations of data collection and exploitation. They thus function to 
conceal the reality of the neoliberal tendency of data use and user commodification online. 
Second, these arguments show a deterministic understanding of the relations between human 
beings and technology, as well as relations between human beings. They thus conceal the 
underlying issues of the politics of technology, i.e. social relations behind certain 
developments of technology.  
9.4. Conclusion 
  
To summarise this chapter applying the framework developed in Chapter 4 and 5, table 9.1 
and 9.2 illustrate the ideological discourse used by participants to justify the Internet 
Economy and to legitimate China’s censorship and the Internet control.  
 
The purpose of the focus group research is to understand how users legitimate or challenge 
the current social relations and the political economy of the Internet. Critical methodology is 
different from the conventional interpretivist approach in the way it relates back to the social 
structure in understanding empirical data. As pointed out by Habermas “the dependence of 
these ideas and interpretations upon the interests of an object of an objective configuration of 
societal reproduction makes it impossible to remain at the level of subjective meaning-
comprehending hermeneutics; an objective meaning-comprehending theory must also 
account for that moment of reification which the objectifying procedures exclusively have in 
mind” (Habermas, 1976: 139). A person’s understanding of the external world is inevitably 
shaped by her/his living experiences which is shaped by the social structure. A dialectic 
concept of meaning, according to Adorno, relates to “the societal essence which shapes 
appearances, appears in them and conceals itself in them” (Adorno, 1976a: 37). 
 
This chapter has shown the diversity of workers’ responses to the power relations regarding 
the Internet in China. This chapter has chosen the ideologies that respond to the political 
economy of the Internet. From an economic perspective, workers have legitimated the 
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domination of several companies in the market through the language of ‘trust’. They have 
argued that data collection is either inevitable with either a techno-determinist discourse or 
‘TINA’ arguments. Regarding the Internet control, nationalist arguments of ‘us vs them’, 
‘stability’, and ‘unique national condition’ is drawn upon.  
 
In particular, one prominent discourse is worth mentioning: TINA. According to workers, 
they have no public-owned alternatives, no control over the platforms, and moreover, no 
other ways for Internet companies to survive without selling users’ data. This argument, I 
would argue, is the most powerful ideology among workers to legitimate the current power 
relations. It de-politicise the discussions surrounding the political economy of the Internet.  
 
 How participants understand and justify 
the Internet Economy  
Alternative arguments from 
focus groups 
Market  • The Internet provides new 
opportunities, especially to start own 
small businesses 
• We trust in big companies  
• No Internet platforms are trustworthy, 
but if we don’t trust big companies, 
we will lose connection with the 
society (TINA) 
• The opportunities provided 





• Data collection is the way for Internet 
companies to survive 
• There is no privacy online anyway 
(TINA) 
• Critical about data 
collection 
• There are ways to block ads 
(differences between 
groups) 
Consumption  • We are consumers who use the 
Internet companies’ service, and our 
power lies in this consumer identity 
• This consumer power is limited, but 
there are no ways to change it (TINA) 
• [Companies’ name] is 
charging users for the 
documents they share for 
free, this is against the spirit 
of the Internet 
Table 9.1. Public digital discourse on the Internet Economy in China 
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 How participants legitimate China’s 




• There are threats from other countries in 
the cyberspace 
• Online content from other countries 
(especially from the West) could have 
negative influences on Chinese people’s 
worldview 
• Us (China, Chinese companies, Chinese 
people) VS. them (Facebook=America) 
• Hoped the international 
commercial Internet 
companies could confront 
the Chinese government’s 
control (bankrupted) 
State level • Stability is central for the Chinese 
society 
• Asking for authoritative content 
regulation regarding fraud, gambling, 
sexual and rumours online 
• Hope commercial 





• China has a unique national condition 
(Guoqing) so not ready for 
democratisation 
• The Internet failed to 
provide democratisation 
it has promised 
Individual 
level 
• Chinese people’s ‘quality’ (Suzhi) is not 
high enough for free expression online 
• The Internet is not free 
Table 9.2. Public digital discourse on Internet Politics in China 
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China has gone through socio-economic and political transformations in the global 
informational capitalism. Accompanied by these transformations is the rise of new discourse, 
culture, ethos, spirit and ideologies. This thesis provides a preliminary investigation into the 
contemporary discourse that direct the Chinese information society, enabled by network 
technologies, to develop in certain ways.  
 
To address this question, I have to, first of all, make clear two key concepts: what is ideology 
and how to understand contemporary Chinese society. To understand the first concept, I 
focused my attention mainly on a classical Marxist tradition or trajectory, including works 
from Marx, Lukács, Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, Williams and Hall (Chapter 2). This is 
because that their critique of ideology relates closely to the analysis of class relations and 
social structures but increasingly takes into account the complexities of language, 
communication and representation, not to ‘dissolve’ the very idea of ideology but to admit 
and analyse its complex workings in social and cultural formations. Class, social power 
relations and social structures are essential to understand the current informational capitalism 
yet are frequently neglected. The critical meaning of ideology and the emphasis of its relation 
to power domination and social structure, as emphasised by traditional Marxists, were 
important for this thesis. Ideology is thus defined in this thesis as reproducing the current 
system and disguising the contradictions through distorted solutions in mind and partial 
representation of reality. To think and to act ideologically means to conceal real 
contradictions in favour of the dominant class.  
 
I investigated Chinese society through a critical analysis of China’s capitalism. Through a 
discussion of the land issue, enterprise’s ownership, foreign relationship, and the role of the 
Party-state (Amin, 2013; Arrighi, 2007; Harvey, 2003; He and Dong, 2009a; Y Huang, 2008; 
Lin, 2013; Naughton, 2018; Yang and He, 1994), Chapter 3  discussed why China should be 
seen as a capitalist society. It has shown that, on the one hand, all these key areas in China 
economy has been involved in a capitalist mode of production. Socialist heritage, on the 
other, is on the decline.  
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Methodologically, I use CDA to investigate ideologies in China’s digital capitalism (Chapter 
6). CDA address the issues in relation to discourse, critique, power and ideology. According 
to Fairclough, CDA “investigates how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are 
ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the 
opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power 
and hegemony”(Fairclough, 2010: 132). As Wodak and Meyer put it, CDA can be roughly 
defined as “fundamentally interested in analysing hidden, opaque, and visible structures of 
dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” (Wodak and 
Meyer, 2015a: 12). Therefore, CDA suits the purpose of this research. In particular, I apply a 
critical policy analysis to examine government documents, a combination of thematic 
analysis and CDA to investigate CEOs’ discourse. I have used focus groups to collect data 
from workers, and thematic analysis for analysing focus group data.   
 
Based on the theoretical and methodological discussions, I have further refined my 
overarching aim as to register and interpret China’s discourse on network technologies, 
reveal the underlying ideologies, and tie this discourse to the transformation of China’s 
capitalism of which it is a part. In particular, I have focused on three stakeholders in my 
investigation: the government, the BAT, and workers. Therefore, this thesis addressed the 
following research questions and will answer them in the next sections:  
 
• RQ1: What kinds of digital discourse regarding the Internet economy and politics are 
created and promoted? How does the government discursively construct China’s 
developmental path in ICT- and Internet-related documents? (10.2.1) 
• RQ2: What kinds of digital discourse regarding the Internet economy and politics are 
created and promoted?  How do BAT discursively represent themselves and their 
relations with other stakeholders in the CEO’s speeches? (10.2.2) 
• RQ3: What kinds of digital discourse on China’s Internet is constructed among 
workers? (10.2.3) 
• RQ4: How does the ideological digital discourse legitimate the institutional 
arrangements and power relations in the transformation of China’s capitalism? (10.3) 
 
Chapter 4 and 5 have developed an analytical framework for this research. Chapter 4 
reviewed important literature on digital discourse in advanced capitalism. This chapter made 
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a theoretical contribution by connecting the discussions of digital discourse to the political-
economic analysis. Advanced capitalist countries have experienced the transformation from 
Fordism to the so-called Post-Fordism with the development of digital technologies (Harvey, 
1990). Digital discourse is thus largely applied to legitimate these changes of economic and 
socio-political arrangements in the societies (Fisher, 2010; Mosco, 2005). The main discourse 
can be divided into economic and political aspects. The former mainly focuses on a new de-
centralised and de-hierarchised market, flexible production, de-aliened work, and 
participatory culture enabled by the Internet. The latter claims that the Internet and digital 
technologies will automatically bring liberation, democratisation, empowerment and 
emancipation for the society and individuals (Andrejevic, 2013; Dean, 2013; Fenton, 2012; 
Fuchs, 2010, 2011, 2014a; Fuchs and Sandoval, 2013; Hardt and Negri, 2001; Harvey, 1990; 
Huws, 2014; Lazzarato, 1996; Ross, 2009, 2012; Sandoval, 2016; Schiller, 2007; Tiziana, 
2013; Zhao, 2007; Zhao and Schiller, 2001).  
 
To contextualise this research, Chapter 5 provided specific discussions about the Chinese 
situation. It has set a basic tone of the discussions of China in this thesis – that China is an 
emerging state-led capitalist country in the transnational informational capitalist system. 
First, informatisation is key to China’s modernisation (Dai, 2003; Hong, 2008; Mueller and 
Tan, 1997; Wu and Yun, 2015; Zhao, 2007). Second, China’s developmental path has been a 
capitalist one. ICT forms a key pillar for China’s long-standing FDI- and export-led economy 
(Hong, 2017a; Schiller, 2005), and a key area for transformation after 2008 and under the 
current Xi-Li Administration. Third, any understanding of China’s development should be 
embedded in the background of global capitalism. China’s integration into and being as one 
pole of global digital capitalism are the important global context of China’s domestic ICT 
development (Fuchs, 2010; Hong, 2011a; Schiller, 2005; Zhao and Schiller, 2001). Fourth, 
the Internet has arguably brought the most vigorous and contested arena for struggles and 
creative participation (Meng, 2009, 2018; Yang, 2009, 2015). These discussions have helped 
to adapt the framework developed in Chapter 4 to suit the Chinese context. A preliminary 
framework for identifying themes and coding schemes can be found in Table 5.1.  
 
In the next section, I will answer the first three RQs in each of the sub-sections. I will then 
answer the question of how digital discourse informs our understanding of China’s capitalism 
under transformation in section 10.3. Section 10.4 will provide some reflections on studying 
ideology. Focusing on workers group discussions, it will link back to my theoretical 
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discussions about ideology. Finally, Section 10.5 will discuss the contributions, limitations, 
and implications for future research.  
10.2. Digital Discourse and Chinese Capitalism  
  
This thesis has analysed discourse from the government, the BAT regarding the economic 
and political aspects of the transformations enabled by the network technologies under 
China’s capitalism.  
 
In particular, the government has determined to utilise network technologies to solve the 
problems of productivity in traditional industries, to increase domestic consumption with the 
help of the Internet, to integrate into the global informational capitalism deeper, and to 
harness the new technologies under the name of Cyber Sovereignty.  
 
The BAT have constructed a positive representation of themselves as Internet infrastructures, 
a strong image in helping traditional industries and China’s economy, and a contradictory 
identity as being global and Chinse enterprises. The use these arguments to legitimate their 
domination in the market, facilitating their expansion into new areas and in the global market.  
 
This thesis has also conducted focus groups with three types of young workers in Shenzhen. 
It aims to explore how workers legitimate, if they do, the current power relations with the 
highly commercialise and controlled Internet. While workers have diverse opinions and 
arguments, their legitimation of the power relations is not entirely firm nor internalised. 
There are space for workers to negotiate with the current situation regarding the online 
politics though they constantly refer to nationalist ideologies. However, there is one highly 
internalised ideology: TINA that depoliticised workers’ discussions of changes.  
 
10.2.1. Digital discourse from the government  
 
The Xi-Li Administration began in 2013 has largely emphasised the Internet-enabled 
Economic ‘New Normal’ and new socio-political arrangements in the digital age. This 
research has chosen 21 government documents, including official documents addressing ICT- 
and Internet-related industries’ development, top-level strategies, and Xi’s important 
speeches addressing informatisation and cybersecurity (more details for sampling strategies, 
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see Chapter 6). Some other documents from state-owned media are referred to as official 
explanations of the documents. This thesis first conducted a thematic analysis, with the help 
of the framework developed in Chapter 4 and 5, to identify the main themes in these 
documents regarding the development of China’s informatisation. It then applies CDA to 
analyse the key arguments under these themes.  
 
The current Xi-Li central government has set the ultimate goal to ‘build a Cyber Superpower’ 
(Wang Luo Qiang Guo) thus to realise ‘China’s great rejuvenation’. The key value stated is to 
‘serve the people’ that reflects the rhetoric of socialist history. The current fast technology 
revolution is the key circumstance for the government to make the decision – China, it is 
claimed, should join the wave of the digital revolution and not lag behind. Based on 
descriptions of the particular current state of affairs and goals,  the central government has 
proposed actions focusing on the information economy, cybersecurity and global cooperation 
(see Table 7.2). With the help of CDA, Chapter 7 not only described the discursive strategies 
applied in the official discourse but also provided detailed interpretations and explanations of 
the discourse.  
 
The official digital discourse is largely integrated into China’s modernisation. First, the Xi-Li 
Administration has put Internet and ICT development at the core of their claimed economic 
transformation from export-orientated and FDI-led economy to an economic ‘New Normal’. 
This ‘New Normal’ emphasises ‘high-quality’ development at the centre of which is the ICT 
and Internet-enabled new production, domestic consumption and technology development. 
Second, the central government and Xi, in particular, have shown a tougher political image to 
the world. This image is well reflected in the official digital discourse. One salient example is 
the claim of ‘Cyber Sovereignty’. The use and application of this term have delivered a 
strong nationalist message on the central government’s determination on domestic Internet 
control. Third, different from this tough political image, the government has claimed to 
deepen global cooperation. This cooperation covers all aspects from political participation in 
international Internet governance to economic expansion of Chinese investments and 
companies, and to cultural aspects of ‘soft power’.  
 
However, there are gaps between official rhetoric and reality. This is not to say that there is 
only one reality, but “different representations of reality, drawing on different discourse” 
(Fairclough, 2000: 155). In other words, there are under-represented realities in government 
 269 
discourse. For example, there is little mention of changes in relations of production in 
China’s digital capitalism. The discussion of inequality is largely restricted in rural and 
western areas instead of, for example, classes. Public’s participation in the digital world is 
limited to the digital economy or ‘opinion expression’ – not to facilitate democratisation or 
personal empowerment. While promoting Internet-enabled entrepreneurs, there is little 
mention of how to protect the worker’s security and insurance. Therefore, the official digital 
discourse and what it ignores provide a valuable perspective to understand how the 
government wants to shape China’s current development and modernisation.  
 
10.2.2. Digital discourse from the BAT 
 
 
Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent, known as BAT, have successfully transferred from domestic-
focused Internet companies into global conglomerates whose businesses cover almost all 
aspects of Chinese people’s life. This thesis has chosen the most important discourse events 
of BAT (more details of the sampling strategy, please see Chapter 6). Most of the speeches 
are from the CEOs of BAT. I have combined thematic analysis and CDA in analysing these 
materials.  
 
BAT share several similar argument themes regarding their political economy. Chapter 8 
illustrated how they justify their domination in the domestic Internet-focused market, their 
expansion into new industries and the global market through using different discursive 
strategies and through responding to the government’s discourse (see Table 8.4 and 8.5). 
BAT use several discursive strategies to construct positive self-representations, favourable 
relations with other stakeholders such as the government, advertisers and users. First, BAT 
legitimated their dominant position in the market by claiming to build an ‘infrastructure’ to 
‘help small businesses’ in the ‘boundaryless Internet’. BAT define ‘infrastructure’ as 
‘ubiquitous’ and ‘boundaryless’ instead of ‘public’ and ‘neutral’. They also claim to have 
supported businesses (clients) in a ‘de-centralised’ Internet-enabled market. The use of 
several discursive strategies has mitigated ‘the other’ reality of oligopolies. Second, BAT 
claim to support China’s economic upgrade. With nationalist statements, BAT won the 
debate with traditional industries and successfully expanded their businesses into the 
manufacturing, agricultural and service industries, including finance, logistics and AI. Third, 
there are contradictions in BAT’s discourse to construct themselves as global companies and 
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Chinese companies. The contradictory discourse illustrates the main purpose of expanding 
their businesses into new sectors and the world. BAT have intentionally appropriate 
nationalist discourse to legitimate and promote their de facto domination and expansion. 
 
The critical discourse analysis is helpful not only to identify main themes in BAT’s discourse 
but also to identify BAT’s operational strategies and their underlying interests. BAT’s 
neoliberal discourse has represented only part of the reality. Their business expansions are 
constructed in a much more positive way or even distorted ways. BAT has constant 
purchased and oppressed of new technology start-ups and companies in other areas, along 
with their expansion of businesses into all areas of public life. They have reframed these 
business operations as ‘building ecosystems’ and even ‘facilitating small businesses’. Their 
violation of user data and privacy has largely been ignored in the discourse. Moreover, there 
is little mention of their constant manipulation of public discussions. This manipulation 
includes conducting censorship ordered by the government and self-censorship driven by 
economic interests, promoting non-political and entertainment information over public 
political discussions, tolerating the spread of rumours and misinformation for attracting 
‘traffic’, avoiding responsibility as the most powerful communication and media platforms in 
the digital age. All these important discussions about the public’s digital life are absent from 
BAT’s discourse. What stated is only neoliberal and nationalist discourse driven by economic 
and political interests.  
 
 
10.2.3. Digital discourse from the workers 
 
While discourse from the government and companies normally receive more attention, the 
public discourse or ‘street talks’ about China’s digital development made by non-elite, 
subaltern groups can easily be under-represented or/and under-studied. What are the other 
groups’ or classes’ attitudes and beliefs towards China’s developmental path of digital 
capitalism? Do they accept or reject the dominant ideologies, official discourse and 
narratives? How they interpret, legitimate and justify their lived experiences regarding the 
Internet in China’s state-led digital capitalism? Chapter 9 investigated these questions.  
 
This research chose focus groups to collect data. Methodologically speaking, public opinions 
can be studied through surveys with a large number of participants. However, this method 
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could either only get simple answers or cost a huge amount of resources. In China’s 
authoritarian settings, it is harder to ensure the accuracy of survey results regarding political 
issues. Another way to study public opinions is through online data mining with digital 
technologies. However, this method could risk not collecting real thoughts from online 
discussions, regarding the censorship in China and discrepancies of people’s behaviours 
between online and offline. Therefore, this research chose to use focus groups to imitate real 
settings for ‘street talks’.  
 
Furthermore, this research chose to focus on three types of workers in China’s digital 
capitalism. Expressions from certain groups or professionals among the public have attracted 
more attention, such as radical dissents and investigative journalists. While acknowledging 
the importance of these studies, Chapter 9 chose to investigate the discourse from three 
subaltern groups that attracted less attention. These groups are not as powerful as the 
dominant government and CEOs. Nor are they groups with more communicative or symbolic 
power. However, they are representative workers who are at the same time users and digital 
labourers. The first type of groups focuses on manufacturing workers, most of whom are 
migrant workers with lower education level. These manufacturing workers are essential for 
China’s development of digital capitalism, especially during the FDI- and export-oriented 
period. They also represent one of the largest Internet user groups but always under-
represented. With the help of the Internet, they started to make a voice, though it could be 
distorted and misrepresented. The second type focuses on programmers who represent the 
newly emerging knowledge worker. This group of people has special positions in the new era 
of digital capitalism with their most required skills, innovation capability and creativity, 
highly exploited working conditions, and deep understanding and knowledge of the Internet 
and new technologies. The final type consists of white-collar workers, most of whom work in 
the service industry in urban cities. They are not necessarily middle-class, but normally are 
the ‘loudest’ group online, especially in the area of online entertainment, game, and 
consumption. This type of groups excludes the first two types of workers.  
 
These three groups were brought together to form a complex, yet in some aspects strikingly 
similar, understanding of the digital discourse prevalent in Chinese society. Chapter 9 
scrutinised these groups’ discourse through a critical lens. It found out how the dominant 
ideologies are legitimated and, more importantly, challenged. From the perspective of the 
Internet Economy, discussions focused on participants’ experiences of opportunities brought 
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by the Internet, data collected by companies, and their discursive constructions of identities 
as consumers. From the political aspect, participants justified and challenged the current 
states of affairs. One salient ideology in their discourse is ‘There is no Alternative’ (TINA) 
that clearly consists of neoliberal, individualistic and techno-deterministic elements. This 
type of digital discourse oftentimes uses topos of uselessness in their arguments. As discussed 
in Chapter 9, there are three main arguments under this theme – there are (a) no alternative 
public service available in China, (b) no effective methods for political participation to solve 
the current problems regarding Internet platforms, and (c) no alternative ways to fund 
Internet platforms except through advertising. However, there are also criticisms of the 
current situation. As shown in the discussions, users could be critical about the dominant 
ideologies though negatively accepting the reality. The discussions from focus groups 
provide the highly contested nature of hegemony.  
 
10.3. Legitimating the Transformation of Chinese Capitalism  
 
Digital discourse is part of social changes. The digital discourse discussed in this thesis does 
not only reflect but also construct the transformations of China’s Capitalism. In this section, I 
will show how digital discourse legitimates the institutional arrangements and social power 
relations in the transformation of China’s capitalism in the information society. In particular, 
digital discourse legitimates the global expansion of China’s capital and enterprises, 
legitimates the concentration of Internet-related market, and discursively construct consumer 
identities to replace a more political class identities.  
 
10.3.1. Legitimating the global expansion of China’s capital and enterprises  
 
China has been increasingly involved in the global capitalist system. The government and 
BAT’s digital discourse has legitimated and promoted the global expansion of China’s capital 
and enterprises.  
 
The government has explicitly promoted international cooperation under Xi’s phrase of ‘a 
community of shared destiny in the Cyberspace’. The government’s globalisation discourse is 
not just about attracting foreign investments but also a clear strategy to ‘go out’. The 
government promote cooperation in all areas from the global digital economy to soft power 
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(culture), and to the global Internet governance (politics). Moreover, this ‘going out’ strategy 
has been connected to ‘national interests’– nationalist discourse has been appropriated to 
legitimate China’s global expansion. As Xi puts it “wherever there is the national interest, 
there shall be informatisation coverage” (Xi, 2016, 4.19 Speech). As on other occasions, Xi 
has equalised the interests of Chinese companies’ transnational business operations to 
China’s national interests, as discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
Along with the government’s active ‘going out’ strategy is Internet companies’ global 
expansion. BAT has also employed nationalist discourse to back their global expansion. As 
BAT started to expand their businesses to the global market and new technology areas, their 
digital discourse has constantly drawn upon nationalist ideologies. For example, BAT claims 
to help upgrade China’s economic growth and increase domestic consumption in entering 
‘traditional industries’. They also claim to represent China’s technology development and 
national interests in global competition and in the global market. While in other occasions 
they frame themselves as international companies, when they try to enter new industries, for 
example when they need support from the government to conduct AI experiments as 
discussed in Chapter, BAT discursively construct themselves as Chinese companies. Their 
description of Chinese national identity is thus a pragmatic strategy to positively frame their 
dominant position in the domestic market and their status as conglomerates. In other words, 
the underlying logic of BAT is that if they are competing in the global market to represent 
China, they should be supported by the government and the industries.   
 
This tension between nationalist discourse as a ‘defend’ or ‘catch up’ and a nationalist 
discourse for ‘going out’ can be illustrated from worker groups’ discourse. There are three 
main types of nationalist arguments among workers – ‘us vs them’, ‘a unitary nation’, and the 
‘unique national condition’ arguments. Similar to the government and CEO’s digital 
discourse, dominated groups use topos of threat, strategy of collectivisation, pronouns of ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ to construct national identity, the equivalence between China and Chinese 
companies, and the relations between China and other countries. However, the nationalist 
discourse among workers is used to legitimate the government’s domestic control over the 
Internet. It was not used to justify the Chinese capital’s global expansion. It is not clear, 
however, with the promotion of the ‘going out’ nationalist discourse by the dominant groups, 
to what extent the new discourse will be accepted. For example, Wolf Warrior 2 has become 
one of the highest-grossing movies in 2017 that depicts a Chinese soldier who saved the lives 
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of oversea Chinese in an African country. Moreover, workers’ digital discourse has shed light 
on a different framework for globalism. For example, some participants have challenged the 
equivalence between China and Chinese companies in the domestic market. For them, the 
Chinese Internet companies do not equal to China and are not serving for Chinese people’s 
interests.  
 
10.3.2. Legitimating the concentration of the market  
 
China’s Internet market is de facto dominated by oligopolies. Digital discourse is used to 
legitimate the concentration of the market or to downplay the negative sides. There is no 
doubt that BAT are the most active actors in legitimating their domination in the market. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, they have appropriated the features of the Internet to describe 
themselves. For example, they use terms such as ‘boundaryless’, ‘connector’, ‘ecosystem’ 
and ‘infrastructure’ to represent themselves. They also try to downplay the negative sides of 
their domination by claiming that they are creating new jobs in niche markets.  
 
The government legitimate the domination of Internet-related market in a more implicit way. 
As shown in Chapter 7, the government supports ‘key enterprises’ (Long Tou Qi Ye ‘龙头企
业’) because they are seen as representing China’s technological development, facilitating 
China’s economic transformation, Chinese capital’s global expansion, and China’s soft 
power. The nationalist discourse of ‘us’ plays a key role. For example, the government claims 
to support ‘key enterprises’  to “play a leading and driving role” to “establish research and 
development bodies and expand market abroad, effectively use global resources, and enhance 
their internationalised development levels” (2016 NIDS). Similarly, in the 13th Five-Year 
Plan for National Informatisation, the government plans to cultivate innovative enterprises 
for developing core technologies that could compete globally and become the top 500. 
 
Workers, however, legitimate the concentration of the market with the discourse of ‘trust’. As 
shown in Chapter 9, participants express that they willingly give up their privacy to big 
companies as an exchange for convenience and security. This is because, according to 
participants, big companies have better technologies to protect their personal data, as 
compared to other small companies. Moreover, there is one salient ideological discourse 
among workers: TINA (see 10.2.3). 
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10.3.3. Constructing a consumer identity to replace class politics 
 
China’s digital discourse also emphasises citizen’s identity as consumers and downplays the 
class politics. The government rarely mentions what kind of work and workplace digital age 
provides. Discourse on equality is restricted to, for example, rural and urban area differences, 
instead of class inequality. Considering CCP’s claims as being representatives of workers and 
farmers, the lack of enough discussions of work in the digital age is unacceptable. There are 
even fewer mentions of exploitation and relations of production in the official documents. 
While the phrase ‘relations of production’ did appear in the 2014 Government Work Report 
(GWR), the first GWR under Xi-Li Administration, it was never shown in any official 
documents after. Discussions of inequality are restricted to poverty in rural and western areas 
in the government discourse. Eliminating poverty is expected to be done through the 
development of forces of production, instead of changes in relations of production. 
 
At the same time, CEOs also chose to neglect this aspect in their discourse, which consists of 
the main differences between China’s digital discourse and the digital discourse in advanced 
capitalist societies. Discussions of jobs within BAT, as shown in Chapter 8, are still limited 
in salaries and bonus, instead of working conditions. There are little discussions of alienated 
work, the workplace arrangement, relations of production among BAT. Similar to the 
government, there are discussions about poverty in China in BAT’s discourse. Their proposal 
to eliminate poverty is through providing Internet services and e-commerce to rural areas and 
low-income families. This e-commerce service has opened a large market of rural areas to 
these Internet companies. In fact, some participants who used to join the ‘digital economy’, 
such as opening online stores on Taobao or Weishang, expressed that ‘it is hard to really 
make money’.  
 
While class identities are rarely mentioned, consumer identities are actively constructed in 
digital discourse. Both government and companies have promoted the Internet for driving 
domestic consumption. One key element of the government’s economic ‘New Normal’ is to 
promote service industry and consumption as the main factors of China’s economy. The 
government emphasises the importance of ‘information consumption’, with a focus on 
increasing Internet penetration rate and improving Internet speed for ‘releasing the enormous 




BAT welcomed this type of digital discourse. As illustrated in Chapter 8, Jack Ma stated the 
role of the Internet to promote domestic consumption of China’s economic growth since an 
early stage. Moreover, BAT have appropriated the ‘participatory’ discourse to promote 
prosumption and consumption brought by the Internet. For example, Pony Ma claims that 
‘the spirit of the Internet’ is ‘to pursue an extremely good experience of products and 
extremely good feedback from users’ (Pony Ma, 2014 TGPC). Topos of usefulness and 
rewording are always used by BAT to promote Internet-related consumptions.  
 
This consumerism gains hegemony among workers. Through the critical discourse analysis, 
workers discursively construct their identities as consumers, as shown in Chapter 9. This 
identity has overtaken other identities, such as politically involved citizens or netizens. 
However, this is not to say that the Internet is not used as a political struggle space in China. 
It is exactly the contrast between the use of the Internet for online participation and the lack 
of democratisation elements in digital discourse form one feature of China’s digital 
capitalism. While subaltern groups use the Internet for free expression, this is not a key 
element in digital discourse, neither from the government, BAT, nor from the focus groups. 
The government and BAT tend to neglect the discussions of democratisation and 
empowerment, or use nationalist discourse to restrict the discussions to ‘online expression’. 
The government, as Xi claims, can ‘listen to’ the public’s online opinions. The focus groups 
constantly refer to the cyberspace as ‘unfree’ and ‘unequal’ space. In particular, the 
participants claim that ‘there is no alternative’.  
 
To summaries, the digital discourse legitimates and facilitates the power relations in the 
transformation of China’s capitalism. In particular, it serves to legitimate the global 
expansion of China’s capital, the concentration of the market, and to promote a consumer 
identity.   
 
10.4. Reflections on Ideology Study  
 
The study of workers’ digital discourse has provided some insights in understanding the 
features of ideology and the mechanisms of how ideologies work, in particular, in 
contemporary capitalism.  
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Workers create their explanations that are different from the ideological discourse promoted 
by the dominant groups to justify the current power relations. In other words, workers do not 
necessarily respond to the dominant ideologies. Instead, various ideological discourse is 
created to deal with contradictions in social life that cannot be solved in reality. There is a 
discrepancy between the ideologies from dominant groups and subaltern groups. For 
example, as shown in Chapter 9, workers justify the current state of market concentration, 
data collection and the dominant companies in the ways that are different from governments 
and CEOs. It shows the necessity of this research to study ideology and digital discourse 
through focus groups with subaltern groups. 
 
This discrepancy demonstrates an important feature of ideology – the legitimated ruling 
power might not be a successfully internalised one. The ruling class or dominant groups 
simply have material means, distribution power and communication means at their disposal 
to gain or ‘manufacture’ consent. As Eagleton points out, we must distinguish the 
‘normative’ acceptance of dominant ideology and the ‘pragmatic’ acceptance. The former 
means that “a legitimated power is always one successfully internalised by those who are its 
targets” while the latter refers to the condition “in which subaltern groups endorse the right of 
their rulers to govern because they can see no realistic alternative” (Eagleton, 2007: 56). 
 
It is within this gap we see a possible rejection of the more monolithic, pessimistic 
conceptions of ideology. As illustrated by Williams’s ‘structure of feeling’ (Williams, 1977: 
125), there are ‘emergent’ forms of consciousness created from social experiences in specific 
social relationships and perceptions. These social experiences are active yet not fully 
articulated. These social experiences can be ignored or repressed by the dominant groups, and 
there is a potential risk of them being integrated into the dominant ideologies. However, there 
is “a potential conflict between ‘practical’ and ‘official’ forms of consciousness, and the 
possibility of variable relations between them: compromise, adjustment, incorporation, 
outright opposition” (Eagleton, 2007: 49). This phenomenon can be identified from my focus 
groups. Workers’ experiences show some socially inter-connected struggles that attempt to 
break through the current dominant digital discourse, yet have not fully articulated or 
formulated into systematic ideas or beliefs. 
 
 278 
Moreover, there are differences between groups, depending on their social reality and lived 
experiences. These lived experiences confirm what Gramsci discussed about ‘practical 
consciousness’ that is different from official consciousness and which arises from their ‘life 
situations’. This ‘practical consciousness’ provide alternative interpretations of official 
political ideologies and thus space for struggles. The differences between groups also 
illustrated the class situation in contemporary China. From an orthodox Marxist perspective 
perceive all these worker groups belong to an exploited class in their relations of production 
as they are selling their labour to make a life. From a Weberian approach, however, they 
belong to different categories in the taxonomy of social stratification.  
 
Finally, despite the importance to recognise the chaotic feature of common sense ideologies, I 
would stress the structured ideology arising from capitalist economic structure. The statement 
TINA from worker groups reflects the existence of a more fundamental ideology that 
emerges from the very economic contradictions in the capitalist system. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, Marx, Lukács and Adorno’s theorisation of ideology is on the basis of a critique of 
the alienation, commodity fetishism, reification, and abstract homogeneity. As Rehmann 
points out, the ideology critique made by Marx is based on the “fatalistic arrangement as the 
naturalisation of social relations based on the fetishism of commodities: movements of 
‘things’ as ‘natural forms of social life’” (Rehmann, 2014: 93). This first type of TINA shows 
a modern example of the naturalisation feature of ideology through commodity fetishism. The 
commodification of user data, the overtaking of use-value by the exchange value of data, and 
the replacement of communicative actions by for-profits economic behaviours on the Internet 
have been taken as the only fate for the society and for arranging social relations. This 
fatalism in groups is the ‘axiom’ in the public discourse, leading to a pessimistic attitude 
towards changes in social relations in informational capitalism (Fuchs and Sandoval, 2013) or 
communicative capitalism (Dean, 2004).  
 
As illustrated in Chapter 2, the understanding of ideology should be multi-layered. There are 
also tensions between different definitions of ideology. On the one hand, ideologies, in terms 
of common sense, should be understood as chaotic, disjointed and dynamic that raises from 
political interests and lived experiences. As shown in my research, focus group participants 
show a variety of interpretations and challenges of the ideologies promoted by the dominant 
class. On the other hand, there is one particular ideology derived from the very fundamental 
contradiction in capitalist society: alienation. Workers have experienced in the class society 
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alienated from their labour process, from the products of their labour,  from other workers 
and from the human nature. The group discussion of TINA has illustrated how workers 
believe that they would not be able to control one of the very fundamental communicative 
tool created by modern capitalism: the Internet and the platforms. This fundamental ideology 
has surpassed all other types of ideologies, common sense and ‘practical consciousness’ that 
dominate workers’ mind.  
 
Therefore, I would argue against a dichotomy between ideology as being derived from 
capitalist structure and ideologies raising from lived experiences. As Gramsci points out “the 
name ideology is given both to the necessary superstructure of a particular structure and to 
the arbitrary elucubrations of particular individuals” (Gramsci, 1971: 376). One thus needs to 
distinguish between “historically organic ideologies, those, that is, which are necessary to a 
given structure, and ideologies that are arbitrary, rationalistic, or ‘willed’”. He further 
confirms that both could direct human behaviours as “to the extent that ideologies are 
historically necessary they have a validity which is ‘psychological’; they ‘organise’ human 
masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, 
struggles, etc. To the extent that they are arbitrary they only create individual ‘movements, 
polemics and so on’”. (ibid.: 377). Accordingly, Figure 2.1 from Chapter 2could be adjusted 




Figure 10.20. The Double-Layered and Multi-Dimensional Model of Ideologies under 
Capitalism.  
 
10.5. Contribution, Limitations and Implications for Future 
Research  
 
Finally, I will show some reflexivity in this section. In the end, I summarise the implications 
of this thesis for future research studying digital discourse and ideologies in the Chinese 
context and worldwide. 
 
This thesis makes contributions in three aspects. First of all, understanding ICT and the 
Internet development in China requires researchers to engage with the individual and 
collective meanings that different actors give to the technologies and the political-economic 
settings surrounding them. This research has shown how different groups or classes use 
discursive strategies in China in the process of shaping the relationship between technology 
and society. It aims to draw attention to digital discourse as a contested field full of 
competing intentions. Secondly, this thesis connected culture studies to the political-
economic analysis of ICT and the Internet – political economy has informed and 
complemented the analysis framework of discourse. On the one hand, ICT has become 
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deeply involved in China’s socio-economic development and politics. On the other hand, the 
digital discourse has normalised the dominant set of political and economic arrangements. 
Finally, this research showed the usefulness of CDA not only to understand the discursive 
construction from dominant groups (e.g. government and companies) but also to interpret 
ideologies in the public discourse. One key concept here is ‘intersectionality’. In my worker 
groups, when participants explained or legitimated dominant ideologies, they frequently 
referred to government discourse and occasionally companies. Furthermore, how subaltern 
group members understand their identities (e.g. as consumers) confirms to the dominant 
ideological construction of power relations. This is, however, not to say that there are no 
alternative explanations, but to emphasise that the discursive sources can restrict the subaltern 
groups’ interpretations.  
 
Yet, this research has several limitations. First of all, while this thesis tried to present an 
overall picture of the dynamics of production and interpretation of digital discourse through 
investigating both the dominant and subaltern groups, it is beyond the limits of one thesis to 
discuss all aspects. I thus restricted the scope of my investigation in several aspects. In terms 
of actors, I had to focus on two types of dominant stakeholders, the government and BAT, 
and three types of subaltern groups, the programmers, the manufacturing workers, and the 
white-collar workers. In terms of the period under investigation, this thesis focused on 
contemporary digital discourse. More specifically, the study of government discourse focused 
on the current Xi-Li Administration since 2013. BAT’s discourse started from when they 
established their dominant status in the market and started to expand businesses with ‘open-’ 
discourse around 2008 (each company could be slightly different). Focus groups were 
conducted in 2016 and 2017. 
 
Focus groups in this thesis are under several constraints.  I did 5 focus groups from June to 
August 2016 and 1 in June 2017. Besides focus groups, I also did 6 individual interviews as 
pilot research before the focus groups. These interviews helped me to fulfil the questionnaires 
for conducting focus groups. The relatively small number of interviewees, biased sample and 
time restrictions of focus groups set limitations to this research. My first intention was to see 
how subaltern groups understand and interpret the dominant power relations, focusing on 
their experiences such as data collection, online advertisings and censorship. In other words, I 
wanted to understand why or why not these groups choose to comply with these 
arrangements under the highly commercialised and state-controlled digital capitalism in 
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China. During this research, I realised the heterogeneity of ‘common sense’. Workers could 
refer to all types of ‘cultural’ resources to legitimate the current power relations and social 
relations. My analysis thus can only focus on (a) their discourse that ‘talk back’ to the 
dominant digital discourse and omit other diverse discourse among workers, (b) the reasoning 
logics instead of all reasons behind the ideological discourse, and (c) their behaviours, 
according to themselves, that challenge the dominant socio-political arrangements. These 
focuses mean that one practical recommendation can be made out of my research is how to 
form counter-arguments against the dominant ideologies, on the basis of the current existing 
logics in workers’ digital discourse and the workers’ own behaviours and resources.  
 
Given the contributions and limitations of this thesis, I would like to propose some further 
areas to be explored. This research opens the question to investigate contemporary digital 
discourse under Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics. Given the complexity of China’s 
state-led capitalism, the power dynamics in allocating not only physical but also 
communication resources in the Chinese context (Meng, 2018), more work needs to be done.  
 
First of all, in terms of the scope of materials, this study has focused on the analysis of digital 
discourse from the government, BAT, and three types of workers. This is an approach 
different from the traditional approach to analyse media content for ideology investigation. 
Scholars have analysed diverse types of content including content from artists, advertisers 
and professional historians when Smith analysed techno-determinism in American culture 
(MR Smith, 1994); books from intellectuals, as Mosco did when analysing Digital Sublime 
(Mosco, 2005); magazines, as Fisher did for analysing ‘the spirit of networks’ (Fisher, 2010); 
newspapers, as Hong did for investigating China’s information society discourse (Hong, 
2008); or entertainment media content and online ethnography, as Meng did for 
understanding media politics (Meng, 2018). Three types of discourse are particularly 
interesting to be added. The first one comes from theorists and serious writers. How they 
understand China’s digital capitalism is worth studying. It would provide more insights for 
understanding contradictions in Chinese society. The second is from the state-owned media, 
such as People’s Daily and CCTV. They function as a mediation between the dominant 
groups and dominated groups. Third, one can analyse the increasingly commercialised media 
content, including popular books advertisings, films, entertainment TV, online discussions. It 
could provide another way to understand public discourse and sentiments.  
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Secondly, in terms of time span, this thesis has restricted itself in studying contemporary 
digital discourse – the current Xi-Li Administration, BAT as oligopolies and fieldwork in 
2016 and 2017. Though I have reviewed the literature on China’s context to provide a 
historical perspective, this was not the main focus of this study. Theoretically speaking, 
history studies could inform the transformation and context of contemporary issues (Meng, 
2018: 1; Zhao, 2009). Methodologically speaking, a historical perspective is important for 
CDA (Reisigl and Wodak, 2015). Further researches could be done, for example, to study the 
historical changes of (aspects of) China’s digital discourse.  
 
Thirdly, in terms of social actors, this research studied the government, CEOs of BAT, and 
three types of workers together. From a Weberian perspective, there are more groups in the 
taxonomy of social stratification. The study of actors could expand to types of groups in 
contemporary Chinese society on the basis of other categories, such as age, levels of 
education, income, and gender. This is not to argue against a Marxist view of class and the 
importance of this concept in contemporary China. As I have shown in my research, there are 
huge similarities and structured ideology in the worker groups under investigation. Yet 
studying groups with different social status could shed lights on studying ‘member’s 
resources (MR)’, the interpretative procedures (Fairclough, 2015b: 155). It could help to 
understand better how ideologies work in discourse.  
 
In particular, I would like to highlight two types of actors to be studied, according to my 
fieldwork experiences. The first type is those practitioners and start-up entrepreneurs who 
work on the ‘frontline’ of developing technology interferences and applications. They are 
those who are (or are not) implanting the ‘systematic’ technological ideologies into the 
people’s everyday use through applications. How do they understand the problems that need 
to be solved by technologies? How do they perceive the further of the society enabled by 
digital technologies? Taking them as the connecting points between the digital ‘spirits’ and 
practitioners of these ‘spirits’, new studies could further link the study of ideologies to the 
political-economic analysis. I have conducted 10 interviews with entrepreneurs and managers 
in Huawei in 2017. This exploratory study provides me with deeper understandings of 
China’s technological developmental path and digital discourse. Another type of actor I 
would like to emphasise is hackers or more radical programmers. I conducted extra 
interviews with programmers in 2016 and 2017 both in China and the UK that are not 
included in this thesis (to keep consistency in research methods). Programmers, to some 
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extent, have more knowledge and are more aware of the problems in the digital world, such 
as the collection of data, security issues. Taking technology, algorithm and data as tools, they 
are more likely to develop alternative imaginations of organising the Internet and digital 
world in a different way. It would be interesting to see how hacker and radical programmers 
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APPENDIX 1. THE FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Before the Start 
 
Participants will be welcomed and assigned seats. The discussion will be arranged in a U-
shape so everyone can see each other.  
 
Moderators will give out and explain the consent form. Moderators will remind participants 
that this discussion will be recorded for the purpose of research. The recordings will not be 
given to any third party and will be kept confidential. This is especially import for 
participants in China as regards talking about sensitive political issues about the government 
censorship.  
 
Moderators will ask participants to speak in a clear voice for the purpose of further data 
analysis.  
 
Moderators will encourage everyone to speak because they appreciate everyone’s opinions. 
The participants are also very welcome to talk about their own experiences about the topics.  
 
Initial questions or requests for clarifications of the process are invited. 
 
Part 1: Cultural Issues   
 
This aspect will be discussed first because it is relatively easy and relaxing. People could talk 
about their own opinions or experiences more freely.  
 
⚫ Can you think of three words to describe your impression about the Internet Spirit 
and Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)? And why?  
⚫ Can you use three words to describe your experiences of using Baidu, Weibo, 
Renren, Youku, Douban, Zhihu, etc.?  
⚫ Do you use them a lot? Why or why not? 
If participants do not come up with enough words for the discussion, they will be asked to 




[Note: to probe a bit more when they are talking about their own experiences.]  
 
Part 2: Economic Issues and Alternative Platforms 
 
In this part, I am especially interested to record people’s opinions about exploitation 
relating to the Internet and social media. In this part and the next part, in order to facilitate a 
vivid discussion, I will show the participants a video within which two people discuss 
questions with totally different perspectives. I will then ask questions relating to these topics, 
and ask the participants to relate these questions to their own experiences.  
 
Video: two people discussing several issues about the Internet, table A1 shows the scripts for 
the actors:  
 
Issues: Discussant A Discussant B 
Personal data on 
social media 
I’m very relaxed about my online personal 
data. For one thing, I always supply fake 
information. I use a fake name, gender, 
age - everything I upload online is fake! 
Those companies can’t get any 
information about me! Even though they 
can get my personal data, so what? 
 
I’m very concerned about 
my personal information. 
Others might be able to find 
my information online 
easily.  
Advertising  shown 
based on online 
behaviour  
I’m totally happy with it. It saves time for 
me. Those advertisements could show me 
interesting things and normally the things 
I love! If someone is influenced by those 
advertisements and thus buy unnecessary 
stuff, it is his own fault! I wouldn’t do 
that. I can control myself perfectly. I only 
buy stuff I need. So I have no problems 
with a search engine collecting my data.  
Those advertisements are 
disturbing. They induce me 
to buy a lot of unnecessary 
stuff. It is also very 
annoying. It shows that the 
search engine knows my 
online behaviour. They 
know what I want to wear, 
what I like to eat, what 
movies I’d like to watch! 
Exploitation Of course, the Internet companies do not 
exploit me! They provide their service for 
free! I don’t need to pay for their service. 
They are brilliant in how they earn money 
from the advertisers! Moreover, they have 
The platforms are selling 
users to the advertisers. 
They are making money 
from us! If nobody uses 
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Table A.1. Scripts for actors in the video: economic issues. 
 
Part 3: Political Issues 
 
Issues A B 
Identification I’m not worried about my personal 
identification online. Only bad 
persons like terrorists are worried 
about it. I’m not doing anything 
wrong, so I’m not scared of the 
revelation of my identification 
based on my online personal data. 
I’m so worried about my 
online identity. I feel like I 




The Internet absolutely promotes 
the progress of democracy! The 
new media provides a lot of news 
that is not be allowed to be shown 
in traditional media. We are 
empowered by the Internet! 
I don’t think the Internet 
actually changes anything. 
There are a lot of 
clicktivists. These days it’s 
getting even harder to post 
political stuff online.  
Freedom Our Internet is a free place! It 
defends our right of freedom of 
expression. Nothing can change it! I 
don’t think it is a problem that the 
government shuts down some 
Nobody should be forced to 
delete his or her opinions 
posted online, or even get 
arrested! The government 
makes me afraid of saying 
to keep updating their service in order to 
attract my interest! And of course I’m not 
‘working’ for the companies, I’m just 
having fun! I also like to post videos 
online!  
their service, they won’t 
exist anymore.  
Ad-free alternative 
platforms 
I don’t need another ad-free Weibo! Why 
should I? If you don’t have advertisements 
on your platform, where can you get 
money? I don’t want to pay for it. I don’t 
need to pay for Baidu or Weibo anyway. 
Also, I have all my contacts on Facebook. 
It’s too difficult to move all my posts and 
contacts to another platform!  
I’d like to have this kind of 
platform. I would want to 
use it and I’d like to donate 
for it! I hope they could find 
a way to move all of the 
data on Weibo onto this 
new platform. 
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Weibo accounts. The government 
has its own reasons to keep the 
society stable. The Western 
countries also do the same.  
anything that is not 
‘politically correct’ online. I 
feel scared that the 
government can put me in 
prison if I said something 
wrong. So I have to censor 
my own speech online. 
Table A.2. Scripts for actors in the video, political issues.  
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APPENDIX 2. GUIDELINE FOR FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONING 
 
Part 1. Introduction  
 
1.    What platforms do you often use and why? What do you like and dislike about the 
platforms? 
 
Part 2. Economic aspects and advertisements advertising  
 
2.    Do you know how online platforms make money? Are you aware of their Business 
Model?  
3.    What do you think of online advertising? 
4.    Do you share your personal information online? Why or why not? Do you use fake 
identities online? 
5.    Have you ever used non-profit websites? Or websites without advertisements?  
6.    If there was a platform or website with no ads, are you willing to use it and donate to it in 
order to maintain it? 
 
Part 3. Political aspects 
 
7.    Have you ever commented or complained about issues about your life, such as your 
work, living environment, city construction, etc. online?  
8.    Have you ever commented or complained about political issues concerning current 
affairs online?  
9.    Do you use your real name online? Are you worried about being identified [monitored?] 
by the government? Do you conduct self-censorship before you post online? 
10.    What do you think about censorship?  
 
Part 4. Cultural aspects 
 
11.    Please use three words to describe your experiences with the Internet (pros and/or cons) 
12.    What do you think is the spirit of the Internet? Please use three words or phrases to 





1. According to the specific situation and discussion in each group, the moderator may 
change the sequence of these questions.  
2. Some issues under different topics (e.g. privacy as regards the political aspect and personal 
information from an economic perspective) may come under discussion at the same time.  
3. If because of the limitation of time and place, the video cannot be shown to participants 
and the discussion seems homogeneous, the moderator will take on the role of trying to 




APPENDIX 3. FOCUS GROUPS AND INTERVIEW 
PARTICIPANTS  
 
1. programmer M  27 
2. programmer M  29 
3. Worker group 1 M 28 
4. Worker group 1 F 28 
5. Worker group 1 F 27 
6. Worker group 1 M  34 
7. Worker group 1 M  30 
8. Worker group 1 M 24 
9. Worker group 1 M 28 
10. Worker group 1 F  27 
11. programmer M 28 
12. worker group 2 M 34 
13. worker group 2 M  32 
14. worker group 2 M 28 
15. worker group 2 M  25 
16. worker group 2 M  26 
17. worker group 2 F  36 
18. worker group 2 F  26 
19. worker group 2 M  28 
20. White-collar group 1 F  26 
21. White-collar group 1 F  26 
22. White-collar group 1 F   23 
23. White-collar group 1 M  26 
24. White-collar group 2 F  26 
25. White-collar group 1 F 27 
26. White-collar group 1 F 25 
27. White-collar group 1 F 30 
28. White-collar group 1 M 23 
29. White-collar group 1 F 24 
30. Programmer group 1 M 26 
31. Programmer group 1 M 26 
32. Programmer group 1 M 25 
33. Programmer group 1 M 27 
34. Programmer group 1 M 26 
35. Programmer group 1 M 27 
36. Programmer  M 24 
37. Programmer  M 26 
38. Worker  M 23 
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39. Programmer group 2 F 27 
40. Programmer group 2 M 27 
41. Programmer group 2 M 29 
42. Programmer group 2 M 28 







APPENDIX 4. CITATIONS 
 



























































































































量，互联网本身巨大的生态，它是能自己完善的 （马云，2014，互联网大会 2014） 
 





















































































能接受；最后一次缩到 5000人，我还是说不行，只能 200人！超过 200人，所有员工，包括管理层，
包括我在内，统统没有奖金，没有年终奖。最终的结果是什么？所有的指标翻了一番还多，而新招人数















































































生产的经济格局都有好多好多种…好多好多种模式就是生长出来…（programmer group 2, #3, 01.45.12） 
 
lv 也就是说出现赚钱的机会，就是由于互联网的发展，然后就是推动了网络购物，给很多人提供了一些
就业的机会。（manufacturing worker group 2，01.46.14 ） 
 
lvi 所以每个行业都是刚开始出现的时候就像雨后春笋啊什么都有，然后谁谁抓住了这最终的主体群体的









lviii 我首先是看他网站是否有一些最基本的加密… 比如说协议啊，是不是加密的协议啊，是不是 https
的，然后，比如说是那种很大的网站，比如说阿里巴巴这种啊，你人家的技术很牛了，应该在这方面也
做的肯定很 ok 了，就不用去担心这些，但是如果那种小的网站，你甚至连个备案信息都看不到的这种
网站，那就可能要么填假的，要么就不填啊… (程 1，#4，30.37) 
 
lix 我对这个这个东西比较信任，比如 QQ 微信啊，我就知道他是一个比较大的公司，腾讯这个公司，他
不太可能欺骗你，我觉得可能比较信任一点，但是像那些不知名的话，我没见过的那种，我绝对不会输





(programmer group 2，45.20) 
 
lxi …虽然我们一直在强调用户隐私，但是实际上在互联网上，每一个用户都是裸奔的，就是可以通过技
















诉你，其实他们是拿到了你自己的隐私的 （programmer group 1，19：07， #6） 
 










损失很大一部分的用户，而对于这种公司来说，如果他没有用户，那他就没有未来… (programmer group 
















行动。我觉得从国家层面的话，他完全就是不太想让他进来。[Programmer group 2, #1, 01：24：02] 
lxviii …如果有一些个人比较极端一点，或者说敏感一些词汇，就是如果被其他人浏览到，就是说也可能会
引起别人这种，啊，这种心态或者说这种，想法，所以正常的屏蔽掉，恩，这种“正能量”（微弱的笑




[he means information as a special type of capital in his previous statements]在肆意发挥它的力量，就导致
现在中东战火连连，各个政府都被推翻，所以我觉得这个资本肯定是要被管的 [programmer group 2，
01：10：19] 
 
lxx 就是这个，我觉得跟国情有关嘛，中国，像刚才 2 号说的，民族比较多嘛，国情比较复杂嘛，确实如
果说传出什么谣言，你不封的话，任他传播的话，这是一个很严重的问题，容易导致社会动荡之类的事
情，所以说对于传播谣言这种，我个人觉得，应该封，其他的像你说的那个历史问题，这些东西，这个

































电视啊，然后就是说没广告，他免费的）(manufacturing worker group 1，01.04.07) 
 
lxxvii 我是觉得..那些大公司，大的品牌还是可以信任的，如果他们都信任不了的话，你对于这个互联网社











你就不要用，然后平台永远不会为了你改变的（white-collar  group 1, 52’24’’） 
 
lxxx不是说无所谓，怎么说呢，他就被强奸强奸惯了，后来你也也也无所谓了，你知道吗？就那种感觉消
极接受（white-collar  group 2, #5, 58’50’’） 
